PIERCE v PIERCE

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No. 81-445 IN THE SUPREME3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ELIZABETH SCOTT PIERCE, Petitioner and Respondent, vs . BRUCE CARROLL PIERCE Appeal from: Respondent and Appellant. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: January 12, 1982 Decided : FEE 1 f tgq J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. Mr. On September 7 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f F r a n k l i n County, Kentucky, d e c r e e d t h a t t h e m a r r i a g e o f B r u c e C a r r o l l Pierce and E l i z a b e t h S c o t t Pierce b e d i s s o l v e d and t h a t Elizabeth P i e r c e be given custody of t h e p a r t i e s 1 s i x year o l d s o n , Jeremy. T h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s from a d e c i s i o n by t h e M i s s o u l a County D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t u n d e r f e d e r a l and s t a t e law i t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h a t c h i l d c u s t o d y determination. Bruce and E l i z a b e t h Pierce w e r e m a r r i e d on March 21, 1 9 7 2 , i n F r a n k l i n County, Kentucky. On J u l y 23, 1 9 7 9 , t h e y e n t e r e d i n t o a s e p a r a t i o n and p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t whereby E l i z a b e t h was g i v e n c u s t o d y o f J e r e m y , and B r u c e was given l i b e r a l v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . T h a t a g r e e m e n t was s u b s e - q u e n t l y a p p r o v e d and a d o p t e d by t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t i n i t s September 7 , 1979, d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e . I n August, 1979, w i t h E l i z a b e t h ' s c o n s e n t , Bruce brought Jeremy t o Montana. A s of t h e d a t e of t h i s appeal t h e p a r t i e s d i s a g r e e d a s t o t h e n a t u r e and d u r a t i o n o f J e r e m y ' s v i s i t t o Montana. I n t h e p l e a d i n g s Bruce a l l e g e d t h a t E l i z a b e t h a g r e e d t o l e t Jeremy v i s i t f o r a n i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d , and E l i z a b e t h a l l e g e d t h a t b e f o r e Jeremy l e f t , t h e y had a g r e e d t o a s p e c i f i c d a t e on which Jeremy was t o b e r e t u r n e d b u t t h a t Bruce f a i l e d t o a b i d e by t h e i r a g r e e m e n t . One y e a r l a t e r , o n August 11, 1980, B r u c e f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of c h i l d custody i n t h e Missoula County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . B r u c e a l l e g e d t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n s (1)( a ) , (1)( b ) and (1)( d ) o f s e c t i o n 40-4-211, MCA. I n an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d i n s u p p o r t of h i s p e t i t i o n , Bruce s t a t e d t h a t h e had r e s i d e d i n M i s s o u l a , Montana, s i n c e August, 1979; t h a t Jeremy had been l i v i n g w i t h him f o r t h e p a s t y e a r w i t h E l i z a b e t h ' s c o n s e n t ; and t h a t Jeremy was a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l i n M i s s o u l a County. I n a n i n i t i a l r e s p o n s e and c o u n t e r p e t i t i o n E l i z a b e t h a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o u r t must d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n p e t i t i o n b e c a u s e Bruce had i m p r o p e r l y r e t a i n e d Jeremy i n Montana a f t e r s h e r e q u e s t e d t h a t h e b e returned t o her custody. I n a n amended r e s p o n s e and c o u n t e r - p e t i t i o n E l i z a b e t h f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t Kentucky had c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e c h i l d custody determination, a s w a s e v i d e n c e d by a n O c t o b e r 8 , 1980, o r d e r from t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t f i n d i n g Bruce i n c o n t e m p t of c o u r t f o r f a i l i n g t o r e t u r n Jeremy t o E l i z a b e t h ' s c u s t o d y , and t h a t , b e c a u s e Kentucky d e s i r e d t o e x e r c i s e i t s c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e Montana c o u r t c o u l d n o t e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 28 USC §1738A, t h e " F u l l F a i t h and C r e d i t Given t o C h i l d Custody D e t e r m i n a t i o n s " p r o v i s i o n o f t h e P a r e n t a l Kidnapping P r e v e n t i o n A c t o f 1980. 