STATE v GOPHER
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No. 80-485 IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . MICHAEL GOPHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John C. Koch argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Randall Snyder argued,Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: June 11, 1981 ~ecidedJUL : ."..u- - Clerk 9 - 1981 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d the Court. t h e Opinion of D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h f e l o n y b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y theft. A f t e r a h e a r i n g on May 9 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o suppress trial was convicted i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e was d e n i e d . held on on both 18, August counts. 1980, and Defendant jury A defendant appeals, was submitting t h a t t h e C a s c a d e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s motion t o s u p p r e s s . about A t burglar 5:00 a.m. a l a r m went o f f F a l l s , Montana. two March 15, 1980, a silent a t t h e Warehouse Pawn Shop i n G r e a t Officer Stan Johnston arrived a t the scene about a minute l a t e r . window, on large rocks spaces in a r i f l e rack, the parking l o t . i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d a broken His on the a floor, number and a f r e s h s e t o f of empty t i r e tracks in While i n v e s t i g a t i n g he n o t i c e d a s i n g u l a r v e h i c l e d r i v i n g s l o w l y p a s t t h e s c e n e and o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t s e x h i b i t e d an un u s u a l c u r i o s i t y i n t h e c r i m e s i t e . J o h n s t o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e knew from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i t was n o t uncommon f o r b u r g l a r s t o r e t u r n t o t h e s c e n e of the crime break-in after simply was u n d i s c o v e r e d , t h e goods. breeking t h e y would a window. then enter If the and take On t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e f a c t s , J o h n s t o n c a l l e d an assisting officer (Sharpe) and requested vehicle. O f f i c e r S h a r p e s t o p p e d and a p p r o a c h e d t h e v e h i c l e shining h i s f l a s h 1i g h t i n t o t h e passenger noticed s e v e r a l r i f l e s on t h e f l o o r . him to stop the compartment. He While examining t h e l i c e n s e of t h e d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t Michael Gopher, t h e o f f i c e r noticed the passenger's arm d r o p p i n g t o w a r d t h e g u n s . When t h e o f f i c e r drew h i s weapon and o r d e r e d t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e car t o g e t o u t of the vehicle, t h e d r i v e r a c c e l e r a t e d and headed north. A subsequent pursuit by police terminated w i t h t h e a r r e s t of b o t h p e r s o n s i n t h e c a r . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l court erred when it refused defendant Gopher's motion to s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e h e a l l e g e s was i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . The g i s t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r who i n i t i a l l y " s t o p p e d " h i s c a r d i d n o t h a v e p r o b a b l e c a u s e to do so. probable He maintains that the c a u s e t o b e l i e v e h e had authorities committed a c r i m i n a l and s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e t o a r r e s t him t o j u s t i f y See s e c t i o n 4 6 - 5 - 1 0 1 ( 1 ) , search cannot arrest. be See defendant maintains, facts to that he that believe must the be facts act the search. and w i t h o u t t h e l a w f u l a r r e s t , properly section have Without probable c a u s e , t h e r e MCA. c a n be no l a w f u l a r r e s t , must made as 46-6-401(4), must h a v e had being incident to MCA. Officer Sharpe, knowledge o f d e f e n d a n t had c o m m i t t e d immediately sufficient arrested. to a sufficient the burglary Gopher properly arrest the and emphasizes a defendant must be known a t t h e moment o f t h e a r r e s t and n o t d i s c o v e r e d during Mont. that or 252, after the arrest. 5 8 1 P.2d 4 3 7 . t h i s Court h a s made S t a t e v. Rader ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 C i t i n g Rader, defendant concludes a clear statement to the effect t h a t s t o p and f r i s k p r i n c i p l e s do n o t a p p l y t o a d e f e n d a n t in a vehicle. A t 581 P.2d a t 440. t h e o u t s e t we r e c o g n i z e t h e Rader s t o p and f r i s k . rule regarding A l t h o u g h d i c t u m , s u c h a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n by t h i s Court p r o h i b i t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o a u t o m o b i l e s c a n n o t be i g n o r e d . W e also recognize that the facts known to Officer Johnston at the time he directed Officer Sharpe to stop defendant's automobile fall short of probable cause. We, therefore, must determine whether Rader should continue to be the law in this State and, if not, what standard should be applied in circumstances such as exist before us here. The State maintains that the "stop and frisk" doctrine should apply to vehicular stops, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 'Terry, the Supreme Court ruled 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d that it can be 889. In constitu- tionally permissible for an officer to stop and search a . person, even in the absence of probable cause. 15. 392 U.S. at This type of encounter must be reviewed as to its "reasonableness," and take into account the police interest involved and existence of specific and articulable facts. The most recent post-Terry decision regarding stop and frisk is United States v. Cortez (1981), - U.S. 