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No. 80-391 I N TI-IE SUPREME COURT O T I E STATE O F ?lONTANA F 1981 I N THE MATTER O THE F ADOPTION O F S . L. R . , a minor c h i l d . Appeal f r o m : D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f R a v a l l i , The FIonorable J o h n S. Henson, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: S m i t h , Connor & Van V a l k e n b u r g , M i s s o u l a , Montana For Respondent : T e r r y S e h e s t e d t , M i s s o u l a , Nontana Submitted on B r i e f s : Decided : Filed: JAN 2 8 1982 !day 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 JAB 2 8 rubL Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a n o r d e r i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , R a v a l l i County, denying a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f S L R , a minor c h i l d . A p p e l l a n t , t h e c h i l d ' s s t e p f a t h e r , r a i s e s two i s s u e s on He a r g u e s f i r s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n appeal. f i n d i n g t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , by p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l s m a l l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g , and by p a y i n g d e b t s u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c h i l d , had " c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t " of t h e c h i l d . The s t e p f a t h e r ' s second argument i s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in f i n d i n g t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r was " u n a b l e " t o p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l support f o r t h e child. S L R w a s b o r n o n J u n e 7 , 1976. The f a t h e r and mother of SLR w e r e d i v o r c e d on March 31, 1978, and c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d was awarded t o t h e mother. The d e c r e e a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r have r e a s o n a b l e r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n and t h a t he pay t h e sum o f $100 p e r month f o r t h e s u p p o r t , c a r e and maintenance o f t h e c h i l d . The s u p p o r t payments were t o s t a r t on A p r i l 5 , 1978. The mother m a r r i e d t h e a p p e l l a n t on November 2 , 1979. S i n c e t h i s m a r r i a g e , t h e c h i l d h a s r e s i d e d w i t h t h e mother and s t e p f a t h e r a t t h e i r home i n S t e v e n s v i l l e , Montana. The f a t h e r h a s f a i l e d t o make any c h i l d s u p p o r t payments s i n c e F e b r u a r y 9 , 1979, a l t h o u g h h e d o e s c l a i m t o have g i v e n t h e c h i l d "a couple of blouses clothing. . . ." and During t h i s t i m e , o t h e r s m a l l i t e m s of t h e f a t h e r h a s o n l y been s p o r a d i c a l l y employed, h a s e a r n e d o n l y a v e r y m a r g i n a l income, h a s r e m a r r i e d , and h a s v o l u n t a r i l y i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i o n a l d e b t s . On F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1980, t h e s t e p f a t h e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e c h i l d i n R a v a l l i County D i s t r i c t Court. The mother c o n s e n t e d t o t h i s p e t i t i o n , and t h e Montana Department o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s waived t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 40-8-122, MCA. The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e f a t h e r was n o t n e c e s s a r y due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had w i l l f u l l y abandoned t h e c h i l d and had n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o h e r s u p p o r t w h i l e a b l e t o do s o f o r one y e a r p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . MCA See s e c t i o n 40-8-111(a) (iii)and ( v ) , . During t h e h e a r i n g , t h e f a t h e r s t a t e d t h a t h e had p r o v i d e d f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f h i s new w i f e ' s c h i l d from a previous marriage f o r a limited t i m e . The f a t h e r f u r t h e r a d m i t t e d t h a t he had p a i d t h e e n t r a n c e f e e f o r t h e b u l l r i d i n g c o m p e t i t i o n i n s e v e r a l r o d e o s d u r i n g t h e summer of 1979. These f e e s may have amounted t o a s much as $100. The r e c o r d a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of t h e f a t h e r ' s p r e s e n t i n d e b t e d n e s s was i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f h i s f i r s t marriage. The t r i a l c o u r t , a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g , d e n i e d t h e p e t i t i o n . I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t found: t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r " c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of (1) t h a t [SLR] by p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g f o r t h e c h i l d and by assuming r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and making payments o n d e b t s i n c u r r e d by t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s d u r i n g t h e i r m a r r i a g e " ; and ( 2 ) t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s i n d e b t e d n e s s , new f a m i l y , and h i s f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n s t e a d y employment have r e n d e r e d him u n a b l e ( w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f s e c t i o n 40-8-111 ( a ) ( v ) , MCA) t o p r o v i d e " a d d i t i o n a l " s u p p o r t f o r SLR. S e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, This appeal followed. i s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h e s e i s s u e s . I t s e t s f o r t h a g e n e r a l r u l e and e x c e p t i o n s . rule is that The g e n e r a l consider a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption