HOCK v LEINCO CEDAR PRODUCTS

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No. 80-464 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 DAWN M. HOCK, Claimant and Respondent, VS. LIENCO CEDAR PRODUCTS, Employer, and STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Roy Andes, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana J. David Slovak argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hoyt and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana Terry N. Trieweiler argued, Whitefish, Montana Submitted: June 12, 1981 Decided: September 28, 1.983. Filed : SEP 2 9 19811 Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant S t a t e Compensation I n s u r a n c e Fund a p p e a l s from t h e o r d e r o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t g r a n t i n g c l a i m a n t Dawn Hock's p e t i t i o n f o r a lump sum award of b e n e f i t s . The Fund p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1. I n d i s p o s i n g of o r p r e j u d i c i n g t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s u r v i v i n g i n f a n t b e n e f i c i a r y , s h o u l d t h e c o u r t have made t h e c h i l d a p a r t y and a p p o i n t e d a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m ? 2. Is i t p r o p e r f o r t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t o e n t e r t a i n a p e t i t i o n f o r a $19,000 lump sum, where a $6,000 c l a i m was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n ? 3. Does a lump sum award of b e n e f i t s i n t h e amount of $19,622.72 c o n s t i t u t e a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n i n l i g h t of e v i d e n c e of e x p e n s e s a g g r e g a t i n g o n l y $14,039.25? 4. Does t h e f a i l u r e t o f i l e a n a t t o r n e y f e e agreement prior to t r i a l f o r f e i t the r i g h t t o collect attorney fees? W e a f f i r m t h e award of t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t , b u t w i t h some i n s t r u c t i o n s t o be f o l l o w e d i n s i m i l a r c a s e s i n the future. Dawn Hock i s e i g h t e e n y e a r s o l d , and h a s a two-year-old child. She i s n o t employed, having completed o n l y t h e t e n t h g r a d e and having no p r o s p e c t s of employment. She p r e s e n t l y draws $186.68 p e r week i n w o r k e r s r compensation payments by r e a s o n of t h e d e a t h of h e r husband, Warren, which o c c u r r e d on May 23, 1980, w h i l e he was working f o r d e f e n d a n t / e m p l o y e r , Lienco Cedar P r o d u c t s ( h i s g r o s s s a l a r y was $279 p e r w e e k ) . She a l s o draws s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s , g i v i n g h e r a monthly, t a x - f r e e income of more t h a n $1,100. The employer was i n s u r e d under compensation p l a n no. by d e f e n d a n t S t a t e Compensation I n s u r a n c e Fund. 3, Under t h e s t a t u t e s , Dawn i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e biweekly payments f o r t h e r e s t o f h e r l i f e ; however, i f s h e e v e r r e m a r r i e s , t h e n s h e w i l l r e c e i v e a f i n a l , s i n g l e payment e q u a l t o t w o - y e a r s ' b e n e f i t s , and compensation w i l l t h e n be s t o p p e d . 39-71-721, Section MCA. Dawn's d a u g h t e r , Dusty Rae, i s a l s o a b e n e f i c i a r y under t h e w o r k e r s ' compensation s t a t u t e s . MCA. S e c t i o n 39-71-116 ( 2 ) , A l l payments a r e p r e s e n t l y made t o Dawn a l o n e , b u t i f she should d i e o r remarry, then t h e c h i l d w i l l r e c e i v e t h e same amount of b e n e f i t s u n t i l a g e 1 8 , o r a g e 25 i f a f u l l - t i m e student. I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e lump s m award t o Dawn, w e u must d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e c h i l d ' s c o n t i n g e n t f u t u r e r i g h t s a r e t o be p r o t e c t e d . Dawn i n i t i a l l y r e q u e s t e d a $6,000 advance on h e r b e n e f i t s from t h e D i v i s i o n of Workers' Compensation. She a l l e g e d c e r t a i n d e b t s were c a u s i n g h a r d s h i p f o r h e r and t h e c h i l d . The c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r t e n t a t i v e l y a g r e e d t o t h e advance, upon t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e $6,000 t o be advanced be d e d u c t e d from t h e payment Dawn would r e c e i v e i n t h e e v e n t s h e r e m a r r i e s . When t h e c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r s u b m i t t e d t h e p l a n f o r a p p r o v a l t o t h e d i v i s i o n administrator, it w a s r e j e c t e d . The a d m i n i s t r a t o r r e q u i r e d " p o s i t i v e p r o t e c t i o n of r e c o v e r y " of t h e advance, c i t i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t should Dawn n e v e r r e m a r r y , t h e n t h e advance would n e v e r be r e c o v e r e d . The Fund o f f e r e d a n o t h e r p l a n , which proposed t o d e d u c t $ 2 5 p e r week from Dawn's b e n e f i t s u n t i l f u l l r e c o v e r y o r r e m a r