1 A t E l i z a b e t h ' s r e q u e s t a n o r d e r was i s s u e d on March 1 0 , 1981, d i r e c t i n g t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o communicate d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e judge o f t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t of Kentucky i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t d e s i r e d t o c o n t i n u e a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e custody determination. On ~ p r i l , 1981, t h e D i s t r i c t 8 C o u r t r e c e i v e d a t e l e p h o n i c message from J u d g e S q u i r e N . W i l l i a m s of t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t of F r a n k f o r t , Kentucky, i n f o r m i n g t h e c o u r t t h a t Judge Williams agreed t h a t s i n c e t h e c h i l d r e s i d e d i n Montana t h e c u s t o d y m a t t e r s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d i n Montana. On A p r i l 1 3 , 1981, F r a n k l i n c i r c u i t C o u r t Domestic R e l a t i o n s Commissioner, R o b e r t A. Bowman, l e f t a message t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d J u d g e W i l l i a m s ' e a r l i e r message. J u d g e Henson of t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n a s k e d M r . Bowman t o r e d u c e h i s o p i n i o n t o w r i t i n g , and i n a l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d t o J u d g e Henson d a t e d A p r i l 27, 1981, M r . Bowman s t a t e d t h a t it a p p e a r e d t h a t p r o p e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n l i e s i n Kentucky u n d e r t h e Uniform C h i l d Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t . On J u l y 27, 1981, J u d g e Henson h e a r d arguments from c o u n s e l on t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s s u e . During t h e h e a r i n g n e i t h e r p a r t y p r e s e n t e d any t e s t i m o n y t h r o u g h sworn w i t n e s s e s . E l i z a b e t h ' s c o u n s e l d i d , however, s u b m i t s e v e r a l e x h i b i t s a s e v i d e n c e t h a t Kentucky had c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . Exhibit 3 was a c e r t i f i e d copy of t h e contempt o r d e r i s s u e d by t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t on O c t o b e r 8 , 1980; E x h i b i t 4 was t h e A p r i l 27, 1981, l e t t e r from M r . Bowman t o J u d g e Henson. At t h e c l o s e o f argument J u d g e Henson r u l e d , as a m a t t e r of l a w , t h a t t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e cause. H e a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t h i s r u l i n g was n o t i n t e n d e d t o b e a r e f l e c t i o n on t h e p a r t i e s . On J u l y 31, 1981, J u d g e Henson i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment. Specifically, the court found t h a t : "3. I n r e s p o n s e t o i n q u i r y by t h e C o u r t , c o u n s e l f o r Respondent a d m i t t e d t h a t i n December, 1 9 7 9 , Respondent r e f u s e d P e t i tioner's request t o return the child t o Respondent a l s o r e f u s e d h e r i n Kentucky. s u b s e q u e n t r e q u e s t s from P e t i t i o n e r f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e child. "10. The F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t d e s i r e s t o , and i s i n f a c t , a s s e r t i n g c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p a r t i e s , t h e minor c h i l d , and t h i s c a u s e . " The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t : "2. Kentucky s t a t u t o r y and c a s e law p r o v i des t h e Franklin C i r c u i t Court with continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t i e s , t h e c h i l d and t h i s c a u s e . " 3 . The F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t i s a s s e r t i n g i t s continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t i e s , t h e c h i l d and t h i s c a u s e . "4. S e c t i o n 28 U.S.C. 1738A, t h e P a r e n t a l Kidnapping P r e v e n t i o n A c t o f 1 9 8 0 , d e n i e s t h i s C o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o modify t h e September 7 , 1979, F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t Decree. "6. I t would b e p r o p e r f o r t h i s C o u r t t o d e c l i n e t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h i s c a u s e u n d e r t h e terms of t h e Montana Uniform C h i l d Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t . " I n a n August 27, 1981, o r d e r d e n y i n g Bruce P i e r c e ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e i t e r a t e d t h a t 28 USC §1738A, and s e c t i o n s 40-7-109 and 40-7-114, MCA, w e r e t h e b a s e s upon which h e c o n c l u d e d t h a t no j u r i s d i c t i o n e x i s t e d and t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n must b e d e c l i n e d . The a p p e l l a n t , Bruce Pierce, r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l : (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n on t h e ground t h a t Kentucky h a d , and d e s i r e d t o a s s e r t , c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r 28 USC §1738A? (2) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l i n i n g t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r modific a t i o n o f t h e Kentucky c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h e ground t h a t a p p e l l a n t had v i o l a t e d t h e t e r m s o f t h e Kentucky