t h e c o u r t must f i r s t d e t e r m i n e t h a t b o t h n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ( i f l i v i n g ) consent t o t h e adoption. s e c t i o n 40-8-111, p a r e n t a l consent. MCA, But t h e e x c e p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n a r e a l s o i m p o r t a n t on t h e q u e s t i o n of One such e x c e p t i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e c o n s e n t of a n a t u r a l parent i s not required: ". . . i f it i s p r o v e n t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , has not contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n . " S e c t i o n 40-8-111(1) ( a ) ( v ) , MCA. From t h e e x p r e s s wording of t h i s s t a t u t e , a s w e l l a s t h e c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t s e c t i o n 40-81 1(1.) ( a ) ( v ) , MCA, s e t s f o r t h a two-part 1 test: F i r s t , the c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e whether t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g p a r e n t h a s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d . Second, t h e c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e whether t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g p a r e n t had t h e a b i l i t y t o contribute t o t h e c h i l d ' s support. s t r i c t compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, Because is required b e f o r e t h e c o u r t c a n c o n s i d e r t h e a d o p t i o n on i t s m e r i t s , t h e p e t i t i o n e r must be a b l e t o show t h a t t h e t e r m s o f t h e s t a t u t e have b e e n met. I n R e Adoption of B i e r y ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. ' The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e f a t h e r cont r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of SLR i s based upon two f a c t o r s : (1) t h e f a c t t h e f a t h e r had, d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r , g i v e n t h e c h i l d " a c o u p l e o f b l o u s e s and a few t h i n g s l i k e t h i s , " and ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had made payments toward c e r t a h d e b t s , some of which w e r e i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e divorce. The n a t u r a l f a t h e r c o n t e n d s , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d , t h a t t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g f a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d by p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l s m a l l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g . W e do n o t a g r e e . I n Matter of Adoption of Smigaj ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 537, 560 P.2d 1 4 1 , t h i s C o u r t , c o n s t r u i n g " s u p p o r t " a s used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111(1) ( a ) ( v ) , s t a t e d : ". . . we have no d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e ' f i n a n c i a l support t h a t a parent - - - a child."' owes (Emphasis added.) 560 P.2d a t 143. t h e f a t h e r was under a d u t y , p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n Here, d e c r e e , t o p r o v i d e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments of $100 p e r month. I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay any c h i l d support f o r over a year before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption w a s filed. The " p l a i n meaning" a p p r o a c h of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a t h e r contribute financial support t o the child. The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t c a n n o t be c u r e d by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g . S i m i l a r l y , t h e noncustodial parent cannot s a t i s f y h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g o r p a y i n g d e b t s which a r e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c h i l d . The e x p r e s s t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r t o " s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n t - - a owes child." Smigaj, s u p r a . H e r e , t h e d e b t s p a i d by t h e f a t h e r w e r e n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d , and much o f t h e d e b t had been i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f h i s f i r s t marriage. The r e c o r d c l e a r l y shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r made no f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d f o r over a year. T h i s r e q u i r e s u s t o v a c a t e t h e f i n d i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e g i f t of c l o t h i n g and payment of d e b t s by t h e f a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d " s u p p o r t " a s t h a t t e r m i s used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e f a t h e r had no v a l i d r e a s o n f o r f a i l i n g t o make even one c h i l d s u p p o r t payment d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e year preceding t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . H e suffered no p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l impairment d u r i n g t h a t t i m e , and h e was p o s s e s s e d of s k i l l s t h a t would have made him employable ( c a r p e n t r y , l a b o r e r , o p e r a t i n g heavy e q u i p m e n t ) . The f a t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y chose a l i f e s t y l e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p a r e n t a l support obligations. T h a t he had a r i g h t t o c h o s e such a lifestyle is conceded. That he had a legal right to prevent the adoption of his child, however, is not consistent with his voluntary failure to contribute to the child's support. In the words of the California court: "A statute should not be interpreted in