r i a g e . The new p l a n was r e j e c t e d by Dawn's a t t o r n e y . Dawn p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t f o r an emergency h e a r i n g on t h e lump sum d i s p u t e . I n her p e t i t i o n , s h e a s k e d , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , f o r a n advance of $19,622.72, which amount i s e q u a l t o t h e two-years' worth of b e n e f i t s s h e would r e c e i v e i n a s i n g l e payment upon r e m a r r i a g e . Fund moved t o s t r i k e t h e $19,000 f i g u r e and i n s e r t t h e The o r i g i n a l $6,000 f i g u r e , on t h e ground t h a t t h e l a r g e r sum had n e v e r been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n and s o w a s n o t a " d i s p u t e " t h e c o u r t c o u l d h e a r , c i t i n g s e c t i o n 39-71-2905, MCA. The Fund p a i d t h e $6,000 sum t o t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t , and f i l e d a n o f f e r of judgment which sets f o r t h t h e F u n d ' s second p r o p o s a l f o r r e c o v e r y of t h e advance. The motion t o s t r i k e was never r u l e d upon by t h e c o u r t . I n i t s t r i a l b r i e f and i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r , t h e Fund r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e t o t h e c h i l d ' s contingent future r i g h t t o receive benefits. The Fund asked t h e c o u r t t o j o i n t h e c h i l d a s a p a r t y and t o a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s i n r e g a r d t o any scheme t o r e c o v e r a lump sum advance. The c o u r t d i d neither. A t t r i a l , Dawn t e s t i f i e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g d e b t s which t o t a l s l i g h t l y o v e r $14,000: 1. New Mobile Home 2 . Automobile $6,500 $4,900 3. F u n e r a l Expenses 4 . Taxes $806 $43.75 5. U t i l i t y I n s t a l l a t i o n $433 6. Balance Due on Old Mobile Home 7. Gambles Account 8. Medical B i l l s $780 $50 a p p r o x i m a t e l y $500. With r e g a r d t o t h e s e d e b t s , Dawn t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r o l d m o b i l e home was i n need of s u b s t a n t i a l r e p a i r , n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e p u r c h a s e of a new one. I n a s i m i l a r manner, s h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had no u s a b l e a u t o m o b i l e and had a r r a n g e d t o p u r c h a s e a s a t i s f a c t o r y used 1978 Plymouth. Dawn t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had no medical i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r h e r s e l f o r h e r d a u g h t e r . The c h i l d i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o c o n v u l s i o n s . Dawn a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e and h e r c h i l d c a n l i v e on h e r $1,100 p e r month t a x - f r e e income, i f h e r d e b t s a r e p a i d . The o n l y o t h e r w i t n e s s a t t r i a l was t h e c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r f o r the division. He t e s t i f i e d t h e d i v i s i o n a c t e d i n good f a i t h t h r o u g h o u t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d and t h e Fund from overpayment. He also stated t h a t no a t t o r n e y f e e agreement had e v e r been f i l e d w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n by Dawn's a t t o r n e y a s r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e , t h u s l a y i n g t h e f o u n d a t i o n upon which t h e Fund a r g u e s t h a t Dawn is not entitled t o receive attorney fees. H e s t a t e d t h a t no c l a i m f o r $19,000 had e v e r been made t o t h e d i v i s i o n , o n l y a c l a i m f o r $6,000, b u t t h a t t h e $19,000 c l a i m would have been d e n i e d i n any e v e n t b e c a u s e t h e p o i n t of d i s p u t e concerned n o t t h e amount of advance b u t t h e method of r e c o v e r i n g i t . The Workers' Compensation C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t lump sum payments a r e more d e s i r a b l e t h a n f o r m e r l y was t h e c a s e . The c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t 1 0 4 weeks of c l a i m a n t ' s f u t u r e weekly b e n e f i t s be c o n v e r t e d i n t o a lump s m of $19,622.72. u The o r d e r p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e Fund can r e c o v e r t h e amount o f t h i s lump sum b e n e f i t by t e r m i n a t i n g payment of biweekly b e n e f i t s t o t h e c l a i m a n t on t h e s i x t e e n t h b i r t h d a y of c l a i m a n t ' s c h i l d , u n t i l an amount e q u a l t o t h e advance p r o v i d e d f o r h a s been r e c o v e r e d . The o r d e r a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s a t t o r n e y i s e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y f e e s and p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e c o u r t would t a k e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e d e f e n d a n t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f e e s and c o s t s . A f e e agreement ( 1 / 3 of award) w a s f