STATE v PRICE

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No. 79-74 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A O R F F OTN 1980 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS. J O H N L. PkICE, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and For t h e County o f G a l l a t i n , Honorable J o s e p h Gary, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana James Goetz a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana John H. Maynard a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n h A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Donald E. White, County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana Michael J. L i l l y a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: 1 1 1990 March 2 4 , 1980 BEC I 7 1980 Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant John L. Price appeals from a judgment of the Gallatin County District Court, entered after a nonjury trial, convicting him of two felony counts of sexual assault and one misdemeanor count of obscenity. In attacking the sexual assault convictions, defendant asserts insufficiency of the evidence to sustain these convictions, but also contends that assuming the sufficiency of the evidence, the case must be reversed because the trial court did not set forth the legal standard of consent whereby it determined that the sexual touching was without the boy's consent. Defendant also argues that his convictions of sexual assault must be reversed because testimony of a psychiatrist concerning defendant's admissions to the sexual touchings constituted a violation of the patient-physician privilege. In attacking the misdemeanor obscenity conviction, defendant contends that the State failed to comply with section 45-8-201, MCA, in that the State failed to admit evidence at trial which would give the trial court a basis upon which to determine contemporary community standards and whether the conduct appealed to a prurient interest in sex. His last contention is that he was denied due process of law at the sentencing hearing because the State surprised him with the testimony of two women who stated that at least 11 years before, while they were young girls, the defendant touched them in a sexual manner. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold both convictions of sexual assault. We reverse and dismiss the misdemeanor conviction of obscenity because the State failed to introduce evidence of contemporary community standards, or evidence that the conduct involved appealed to a prurient interest in sex. This requirement is a statutory one in this state, and the failure of the State to meet this -2- requirement left the trial judge without an evidentiary basis to determine this issue. The question as to the admissibility of the psychiatrist's testimony is one that defendant cannot really complain about in this appeal, because he first sought and obtained admission of medical reports containing defendant's admissions that he touched the boy. Defendant did not, furthermore, object to the admission of this testimony at trial, and thus, he has waived his right to predicate error upon its admission. The criminal charges involved arose out of incidents which took place in a swimming pool at Bozeman Hot Springs. The Hot Springs is a privately owned and operated camping and recreation resort. The complex includes a public indoor hot springs mineral swimming pool. Swimmers are required to wear proper swimsuits and remain properly covered. The incidents took place in November and December 1978, while Chris, a ten-year-old boy, and his nine-year-old sister, Nicole, were staying with their parents at the KOA Campgraund, which is adjacent to the Hot Springs. Chris and Nicole frequently played on the grounds surrounding the Hot Springs and regularly swam in the pool. The first incident which later gave rise to a charge of sexual assault and a charge of obscenity took place at the swimming pool in November 1978. While Chris and Nicole were swimming, they noticed the defendant, a 65-yearold man, exposing himself. The defendant then approached Chris and struck up a conversation. While doing so he placed his hand down the front of Chris's swimsuit and touched the boy's private parts. moved away from the defendant. Chris was angered and Nicole observed this incident. The next incident, but one which did not lead to a criminal charge, took place on December 11, 1978, when Chris, Nicole and their little brother were riding bicycles around the Hot Springs complex, when they noticed the defendant in his car. He asked the children to go to his car and listen to music, but they declined. While the children were leaving, however, the defendant again touched Chris on the outside of his clothing in the genital area. Chris rode his bicycle home and reported the incident to his mother. His parents notified law enforcement officials. The last incident, which led to another charge of sexual assault, took place on December 17, 1978, when Chris, at the suggestion of law enforcement officials, was used to lure the defendant into another act of sexual touching. The deputies, with the consent of the parents, asked Chris to go to the Hot Springs pool and instructed him how to conduct himself at the pool. Chris was specifically instructed "not to go towards the defendant or say anything to him, beckon to him or call to him." Chris then went into the swimming pool and the deputies went to prearranged observation stations at the pool. While Chris was swimming, the defendant came over to him and started a conversation. Chris continued to swim. Moments later, while Chris was upside down in the pool walking on his hands, the defendant grabbed Chris's legs and set him rightside up. Defendant then placed his hand down in front of Chris's swimsuit and touched his private parts. was angered and moved away. Chris Chris then saw his father standing along the pool, and he immediately got out of the pool. As a result of these episodes, defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of obscenity. During the trial, the psychiatrist who had examined the -4- defendant testified that defendant had admitted to him that he had touched the boy in a sexual way. not object to this testimony. Defense counsel did The prosecution also introduced into evidence, without objection from defendant, a report from the same psychiatrist which contained statements by the defendant that he had touched the boy in a sexual way. The defendant did not testify. On September 13, 1979, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions and judgment and found defendant guilty of all three charges. The court also ordered a presentence investigation and report and set the sentencing for September 24, 1979. Defendant was sentenced to six months in the county jail for obscenity and he was sentenced to ten years in the Montana State Prison on each of the two felony counts of sexual assault, with six years suspended on each count. The sentences were to run concurrently. The trial court also ruled that defendant was a nondangerous offender. This appeal followed. THE CONSENT ISSUE With relation to defendant's argument that the State failed to prove the boy did not consent to the sexual touching, we must preface our analysis with a brief statement of the existing statutory law applying to the issue of consent where the charge is sexual assault. Defendant was convicted of violating section 45-5-502, MCA. Neither this statute nor any other applicable statute, provided that consent is ineffective if the victim is under a certain age. (Although not applicable here, this statute has since been amended to provide that consent cannot be given if the victim is less than 14 years old. See section 45-5-502 (5), MCA. ) Because of this legislative omission, defendant contends that the State must prove lack of consent regardless of the age of the victim. -5- We are faced with two anomalies. First, we must analyze the evidence to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the boy did not consent to the sexual touching. Obviously, if the evidence was insufficient, the trial court's decision must be reversed and the charges ordered dismissed. Assuming that the evidence is sufficient (and we so find), we are confronted by a bare bones set of findings and conclusions, from which it is not apparent the precise legal basis upon which the trial court decided the issue of consent. The defendant argues that the failure to set forth in the conclusions, the legal theory upon which the consent was found, necessitates a reversal. First, to an analysis of the evidence. The consent issue is raised here because the State failed to ask a direct question of the boy--ats to whether he consented to the contacts. Our job here, however, is first to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the trial court could determine that the boy did not consent, even though the legal basis for such conclusion was not set forth. After the first sexual touching in November 1978, the boy was angered and moved away from the defendant. The boy testified that after this incident, he stayed away from the Hot Springs swimming pool because he did not wish to be near the defendant. Another sexual touching occurred when the defendant asked the young boy and his sister and brother to get into the car with him and listen to music. Indeed, it was this sexual touching which prompted the boy to tell his parents. The third sexual touching took place in a situation where the boy was instructed to get in the swimming pool, and where the conduct of the defendant and the boy was -6- observed. The boy was specifically instructed not to do anything to entice the defendant towards him. The record is barren of any evidence that the boy enticed the defendant to be near him or that when he did come near, that he consented to any touching at all. Indeed, the boy was walking on his hands in the swimming pool when the defendant grabbed him and turned him rightside up. Almost immediately, the defendant then shoved his hand inside the boy's swimming trunks and touched him. The boy pulled away in anger and got out of the defendant's reach. This episode was observed by two police officers who were stationed there to specifically observe the conduct, primarily of the defendant, but also that of the boy. Defendant contends that this evidence fails to lay a basis for a legally sufficient conclusion that the boy did not consent to the sexual touching on each of the occasions involved. Defendant contends that only direct evidence from the mouth of the boy that he did not consent could establish that he did not consent to the sexual touchings. But this argument ignores the reality of a small boy being confronted by an adult under embarrassing circumstances. Undoubtedly, the consent issue would have presented a cleaner case if the boy had uttered the magic words in front of the trial judge that he did not consent to the sexual touchings, but this failure does not render the evidence insufficient. There is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that the boy permitted the sexual touchings to occur. Indeed, as is so often the case in situations such as this, the events took place so fast that there was hardly time for a young boy (or anyone, for that matter) to have advance warning of what was about to take place. On both occasions involved, the boy -7- was angered and moved away from the defendant. This hardly demonstrates that the boy approved of such conduct. The fact that the boy reported an intervening incident to his parent is indicative, albeit circumstantially, of a lack of consent. The failure of the boy to utter the magic words does not ipso facto establish the insufficiency of the evidence. Our task here, however, does not end with a holding that the evidence is sufficient for sustaining a finding of guilt. We are left with a sufficient evidentiary record and with no precise basis of determining how the trial court reached its decision. The sexual assault statute, which contains the consent requirement at issue here, section 45-5-502(1), MCA, reads as follows: "A person who knowingly subjects another not his spouse to any sexual contact without consent commits the offense of sexual assault." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that one of the elements the State must prove is that the sexual touching took place "without consent" of the victim. It is equally clear that every element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. At the conclusion of the trial, defendant moved the trial court to dismiss the assault charges or to grant a directed verdict on the ground that the State failed to prove lack of consent to the sexual touching. The State asked the trial court to open up the trial to permit additional evidence on the consent issue. The trial court took this motion under advisement and ultimately denied it. Briefs were then filed by both sides on the issue of consent. State defended the consent issue on three grounds: -8- The First, that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to reach a conclusion that the State proved lack of consent; second, that sections 45-5-501 and 45-5-503, MCA, which provide that a victim under the age of 16 is incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse, should also apply to the sexual assault charges filed under section 45-5-502; and third, that general definitional and case law dictate an applicat'ion of the common law rule that someone 10 years old or younger is incapable of legally consenting to anything. In this appeal, the State concedes the inapplicability of either of its arguments with relation to inability to consent as a matter of law. its first approach: The State thus concentrates on that the circumstantialevidence existing is sufficient to prove the lack of consent. agree with this assessment. We However, the findings and . conclusions entered by the trial court do not tell us on what legal basis the trial court determined the issue of consent. Did the trial court determine as a matter of evidence only that the State had proved lack of consent? Or did the trial court determine that the young boy was, as a matter of law, incapable of giving consent by either of the two theories advanced by the State? With relation to the first charge of sexual assault, the pertinent finding (No. 9) provides: "The old man also asked Chris if he liked hot water. Christopher replied that he did. The old man then asked him 'Does it give you a hard on?' Chris said, 'What?' and then the old man stuck his hand down Chris' swimming suit and felt his 'privates'. Chris pulled away from the - - and felt -- - old man - -mad." (Emphasis added.) The conclusion of law with relation to the issue of consent (No. 6) states : "That on or about the 19th day of November, age 65, 1978, the defendant, John L. Price, - subjected Chris, a child of - ten, not his spouse, - to sexual-contact without consent." (Emphasis added. ) The findings and conclusions with relation to the second assault charge similarly fail to reveal the legal basis upon which the consent issue was decided. The pertinent finding (No. 13) provides: "Gallatin County Sheriff's deputies Pearson, Brown and Schumacher, took up various vantage points around the pool. Deputy Schumacher was stationed in the ceiling above the pool and could observe all that occurred therein. He saw a white haired old man with a white beard approaching Chris, who attempted to get away. The old man eventually caught up with Chris and picked him up by his feet and let him down and then approached Chris and appeared to thrust ---his hand down into Chris' swimming away and then suit. Chris pulled --- immediately got out of the pool. Chris stated that the ----old white haired man had put his hand into his swimming suit and felt his 'private'. The old man also asked, as he put his hand into Chris' pants, if Chris wanted to get a hard felt mad after on. ~h;is ----this happened. " (Emphasis added.) 7 The conclusion of law with relation to this same event in relation to the consent issue (No. 9) provides: "That on or about the 17th day of December, 1978, the defendant, John L. Price, - age 65, aged ten, subjected Chris, a child -- not his spouse, to sexual-contact without consent." (~mphasisadded. ) As we have already stated, lack of consent could be proved by circumstantial evidence, and there was sufficient evidence to support a determination of lack of consent. In this situation, there are well-established rules of appellate law which apply to sustain the judgment of conviction entered by the Court on the counts of sexual assault. Duncan (19791, Mont. , In State v. 593 P.2d 1026, 1034, 36 St.Rep. 748, 758, we said a District Court in a criminal bench trial was under no statutory duty, except in death penalty cases (section 46-18-306, MCA), to make findings, but was merely obliged to enter a general verdict of innocence or guilt. Error of the District Court is not presumed, State v. Boe (1963), 143 Mont. 141, 388 P.2d 372; indeed every presumption is in favor of a judgment of conviction on appeal if any substantial evidence supports it. State v. Stoddard (1966), 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827. The conclusions of law reached by the District Court could be construed to mean that the court found lack of the victim's consent from his incapacity as a 10-year-old to consent, or that in any event the boy did not consent. Conclusions of law reached by a trial court do not enjoy the same level of inviolability that findings of fact are accorded on appeal (see e.g., Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.1. This Court is in at least an equal position with the District Court to determine the appropriate conclusion of law to be reached from the facts found in a case. Since we have found that there was sufficient evidence adduced to support a conclusion that the boy did not in fact consent to defendant's unlawful acts, all the presumptions are in favor of the judgment of conviction, as we have shown. We, therefore, sustain the conviction on the sexual assault counts. THE OBSCENITY ISSUE We have already set forth the facts leading to the obscenity conviction--in essence, that the defendant in November 1978, exposed his sexual organs to the young boy and his sister while they were at the Bozeman Hot Springs swimming pool. As a result of this exposure, defendant was charged with and convicted of obscenity under section 45-8201, MCA. Defendant acknowledges that the exposure was sufficient to subject him to a charge of indecent exposure, but argues that the State chose instead to charge him with obscenity, and thus, must prove each of the requirements -11- under the obscenity statute. He argues that the obscenity conviction cannot be sustained because the State did not establish at trial, as an evidentiary proposition, that based on contemporary community standards, the conduct involved appealed to the prurient interest in sex. section 45-8-201(2)(a) and (b), MCA. See The State acknowledges that it presented no evidence on this question, but argues that it is not required to establish an evidentiary foundation with regard to contemporary community standards and the appeal to a prurient interest in sex. In arguing that it need not present trial evidence with regard to contemporary community standards, appeal to prurient interest or patent offensiveness, the State relies on Kaplan v. California (1973), 413 U.S. 115, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 37 L.Ed.2d 492, which seemingly holds that all that is required is for the alleged obscene material to be introduced into evidence and a subsequent jury verdict stamping the material as obscene. Whatever the holding in Kaplan, however, we cannot consider it as controlling the issue here. The first reason that Kaplan is not controlling is that this state has enacted specific legislation setting forth the elements which must be proved for an obscenity conviction. Seotion 45-8-201(b), MCA, requires that the conduct involved must appeal to the prurient interest in sex, and requires that this standard must be determined by contemporary community standards. Nowhere does this statute permit the trier of fact to make these determinations without an evidentiary basis in the trial record. This being the case, the findings and conclusions of the trial court, absent the required evidentiary basis, cannot be upheld. -12- We concede that the portion of the obscenity statute that requires proof of contemporary community standard refers to "material", and that the obscenity statute could be stretched to mean that community standards do not apply to exposure crimes, since "material" is not involved. This defendant undoubtedly committed a crime of indecent exposure, but was charged under the obscenity statute. That statute is imprecise when applied to this crime, because the obscenity statute was fashioned to meet First Amendment implications in obscenity cases. So this Court comes again to a situation where a conviction must be set aside for lack of proof of the crime charged. This Court has received some criticism because we have reversed convictions in cases such as this. Generally, we have refrained from adverse comment in our decisions, because judicial opinions are not meant to be instruments of public relations. Here, we will offer only this plain advice: charge a flasher as a flasher and not as a strip-tease artist. The obscenity conviction must be reversed and dismissed. THE SENTENCING ISSUE About five minutes before the sentencing hearing was to begin, the State notified defendant that it would call two female witnesses to testify that some 11 years before, the defendant had touched them in a sexual manner very similar to this case. Defendant objected to this testimony, but the objection was overruled. for a continuance. Defendant did not, however, ask The court admitted the testimony but did not refer to it in any manner in its sentencing judgment. testified One woman, 21 years old,/that the defendant exposed himself to her during the summer of 1968, when she was 11 years old. She also testified that during this same summer -13- the defendant touched her sexually--the ostensible justification for the touching being her complaint that her legs were sore after a day of horseback riding. Finally, she testified that during this summer she frequently saw the defendant expose himself at the swimming pool by dropping his swimming trunks. She could not specify the dates on which these activities allegedly took place nor was her testimony corroborated in any manner. The other woman, 24 years old, testified that during the summer of 1966, when she was 10 years old, she was sitting on the defendant's lap after riding horses, and the defendant caressed her sexually. Like the first witness, she could not establish the dates or times when this happened, and neither was her testimony corroborated