favor of a father who seeks the benefit of parental rights but shuns the burden of parental obligations." In Re Burton's Adoption (1956), 147 Cal.App.2d 125, 305 P.2d 185, 191. It was the burden of the stepfather to show that the father was able to but failed to provide support for the child during the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In Re Adoption of Challeen (1976), 172 Mont. 362, 563 P.2d 1120. In Challeen, the Court found that the petitioner had failed to meet this burden. In that case, the natural father had one of his eyes surgically removed, had been confined in the state prison, and had attended college during the time that he was alleged to have been "able" to contribute to the support of the child. Similarly, in the recent case of In Re Adoption of T.G.K. & J.P.K. (1981), - Mont. - 630 P.2d 740, 38 St.Rep. , 1030, it was shown that the father had been incarcerated in the state prison and therefore was thus not able to contribute to the child's support. no such excuse. In the present case, the father had Indeed, his own testimony reveals that, during the entire period, he was fully capable of obtaining fulltime employment but refused to do so. His voluntary assumption of the debts of his new wife and his support of her child for a limited period belie his claim of inability to support his own child. The record here shows that petitioner has met his burden of proof as to the father's "ability." The findings of the District Court as to the issues of the father's contribution to the support of the child and his a b i l i t y t o s o c o n t r i b u t e are v a c a t e d . The c a s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s on t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption. ,N4 Justice W e Concur: Chief ~ u s t i c e /us tices d Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g : I dissent. R e g a r d l e s s o f what name i s g i v e n t o t h e s t a t u t e i n v o l v e d ( s e c t i o n 40-8-111 (1) MCA) , , t h e undeniable f a c t i s t h a t w e are i n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e which h a s an irrevocable sanction: h i s parental rights. a n a t u r a l p a r e n t can f o r e v e r l o s e Because, however, t h e s t a t u t e i s , i n e s s e n c e , a p e n a l s t a t u t e , i t must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and i n f a v o r o f t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r . That i s t r u e of a l l c i v i l s t a t u t e s penal i n nature. Missoula High School L e g a l Defense Assoc. v. S u p t . o f P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n (Deckniber 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 ) , St.Rep. - Moot. -1 - P.2d r 38 2164; and S t a t e v. S t a t e Highway P a t r o l ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 133 Mont. 162, 321 P.2d 612. Few c i v i l s t a t u t e s impose a more s e v e r e s a n c t i o n than one f o r e v e r terminating p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . The l a n g u a g e " h a s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d o f one y e a r b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n , " i s ambiguous, and t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y why t h i s C o u r t h a s been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e p h r a s e "has n o t contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d . . ." The l e g i s l a t u r e c h o s e n o t t o s p e c i f y o r d e i g n what i t c o n s i d e r s t o be a " c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d . . ." Because w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a p e n a l s t a t u t e , t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d n o t p r o v i d e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by a d e f i n i t i o n f a v o r i n g t h e termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . Rather, t h i s Court s h o u l d s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e t h i s s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t any k i n d o f s u p p o r t o f t h e c h i l d w i t h i n t h e one y e a r p e r i o d w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y p r e v e n t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether i t would b e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d t o be adopted. The c a s e o f I n R e Adoption o f Smigaj ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 537, 560 P. 2d 1 4 1 , d i d c o n s t r u e s e c t i o n 40-8-111 (1)( a ) ( v ) , MCA, t o mean " f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n t owes a c h i l d . " But t h e C o u r t f a i l e d t o acknowledge t h a t i t was i n t e r p r e t i n g a p e n a l s t a t u t e t h a t must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e penalty--the p e n a l t y of f o r e v e r l o s i n g o n e ' s c h i l d . f o r e , Smigaj w a s i n c o r r e c t l y d e c i d e d . There- H e r e t h e majority has i g n o r e d t h e f a c t t h a t s e c t i o n 40-8-111(1), i s , i n essence, a p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a p p l i e d t o a p e r s o n who h a s r e f u s e d t o c o n s e n t t o t h e a d o p t i o n of h i s c h i l d . I f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has n o t e x p l i c i t l y set f o r t h t h e b a s i s on which t h e p e n a l t y i s t o b e i n v o k e d , t h i s C o u r t should f i l l i n t h e blanks f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Our d u t y i s t o s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t e a g a i n s t i n v o c a t i o n of t h e penalty. To do t h a t w e must l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e t h e terms " c o n t r i b u t e d " and " s u p p o r t " i n f a v o r o f t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t .

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