FOSTER APIARIES INC v HUBBARD A
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No. 80-399 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 FOSTER APIARIES, INC. a Montana Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs . HUBBARD APIARIES, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus. Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Parrish, Knopp & O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana Robert Knopp argued, Lewistown, Montana Fdr Respondentt K. Robert Foster argued, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: [JILZ- June 16, 1981 JUL 2 1905 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d the Court. D e f e n d a n t Hubbard A p i a r i e s , I n c . , of t h e Opinion of a p p e a l s from d e n i a l i t s m o t i o n s t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t o f $ 1 1 , 9 6 8 e n t e r e d J u n e 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 , by t h e F e r g u s County D i s t r i c t Court. Appellant is Hubbard p r o c e s s e s honey p r o d u c t s . a Michigan corporation Respondent F o s t e r A p i a r i e s , I n c . , i s a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h p r o d u c e s h o n e y . 1978 F o s t e r dispute s h i p p e d beeswax over the which t o Hubbard accounting arose for I n November processing. between the A parties. F o s t e r f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n F e r g u s County D i s t r i c t C o u r t on F e b r u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , which was s e r v e d March 9 , 1 9 7 9 . 15 the president of Hubbard Apiaries sent the On March following l e t t e r t o F o s t e r ' s a t t o r n e y , Robert Foster: "Dear Mr. F o s t e r : "Enclosed p l e a s e f i n d p h o t o c o p i e s of i n v o i c e s f o r which we s e n t c h e c k s . "We were n o t a w a r e t h e r e was a p r o b l e m . F o s t e r s e n t i n cappings-slum. W e rendered and r e p o r t e d . What more c a n w e do o r s a y ! "Yours s i n c e r e l y , " / s / R . L . Hubbard" Hubbard did communicate w i t h not retain Foster's e n t e r e d on J u n e 2 0 , n o t s e n t t o Hubbard, local counsel. 1979. counsel Default or further judgment was A l t h o u g h n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t was t h e company had actual notice of the d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t i t on S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 . Hubbard then contacted counsel. On counsel behalf in who secured Montana Hubbard A p i a r i e s , of Michigan counsel filed a m o t i o n t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s on F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8 0 , c l a i m i n g lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n . When t h a t m o t i o n was d e n i e d on J u n e 11, 1 9 8 0 , Hubbard renewed t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s and v a c a t e on J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 , on t h e g r o u n d s o f m i s t a k e , ina-dvertence, s u r p r i s e o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t and o f f e r e d a n answer t o t h e complaint. court to The m o t i o n was deemed d e n i e d by f a i l u r e o f r u l e on t h e motion. N o t i c e of the a p p e a l was f i l e d August 21, 1980. W e find the following issues fundamental to this appeal : Was H u b b a r d ' s a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t t i m e l y f i l e d 1. u n d e r R u l e 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P.? 2. Did Hubbard's judgment the June 17, District 1980, on g r o u n d s o f Court motion mistake, err to when vacate the inadvertence, denied it default surprise or excusable neglect? Did 3. M.R.Civ.P., Foster comply requirement of with the showing by Rule 55(a), "affidavit or otherwise?" Was H u b b a r d ' s 4. l e t t e r t o respondent's counsel an appearance r e q u i r i n g a three-day n o t i c e of e n t r y of d e f a u l t ? 5. not Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse appointing a representative for its discretion i n Hubbard under Rule 5 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.? Accompanying a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , respondent Foster a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r H u b b a r d ' s a p p e a l because it is u n t i m e l y . c o u r t denied Hubbard's As the facts reflect, f i r s t m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on J u n e 11. N o t i c e o f a p p e a l was n o t f i l e d u n t i l A u g u s t 2 1 , days l a t e r . time limit l i m i t s for exclusive. This, Foster mandated by filing the an argues, Rule 5, appeal seventy-one i s beyond t h e t h i r t y - d a y M.R.App.Civ.P. are The time jurisdictional and An a p p e l l a n t h a s a d u t y t o p e r f e c t i t s a p p e a l i n the manner and compliance, time this provided Court in lacks Rule 1 2 9 6 , 37 S t . R e p . Hubbard Absent jurisdiction P r i c e v . Zunchich ( 1 9 8 0 ) , appeal. 