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. I In Cortez, the Supreme Court ruled that objective facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting that a particular automobile is involved in some sort of criminal activity is sufficient to warrant a limited investigatory stop. Chief Justice Burger writes: "The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions--inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. "The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articu- l a t e d a s such, p r a c t i c a l people formulated c e r t a i n common s e n s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t human behavior; jurors a s f a c t f i n d e r s a r e permitted t o do t h e same--and s o a r e law e n f o r c e m e n t officers. Finally, the evidence thus coll e c t e d m u s t b e s e e n and weighed n o t i n t e r m s o f l i b r a r y a n a l y s i s by s c h o l a r s , b u t a s u n d e r s t o o d by t h o s e v e r s e d i n t h e f i e l d o f a t 6 9 5 , 66 law e n fo rc e m e n t . " 101 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d a t 629. h e r e t h a t O f f i c e r J o h n s t o n is an I t s h o u l d be n o t e d experienced police and knowledgeable department, twelve years. having This member been of with the the Great force is a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f Falls for over the Cortez a n a l y s i s , which e m p h a s i z e s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t authorities are allowed t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s which laymen c o u l d n o t p r o p e r l y d r a w i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f a s p e c i f i c vehicular stop is legally valid. The -o r t e z C- court concludes: ". . . Thus, t h e t e s t is n o t whether o f f i c e r s Gray and Evans had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e v e h i c l e t h e y s t o p p e d would c o n t a i n 'Chevron' and a g r o u p o f i l l e g a l a l i e n s . R a t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r , b a s e d upon t h e whole p i c t u r e , t h e y , a s e x p e r i e n c e d Border Patrol agents, could reasonably surmise t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r vehicle they s t o p p e d was engaged i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . On t h i s record, they could s o conclude." 101 S . C t . a t 6 9 7 , 66 L.Ed.2d a t 6 3 1 . Court is convinced disposal in this This officer's under C o r t e z . 504 P.2d 437, to at the affirm Ruiz a u t h o r i t y is ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 9 Ariz.App. 84, 1 3 0 7 , t h e c o u r t i n S t a t e v . Dean ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 112 A r i z . 543 P.2d is a l l t h a t can facts sufficient r e v e a l s t h a t t h e g r e a t t r e n d of Citing State v. accord. are the F u r t h e r , our review of c a s e s from n e i g h b o r i n g jurisdictions in case that '" held t h a t "I is n e c e s s a r y , determine harassing. 425, that the 543 P.2d . . . [ a ] founded s u s p i c i o n some b a s i s from which t h e c o u r t detention 425, 427 was not arbitrary ( q u o t i n g Wilson v. or Porter ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 361 F.2d 4 1 2 , 4 1 5 ) . In 391, the Stone People v. Colorado v. People ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 196 Colo. Waits Supreme C o u r t (1971), 174 applied Colo. 35, the 504, 580 P.2d standards of 485 P.2d 495, stating: " ' I n order l a w f u l l y t o d e t a i n an i n d i v i d u a l f o r q u e s t i o n i n g , ( 1 ) t h e o f f i c e r m u s t have a reasonable suspicion t h a t the individual has c o m m i t t e d , o r i s a b o u t t o commit, a c r i m e ; ( 2 ) t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e d e t e n t i o n must be r e a s o n a b l e ; and ( 3 ) t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d e t e n t i o n m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e when c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of t h e purpose.' 174 Colo. a t 509, 485 P . 2 d a t 497. "We have p r e v i o u s l y a p p l i e d t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t o investigatory s t o p s involving automobiles. People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P . 2 d 120 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . " 580 P.2d a t 393. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 34 0 r . A p p . See a l s o S t a t e v. Bartosz 1 2 3 , 578 P.2d 426; W a s h i n g t o n v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 94 Nev. 1 8 1 , 576 P.2d 1 1 2 6 . Primarily applying the rules of Cortez, the State submits t h a t s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z e d suspicion existed t o j u s t i f y t h e s t o p of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r . two e l e m e n t s : officer The S t a t e ' s b u r d e n h a s ( 1 ) o b j e c t i v e d a t a f r o m which a n e x p e r i e n c e d c a n make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e occupant of a c e r t a i n v e h i c l e is o r has been engaged activity. in wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal The f u n d a m e n t a l f a c t s p e r s u a d e u s t h a t t h e b u r d e n was met i n t h i s c a s e . The o f f i c e r s knew t h a t a c r i m e had b e e n committed-probably theft, but certainly criminal b e l i e v e d s e v e r a l g u n s had b e e n t a k e n . was p r o b a b l y involved. mischief. They They knew a v e h i c l e They o b s e r v e d o n e v e h i c l e d r i v i n g very slowly p a s t t h e crime scene. Although h i s p o l i c e c a r was n o t on t h e f r o n t s t r e e t and d i d n o t h a v e i t s f l a s h i n g lights on, the occupants of the vehicle expressed an inordinate amount of interest in the scene. These known f a c t s , combined w i t h t h e d e d u c t i o n s made i n l i g h t o f t w e l v e years' experience Johnston to in crime investigation, s u s p e c t d e f e n d a n t was involved led in, Officer or witness t o , t h e crime. W reaffirm the traditional e dictum is not binding as r u l e of controlling D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 521, compelled and feel precedent, 453, t o abandon t h i s Court tha.t 471, the S t a t e v. 365 P.2d language of 512, Rader which a p p e a r s t o p r e c l u d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e T e r r y s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o v e h i c u l a r s t o p s . decision, I n l i g h t of t h e C o r t e z and o t h e r p e r s u a s i v e a u t h o r i t y , we now h o l d t h a t when a t r a i n e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r h a s a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t of criminal activity, a vehicle or is or witness has thereto, been a engaged limited in and r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p and s e a r c h i s j u s t i f i e d . The d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s and h i s subsequent conviction a r e affirmed. 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