in any manner. Defendant contends that this surprise testimony deprived him of any meaningful opportunity to refute the charges. He argues, furthermore, that the testimony as to the events so remote in time had the effect of depriving defendant of meaningfully rebutting the testimony. The State, on the okher hand, admits that it planned to surprise defendant by this testimony at the sentencing hearing. Answering the defendant's remoteness argument, the State argues that the evidence was relevant in all events because a sentencing court should have before it all available evidence concerning a defendant's past. Next, the State argues that failure to give advance notice of this testimony was sufficiently ameliorated because defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine both witnesses. Finally, the State urges that defendant is in no position to press this point on appeal because he waived such right by failing to ask for a continuance of the sentencing hearing in order to better meet the evidence offered. -14- Because of the State's denial of a reasonable notice to defendant, any contention of the State that defendant waived his right to complain because he did not request a continuance, falls on deaf ears. To hold otherwise would reward the State for its failure to comply with one of the pillars of due process of law,fair notice. For this reason alone, we are compelled to order resentencing. Now that the defendant has notice, he will at the time of resentencing in the case have the opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence on the prior crimes,if such evidence is admitted. The question of admissibility of such evidence as having a bearing on the sentencing, and as to whether it is remote and uncorroborated, remains one for the reasonable discretion of the trial court. The defendant's character, background, history, and mental and physical condition are proper subjects for the District Court to consider in determining a proper sentence. Section 46-18-101, MCA. As far as the record now shows, although the trial court admitted this evidence at the sentencing hearing, it was not alluded to as a factor in the sentence received by the defendant. The convictions of sexual assault are affirmed. The cause is remanded for a new sentencing hearing on those convictions. The conviction of obscenity is reversed and the cause ordered dismissed. 'iI We Concur: i/ Justice (1 Justices ustice Daniel J. Shea will file a written dissent later. -15- DISSENT No. 79-74 State v. Price .............................................................. Authored by Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea .............................................................. December 24, 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . S h e a c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g in part: I c o n c u r w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n r e v e r s i n g and d i s m i s s i n g t h e o b s c e n i t y c o n v i c t i o n , b u t I h a v e more t o s a y on t h e i s s u e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y community s t a n d a r d s . requiring evidence of Even w i t h o u t a statute standards, we should contemporary r e q u i r e such evidence i n a l l o b s c e n i t y t r i a l s so t h a t a j u r y is n o t g i v e n u n b r i d l e d d i s c r e t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e what i s o r i s n o t obscene. Requiring evidence of c o n t e m p o r a r y community s t a n d a r d s a l s o preserves our f u n c t i o n a s a reviewing c o u r t s o t h a t we do n o t become m e r e l y a r u b b e r s t a m p f o r what h a s occurred a t t r i a l . M views a r e s e t f o r t h i n t h i s opinion. y I a l s o concur w i t h the decision vacating the sentence I depart here and r e m a n d i n g f o r a new s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . from t h e m a j o r i t y , b e c a u s e I would n o t p e r m i t t h e however, S t a t e t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e a t t h e new s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h a t the defendant, s o many y e a r s a g o , w i t h two young g i r l s , is mony too Furthermore, taking remote the unfair now grown women. and State impossible should advantage sentencing hearing. had s e x u a l c o n t a c t I of not the The o f f e r e d t e s t i to be defend rewarded defendant emphasize, at however, against. here the for first t h a t because I d i s s e n t from t h e a f f i r m a n c e o f t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s , sentencing again i s s u e h e r e would convicted after a the be moot u n l e s s d e f e n d a n t w e r e new trial. M y views as to sentencing are s e t f o r t h i n t h i s opinion. I dissent from t h e o p i n i o n a f f i r m i n g t h e a s s a u l t con- victions, for that trial the "without r i g h t law. the consent" basic court r e a s o n t h a t we h a v e no a s s u r a n c e properly element of the decided charge the by underlying applying the The a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s p r e s e n t a s i m p l e i s s u e ( c o m p l i c a t e d , however, by t h e m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n ) : S h o u l d we a f f i r m a c o n v i c t i o n and s e n d a p e r s o n t o p r i s o n where t h e r e i s no a s s u r a n c e , and t h e r e f o r e more t h a n a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d t h e r i g h t law i n d e c i d i n g t h e "without consent" issue, an essential element of sexual assault? To t h i s q u e s t i o n t h e m a j o r i t y d e c l a r e s " y e s . " I s a y t h a t t h e answer m u s t b e " n o . " I proceed f i r s t t o t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s . THE ASSAULT CONVICTIONS P r o c e d u r a l Background and P r o b l e m s P r e s e n t e d stated in the introduction, I As a simple problem is p r e s e n t e d h e r e , and i t i s o n l y made more c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e majority opinion. trial court The q u e s t i o n c e n t e r s a r o u n d w h e t h e r decided the "without a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e r i g h t l a w . not know, prison, I we say that should if first a c t u a l l y decided. consent" No o n e knows. we are be going s u r e of to what issue the by B e c a u s e we do send the a man trial to court the majority opinion is The e s s e n c e o f t h a t i t r e a l l y d o e s n ' t m a t t e r what t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t u a l l y c a n t e l l from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s decided--we guilty. shows The q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d as to the consent i s n o t what issue--the question t r i a l c o u r t decided a s t o t h e consent i s s u e . the evidence i s what the Because it is i m p o s s i b l e t o make t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n from t h e r e c o r d h e r e , I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s m u s t be r e v e r s e d . The p r o b l e m s p r e s e n t e d procedural context of c a n b e s t be u n d e r s t o o d how the consent issue in the arose--the q u e s t i o n a t t r i a l a r o s e a s t o what l a w s h o u l d a p p l y t o t h e f a c t s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n s e n t . the State's because the case, d e f e n d a n t moved State failed to prove A t t h e end o f t o dismiss the lack of charges consent. It a p p e a r s t h a t t h e S t a t e was a t a l l t i m e s p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " w i t h o u t c o n s e n t " was p r o v e d a s a m a t t e r o f law s i m p l y by p r o v i n g t h e a g e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ( 6 5 ) and t h e age of boy t h e boy ( 1 0 ) - - t h e was legally contact. State taking the position t h a t the incapable of consenting The S t a t e d i d p r o v e to the sexual t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a g e and t h e boy's age. I n response t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s , S t a t e was a p p a r e n t l y t a k e n by s u r p r i s e , trial court issue. to offer additional T h i s r e q u e s t was denied. issue. Both sides then and t h u s moved t h e evidence t a k e n under submitted on the advisement briefs on consent and l a t e r the consent The S t a t e a r g u e d t h a t n o t o n l y was l a c k o f c o n s e n t proved by t h e e v i d e n c e , but the that actual i n any e v e n t t h e boy was l e g a l l y i n c a p a b l e o f c o n s e n t i n g b e c a u s e o f h i s a g e . The S t a t e u r g e d two i n c a p a c i t y t o c o n s e n t t h e o r i e s upon t h e trial judge: First, that the s t a t u t e s providing t h a t one under t h e age of 16 is i n c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o an a c t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e ( s e e s e c t i o n s 45-5-501 that the statute, same statutes section applied 45-5-502. c a s e law j u s t i f i e d to Second, a p p l i c a t i o n of and 4 5 - 5 - 5 0 3 ) , the sexual and assault t h e S t a t e argued that t h e common law r u l e t h a t someone o f t h i s b o y ' s a g e i s p r e c l u d e d f r o m g i v i n g h i s l e g a l consent t o anything. The t r i a l c o u r t l a t e r e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s o f conclusions majority of law, opinion and sets found forth f a c t and the defendant g u i l t y . the pertinent conclusions a s t o both a s s a u l t convictions. findings The and Defendant then appealed t o t h i s Court. I n d e f e n d a n t ' s opening b r i e f t o t h i s C o u r t , he e f f e c t i v e l y f o r e c l o s e d any r e l i a n c e by t h e S t a t e on e i t h e r t h e o r y of l e g a l incapacity t o consent. The S t a t e r e c o g n i z e d this i n i t s r e p l y b r i e f by c o n c e d i n g t h a t n e i t h e r t h e o r y o f l e g a l i n c a p a c i t y t o c o n s e n t was the right law t o apply t o this T h u s , t h e S t a t e c o n f i n e d i t s agument t o w h e t h e r t h e r e case. was sufficient evidence in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e boy d i d sexual contact. record not in consent could apply sufficient circumstantial that the t h a t t h e t r i a l judge this basis unless conclusions? from the trial here: the Assuming consent, he told and us so in f i n d i n g s and how do we know i s s u e on findings and In f a c t , it is impossible t o t e l l conclusions court applied majority his is there a c t u a l l y decided the consent in t h a t " w i t h o u t c o n s e n t " was p r o v e d . Even legal incapacity evidence t o j u s t i f y boy d i d n o t H e did not. findings consent the a The S t a t e i g n o r e d t h e o b v i o u s i s s u e p u l l e d theory conclusions support f a c t consent t o the i n t o f o c u s by i t s c o n c e s s i o n t h a t n e i t h e r to to opinion just what finding theory and of concluding W a r e l e f t t o guess. e acknowledges that it is i m p o s s i b l e t o t e l l from t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s which theory of consent the trial court applied to the consent issue: ". . . Assuming t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t ( a n d we s o f i n d ) , we a r e conf r o n t e d w i t h a b a r e b o n e s s e t o f f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , from which i t i s n o t a p p a r e n t t h e p r e c i s e l e g a l b a s i s upon which t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e c i d e d t h e i s s u e of c o n s e n t . . ." The majority c r e a t e d by the also accurately defines " b a r e bones" the problems f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s when p r e s e n t e d t o an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t : "Our t a s k h e r e , however, d o e s n o t end w i t h a holding t h a t the evidence is s u f f i c i e n t for s u s t a i n i n g a f i n d i n g of g u i l t . W are l e f t e w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n t i a r y r e c o r d and w i t h no p r e c i s e b a s i s o f d e t e r m i n i n g how t h e t r i a l c o u r t reached its d e c i s i o n . "In t h i s appeal, the S t a t e concedes the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of e i t h e r of i t s arguments with r e l a t i o n t o i n a b i l i t y t o consent a s a m a t t e r of law. The S t a t e t h u s c o n c e n t r a t e s on i t s f i r s t a p p r o a c h : which i s t h a t c i r cumstantial evidence e x i s t i n g is s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e t h e l a c k of c o n s e n t . W e agree with t h i s assessment. However, t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t d o n o t t e l l u s on what l e g a l b a s i s t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h e i s s u e of c o n s e n t . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t determine a s a ma-tter of evidence o n l y t h a t t h e S t a t e had p r o v e d l a c k o f consent? Or d i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e young boy was, a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , i n c a p a b l e o f g i v i n g c o n s e n t by e i t h e r o f t h e two t h e o r i e s a d v a n c e d by t h e S t a t e ? " Unfortunately, before deciding to affirm the convictions here, the majority does not purport t o answer these questions. Why a r e we a f f i r m i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n s and s e n d i n g t h i s man t o p r i s o n i f w e d o n o t know t h e a n s w e r s t o these questions? How c a n we i n good c o n s c i e n c e p u t o u r s t a m p o f a p p r o v a l upon t h e s e c o n v i c t i o n s when w e do n o t know t h e answers t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s ? In fact, pertinent opinion, trial i f a n y t h i n g a t a l l i s t o b e g l e a n e d from t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s q u o t e d it i s t h a t judge decided it is j u s t the consent l e g a l i n c a p a c i t y t o consent--the in the majority a s likely a s not that the i s s u e based on t h e b o y ' s wrong law. At trial, the S t a t e p r o v e d b o t h t h e a g e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ( 6 5 ) and t h e a g e of the boy (10). Before f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , the trial judge entered the t h e S t a t e u r g e d him t o u s e o n e o r t h e o t h e r of t h e l e g a l i n c a p a c i t y t o c o n s e n t t h e o r i e s . In each of t h e p e r t i n e n t f i n d i n g s , t h e t r i a l judge r e c i t e s t h e a g e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ( 6 5 ) and t h e a g e o f t h e boy r e p e a t s t h i s i n e a c h of It (lo), the p e r t i n e n t conclusions of i s from t h e s e u n d e r l y i n g and law. f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e f o u n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y u n d e r s e c t i o n 455-502, supra, the sexual assault s t a t u t e . I n any e v e n t , i t c a n n o t b e s t a t e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , that the t r i a l j u d g e a p p l i e d t h e r i g h t law. I n c a s e s t h a t p r e s e n t problems such a s t h i s , t h e r e is a well-known and o f t e n - u s e d r u l e t h a t appellate courts apply in deciding what must be done with the judgment under review. I n v o c a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t r u l e h e r e would require this Court to reverse the assault convictions. U n f o r t u n a t e l y i n t h i s c a s e , we i g n o r e d t h i s r u l e . The M a j o r i t y I q n o r e d a F u n d a m e n t a l R u l e o f A p p e l l a t e Review The r u l e I r e f e r t o i s a s i m p l e o n e : a judgment m u s t be s e t a s i d e where i t i s s u p p o r t a b l e on o n e g r o u n d b u t n o t another, it i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which g r o u n d was if used i n r e a c h i n g t h e d e c i s i o n . T h i s r u l e a p p l i e s t o jury- t r i e d c a s e s and t o j u d g e - t r i e d cases. I t i s b a s i c , hornbook law. The U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a s a p p l i e d c a s e s and j u d g e - t r i e d 354 U.S. 293, cases. 77 S . C t . this rule Y a t e s v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 0 6 4 , 1 0 7 3 , 1 L.Ed.2d c a s e ) ; and Thomas v . C o l l i n s ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 323 U.S. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 in jury ( a judge-tried case). 1356 ( a jury 5 1 6 , 65 S . C t . In Yates, a judge i n s t r u c t e d a j u r y on a c r i m i n a l c h a r g e i n which t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had e x p i r e d a s t o p a r t o f t h e c h a r g e , b u t i n which the other part of t h e c h a r g e was s t i l l v a l i d . jury returned a g u i l t y verdict, ultimately determine charge reversed whether i n which the the the b u t t h e U.S. conviction jury convicted underlying Supreme C o u r t because on the s t a t u t e of The it could part of not the l i m i t a t i o n s had e x p i r e d , o r on t h a t p a r t o f t h e c h a r g e t h a t was s t i l l v a l i d . In remanding for a new trial on that part of the s t i l l v a l i d , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d : ". . . I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s we t h i n k t h e p r o p e r r u l e t o be a p p l i e d i s t h a t which r e q u i r e s a v e r d i c t t o be s e t a s i d e i n c a s e s where t h e v e r d i c t is s u p p o r t a b l e on one g r o u n d , b u t n o t on a n o t h e r , and i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which g r o u n d t h e j u r y s e l e c t e d . Stromberg v. P e o p l e v. C a l i f o r n i a , 283 U.S. 3 5 9 , 367-368, 5 1 S . C t . 5 3 2 , 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117; Williams v. S t a t e v. North C a r o l i n a , 317 U.S. 2 8 7 , 291-292, 63 S . C t . 207, 209-210, 87 L.Ed. 279; Cramer v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 325 U.S. 1, 36, 65 S . C t . 918, 9 3 5 , charge n o t e 4 5 , 89 L.Ed. 1 4 4 1 . " 354 U . S . a t 312, 77 S . C t . a t 1 0 7 3 , 1 L.Ed.2d a t 1 3 7 1 . I n Thomas v. C o l l i n s , s u p r a , t h e U.S. Supreme applied the same r u l e i n r e v e r s i n g a c i v i l contempt o r d e r A Texas a p p r o v e d by t h e T e x a s Supreme C o u r t . judge had trial trial i s s u e d an o r d e r t o u n i o n o r g a n i z e r s t h a t imposed r e s t r a i n t s on t h e i r o r g a n i z i n g a c t i v i t i e s . The t r i a l c o u r t i n contempt of c o u r t f o r v i o l a t i n g i t s h e l d a u n i o n member order. Court The T e x a s Supreme C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e o r d e r . t h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e U.S. One o f Supreme C o u r t , was w h e t h e r , i n making t h e s p e e c h f o r which h e was h e l d i n c o n t e m p t , the u n i o n member had u t t e r e d g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s i n v i t i n g p e o p l e to join the addressed union. to The union, or specific trial whether people he had uttered statements inviting to join was court order them clear as to not the which a c t i v i t y r e s u l t e d i n t h e c i t a t i o n f o r contempt. The p r o b l e m presented court, by the ambiguous o r d e r of the trial was s t a t e d a s follows: ". . . The o r d e r a d j u d g i n g Thomas i n c o n t e m p t was i n g e n e r a l t e r m s , f i n d i n g t h a t h e had violated the restraining order, without d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s o l i c i t a t i o n s s e t forth in the petition and proved as I n t h i s s t a t e of t h e record violations i t must be t a k e n t h a t t h e o r d e r f o l l o w e d t h e p r a y e r of t h e motion [ t h e motion t o have t h e c o u r t h o l d Thomas i n c o n t e m p t f o r h i s u t t e r a n c e s i n v i o l a t i o n o f a c o u r t o r d e r ] and t h e f i a t ' s r e c i t a l , and t h a t t h e p e n a l t y was imposed on a c c o u n t o f b o t h i n v i t a t i o n s . The m q m e n t -h -r- f o r e m u s t b e a f f i r m -d -----t - e- e e as to - both o r a s t o n e i t h e r . Cf. W i l l i a m s v. North 287, 292; S t r o m b e r g v. C a r o l i n a , 317 U.S. C a l i f o r n i a , 283 U.S. 3 5 9 , 3 6 8 , and i t f o l l o w s that the statute, a s i t was applied, r e s t r a i n e d and p u n i s h e d Thomas f o r u t t e r i n g , i n t h e c o u r s e of h i s a d d r e s s , t h e g e n e r a l a s well as the specific invitation." 323 U.S. a t 529. (Emphasis added.) ... A The Supreme C o u r t reversed the judgment, holding that it c o u l d n o t a f f i r m t h e c o n t e m p t c i t a t i o n on b o t h g r o u n d s . By a p p l i c a t i o n o f U.S. Supreme Court t h i s r u l e t o judge-tried issued a clear message to cases, all the trial c o u r t s t h a t t h e l e g a l b a s i s f o r a d e c i s i o n must be c l e a r l y a t least a l l judgments t h a t c o n t a i n c o n s t i t - ascertainable, utional issues--free speech being the issue i n Thomas v . Collins. A l t h o u g h i t was i g n o r e d i n t h i s c a s e , stranger t h i s r u l e is no W have invoked t h e r u l e i n both e t o t h i s Court. c i v i l and c r i m i n a l cases t o r e v e r s e d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g m e n t s in situations in r e l i e d on t h e ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 2 Mont. ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. include: and wrong right 468, 318 P.2d 489, S t a t e v. Wolf v . (1904), 1 3 8 P. Garney McClennan 29 1088, 1089. Criminal ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 1 2 2 Mont. 491, 5 0 5 , 1 3 9 P. cases 207 P.2d 441; State Mont. 508, 75 P. 362, 365; S t a t e v. 532, 59 P . 924, 926; S t a t e v. ( 1 8 9 9 ) , 2 3 Mont. 358, ( 1 8 9 9 ) , 22 M o n t . 293, ( 1 8 9 8 ) , 2 1 Mont. 5 8 2 , 5 5 P. 59 P. 56 M o n t . 