MARTINEZ v YELLOWSTONE COUNTY WELF

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No. 80-329 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 YVONNE MARTINEZ, Charging party & Respondent, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY WELFARE DPEARTMENT., Petitioner and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Anderson, Edwards and Molloy, Billings, Montana Donald W. Molloy argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Harold F. Hanser, County attorney, argued, Billings, Montana C. David Gorton argued, Billings, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Frederick Sherwood argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: February 18, 1981 Decided: March 27, 1981 MAR Filed. 2 1 1981 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n 1977, a p p e l l a n t , Yvonne M a r t i n e z f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e Montana Human R i g h t s Commission (Commission), c h a r g i n g t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Yellowstone County Welfare Department (Department), with r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The c h a r g e stemmed from t h e Department' s r e j e c t i o n of M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r s e v e r a l job v a c a n c i e s . Following a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e Commission conducted a h e a r i n g . On November 1, 1979, t h e Commission i s s u e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and a n o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e Department had u n l a w f u l l y discriminated a g a i n s t Martinez. The Department f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Judge C h a r l e s Luedke presiding. O n August 1 9 , 1980, Judge Luedke e n t e r e d a n o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e Commission's f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r and g r a n t i n g t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s motion t o dismiss t h e complaint. From t h i s o r d e r , M a r t i n e z a p p e a l s . Yvonne M a r t i n e z i s a f i f t y - t w o - y e a r - o l d b l a c k woman. She s p e a k s , r e a d s and w r i t e s p r o f i c i e n t l y i n b o t h E n g l i s h and S p a n i s h . From F e b r u a r y 1973 t o August 1974, M a r t i n e z was employed by t h e Department a s a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n . During h e r employment, M a r t i n e z was recommended f o r and r e c e i v e d permanent s t a t u s w i t h t h e Department, i n s p i t e of problems i n v o l v i n g t a r d i n e s s , a b s e n t e e i s m and p e r s o n a l i t y con£l i c t s . I n August 1974, M a r t i n e z v o l u n t a r i l y r e s i g n e d from t h e Department and moved t o C a l i f o r n i a . Upon h e r t e r m i n a t i o n , s h e r e c e i v e d v e r y f a v o r a b l e l e t t e r s of recommendation from h e r immediate s u p e r v i s o r s . I n C a l i f o r n i a , M a r t i n e z o b t a i n e d employment w i t h t h e San Diego Department of P u b l i c W e l f a r e a s a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n advancing i n p o s i t i o n d u r i n g h e r employment. I n J u n e 1976, M a r t i n e z r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s , Montana, and s o u g h t employment a t t h e Department. She was a d v i s e d by t h e Department D i r e c t o r James Greer t o a p p l y t h r o u g h t h e Montana M e r i t System. M a r t i n e z complied by having h e r t e s t s c o r e s o b t a i n e d i n C a l i f o r n i a t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e Montana M e r i t Counsel. I n October 1976, a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n vacancy a r o s e a t t h e Department. M a r t i n e z a p p l i e d f o r t h e vacancy. The m e r i t system r e g i s t e r f o r Yellowstone County i n d i c a t e d t h a t M a r t i n e z was t h e most q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t . The Department had p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n b u t c h o s e t o r e j e c t M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e female. M a r t i n e z t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e c a l l e d t h e Department c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n and was t o l d by J a c k i e Hurick, a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department, t h a t t h e vacancy had been f i l l e d , and t h a t t h e y w o u l d n ' t be h i r i n g any " n i g g e r s " anyway. H u r i c k , t h e a l l e g e d d e c l a r a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t no s u c h s t a t e m e n t was e v e r made. The Commission d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t had, i n f a c t , been made and t h e Commiss i o n ' s p o s i t i o n was a d o p t e d by Judge Luedke i n h i s o r d e r . I n December 1976 when a second vacancy a r o s e , M a r t i n e z ' name a p p e a r e d on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r a s t h e most q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t , n o t o n l y i n Yellowstone County, b u t i n t h e e n t i r e S t a t e of Montana. The Department had p o s s e s s i o n o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n when i t r e j e c t e d M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e female. A t h i r d vacancy a r o s e i n F e b r u a r y 1977. Again M a r t i n e z ' name a p p e a r e d f i r s t on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r f o r b o t h Yellowstone County and t h