d e c r e e ? F u l l F a i t h and C r e d i t L i m i t a t i o n s on Montana J u r i s d i c t i o n P r i o r t o e n a c t m e n t o f 28 USC §1738A, i n Montana, Kentucky and f o r t y - t w o o t h e r s t a t e s , t h e Uniform C h i l d Custody J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t ( U C C J A ) p r o t e c t e d one s t a t e ' s c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n from m o d i f i c a t i o n by c o u r t s o f a n o t h e r s t a t e . See, e.g., sections 40-7-101, et. seq., MCA; Ky. Rev. Stat. 85403.400, et. seq. In Wenz v. Schwarz (1979), Mont. - , 548 P.2d 1086, 36 St.Rep. 1360, this Court outlined - the two-part process required to determine whether Montana has jurisdiction to modify another state's decree under the UCCJA. That process required first, a determination that Montana had jurisdiction under section 40-7-104, MCA, which by reference incorporated the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 40-4-211, MCA, and second, a determination that the decree state no longer had jurisdiction or had declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Section 8 of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 elevated the UCCJA jurisdictional standards to a federal level. Custody determinations made in accordance with those standards must now be given full faith and credit. The same two-step decision-making process used under the UCCJA must be followed in applying 28 USC 51738A(f). The lower court correctly determined, under step 2 of the Wenz analysis, that if Kentucky had continuing jurisdiction, such a finding would foreclose any need for the trier of fact to ascertain whether Montana satisfied one of the four alternate jurisdictional bases under section 40-4-211, MCA. This Court finds no harm in the District Court's inverted approach to the jurisdictional issue; however, error does lie in the fact that the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by evidence. Without benefit of either the affidavits required under section 40-7-110, MCA, or an evidentiary hearing, the District Court made conclusory findings that Kentucky's jurisdiction did in fact continue and that Montana must decline to exercise jurisdiction because appellant improperly retained the child after a visit. A t a minimum, 28 U C § 1 7 3 8 ~ ( f ) e q u i r e s t h e S r t r i e r o f f a c t t o weigh t h e f a c t s v i s a v i s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e law of t h e d e c r e e s t a t e . The law i s v e r y c l e a r : Kentucky's j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n t i n u e s o n l y i f t h e c h i l d o r o n e c o n t e s t a n t s t i l l r e s i d e s i n Kentucky and - one of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a s e s of Ky. Rev. S t a t . §403.420(1) is currently satisfied. 28 U C §1738A(d). S Ky. Rev. S t a t . § 4 0 3 . 4 2 0 ( 1 ) , i d e n t i c a l f o r t h e most p a r t t o s e c t i o n 40-42 1 1 , MCA, p r o v i d e s : "403.420. P r e r e q u i s i t e s t o j u r i s d i c t i o n -Commencement of p r o c e e d i n g . -- (1) A c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e which i s competent t o d e c i d e c h i l d c u s t o d y matters h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a c h i l d c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n by i n i t i a l o r modification decree i f : " ( a ) T h i s s t a t e i s t h e home s t a t e of t h e c h i l d a t t h e t i m e of commencement o f t h e proc e e d i n g , o r had been t h e c h i l d ' s home s t a t e w i t h i n s i x ( 6 ) months b e f o r e commencement o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g and t h e c h i l d i s a b s e n t from t h i s s t a t e b e c a u s e of h i s removal o r r e t e n t i o n by a p e r s o n c l a i m i n g h i s c u s t o d y o r f o r o t h e r r e a s o n s , and a p a r e n t o r p e r s o n a c t i n g a s parent continues t o l i v e i n t h i s s t a t e ; o r "(b) I t i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e t h e c h i l d and h i s p a r e n t s , o r t h e c h i l d and a t l e a s t one (1) c o n t e s t a n t , have a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s s t a t e , and t h e r e i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s s t a t e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence c o n c e r n i n g t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and p e r s o n a l r e l a tionships; o r " ( c ) The c h i l d i s p h y s i c a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h i s s t a t e and t h e c h i l d h a s been abandoned o r it i s n e c e s s a r y i n a n emergency t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d b e c a u s e h e h a s been s u b j e c t e d t o o r threatened with mistreatment o r abuse o r i s otherwise neglected o r dependent; o r " ( d ) I t a p p e a r s t h a t no o t h e r s t a t e would have j u r i s d i c t i o n under p r e r e q u i s i t e s subs t a