i l e d w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e h e a r i n g , b u t was o b j e c t e d t o a s n o t timely. Dawn's a t t o r n e y s u b s e q u e n t l y o f f e r e d t o s t i p u l a t e t o a change i n t h e method of r e c o v e r y o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t . The s t i p u l a t i o n would have c a l l e d f o r r e c o v e r y o f t h e advance o u t of Dawn's r e m a r r i a g e b e n e f i t s o r , i f s h e d i d n o t r e m a r r y , o u t o f h e r weekly b e n e f i t s a f t e r t h e c h i l d c e a s e d t o be a beneficiary. The Fund d i d n o t choose t o c o n s i d e r t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n , p r e f e r r i n g t o proceed w i t h t h e a p p e a l . I. There c a n b e no q u e s t i o n t h a t an i n f a n t c h i l d of a widow who draws compensation b e n e f i t s h a s a s e p a r a t e i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n . S e c t i o n 39-71-116(2), MCA, defines "Beneficiary" a s i n c l u d i n g ( a ) a s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , and ( b ) a n unmarried c h i l d under 1 8 , o r under 25 i f a f u l l - t i m e s t u d e n t . 71-723, S e c t i o n 39- MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t compensation due t o b e n e f i c i a r i e s s h a l l b e p a i d t o t h e s u r v i v i n g spouse. This Court, i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e p r e d e c e s s o r of t h e above s e c t i o n , h a s s t a t e d : " I t i s t r u e t h a t f o r t h e purpose of s a v i n g t r o u b l e and e x p e n s e o f g u a r d i a n s h i p p r o c e e d i n g s t h e l a w p e r m i t s t h e payment of t h e f u l l amount t o t h e widow . . . but an u n d i v i d e d p o r t i o n t h e r e o f b e l o n g s a b s o l u t e l y t o t h e c h i l d and i s dedicated t o i t s support." C o g d i l l v. Aetna L i f e I n s . Co. ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 244, 257, 2 P.2d 292, 296. The c o u r t went on t o h o l d t h a t c h i l d r e n r e c e i v e f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n under t h e a c t , t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s must always be c a r e f u l l y g u a r d e d , and t h a t " [ t l h e a c t g i v e s t o t h e c h i l d r e n s u c h a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e compensation a s c a n be l a i d h o l d of by t h e c o u r t s , and i t s u l t i m a t e d i s p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d ; p a r t i c u l a r l y i s t h i s s o when such compensation assumes t h e s h a p e of a commuted payment." I n s . Co., supra. ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) C o g d i l l v. Aetna L i f e The Workers' Compensation s t a t u t e s have undergone s u b s t a n t i a l amendment s i n c e 1931, b u t t h e above quoted p r i n c i p l e s s t i l l apply because c h i l d r e n a r e s t i l l named as s e p a r a t e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and payments a r e s t i l l made only t o t h e surviving parent. The c o u r t ' s o r d e r c o u l d r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n i n b e n e f i t s t o t h e c h i l d because of t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of payment of b e n e f i t s a t t h e t i m e t h e c h i l d r e a c h e s s i x t e e n y e a r s of a g e . T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e b e n e f i t t o t h e c h i l d of t h e p r e s e n t lump sum s e t t l e m e n t a s compared t o t h e p r o s p e c t i v e l o s s of b e n e f i t s . There i s t h e r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t may c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e m o t h e r ' s a t t h a t p o i n t , and t h a t a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m would be r e q u i r e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t . The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t Rule 1 7 ( c ) , M . R . c ~ v . P . , i s t h e o n l y p r e s e n t a u t h o r i t y i n Montana f o r a p p o i n t m e n t of a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m . The r u l e s of c i v i l p r o c e d u r e a r e n o t d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t , b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t i s e x p r e s s l y made s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Montana A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e Act ( s e c t i o n 39-712903, MCA) and M P a l l o w s e a c h agency t o promulgate i t s own AA rules. F e d e r a l Rule 17 ( c ) i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same a s Montana Rule 1 7 ( c ) . The f e d e r a l r u l e h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g discretionary, granting t o the federal d i s t r i c t court the , power t o choose whether o r n o t t o a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m , b u t t h e c o u r t s must f i n d t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor a r e a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t e d . M.S. v. Wermers ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F. 2d 170, 174. This c o u r t has adopted a s i m i l a r d i s c r e t i o n a r y approach t o a p p o i n t m e n t of i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l i n d i v o r c e / c u s t o d y cases. "[Tlhe c o u r t s h a l l appoint independent counsel f o r t h e c h i l d [where c u s t o d y i s i n s e r i o u s d i s p u t e ] o r make a f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s t h a t such a p p o i n t m e n t was u n n e c e s s a r y . " ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) M a t t e r of G u a r d i a n s h i p of G u l l e t t e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 132, 1 4 0 , 566 P.2d 396, 400. re M a r r i a g e of Bartmess ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 38 St.Rep. 1097, 1098. Mont. - See a l s o I n 631 P.2d 299, 300, The Workers' Compensation C o u r t s h o u l d have a p p o i n t e d a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m o r made a f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s why a n appointment was u n n e c e s s a r y ; b u t b e c a u s e of t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e , we f i n d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o a p p o i n t a guardian ad l i t e m does n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . In t h i s c a s e t h e r e was a mutual b e n e f i t t o t h e c h i l d and t h e mother i n t h e payment of t h e d e s c r i b e d d e b t s . I n a d d i t i o n , b e c a u s e of t h e change of t h e method of repayment a s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s o p i n ion, t h e r e i s a very l i m i t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of f i n a n c i a l l o s s t o the child. We, therefore, hold t h a t the f a i l u r e t o appoint a g u a r d i a n was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . However, w e admonish t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t h a t i n f u t u r e c a s e s , where a c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t may be e f f e c t e d by any lump sum award, t h e c o u r t s h a l l a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m f o r t h e c h i l d o r make a f i n d i n g s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s t h a t s u c h a p p o i n t ment i s u n n e c e s s a r y . The Fund a r g u e s t h a t no c l a i m f o r any amount o v e r $6,000 s h o u l d have been h e a r d by t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t , b e c a u s e o n l y t h e $6,000 c l a i m was e v e r p r e s e n t e d t o the division. The Fund a r g u e s (1) t h e r e i s no e s t a b l i s h e d " d i s p u t e " a s t o t h e e x c e s s money t h a t c o u l d g i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e c o u r t under s e c t i o n 39-71-2905, MCA, and ( 2 ) t h e c o u r t h e a r i n g c o n s t i t u t e s a n a p p e a l from a n agency, r e q u i r i n g a c l a i m a n t t o r a i s e a l l i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e agency, t o e x h a u s t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , b e f o r e he c a n be h e a r d i n c o u r t . The c l a i m s s u p e r v i s o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e " d i s p u t e " d i d n o t c o n c e r n t h e amount of t h e advance a s much a s t h e method t o be used f o r r e c o v e r y . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e $19,000 c l a i m would c e r t a i n l y have been d e n i e d i f p r e s e n t e d . Therefore, a d i s p u t e a s t o method of repayment d i d e x i s t ; a l s o , b e c a u s e " E t l h e law n e i t h e r d o e s n o r r e q u i r e s i d l e a c t s " , s e c t i o n 13-223, MCA, Dawn s h o u l d n o t now be r e q u i r e d t o go back t o t h e d i v i s i o n and b e g i n a g a i n o n l y t o have t h e same i s s u e s arise. Dawn h a s n o t f a i l e d t o e x h a u s t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e The Workers' Compensation C o u r t i s r e m e d i e s i n any e v e n t . n o t a f u l l - b l o w n D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t i n g i n r e v i e w of a n agency d e c i s i o n . I t i s a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law c o u r t , h a v i n g limited jurisdiction t o decide disputes r e l a t i n g t o b e n e f i t s i n a d e novo p r o c e e d i n g . Fund v . Hunt ( 1 9 8 1 ) , St.Rep. 421, 424-425. See S t a t e e x r e l . Uninsured Employer's Mont . -, 625 P.2d 539, 542, 38 I t s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t t o p r e s e n t i s s u e s a t any time b e f o r e t h e d i v i s i o n o r t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n r e v i e w by t h i s C o u r t . Such a n approach i s s u p p o r t e d by s e c t i o n 39-71-2903, MCA, which s u b j e c t s t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of MAPA. The F u n d ' s c i t e d a u t h o r i t y f o r r e q u i r i n g p r i o r presentation t o the division i s not persuasive. Its p r i n c i p a l c a s e was handed down b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t A t t h e time of t h a t c a s e , t h e d i v i s i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d . conducted i t s own c o n t e s t e d c a s e h e a r i n g s l i k e a l l o t h e r agencies. hearing. The i s s u e s t h e r e were n o t even p r e s e n t e d a t t h e DeLeary v . Anaconda Aluminum Co. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 208, 541 P.2d 788. By c l a i m a n t ' s r a i s i n g of a l l i s s u e s i n h e r o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n b e f o r e t h e Workers ' Compensation C o u r t , t h e Fund was a£ f o r d e d a d e q u a t e n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e f e n d . The Fund f e a r s a w a s t e of j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s i f a r e s o l v a b l e controversy i s not f i r s t presented t o t h e d i v i s i o n , b u t h e r e , by t h e d i v i s i o n ' s own a d m i s s i o n s , no r e s o l u t i o n c o u l d have been had. Allowing c l a i m a n t t o p r e s e n t i s s u e s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t time a t t h e h e a r i n g i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h s e c t i o n 39-71-104, MCA: the act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. 111. Dawn established debts of $14,039 at trial. The court awarded her a $19,622 lump sum advance. Lump sum settlements are granted in exceptional circumstances. Outstanding indebtedness, pressing need, or circum- stances in which the best interests of the claimant, his family and the general public are served justify such a settlement. Willoughby v. Arthur G. McKee & Co. (1980), - Mont.- 609 P.2d 700, 702, 37 St.Rep. 620, 623; Kuehn v. , National Farmers Union Property 303, 307, 521 P.2d 921, 924. & Cas. Co. (1974), 164 Mont. The decision to award or deny a lump sum settlement will not be interfered with on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. The Workers1 Compensation Court will be presumed correct and affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, and reversed only if the evidence clearly preponderates against its findings. 609 P.2d at 702. Willoughby, Wide discretion will be afforded the Workers' Compensation Court in its determinations. Willoughby, 609 P.2d at 704; Kuehn, 521 P.2d at 923. In determining whether or not there is subtantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Court's findings and conclusions, the Supreme Court is required to look to all of the evidence properly before the lower court. Hume Mont. - 608 P.2d 1063, v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1980), , 1066, 37 St.Rep. 378, 382. Evidence before the court showed existing debts for the purchase and maintenance of a home, living expenses, medical expenses, potential future medical expenses for the child, and the need for a fuel efficient car, in all of which the mutual interests of Dawn and her child are intertwined. In addition, we have the possibility of attorney fees being taken out of the award pursuant to the fee agreement. Considering all such factors, we find no abuse of discretion by the court and affirm the award. IV . The Fund argues that Dawn's attorney failed to file his fee agreement prior to the hearing, so has forfeited any claim for attorney fees. No statute or division rule prescribes the time for filing fee agreements. Section 39-71-613, MCA, and Rule 24.29.3801, ARM, set maximum amounts of fees and simply require such filing. In the absence of any specified time, and in view of the court's call for a hearing on fees, the division's asserted desire to regulate fees and to protect the workman are not prevented. No rule has been violated under section 39-71-613(3), MCA, justifying forfeiture. The division and/or the court can certainly adopt their own rules as to time of filing if the question is as important as claimed. Claimant urges the award of attorney fees in connection with this appeal. When an appeal is entirely unfounded and causes delay, respondent is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. Mont. (1979) - Carbon County v. Schwend , - 594 P.2d 1121, 1127, 36 St.Rep. 917, 924-925. We find that the Fund in good faith raised significant issues on appeal. We, therefore, do not award attorney fees for the appellate proceedings. VI . We remand the case to the Workers' Compensation Court for the following action: (1) Modification of the order awarding lump sum advance to provide that recovery of the amount of the advance shall be repayable out of the advance to Dawn in the event of her remarriage, or if she does not remarry, out of her biweekly benefits received after her child ceases to be a beneficiary, or in the event that the claimant dies, that recovery be made out of the child's benefits commencing at her sixteenth birthday; all as agreed to by claimant. (2) Determination by the court of the amount of the attorney fees to be awarded to claimant's attorney and the party responsible for the payment of such fees and other costs. We Concur: -~?$~Pd~4.e~ 24 Chief Justice

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