e e n t i r e S t a t e of Montana. The De- p a r t m e n t had p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n when i t r e j e c t e d M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e f e m a l e c l e r i c a l worker from a n o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e Department. During t h e p e r i o d i n which M a r t i n e z a p p l i e d f o r job o p e n i n g s , t h e Department used t h r e e f a c t o r s i n f i l l i n g vacancies. The d i r e c t o r , James Greer, looked a t t h e names of t h e t o p t h r e e a p p l i c a n t s l i s t e d on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r , c o n s i d e r e d i n t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l a p p l i c a n t s , even i f t h e i r names d i d n o t a p p e a r on t h e m e r i t r e g i s t e r , and d i s c u s s e d t h e a p p l i c a n t s w i t h p e r s o n n e l i n t h e Department. Greer spoke p r i m a r i l y w i t h t h r e e p e o p l e c o n c e r n i n g Martinez: Lou Hagerman, a s u p e r v i s o r i n t h e o f f i c e d u r i n g M a r t i n e z ' p r i o r employment a t t h e Department; C a r o l e C h a p p e l l , a co-worker i n t h e Department d u r i n g M a r t i n e z ' p r i o r employment; and J a c k i e Hurick, a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department. I t was t h e o p i n i o n of a l l t h r e e t h a t M a r t i n e z had £re- q u e n t l y been t a r d y , a b s e n t and had c a u s e d c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n t h e Department. rehired. A l l t h r e e recommended t h a t M a r t i n e z n o t be G r e e r acknowledged t h a t t h e o p i n i o n s of t h e s e t h r e e p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y J a c k i e Hurick, had a g r e a t i m p a c t on h i s d e c i s i o n t o r e j e c t M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n s . Following a c o n t e s t e d h e a r i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r , t h e Commission d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t , M a r t i n e z , had been u n l a w f u l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Department. I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e Commission r e l i e d upon and a p p l i e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a s e s , a s s e t f o r t h i n McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 9 3 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t acknowledged t h e Commission's r e l i a n c e upon t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s b u t r e v e r s e d t h e a g e n c y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n due t o what t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a ". . . failure to require t h a t t h e proof e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s of t h e c h a r g e of p r o h i b i t e d r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . . ." According t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t " [ d l i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t c o m p l a i n a n t b e c a u s e of h e r membership i n t h e b l a c k r a c e r e q u i r e s f i r s t , proof t h a t s h e i s b l a c k and, second, t h a t r e s p o n d e n t knew s h e w a s b l a c k a n d , t h i r d , t h a t s h e was d e n i e d employment b e c a u s e s h e was b l a c k . " After reviewing t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t no proof e x i s t e d which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t James G r e e r , d i r e c t o r of t h e Department, knew M a r t i n e z was b l a c k when he made h i s d e c i s i o n s t o r e j e c t her applications. The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g proof of s c i e n t e r on t h e p a r t of James G r e e r ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t exceeded i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y of r e v i e w under s e c t i o n 2-4-704, 3. MA C? Whether t h e Commission e r r e d i n r e d u c i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s award of backpay by u s e of i n f o r m a t i o n of i n t e r i m wages n o t p r e s e n t e d a t t h e Commission h e a r i n g ? A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t i t was e r r o r t o r e q u i r e proof of G r e e r ' s s t a t e of mind. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s such a r e q u i r e - ment e x c e e d s t h e prima f a c i e showing s t a n d a r d e s t a b l i s h e d i n McDonnell Douglas v . Green, s u p r a . T h i s i s a c a s e of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana. The c a s e a r o s e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 4 9 , Human R i g h t s A c t , MCA, s p e c i f i c a l l y s e c t i o n 49-2-303, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n pertinent part: " (1) I t i s a n u n l a w f u l d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e for: " ( a ) an employer t o r e f u s e employment t o a p e r s o n ... b e c a u s e of h i s r a c e , c r e e d , r e l i g i o n , m a r i t a l status, color, o r national origin . . ." The p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 49, Montana Human R i g h t s A c t , a r e c l o s e l y modeled a f t e r T i t l e V I I of t h e F e d e r a l C i v i l R i g h t s Act of 1964, 4 2 U.S.C. 52000$ e t seq., and t o a l e s s e r d e g r e e a f t e r t h e Age D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n Employment A c t , 29 U.S.C. 5621, e t s e q . A c o n s i d e r a b l e body of law h a s developed