n t i a l l y i n accordance with paragraphs ( a ) , ( b ) , o r ( c ) , o r another s t a t e has declined t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h i s s t a t e i s t h e more a p p r o p r i a t e forum t o d e t e r mine t h e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d , and it i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t t h i s c o u r t assume j u r i s d i c t i o n . " E x c e p t i n g t h e e x h i b i t s p r e s e n t e d by r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l d u r i n g argument on t h e l a w , t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e lower c o u r t a s t o any f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n was t h e a f f i d a v i t from Bruce P i e r c e which accompanied h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n and temporary c u s t o d y p e t i t i o n . This evidence does n o t conform t o any of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n Ky. Rev. S t a t . 5 4 0 3 . 4 2 0 ( 1 ) . A s f o r t h e e x h i b i t s submitted by r e s p o n d e n t , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t n e i t h e r t h e O c t o b e r , 1980, contempt o r d e r n o r t h e l e t t e r from M r . a f i n d i n g of c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . Bowman s u p p o r t The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n n o t i n f e r from e i t h e r of t h e s e e x h i b i t s t h a t t h e f a c t s needed t o e s t a b l i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o Ky. Rev. S t a t . 5403.420(1) a r e e x t a n t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t must make a s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g , based on e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d and n o t m e r e a l l e g a t i o n s , a s t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r b a s i s upon which t h e decree s t a t e could lawfully continue t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e r r o r w a s f u r t h e r compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o u r t prematurely r e s o r t e d t o informal communication w i t h t h e F r a n k l i n C i r c u i t C o u r t of Kentucky t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l decision-making p r o c e s s . S e c t i o n 7 of t h e UCCJA, a f t e r which s e c t i o n 40-7-108(4) was m o d e l l e d , does d i r e c t c o u r t s of one s t a t e t o communicate w i t h c o u r t s i n a n o t h e r s t a t e when a n i n t e r s t a t e c u s t o d y matter arises. However, such communication was i n t e n d e d t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e d e c i s i o n a l p r o c e s s i n s i t u a t i o n s where i t h a s been d e t e r m i n e d t h a t two s t a t e s have c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n , and a d e c i s i o n must be made r e g a r d i n g which s t a t e i s t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e forum t o a c t i n l i g h t of t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t interests. The comment f o l l o w i n g UCCJA 57 s t a t e s : "The p u r p o s e of t h i s p r o v i s i o n i s t o e n c o u r a g e judicial r e s t r a i n t i n exercising jurisdiction whenever a n o t h e r s t a t e a p p e a r s t o b e i n a b e t ter p o s i t i o n t o determine custody of a c h i l d . It as a - serves - - second check on jurisdiction or once the test of sections 3 14 has been met." ---(Emphasis supplied.) Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 139 (master ed. 1979). In that requirements of (c)(2) and (f) of the federal statute are substantively equivalent to the tests required by UCCJA sections 3 and 14, the District Court's attempt to informally resolve possible interstate jurisdictional conflict was untimely. The issue of whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction is secondary to, and distinct from, the issue of whether jurisdiction lies. In reapplying 28 USC §1738A, which by reference incorporates both Kentucky and Montana law, the trial court is directed to hold a full evidentiary hearing to settle the jurisdiction matter. The Wenz decisional mode should be followed, and specific findings of fact as to jurisdictional basis should be made. If the District Court choses to address the Wenz steps in reverse order, it must address the question of Kentucky's continuing jurisdiction systematically in light of Ky. Rev. Stat. §403.420(1). If the lower court finds that Kentucky is Jeremy's home state, it must conclude that Kentucky has continuing jurisdiction and that Montana cannot modify the Kentucky decree consistent with the provisions of 28 USC §1738A(f). If the lower court finds that, as the present record indicates, Jeremy's home state is not Kentucky 2 but Montana, then the jurisdictional prerequisites of subsections (a) and (d) of the Kentucky statute must be automatically eliminated as possible bases for continuing jurisdiction. Since there are no allegations