169, 264, defendant has been 174; S t a t e v. Sloan and S t a t e v. Rolla 268; 523, 525. The e f f e c t o f n o t a p p l y i n g o u r the Barry O'Leary, ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 2 3 Mont. Keerl Peel a.re 582, 586; K i r k v . Smith 5 0 6 ; S t a t e v . J o n e s ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 M o n t . v. instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s o r on t h e wrong C i v i l cases i n c l u d e : instructions. Inc. right b u t where it i s i m p o s s i b l e t o t e l l whether given t o a jury, the jury which convicted own rule here is t h a t and s e n t e n c e d t o p r i s o n , a n d y e t w e d o n o t e v e n know w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y decided the "without consent" element of the crime by a p p l y i n g t h e r i g h t law. is Nor it any excuse to refuse to apply this rule because s t a t u t e s do n o t r e q u i r e a judge i n a c r i m i n a l bench t r i a l t o e n t e r f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w . In federal s e l e c t i v e s e r v i c e c a s e s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e were n o s t a t u t o r y provisions boards, this requiring findings and c o n c l u s i o n s by draft f e d e r a l c o u r t s h a v e shown n o h e s i t a t i o n i n i n v o k i n g rule or some v e r s i o n of it in s i t u a t i o n s where the basis of the decision example: U.S. 624; U.S. v. v. cannot Lemmens Broules be determined. 1 9 7 0 ) , 423 F.2d v . H a u t h t o n ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , 4 1 3 F.2d U.S. Washington (6th Cir. 1 9 6 8 ) , 392 F.2d J a k o b s o n ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 6 3 ) , 325 F.2d for 1 9 7 0 ) , 430 F.2d (7th Cir. (4th Cir. See, 37, 619, 1299, 1304; 736, 742; U.S. 39; and U.S. v. v. 409, 416-417. I have c i t e d s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r u l e upon which I r e l y i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s I w a n t t o l e a v e no d o u b t t h a t t h e r u l e i s m u s t be r e v e r s e d . j u s t what I s t a t e i t i s , b a s i c h o r n b o o k law. 58 Am.Jur .2d N e w - some v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e i s s e t f o r t h i n : Trial, 55 C.J.S. C r i m i n a l La-w, 125-126; 75 Am.Jur.2d 1 8 8 8 ( c ) and 66 C.J.S. The U.S. 5 1307; S5 Trial, 24A The r u l e o r 628, C.J.S. 920; C r i m i n a l Law 23A 5 New T r i a l , 5 44. Supreme C o u r t makes a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r i n Thomas v. C o l l i n s t h a t it w i l l a l s o a p p l y t h i s b a s i c r u l e t o judgetried cases. its Moreover, is particularly Whether i t be a j u r y t r i a l o r a required i n criminal cases. judge-tried application case, the potential l o s s of l i f e o r l i b e r t y by an a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e wrong l a w , i s t h e same. I n a j u r y c a s e , i f a j u d g e g i v e s t h e j u r y t h e wrong l a w t o apply t o t h a t is t h e f a u l t of the evidence, not the jury. I n a judge-tried t h e wrong law t o t h e e v i d e n c e , of t h e judge, n o t of case, if t h e judge, t h e judge applies obviously t h a t is the f a u l t anyone e l s e . ( I cannot discount the f a c t , however, t h a t o v e r z e a l o u s c o u n s e l may w e l l c o n t r i b u t e to of the error a trial judge.) The b e t w e e n a j u r y c a s e and a j u d g e - t r i e d only case is t h a t i n a jury c a s e , t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , wrong ones, mistake, would make however the palpable error distinction including the more p a l p a b l e . But t h e i t may b e i n a j u r y c a s e , l e s s grievous t o a defendant i n a judge-tried i s no c a s e because t h e t r i a l j u d g e f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e g r o u n d s upon which h e decided t h e case. I t would be a s t r a n g e d o c t r i n e t o h o l d i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e t h a t a t r i a l judge d o e s n o t have t o d i s c l o s e t h e l e g a l grounds f o r conviction. B u t , i f we do p e r m i t s u c h p r o c e d u r e , t h e b u r d e n m u s t , on a p p e a l , c l e a r l y b e p l a c e d on t h e s t a t e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e r i g h t l e g a l grounds were used for conviction. Furthermore, omitting from otherwise), based, the if t r i a l judges can, their decisions legal basis by t h e e x p e d i e n t o f (whether upon which intentional or conviction is a it w i l l d o more t h a n f r u s t r a t e t h e a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w process. I t w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y immunize t r i a l j u d g e d e c i s i o n s from a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . T r i a l c o u r t s w i l l become i n f a l l i b l e on q u e s t i o n s o f l a w s i m p l y by f a i l i n g t o d i s c l o s e t h e l e g a l T h a t i s why g r o u n d s upon which t h e i r d e c i s i o n s a r e b a s e d . we m u s t do our d u t y h e r e and r e v e r s e t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t ions. I can only e x p l a i n t h e f a i l u r e t o apply t h i s b a s i c r u l e here, and the decision of the majority to affirm, as d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e C o u r t i s more c o n c e r n e d w i t h a r r i v i n g a t t h e r e s u l t we want t h a n we a r e w i t h a r r i v i n g a t t h e r i g h t result. Nonetheless, f a i l u r e t o apply t h i s r u l e here, s t i l l d o e s n o t mean t h a t o u r d u t i e s o f r e v i e w a r e f u l f i l l e d . ambiguous findings and conclusions problems t h a t w e cannot i g n o r e . rule t h a t I urge here, does not create The constitutional Failure t o apply t h e b a s i c cause the constitutional issues t o evaporate. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l B a r r i e r s o f W i n s h i p a n d Chapman Have N o t Been S u c c e s s f u l l y Crossed I f we a p p l i e d t h e r u l e I u r g e h e r e , w e would n o t h a v e t o m e e t t h e u n d e r l y i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s c r e a t e d by t h e ambiguous findings and conclusions entered by the trial judge. But the rule must sometimes be invoked b e c a u s e t h e r e is a n u n d e r l y i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l was, f o r example, precisely issue. t h e e s s e n t i a l r e a s o n f o r t h e U.S. That Supreme C o u r t i n v o k i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e i n Thomas v . Collins, s u p r a , t o r e v e r s e t h e contempt of c o u r t c i t a t i o n s . Because we d i d n o t w e must, i n v o k e and a p p l y t h e r u l e t o r e v e r s e , n o n e t h e l e s s , s u c c e s s f u l l y c r o s s two b a r r i e r s imposed by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . First, if s t i l l must w e do n o t cross the barrier 358, 90 S . C t . U.S. invoke the of reverse, we 368, which d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e U.S. Constitution requires the a reasonable doubt, f a c t essential t o a conviction. a t 1 0 7 3 , 25 L.Ed.2d and I n Re W i n s h i p ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 1 0 6 8 , 25 L.Ed.2d S t a t e t o p r o v e beyond rule 397 U.S. each element o r a t 364, 90 S . C t . How c a n w e s a y h e r e t h a t t h e a t 375. element of " w i t h o u t c o n s e n t " was p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t when i n t h e same b r e a t h we m u s t d e c l a r e t h a t it is i m p o s s i b l e t o t e l l whether t h e t r i a l judge a p p l i e d t h e r i g h t law i n d e c i d i n g t h e c o n s e n t i s s u e ? S e c o n d , Chapman v . S.Ct. 824, 1 7 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1 8 L.Ed.2d C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 705 r e h . d e n i e d 386 U.S. 241, declares with constitutional e r r o r , review, of t h e judgment a belief 386 U.S. a t 24, 710-711. Applied here, beyond applied a conclusions reasonable the right 987, 87 S . C t . case 87 S . C t . we can harmless doubt that t h a t t h e e r r o r was a t 828, declare only the if trial law t o t h e c o n s e n t i s s u e . 1 7 L.Ed.2d the we "The at ambiguous can d e c l a r e judge in fact The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n makes t h e c a s e f o r r e v e r s a l h e r e : c o n c l u s i o n s o f law r e a c h e d by t h e C o u r t c o u l d be c o n s t r u e d t o mean District infected c a n be a f f i r m e d o n l y by a d e c l a r a t i o n beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , and a 87 comes t o a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t f o r harmless. findings t h a t when 18, t h a t t h e c o u r t found l a c k o f t h e v i c t i m ' s c o n s e n t from h i s i n c a p a c i t y a s a t e n - y e a r o l d t o c o n s e n t [ c o n c e d e d by t h e S t a t e i n i t s b r i e f t o be t h e wrong b a s i s ] , o r t h a t i n a n y e v e n t t h e boy d i d n o t c o n s e n t . . ." What more i s needed t o r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t s ? Assuming proof of the "without consent" issue a p p l i c a t i o n of a l e g a l i n c a p a c i t y t o c o n s e n t t h e o r y , no p r o o f a t a l l . by it is I c a n n o t f o r one m i n u t e b e l i e v e t h a t I n R e Winship p e r m i t s proof of an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f an o f f e n s e by a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e wrong l e g a l s t a n d a r d . the conviction standard was can stand applied to here the only if consent This being s o , the issue. right legal Here it is i m p o s s i b l e t o t e l l w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t o r wrong l e g a l s t a n d a r d was a p p l i e d t o t h e c o n s e n t i s s u e . This being so, more t h a n a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e t h e wrong l e g a l s t a n d a r d t o t h e c o n s e n t issue--and t h e r e is applied so the p r o o f c a n n o t f u l f i l l t h e m a n d a t e o f I n Re W i n s h i p . Furthermore, California, reviewing I have indicated, Chapman v. s u p r a , p u t s a b r a k e on a l l a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s i n a conviction constitutional prepared as error. to state, that comes Applied before to here, affirming them infected this with Court must the convictions, be that t h e t r i a l court i n f a c t applied the r i g h t legal standard i n determining consent." the issue of "sexual . . . contact T h a t d e c l a r a t i o n c a n n o t be made h e r e , without and t h e m a j o r i t y h a s a d m i t t e d t h a t i t c a n n o t be made. A conscientious application of In Re Winship and Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a , t o t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s be r e v e r s e d . U p h o l d i n q t h e C o n v i c t i o n s Adds t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e f e c t s I n h e r e n t i n t h e Affirmance: I h a v e s t a t e d my c a s e a s t o why t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s must be reversed. In the usual dissent, I suppose this would be creates sufficient, new but because constitutional embark upon an a n a l y s i s o f the defects, I majority feel analysis compelled to t h e i r grounds f o r upholding t h e convictions. I would First, that p r e f a c e my a n a l y s i s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t the majority's example o f and w e l l - s e t t l e d what h a p p e n s when w e l l - d e f i n e d of i s a good principles affirmance here a p p e l l a t e review a r e ignored conviction. Here, however, i n t h e d e s i r e t o uphold a the problems created are of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n , and