5. to this hea-r t h e , Mont. 612 P.2d 1058. responds that Foster's argument belies the f a c t t h a t t h e M i c h i g a n c o r p o r a t i o n was a p p e a r i n g s p e c i a l l y , c h a l l e n g i n g o n l y t h e c o u r t 1s j u r i s d i c t i o n . presenting obtaining jurisdictional a ruling, questions separate from The n e c e s s i t y o f to other results i n two m o t i o n s and two h e a r i n g s , provide appealable decisions. the court viable and issues, b o t h o f which may Hubbard concludes that it would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e q u i r e t h e d e f a u l t e d d e f e n d a n t t o appeal the jurisdictional decision prior to judgment on other motions. I n our view n e i t h e r p a r t y is c o m p l e t e l y c o r r e c t . The a p p e a l of t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard1s f i r s t motion t o d i s m i s s is untimely. before However, t h e s e c o n d d e n i a l i s t i m e l y and p r o p e r l y this Court for consideration. This b a s e d on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t we h a v e h e r e orders, each c o n t r o l l e d conclusion is two s e p a r a t e f i n a l s e p a r a t e l y by t h e p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s and e a c h s i n g u l a r l y a p p e a l a b l e . A s Chief J u s t i c e Haswell s t a t e d - Mont . Refrigerated Freight Lines (1979), 1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 5 , 36 S t . R e p . an order refusing 472, to immediately appealable. have appealed 478, vacate there a that p r o m p t l y when Hubbard , Pirkle 591 P.2d i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t default judgment is T h i s b e i n g t h e c a s e Hubbard s h o u l d t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l noted i n S h i e l d s v. moved to vacate grounds. for lack its I t should be of personal j u r i s d i c t i o n , which c a n be waived i f n o t a p p e a l e d p r o p e r l y , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , which may be r a i s e d a t any t i m e . Hubbard's r i g h t t o appeal t h e d e n i a l of its February 14, 1 9 8 0 , m o t i o n was e x t i n g u i s h e d when i t f a i l e d t o a p p e a l Hubbard i s w i t h i n t h e time l i m i t s o f R u l e 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. not persuasive The company i t s i s s u e of regarding has not shown s p e c i a l appearance. its that special appearance somehow engaged a new s e t o f p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s . W a l s o d i r e c t Hubbard's e there is no longer any attention t o the f a c t that distinction between a general s p e c i a l appearance i n Montana. M.R.Civ.P., abolished the traditional classifications of appearances. The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e i s p r e s e r v e d by including in initial 12, it plaintiff's tional waived we defendant's a claim. issue because of v. 1910. Union Tank Car general the claim and response. the special to the the jurisdic- is the Rule between response (1980), S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Co. 1 1 8 5 , 37 S t . R e p . difference Once a p a r t y h a s r a i s e d its pleading, in solely With t h e a d o p t i o n o f or not lost or Knoepke v. Mont. , 620 P . 2 d S e e a l s o Dragor S h i p p i n g C o r p o r a t i o n Company Orange T h e a t r e C o r p . v . (9th Cir. 1 9 6 7 ) , 378 F . 2 d R a y h e r s t z Amusement C o r p . 241; (3rd Cir. 1 9 4 4 ) , 139 F.2d 871; 2 M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e Yl12.12. A An first immediate motion jurisdiction motion to appeal would of the vacate on not of have District other, the court's exposed Court. denial of the appellant to the By filing nonjurisdictional a second grounds, Hubbard a c c e p t e d t h e d e n i a l and a d m i t t e d t h e a u t h o r i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e company and t h e c a s e . R e g a r d i n g t h e d e n i a l o f H u b b a r d ' s J u n e 17 m o t i o n , we find that the Disregarding notice the of improper appeal was from deviations timely the o u t l i n e d i n R u l e s 6 0 ( b ) and 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., the motion would be deemed f i f t e e n days a f t e r hearing. a p p e a l on A u g u s t 2 1 , limit. denied on filed. procedures we f i n d t h a t August 10, 1980, its n o t i c e of Appellant f i l e d 1980, w e l l w i t h i n t h e t h i r t y - d a y time Therefore, t h i s Court has t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s a c t i o n on t h e s e c o n d m o t i o n . Although w e have