under t h e s e f e d e r a l empl.oyment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n acts. Due t o t h e p a r a l l e l s t r u c t u r e of t h e f e d e r a l laws and t h e Montana Human R i g h t s A c t , t h i s C o u r t h a s examined t h e r a t i o n a l e of f e d e r a l c a s e law. Under f e d e r a l c a s e law, u n l a w f u l employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n claims a r e separated i n t o t h r e e d i s t i n c t categories: (1) d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t , where a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s member a l l e g e s unequal c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b u t where t h e r e a r e f a c i a l l y n e u t r a l h i r i n g p r a c t i c e s (McDonnell Douglas) ; ( 2 ) d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t t o a whole c l a s s where a n employer r e g u l a r l y and p u r p o s e f u l l y t r e a t s a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s less f a v o r a b l y i n t h e employment p r o c e s s ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood of T e a m s t e r s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed. 2d 396) ; and ( 3 ) d i s p a r a t e i m p a c t , where an e m p l o y e r ' s practice i s facially neutral, but i n actuality affects a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s more h a r s h l y t h a n o t h e r c l a s s e s . (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 4 2 2 U.S. 2362, 45 405, 95 S.Ct. A complaining p a r t y i s o f t e n u n a b l e t o d e v e l o p d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . A s was n o t e d i n Loeb v . Textron, 1014. Inc., (1st C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 600 F. 2d 1003, / ". . . 71.) d i r e c t e v i - dence of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o be u n a v a i l a b l e , and ( 2 ) t h e employer h a s t h e b e s t a c c e s s t o t h e r e a s o n s t h a t prompted him t o f i r e , r e j e c t , d i s c i p l i n e o r r e f u s e t o promote t h e complainant. . ." To e a s e t h i s d i f f i c u l t y t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n McDonnell Douqla-s e n u n c i a t e d t h e e l e m e n t s of f a c t u a l proof which make a prima f a c i e c a s e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f where t h e a l l e g a t i o n i s d i s p a r a t e treatment. Once a complaining p a r t y e s t a b l i s h e s a prima f a c i e c a s e , a n i n f e r e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a r i s e s by o p e r a t i o n of law i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n exists. U.S. Furnco C o n s t r u c t i o n Corp. v . Waters ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 438 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957. The e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t i n g a prima f a c i e c a s e under e a c h t h e o r y of discrim: i n a t i o n may d i f f e r . I n the case a t b a r , Martinez' complaint stemmed from unequal t r e a t m e n t where t h e r e w e r e f a c i a l l y neutral hiring practices. Thus, t h i s C o u r t must f o c u s on t h e e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t i n g a prima f a c i e c a s e under t h e d i s p a r a t e treatment discrimination theory. To make o u t a prima f a c i e c a s e of d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t , a complaining p a r t y must show: ". . . ( i ) t h a t he b e l o n g s t o a r a c i a l m i n o r i t y ; ( i i ) t h a t he a p p l i e d and was q u a l i f i e d f o r a job f o r which t h e employer was s e e k i n g a p p l i c a n t s ; (iii) t h a t , d e s p i t e h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , he was r e j e c t e d ; and ( i v ) t h a t , a f t e r h i s r e j e c t i o n , t h e p o s i t i o n remained open and t h e employer c o n t i n u e d t o s e e k a p p l i c a n t s from p e r s o n s of c o m p l a i n a n t ' s qualifications." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, s u p r a , 4 1 1 U.S. a t 802. The Supreme C o u r t i n McDonnell Douglas n o t e d t h a t due t o t h e v a r y i n g f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s a r i s i n g under T i t l e V I I discrimination claims, t h e s e four elements w e r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o every d i s p a r a t e treatment claim. Thus, c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t t h e f o u r t h e l e m e n t i n McDonnell Douglas was s a t i s f i e d by a showing t h a t t h e job v a c a n c i e s were f i l l e d w i t h w h i t e employees, Crawford v. Western E l e c . Company, I n c . (5th C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 614 F.2d 1300. Once a prima f a c i e c a s e i s e s t a b l i s h e d , an i n f e r e n c e a r i s e s which i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n t h e complaining p a r t y ' s burden of p r o o f . Where evidence exists establishing a prima facie case, the trier of fact must proceed to the next step in evaluating evidence. This entails determining whether the employer countered the complaining party's prima facie case with probative evidence establishing ". . . some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S. at 802. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra,/ If no such evidence exists, the complaining party must prevail-. If evidence exists which, on its face, shows a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's conduct, the trier of fact must resolve the conflict and determine whether complainant has satisfied the burden of proof. In resolving this conflict, the trier of fact may be aided by affirmative evidence of pretext. McDonnell Douglas. The trier of fact may also be assisted by the strength of the inference arising from the complaining party's prima facie case or by its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at trial. (1979)r Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn Me. , 408 A.2d 1253. In the case at bar, the Commission followed the evidentiary standards enunciated in McDonnell Douglas. The Commission determined that Martinez had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the Department had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Martinez. The Commission then found that the evidence, as a whole, established unlawful discrimination because the Department's reason for rejecting Martinez was merely a pretext for a discriminatory purpose. In making this finding the Commission considered that Martinez had previously been promoted to permanent status despite her tardiness, absences and personality conflicts. The District Court, in requiring Martinez to prove that James Greer knew she was black when he rejected her application, erred as a matter of law. The McDonnell Douglas elements, constituting a prima facie case, do not require a showing of scienter on the part of the employer. Requiring proof of such knowledge would effectively destroy the prima facie case rule and the inference of discrimination created by law. The District Court held that no proof existed showing Greer's adverse decision regarding Martinez to be affected by the racially biased remark of Jackie Hurick. Section 49- 2-101(8), MCA, which defines "employer" is silent on whether that term embraces "agents" or those upon whom the employer relies. Since Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) defines employer to include "agents", the federal cases are inapplicable. The holding by the District Court is contrary to the rationale expressed in Board of Trustees of Billings, Etc. v. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals (1979), , 604 P.2d 770, 36 St.Rep. 2289. Mont. In that case we held that it was an unlawful act of discrimination for a school board to rely upon a tainted evaluation of a school teacher in reaching a decision not to rehire. Chief Justice Haswell, writing for a unanimous court, made it abundantly clear that it was the taint of the evaluation that created the unlawful discrimination. The school board trustees ". . . relied upon this evaluation, thereby committing the prohibited act of discrimination. - - - insulate themselves by They may not claiming - -of knowledge. lack If we were not to adopt such a policy a school board could violate a public employee's rights with impunity in almost every instance (Emphasis supplied.) 604 P.2d at 775. . . ." I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , James G r e e r , d i r e c t o r of t h e Department, r e l i e d upon a n e v a l u a t i o n of M a r t i n e z by J a c k i e H u r i c k , a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department. was t a i n t e d . This evaluation W h o l d t h a t G r e e r ' s p e r s o n a l knowledge was e n o t m a t e r i a l , and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g s u c h p e r s o n a l knowledge t o be a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t of p l a i n t i f f ' s proof. I n reaching i t s determination t o reverse, the D i s t r i c t C o u r t reviewed t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d , and i n e f f e c t , r e d e t e r m i n e d t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o e v i d e n c e by t h e Commission. The s c o p e of r e v i e w of a D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e g a r d i n g agency d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i s governed by s e c t i o n 2-4-704, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( 2 ) The c o u r t may n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e agency a s t o t h e w e i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e The c o u r t may r e v e r s e on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t o r modify t h e d e c i s i o n i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e a p p e l l a n t have been p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e t h e adminis t r a t i v e f i n d i n g s , i n f e r e n c e s , c o n c l u s i o n s , o r decisions are: ... " ( e ) c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e , p r o b a t i v e , and s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e on t h e whole record; " The e f f e c t of t h i s p r o v i s i o n i s t o l i m i t a r e v i e w i n g D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether o r n o t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e x i s t s t o s u p p o r t t h e agency d e c i s i o n . T h i s C o u r t spoke t o t h a t i s s u e i n S t a n d a r d Chemical Manu f a c t u r i n g Company v . Employment S e c u r i t y D i v i s i o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 613 108 Mont. , 605 P.2d 610,/37 St.Rep. 1 0 5 , / s t a t i n g t h a t : . . . I n q u e s t i o n s of t h i s k i n d , where t h e agency i s ent r u s t e d and c h a r g e d w i t h a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e s t a t u t e and making n e c e s s a r y , i n i t i a l f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i 6 n s . i t i s well s e t t l e d t h a t a reviewing c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s l i