t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t be s o l i g h t l y ignored. Second, draw from merits, charged, I preface the that my a n a l y s i s w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s I majority opinion. is defendant the function of in In fact determining guilty t h e t r i a l judge of on the t o make the crime factual d e t e r m i n a t i o n s b a s e d upon a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t l a w i s usurped. A corollary to this is that we have, by d e t e r m i n i n g t h e f a c t s on t h e m e r i t s , a b d i c a t e d o u r p o s i t i o n a s a c o u r t o f r e v i e w and h a v e become b o t h t h e t r i e r - o f - f a c t and a p p e l l a t e c o u r t r o l l e d i n t o o n e . an essential fact on the merits d e c i d e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , his constitutional right F i n a l l y , by d e c i d i n g that may not have been we h a v e s t r i p p e d d e f e n d a n t o f to have his guilt or innocence determined a t t h e t r i a l . The purpose leading majority of laying to the cites the three cases groundwork affirmance. for for the These the ostensible legal cases are analysis wholly i n a p p l i c a b l e b o t h f a c t u a l l y and l e g a l l y t o t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e raised here. First, Mont . , t h e m a j o r i t y c i t e s S t a t e v. 593 P.2d 1 0 2 6 , 36 S t . R e p . t h a t a t r i a l judge i n a j u d g e - t r i e d Duncan ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - 748, 753, a s h o l d i n g c r i m i n a l c a s e i s "under no s t a t u t o r y d u t y , 46-18-306, enter except i n death penalty t o make MCA), findings, a g e n e r a l v e r d i c t of cases b u t merely (section obliged innocence or g u i l t . " to Whatever t h e h o l d i n g may b e , t h e d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t c o n t e n d h e r e t h a t the judge had conclusions, statutory a statutory nor duty does to he enter innocence o r g u i l t . duty to contend more enter that than a findings the judge general and had verdict a of I n f a c t , t h e t r i a l judge e n t e r e d both f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s h e r e , b u t t h e y a r e d e s c r i b e d by t h e majority, as the "bare bones" kind. Furthermore, c o n t e n t i o n i n Duncan was n o t t h a t t h e t r i a l judge the applied t h e wrong l a w , o r may h a v e a p p l i e d t h e wrong l a w i n d e c i d i n g any of the issues. But t h e c o n t e n t i o n h e r e , is t h a t the t r i a l j u d g e may h a v e a p p l i e d t h e wrong l a w i n d e c i d i n g t h e statutory "without consent" element of the charges. The m a j o r i t y c a n d e r i v e no s u p p o r t f r o m Duncan. Second, Mont. 141, the majority 388 P.2d 372, c i t e s S t a t e v. for Boe ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 143 t h e a b s t r a c t l y vacuous r u l e t h a t " e r r o r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s n o t p r e s u m e d . " Trans- l a t e d , t h i s r u l e means t h a t a p a r t y a p p e a l i n g a c a s e t o t h i s C o u r t must c o n v i n c e a t l e a s t a m a j o r i t y o f i t s members t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d and t h a t t h e e r r o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d o r c o u l d have a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e judgment. would not require be a sound t h e winning i n i t i a l burden of should be upheld. rule party has not judicial in District administration Court to have to the c o n v i n c i n g t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e judgment Rather, p l a c e d on t h e l o s i n g p a r t y . majority of It obviously the initial I note, demonstrated burden should be furthermore, t h a t the application r e s o l u t i o n of t h e i s s u e presented here. of Finally, Boe to however, t h e f a c t is t h a t t h e defendant h e r e h a s c l e a r l y demonstrated p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . The t r i a l j u d g e h a s c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t o f two f e l o n i e s and s e n t e n c e d him t o p r i s o n , and y e t h a s n o t t o l d d e f e n d a n t which law h e a p p l i e d t o r e s o l u t i o n of t h e c o n s e n t i s s u e . What c o u l d b e more p r e j u d i c i a l t h a n t h a t ? T h i r d , t h e m a j o r i t y c i t e s S t a t e v. S t o d d a r d ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 412 P.2d 402, is presumption in a s embodying t h e r u l e t h a t " e v e r y 827, favor of a judgment of conviction a p p e a l i f any s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s i t . " added.) This is m e r e l y another way of on (Emphasis stating that if s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n , t h e c o n v i c t i o n w i l l be s u s t a i n e d a s a g a i n s t a c o n t e n t i o n t h a t T h i s i s n o t e x a c t l y an s u b s t a n t i a l evidence does not e x i s t . e d i f y i n g r u l e , t o be c l a s s i f i e d a s a l e g a l gem. mean, however, that a judgment w i l l be It does not s u s t a i n e d even if t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e , i f e r r o r o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e trial that Applied affects here, defendant's the question right is not to a fair whether trial. there is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o u p h o l d t h e c o n v i c t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e boy d i d n o t c o n s e n t i n a n y e v e n t ; t h e q u e s t i o n i s whether the t h e t r i a l judge q u e s t i o n of a p p l i e d t h e r i g h t law i n d e c i d i n g whether or not there was substantial The i s s u e h e r e i s n o t a q u e s t i o n o f e v i d e n c e , i t evidence. is a q u e s t i o n o f l a w . These fail to analysis. the three cases, provide After majority good Duncan, and S t o d d a r d , window-dressing c i t i n g Duncan, next g, states the Boe, for the majority and S t o d d a r d , reasons for supra, supra, affirming assault convictions: " T h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w r e a c h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d t o mean t h a t t h e c o u r t found l a c k o f t h e v i c t i m ' s c o n s e n t from h i s i n c a p a c i t y a s a t e n - y e a r o l d t o c o n s e n t , o r t h a t i n a n y e v e n t t h e boy d i d not consent. C o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w r e a c h e d by a t r i a l c o u r t do n o t e n j o y t h e same l e v e l o f i n v i o l a b i l i t y t h a t findings of f a c t a r e the a c c o r d e d on a p p e a l ( s e e e . g . , Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.) T h i -o u r- i -t l e a s t * s C-t i - a s n e q u a l p o s- n w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o itio de -- t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w t o be r e a c h e d f r o m t h e f a c t s f o u n d i n a c a s e . S i n c e w e h a v e f o u n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e adduced t o s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e boy d i d n o t i n f a c t c o n s e n t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s unlawful a c t s , a l l t h e presumptions a r e i n f a v o r o f t h e judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n , a s we h a v e shown. W e t h e r e f o r e s u s t a i n t h e conv i c t i o n on t h e s e x u a l a s s a u l t c o u n t s . " (Emphasis added.) I f t h i s o p i n i o n s a y s what I t h i n k i t s a y s , t r a n s l a t e d , i t would r e a d s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s : Only one t h e o r y of c o n s e n t is p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e ; b u t t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s a r e s o vague t h a t w e c a n n o t t e l l which t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t t h e t r i a l judge a c t u a l l y applied t o a determination of t h e c o n s e n t i s s u e . I t d o e s n o t m a t t e r however, this which theory he applied to d e t e r m i n a t i o n , because w e have determined t h a t t h e evidence is l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o support the only proper theory of consent. T h i s is t h e c o n c l u s i o n of law t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d h a v e reached--and i f he a p p l i e d t h e l a w p r o p e r l y h e would h a v e d e c i d e d t h e same a s we d e c i d e . Because t h e evidence is s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e boy d i d n o t i n f a c t c o n s e n t , e v e n t h o u g h we do n o t know t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e made t h i s same f i n d i n g , w e w i l l make t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f i n d i n g and c o n c l u s i o n f o r him and t h u s u p h o l d t h e convictions. The c o n v i c t i o n s a r e t h e r e f o r e affirmed. Even assuming that t r a n s l a t i o n t h i s holding, First, court--it partially inaccurate in my particularly i n a criminal case, 3 is astounding. am I I t s t r i k e s a t t h e h e a r t of our t r i a l system. the holding usurps the f u n c t i o n of the trial i s t h e t r i a l j u d g e and t h e t r i a l j u d g e a l o n e , who h a s t h e r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e i f " w i t h o u t c o n s e n t " was p r o v e d . W h a v e no r i g h t t o t e l l t h e t r i a l c o u r t w h a t c o n c l u s i o n t o e r e a c h , and w e h a v e no r i g h t , a s we h a v e d o n e h e r e , t o r e a c h that conclusion convictions. for Second, the as trial a court corollary and to affirm the usurping the f u n c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t by d e c i d i n g t h e f a c t o f " w i t h o u t consent1' f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t , w have a b d i c a t e d o u r f u n c t i o n e of appellate review. We are here to determine if the evidence sufficient is findings. W e are not conclusions for the to trial justify here to the make court. trial the Third, court's findings a s an and appellate c o u r t , we h a v e e f f e c t i v e l y g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n a criminal case conclusions by to ourselves. not only reach, telling but by the making trial that court what determination That is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o h i b i t e d . I wholeheartedly agree with t h e majority statement t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w c a n be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t t h e trial judge decided the s t a t u t o r y element of c o n s e n t " by a p p l i c a t i o n o f of the wrong law. t h e r i g h t l a w o r by a p p l i c a t i o n That, which l a w d i d he a p p l y ? "without of I course, agree, is t h e issue here: a t l e a s t t o an e x t e n t , t h a t t h i s C o u r t i s n o t h a m s t r u n g by t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w r e a c h e d by a t r i a l j u d g e when r e v i e w i n g t h e c a s e on a p p e a l . T h i s m u s t be q u a l i f i e d by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f law based on t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f witnesses or demeanor of witnesses, m u s t o b v i o u s l y b e g i v e n more w e i g h t t h a n t h o s e I t must be r e a c h e d from c o l d , o b j e c t i v e e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s . f u r t h e r q u a l i f i e d by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r u l e i s n o t t h e same i n criminal cases a s it is i n c i v i l cases. One o f o u r f u n c t i o n s i n r e v i e w i n g c a s e s i s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e f i n d i n g s made c a n l e a d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w B u t w e h a v e no r i g h t t o t e l l a j u d g e i n a c r i m i n a l entered. case, sitting as the trier of guilt or innocence, what f i n d i n g s t o make o r what c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w t o make i n t h e process of innocence. judge, reaching That is the ultimate solely the question of perogative of guilt the or trial j u s t a s i t would be t h e s o l e p e r o g a t i v e o f a j u r y i n a case t r i e d t o a jury. h a v e done h e r e , majority. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h a t i s j u s t what w e and t h a t i s where I p a r t company w i t h t h e determination A sufficient to by support this Court factual that the evidence determination and is ultimate c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e " s e x u a l c o n t a c t " was " w i t h o u t c o n s e n t " , does not ipso permit this Court to affirm the Such a r u l i n g means o n l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s convictions. not facto entitled, as a matter d i s m i s s a l of t h e c h a r g e s . of law, to a reversal and The r u l i n g o n t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e had t h e e f f e c t o f t e l l i n g the defendant only t h a t he was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a d i s m i s s a l . But whether c o n v i c t i o n s c a n be t h e evidence sufficient to affirmed, prevent even though a a reversal is dismissal, entirely the is another question. An depends affirmance, on the or underlying ordering factual a new trial, determinations c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w a c t u a l l y made by t h e t r i a l j u d g e , and rather t h a n on t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h i s C o u r t f e e l s he s h o u l d h a v e made. I f we c a n d e t e r m i n e f r o m t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e a c t u a l l y d e c i d e d t h a t t h e boy d i d n o t c o n s e n t , w e c a n a f f i r m t h e judgment. B u t we c a n n o t do s o , and t h e m a j o r i t y a d m i t s t h a t we c a n n o t do s o . To comply w i t h t h e m a n d a t e s o f I n Re W i n s h i p and Chapman California, supra, an a £f irmance requires this v. Court to s t a t e a b e l i e f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t (1) t h e t r i a l j u d g e a c t u a l l y d e c i d e d by a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t l a w , t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t i n f a c t c o n s e n t , and ( 2 ) t h a t t h e f a i l u r e to set forth conclusions declaration the was I legal therefore am u n w i l l i n g basis for harmless his findings error. t o make. That believe I and a is that the m a j o r i t y would a l s o be u n w i l l i n g t o make t h a t d e c l a r a t i o n , if i t had properly addressed the underlying c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d by t h e amgibuous f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . Here, however, the majority went a step beyond an a f f i r m a n c e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment. the and findings simply conclusions determines finding and that such the being are ambiguous, evidence the Admitting the majority supported case, a would it that certain enter the a p p r o p r i a t e conclusion of law t h a t t h e defendant d i d n o t i n f a c t consent. I n d o i n g s o , t h e c o u r t t r a m m e l l e d o v e r some fundamental r i g h t s . I f we assume t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e a p p l i e d t h e wrong l a w in deciding reasonable right, the consent doubt in to issue support virtually this the i s more (and t h e r e breath, to a h a v e no assumption), w e same than affirm the c o n v i c t i o n s because t h e evidence, n o n e t h l e s s , proved a c t u a l nonconsent. P r o v e d t o whom: t o t h e t r i a l judge, or t o us? 0 W e are effectlvely requires a affirming a conviction that first statutory factual determination t h a t the trial c o u r t may n o t h a v e i n f a c t made. U n l e s s w e , a s an a p p e l l a t e court, judge, a s opposed to the trial have the right to determine g u i l t o r innocence, t h i s cannot be. An a x i o m a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e i n a l l c r i m i n a l cases is t h a t g u i l t o r trial l e v e l by either i n n o c e n c e must the jury, be decided o r by t h e j u d g e d e f e n d a n t h a s waived a j u r y t r i a l . at the where a I n t h e case of a jury t r i a l t h i s b a s i c p r i n c i p l e i n h e r e s i n t h e S i x t h Amendment t o C o n s t i t u t i o n and i n 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , t h e U.S. 2 4 and 2 6 . decide 55 11, Both p r o v i s i o n s g u a r a n t e e t h a t o n l y a j u r y c a n guilt presiding Art. or over compelling innocence. a the defendant g u i l t y . jury trial evidence, is That to why no right, direct a has a trial judge no m a t t e r jury to how find a A l t h o u g h h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t waived a j u r y t r i a l and e l e c t e d t o h a v e a t r i a l j u d g e d e c i d e h i s g u i l t o r innocence, provisions, a necessary corollary i s t h a t where a j u r y to these trial constitutional i s waived o n l y t h e trial judge event, alone can determine t h e judge has the guilt or innocence. In such a s s u m e s t h e same r o l e a s t h e j u r y and h e perogative to decide guilt or innocence. Where i s t h e l a w t h a t g i v e s t h i s C o u r t t h e r i g h t t o u s u r p t h a t function? The o n l y way t h a t I c a n s e e w h e r e t h i s C o u r t would h a v e t h e r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e , a s we h a v e d o n e h e r e , would be i f d e f e n d a n t i n h i s w a i v e r o f j u r y trial expressly function. to have consented to t h i s Court assuming Such i s n o t t h e c a s e h e r e - - d e f e n d a n t the trial judge, rather than a this agreed only jury, decide h i s g u i l t or innocence. Based on the foregoing examination of the law, this C o u r t u n d o u b t e d l y had no r i g h t t o d e c i d e t h i s c a s e by making the following declaration: ". . . T h i s C o u r t is i n a t l e a s t an e q u a l position with the D i s t r i c t Court t o determine t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w t o b e r e a c h e d from t h e f a c t s i n a c a s e . S i n c e we h a v e f o u n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e adduced t o s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e boy did not i n f a c t consent t o the defendant's unlawful a c t s , a l l t h e presumptions a r e i n f a v o r o f t h e judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n , a s we h a v e shown. W t h e r e f o r e s u s t a i n t h e cone v i c t i o n on t h e s e x u a l a s s a u l t c o u n t s . " T h i s d e c l a r a t i o n of g u i l t has usurped t h e f u n c t i o n of the trial judge, abdicated our position as an appellate c o u r t , and d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o h a v e t h e t r i a l j u d g e , by a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t l a w , d e c i d e h i s g u i l t or innocence. W e c a n , of c o u r s e , d e t e r m i n e i f t h e t r i a l judge, based on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , made a c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w t h a t i s But w e c a n n o t , s u p p o r t a b l e by t h e e v i d e n c e . based on t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e t r i a l r e c o r d b e f o r e u s on a p p e a l , make t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t w h e r e by doing so we are deciding a fact essential to a valid Here, w e decided a f a c t e s s e n t i a l t o a v a l i d conviction. s t a t u t o r y element of "without consent. " conviction--the decided fact t h i s f a c t by d e c l a r i n g consent1'--and yet we do j u d g e d e c i d e d t h i s same f a c t . judge decided consenting, only that that--"the not For boy d i d know w h e t h e r a l l we t h e boy was not the We in trial know t h e t r i a l legally incapable of and t h u s n e v e r r e a c h e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e boy d i d o r d i d n o t i n f a c t c o n s e n t . or did not i n f a c t consent, t r i a l judge--to Whether t h e boy d i d is a q u e s t i o n solely for the be d e c i d e d a t a new t r i a l . I would r e v e r s e t h e a s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n s and o r d e r a new s o t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s t r i e d by an a p p l i c a t i o n o f trial the r i g h t law t o t h e i s s u e of c o n s e n t . The O b s c e n i t y I s s u e Although I a g r e e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e o b s c e n i t y c o n v i c t i o n m u s t be r e v e r s e d and d i s m i s s e d , I do n o t agree w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y ' s a p p a r e n t response t o what it c o n s i d e r s I t is n o t our f u n c t i o n t o respond adverse public criticism. t o t h e w i l l of t h e p e o p l e o r of t h e p r e s s when r e a c h i n g o u r decisions. C r i t i c i s m , w h e t h e r r i g h t o r wrong, from w h a t e v e r s o u r c e , comes w i t h t h e j o b . But t o g e t t o the i s s u e a t hand. W must e in cases involving potential constitutional questions r e l a t i n g t o the First Amendment constitution, and similar preserve our provisions in f u n c t i o n a s a c o u r t of our own review. To do t h a t , we m u s t r e q u i r e , e v e n t h o u g h a s t a t u t e may n o t require that it, the prosecution introduce evidence of c o n t e m p o r a r y community s t a n d a r d s i n s u p p o r t o f i t s c a s e - i n chief. I f we do n o t do t h i s , we w i l l h a v e n o t h i n g t o r e v i e w i n such c a s e s , and discretion reach to each j u r y w i l l whatever be g i v e n t h e u n b r i d l e d decision it wants without r e g a r d t o t h e e v i d e n c e o f p r e v a i l i n g community s t a n d a r d s . The m a j o r i t y 413 U.S. alludes 3 1 5 , 93 S . C t . t o Kaplan v. 2680, 37 L.Ed.2d California 492, (1973), and s t a t e t h a t t h i s c a s e "seemingly h o l d s t h a t a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d is f o r t h e a l l e g e d obscene m a t e r i a l t o be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o evidence and a subsequent obscene . . ." jury verdict requires the that prurient community the the interest standards. majority material s e c t i o n 45-8-201(a) "material" in sex as The concludes, conclusion: It conviction because would by a contemporary c a n n o t be the sustained, State these