t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n c l a i m s of error regarding t o hear Hubbard's i t s second motion t o v a c a t e , the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l was n o t e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e m o t i o n was untimely f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t Court. R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides in part: "The m o t i o n s h a l l be made w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , and f o r r e a s o n s ( I ) , ( 2 ) , and ( 3 ) when a defendant has been p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d , whether i n l i e u of p u b l i c a t i o n o r n o t , n o t more t h a n 60 d a y s a f t e r t h e j u d g m e n t , o r d e r o r p r o c e e d i n g was e n t e r e d o r t a k e n , o r , i n a c a s e where n o t i c e o f e n t r y o f judgment i s r e q u i r e d by R u l e 7 7 ( d ) , n o t more t h a n 60 d a y s after service of notice of entry of j udgment " . The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t Hubbard no l a t e r t h a n September seven days This later Court sixty-day has 20, Hubbard consistently limitation. See t o dismiss and Strnod actual notice One h u n d r e d and f o r t y - 1979. moved had under Rule 60. s t r i c t l y enforced the v. 141 Abadie (1962), Mont. 224, 376 P.2d 730. I n t h e c a s e a t hand, Hubbard simply s t a t e d t h a t it d i d n o t know t h a t f u r t h e r a c t i o n was r e q u i r e d o f i t by way of excusable an neglect, appearance. This does not e s p e c i a l l y when a p p e l l a n t ' s constitute representative is t h e p r e s i d e n t o f a l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n d o i n g b u s i n e s s on a m u l t i s t a t e basis. I n Morris v. F r a n k T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co. (1979), - Mont . , 6 0 1 P.2d 6 9 8 , 36 S t . R e p . 1 8 7 5 , we s t a t e d : "A f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r d u e t o f o r g e t f u l n e s s and t h e p r e s s o f o t h e r , more i m p o r t a n t b u s i n e s s is not s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h excusable neglect. D u d l e y v . S t i l e s ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont. 3 4 2 , 343. Even t h e m o s t 566, 386 P.2d l i b e r a l approach t o t h i s problem cannot s a v e appellants1 case. A l i b e r a l court c a n n o t f i n d e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t where a d e f e n d a n t h a s w i l l i n g l y slumbered on h i s r i g h t s and i g n o r e d t h e j u d i c i a l m a c h i n e r y e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w . ' " 601 P.2d a t 699. . . . is o u r It appeal to thereby this view that Court, here again, appellant extinguished them. slept Hubbard as its in its on tardy rights admitted and to having a c t u a l n o t i c e o f t h e d e f a u l t on S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 . I f we R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , Hubbard a r e t o s t r i c t l y apply t h e language of had u n t i l November 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t o move t h e c o u r t t o v a c a t e t h e I t is s i m p l y n o t r e a s o n a b l e f o r a p a r t y judgment. t o wait u n t i l F e b r u a r y 14 t o r a i s e an i s s u e of e r r o r i n r e g a r d t o a default judgment. Hubbard1s incalcitrance cannot be condoned by a l l o w i n g i t t o now c o m p l a i n o f i m p r o p r i e t y . we Since have no jurisdiction to hear Hubbard's a p p e a l of t h e f i r s t d e n i a l of i t s motion t o v a c a t e , Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., f i l e d with and since the second the D i s t r i c t Court, motion i n t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard's to the untimely. motion should have we T h e r e c o u l d be no prejudicial error since untimely R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., w i l l n o t consider Hubbard's o t h e r i s s u e s . vacate, was second motion been denied as No c a u s e s h a l l be r e v e r s e d upon a p p e a l by r e a s o n o r e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t where t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e same r e s u l t would h a v e b e e n attained had the trial errors. R u l e 1 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P. (1957), 1 3 3 Mont. 34, court 319 not P.2d committed the error or S e e a l s o G a l i g e r v . Hansen 1051. Only substantial p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s of Hubbard would w a r r a n t r e v e r s a l . N such p r e j u d i c e o c c u r r e d because of t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s of o the t r i a l court. Af f irmed. W concur: e
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