m i t e d . Where f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e warr a n t e d by t h e r e c o r d and have a r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s i n It i s not the court's law, t h e y a r e t o be a c c e p t e d . f u n c t i o n t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s own i n f e r e n c e s of f a c t f o r t h o s e of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l o r agency, where f a c t s a r e s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d . " I n the case a t b a r , c o n f l i c t i n g evidence e x i s t e d regarding M a r t i n e z ' prima f a c i e c a s e and t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s c l a i m e d n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y r e a s o n f o r n o t r e h i r i n g M a r t i n e z . These c o n f l i c t s w e r e d e c i d e d i n f a v o r of M a r t i n e z by t h e Commission. For t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o review and r e d e c i d e t h e s e c o n f l i c t s exceeds i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y . A s was n o t e d i n S t a n d a r d Chem., 605 P.2d a t 614: "Where t h e i s s u e [ i n c o n t r o v e r s y ] i s s o c l o s e and t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e on t h e rec o r d which would a l l o w r e a c h i n g o p p o s i t e conclus i o n s , w e t h i n k t h a t a f i n d i n g which o v e r t u r n s another a s being ' c l e a r l y erroneous' i s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Where t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s reviewing function i s limited, a s i n t h i s case, the f i n d i n g s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c i e s and t r i b u n a l s must be s u s t a i n e d where t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence i n the record." For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must be r e v e r s e d . W e must now t u r n t o t h e i s s u e of o f f s e t t i n g i n t e r i m wages. Although no e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t t h e c o n t e s t e d h e a r i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r r e g a r d i n g i n t e r i m wages e a r n e d by M a r t i n e z , t h e Commission reduced h e r backpay award based on information contained elsewhere i n i t s record. The Commission d i d n o t s p e c i f y t h e s o u r c e of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t b u t merely d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M a r t i n e z had e a r n e d $5,229.50 d u r i n g t h e d u r a t i o n of t h i s m a t t e r . S e c t i o n , 2-4-612, MCA, sets f o r t h r u l e s r e g a r d i n g p r o c e d u r e f o r Commission h e a r i n g s . part, I t provides i n p e r t i n e n t that: " (1) O p p o r t u n i t y s h a l l be a f f o r d e d a l l p a r t i e s t o respond and p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and argument on a l l i s s u e s involved. " (5) A party s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o c o n d u c t c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r a f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e of f a c t s . . . " ( 6 ) N o t i c e may be t a k e n of j u d i c i a l l y c o g n i z a b l e facts P a r t i e s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d e i t h e r b e f o r e o r d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g o r by r e f e r e n c e i n p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t s o r o t h e r w i s e of t h e m a t e r i a l n o t i c e d , i n c l u d i n g any s t a f f memoranda o r d a t a . They s h a l l b e afforded an opportunity t o c o n t e s t the m a t e r i a l so noticed. " ... I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n used by t h e Commission t o r e d u c e M a r t i n e z ' backpay award was n o t n o t i c e d t o t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d t h u s p r e c l u d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t from c o n t e s t i n g t h e reduction. F u r t h e r m o r e , s e c t i o n 2-4-623, MCA, governing t h e f i n a l o r d e r handed down by t h e Commission i n c o n t e s t e d c a s e s , p r o vides that: ... A f i n a l d e c i s i o n s h a l l i n c l u d e f i n d i n g s of "(1) f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, s e p a r a t e l y s t a t e d . .. " ( 2 ) F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l be based e x c l u s i v e l y on t h e e v i d e n c e and on m a t t e r s o f f i c i a l l y n o t i c e d . " S i n c e t h e m a t t e r of i n t e r i m wages w a s n o t s u b s t a n t i a t e d by e v i d e n c e a t t h e h e a r i n g nor o f f i c i a l l y n o t i c e d t o t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , i t was e r r o r f o r t h e Commission t o r e d u c e t h e backpay award of Yvonne M a r t i n e z . Therefore, t h i s m a t t e r must be remanded f o r p r o p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e o f f s e t , i f any. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r i s r e v e r s e d . The o r d e r of t h e Commission i s r e i n s t a t e d e x c e p t t h a t p o r t i o n o f f s e t t i n g i n t e r i m wages. The c a s e i s remanded t o t h e Commission w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o h o l d a h e a r i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g what, i f any, i n t e r i m wages s h o u l d be o f f s e t from t h e award granted. ./'/ /) Justices I/

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