to support consideration of the "abandonment/emergency" alternative of subsection ( c ) , it would then follow that the only logical basis upon which the District Court could find continuing jurisdiction is subsection (b), the "significant connection" standard. Only if the District Court finds Kentucky has jurisdiction, should it dispense with analysis of possible jurisdiction in Montana and conclude that Montana has no jurisdiction to modify the Kentucky decree. If the District Court finds that Kentucky no longer has jurisdiction under one of the enumerated bases, it must determine whether Montana has jurisdiction under section 404-211, MCA, which is incorporated by reference in section 40-7-104, MCA. If the lower court finds that Montana satisfies any of these jurisdictional standards, it must find that, under 28 USC §1738A(f) and sections 40-4-211 and 40-7-114, MCA, Montana has jurisdiction to modify the Kentucky decree. Only after such a finding is made should the District Court focus on policy considerations as to whether Montana should exercise its jurisdiction. It is then and only then that the "forum non conveniens" and "clean hands" provisions under state law come into play. Discretion to Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction As outlined above, the question of whether it is appropriate for a state court to exercise its jurisdiction need only be reached if a determination is made that Montana in fact has jurisdiction. The finding of fact upon which the trial judge relied in reaching his conclusion to decline jurisdiction, that appellant wrongfully retained the child, is unsupported by what little evidence there is in the record. Once again referring to appellant's affidavit, appellant swore that Jeremy had been in Montana since August, 1979, with respondent's consent. Although appellant's counsel did concede during argument that respondent made no request for the child's return for five months after the child left Kentucky, at no time during argument did counsel make an admission that expressly contradicted his client's prior sworn statement; moreover, respondent did not submit any sworn testimony that refuted appellant's testimony. Counsel for appellant, at the beginning of argument, made it quite evident that the facts surrounding any alleged request were as yet disputed. The exchange between the court and counsel at p. 25 of the transcript does not constitute an admission as to improper retention. Additionally, the trial judge should not have relied upon the Kentucky contempt order to determine the propriety of appellant's conduct. The validity of that order may be suspect under 28 USC §1738A(g) and KRS 5403.540. Both sections provide that a state shall not exercise jurisdiction if a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in the court of another state that is exercising jurisdiction consistent with federal/UCCJ~ jurisdictional standards. If the trial judge finds that Montana had juris- diction to modify the decree on or before October 1, 1980, it follows that the Franklin Circuit Court was acting in contravention of federal and Kentucky law when it issued the contempt order that effectively countermanded the temporary custody order issued by the Montana District Court on September 4th. The comment following UCCJA section 8, after which section 40-4-109, MCA, was modelled, states that "[tlhe qualifying word 'improperly' is added to exclude cases in which a child is withheld because of illness or other emergency in or - which there are other special justifying circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.) Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 143 (master ed. 1979). In determining whether the appellant "improperly retained [Jeremy] after a visit," the trial judge should examine all the circumstances surrounding the retention and not deem appellant's action improper per se merely because respondent may have requested immediate return of the child. While the custodial parent's request should not be disregarded, neither should the Court overlook the possibility that immediate return upon request might unreasonably disrupt the child's home and school life. Finally, before the trial judge may conclude jurisdiction must be declined, the trial court must balance the child's best interests against the State's interest in avoiding forum-shopping and parental kidnapping. Jurisdiction shall not be declined unless the trial court determines that the child's best interests will not be injured by such a decision. The lower court's judgment is reversed, the order vacated and the cause is remanded for evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion. Provisions of 28 USC 81738A pertinent to this appeal provide: "81738A. Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations. "(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. " (b) As used in this section the term -- "(2) 'Contestant' means a person, including a parent who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; "(3) 'custody determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a c h i l d , and i n c l u d e s permanent and temporary o r d e r s , and i n i t i a l o r d e r s and m o d i f i c a t i o n s ; "(4) 'home S t a t e ' means t h e S t a t e i n which, immediately p r e c e d i n g t h e t i m e i n v o l v e d , t h e child lived with h i s parents, a parent o r a person a c t i n g a s parent, f o r a t l e a s t s i x c o n s e c u t i v e months, and i n t h e c a s e of a c h i l d l e s s t h a n s i x months o l d , t h e S t a t e i n which t h e c h i l d l i v e d from b i r t h w i t h any o f such p e r s o n s . P e r i o d s of temporary a b s e n c e of any o f such p e r s o n s a r e c o u n t e d a s p a r t o f t h e six-month o r o t h e r p e r i o d ; " ( 5 ) ' m o d i f i c a t i o n ' and 'modify' r e f e r t o a c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n which m o d i f i e s , r e p l a c e s , s u p e r s e d e s , o r o t h e r w i s e i s made s u b s e q u e n t t o , a p r i o r custody determination concerning t h e same c h i l d , whether made by t h e same c o u r t o r not; "(8) ' S t a t e ' means a S t a t e of t h e United S t a t e s , t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia, t h e Commonwealth of P u e r t o R i c o , o r a t e r r i t o r y o r p o s s e s s i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . " ( c ) A c h i l d c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by a c o u r t of a S t a t e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y i f -" ( 1 ) s u c h c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e l a w o f s u c h S t a t e ; and "(2) o n e of t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s i s m e t : "(A) such S t a t e ( i ) i s t h e home S t a t e of t h e c h i l d on t h e d a t e of t h e commencement of t h e p r o c e e d i n g , o r ( i i ) had been t h e c h i l d ' s home S t a t e w i t h i n s i x months b e f o r e t h e d a t e of t h e commencement of t h e p r o c e e d i n g and t h e c h i l d i s a b s e n t from s u c h S t a t e b e c a u s e of h i s removal o r r e t e n t i o n by a c o n t e s t a n t o r f o r o t h e r r e a s o n s , and a c o n t e s t a n t c o n t i n u e s t o l i v e i n such S t a t e ; " (B) ( i ) i t a p p e a r s t h a t no o t h e r S t a t e would have j u r i s d i c t i o n under s u b p a r a g r a p h ( A ) , and ( i i )i t i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a t a c o u r t of such S t a t e assume j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e ( I ) t h e c h i l d and h i s p a r e n t s , o r t h e c h i l d and a t l e a s t one c o n t e s t a n t , have a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h such S t a t e o t h e r t h a n mere p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e i n such S t a t e , and (11) t h e r e i s a v a i l a b l e i n such S t a t e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence concerning t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e c a r e , p r o t e c t i o n , t r a i n i n g , and p e r sonal relationships; " (D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), ( C ) , or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or "(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. "(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. "(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if -"(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and " (2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. " (g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination." As the record stands, as of August 11, 1980, under federal and state law, Montana was Jeremy's home state. This Court is not persuaded by respondent's contention that during the time a child is present in a state as a result of acts in violation of an existing custody decree, calculation of the six month period needed to establish "home state" jurisdiction should be tolled. Cf. Freeman v. Freeman (Ky. 1977), 547 S.W.2d 437. Neither the language nor the legislative history of the "home state" definitional subsection support such a conclusion. See Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 123 (master ed. 1979). Facts relating to the improper conduct of a petitioner should only be addressed in the context of determining whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction once it has been determined that Montana has jurisdiction. Additionally, Wenz, supra, Marriage of Settle (1976), 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962, 965, overruled in part, 291 Or. 363, 630 P.2d 353; Matter of Custody - of Ross (1981), 291 Or. 363, 630 P.2d 353, 358;~ruenig v. Silverman Hook Hook (Ky. 1978), 563 S.W.2d 482; and - - v. - (Ky.App., 1977), 551 S.W.2d 818, at a minimum, would support a finding that Montana has jurisdiction under either the "home state" or "significant connection" standard of section 3. We Concur:

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