points. be and ( b ) , i n v o l v e d must a p p e a l t o a s measured i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e on b o t h o f this the The m a j o r i t y t h e n s t a t e s t h a t K a p l a n d o e s n o t c o n t r o l because a s t a t u t e , MCA, stamping travesty failed to I agree with to sustain a c o n v i c t i o n where t h e S t a t e h a s s o u t t e r l y f a i l e d t o comply But t h e r e i s a n o t h e r problem h e r e , which with the s t a t u t e . the majority does not address. The m a j o r i t y s t a t e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d t o comply w i t h t h e m a n d a t e s o f t h e F i r s t Amendment. However, i t would a p p e a r t h a t K a p l a n , r e q u i r e s s u c h an e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s s u p r a , no l o n g e r in the t r i a l If we assume t h a t K a p l a n i s t h e l a w , l a t u r e would be f r e e t o r e p e a l s e c t i o n 45-8-201 and by d o i n g s o , evidentiary standards, empower basis whether a l l juries founded or not appealed t o the p r u r i e n t in the legis( a ) and ( b ) , t o decide, w i t h o u t an contemporary community the material interest to That is t h e meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e F i r s t Amendment. problem. record (or act involved), i n s e x and d e v i a t e d f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y community s t a n d a r d s . The p r o s p e c t judge or discretion a jury, that the t r i e r would t o determine have what of f a c t , whether unbridled is or what and it be a unreviewable is n o t obscene, i m p e l l e d t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t t o r e q u i r e e v i d e n c e o f community s t a n d a r d s i n any o b s c e n i t y p r o s e c u t i o n . What the ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 72 C a l . To a s s u r e the Court said Rptr. 655, i n t e g r i t y of in the case 446 P.2d the of 535, trial In Re Giannini bears repeating. process i t s e l f , the Court s t a t e d : " R e l y i n g p r i n c i p a l l y on t h e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e t h a t j u r o r s s h o u l d n o t be endowed w i t h t h e p r e r o g a t i v e o f i m p o s i n g t h e i r own p e r s o n a l s t a n d a r d s a s t h e t e s t of c r i m i n a l i t y of conduct, we hold t h a t e x p e r t testimony s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d t o e s t a b l i s h community standards. W c a n n o t assume t h a t j u r o r s i n e themselves necessarily express or r e f l e c t community s t a n d a r d s ; w e m u s t a c h i e v e s o f a r a s p o s s i b l e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of an o b j e c t i v e , rather than a subjective, determination of community s t a n d a r d s . An even-handed a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c r i m i n a l law, even w i t h evidenis sufficiently t i a r y guidance d i f f i c u l t i n a n a r e a s o c o n f u s i n g and intricate as obscenity. To s a n c t i o n c o n v i c t i o n s w i t h o u t e x p e r t e v i d e n c e o f community standards encourages t h e j ury t o condemn a s o b s c e n e s u c h c o n d u c t o r m a t e r i a l a s is p e r s o n a l l y d i s t a s t e f u l o r o f f e n s i v e t o the particular juror. ( C f . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Klaw, s u p r a , 350 F.2d 1 5 5 , 1 6 7 . ) 'Community can hardly be standards e s t a b l i s h e d except through e x p e r t s T h e r e i s no e x t e r n a l m e a s u r i n g r o d f o r obscenity. N e i t h e r , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s its ascertainment a merely subjective r e f l e c t i o n of t h e t a s t e or moral outlook of i n d i v i d u a l j u r o r s o r i n d i v i d u a l judges.. T h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ought n o t t o depend s o l e l y on t h e n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d , h i t - o r m i s s s u b j e c t i b l e view of t h a t they a r e b e l i e v e d t o be t h e i n d i v i d u a l j u r o r o r judge. I t b e a r s r e p e t i t i o n t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of o b s c e n i t y i s f o r j u r o r o r judge n o t on t h e basis of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection or particular e x p e r i e n c e s o f l i f e , b u t on t h e b a s i s o f ' c o n t e m p o r a r y community s t a n d a r d s ' " S m i t h v . P e o p l e v . S t a t e o f C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 361 U.S. 1 4 7 , 1 6 5 , 8 0 S . C t . 215, 225, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 ( F r a n k f u r t e r , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) 446 P.2d a t 543-544. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. The c o u r t i n G i a n n i n i h e l d , moreover, that there are e q u a l l y c o g e n t r e a s o n s f o r r e q u i r i n g e v i d e n c e o f community standards in order to facilitate appellate review a s s u r e t h a t i t i s more t h a n a r u b b e r - s t a m p i n g what h a s o c c u r r e d a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l . and to process for The C o u r t s t a t e d : " F i n a l l y , e v e n i f t h e j u r y s h o u l d b e deemed t o be a m e t a p h y s i c a l embodiment o f t h e 'community,' and therefore intrinsically c o g n i z a n t o f community s t a n d a r d s , p r o o f o f community s t a n d a r d s would n e v e r t h e l e s s b e i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o e f f e c t i v e a p p e l l a t e review. An a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m u s t r e a c h a n i n d e p e n d e n t d e c i s i o n a s t o t h e o b s c e n i t y of t h e m a t e r i a l S i n c e an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t i n a n y s e n s e compose a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e community, i t c a n n o t e f f e c t i v e l y c a r r y o u t t h i s f u n c t i o n i n t h e absence of evidence i n t h e r e c o r d d i r e c t e d toward p r o o f o f t h e community s t a n d a r d . " 4 4 6 P.2d a t 5 4 4 . . . . The G i a n n i n i d e c i s i o n h a s much t o commend i t . There is no d o u b t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s v a s c i l lated on the Amendment. jurors, issues relating to obscenity and the First But w h a t e v e r t h e o u t c o m e , t r i a l j u d g e s o r t r i a l should not, i n a f e d e r a l o r s t a t e system, be g i v e n t h e s o l e and u n m o d i f i a b l e p r e r o g a t i v e t o d e t e r m i n e by t h e i r own s t a n d a r d s , what i s o r w h a t i s n o t o b s c e n e . fundamental observation, as set out in This rather Giannini, should require in a l l obscenity prosecutions t h a t the prosecution introduce p a r t of evidence of its proof. c o n t e m p o r a r y community standards a s The m a t e r i a l i t s e l f o r t h e a c t i t s e l f s h o u l d n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s o l e b a s i s f o r a prosecution. The S e n t e n c i n g I s s u e T h e r e i s a l i t t l e more t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e S t a t e springing the defendant at other the witnesses sentencing to previous hearing. c r i m e s on the The S t a t e a d m i t t e d before t h i s Court t h a t it d e l i b e r a t e l y withheld i t s evidence from t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o t a k e him by s u r p r i s e at the whether sentencing hearing. The question t h e S t a t e s h o u l d b e r e w a r d e d by arises these as to t a c t i c s by g i v i n g it t h e g r e e n l i g h t t o a g a i n o f f e r t h i s testimony a t the resentencing. I don't think so. To p e r m i t t h e S t a t e t o again o f f e r t h i s testimony only encourages t h e S t a t e t o use questionable trial tactics in its efforts to seek c o n v i c t i o n s and s t i f f e r s e n t e n c e s . The o n l y way t h e S t a t e c a n l e a r n t o p l a y f a i r by s t a r t i n g o f f notice, by is an order precluding i n i t i a l l y with f a i r the State from again offering t h i s testimony. In admitting before this Court that it d e l i b e r a t e l y w i t h h e l d t h e e v i d e n c e from t h e d e f e n d a n t u n t i l t h e e l e v e n t h hour--about f i v e m i n u t e s b e f o r e t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g was t o begin--the other S t a t e o f f e r e d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r doing so t h a n i t s d e s i r e t o c a t c h t h e d e f e n d a n t by s u r p r i s e . The S t a t e a d m i t t e d t h a t i t f i r s t l e a r n e d o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f these witnesses several days before the date set for the The p r o s e c u t o r i m m e d i a t e l y s e t t o work sentencing hearing. r e s e a r c h i n g t h e law t o f i n d l e g a l s u p p o r t f o r h i s d e c i s i o n to take the testimony on defendant him at by the surprise sentencing by springing hearing. He this also r e s e a r c h e d t h e law a s t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f such e v i d e n c e . Upon the commmencement immediately provided of the t r i a l cour t--designed, the product of c o u r s e , hearing, of his the research before a copy o f the t h e opening of State's the to the t o influence a favorable d e c i s i o n t o a d m i t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e two women. received prosecutor brief hearing. only a Defendant few m i n u t e s So d e f e n d a n t had no o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e s e a r c h t h e law t o a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t not t o admit t h e testimony. Common s e a , or at least a sense of fundamental f a i r n e s s , s h o u l d have convinced t h e p r o s e c u t o r a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t he d i d n o t have t o r e s e a r c h t h e q u e s t i o n of whether he had t h e d u t y t o g i v e r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e t o d e f e n d a n t o f t h e State's intent to sentencing hearing. use such prejudicial evidence at the The p r o s e c u t o r c l e a r l y had t h e d u t y t o g i v e advance n o t i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . T h a t i s why I d o n o t see why t h e S t a t e s h o u l d b e r e w a r d e d by a d e c i s i o n o f t h i s Court t h a t permits t h e S t a t e t o again o f f e r t h e testimony. If the State does not have to pay the price its for c a l c u l a t e d d e c i s i o n t o d e p r i v e defendant of f a i r n o t i c e , t h e S t a t e w i l l o n l y be e n c o u r a g e d t o u s e t h e same t a c t i c s i n t h e f u t u r e , s a f e i n t h e knowledge t h a t t h i s C o u r t w i l l impose no s a n c t i o n s and t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w i l l u l t i m a t e l y b e r e c e i v e d i n evidence against the defendant. Even State's assuming intent hearing, to the remoteness proper use notice this from t h e o u t s e t , testimony combination of time, in lack the rendered at of the of the sentencing corroboration testimony and inadmissible. The a l l e g e d a c t s o f e x p o s u r e and g e n i t a l f o n d l i n g o c c u r r e d 10 and 13 years before the sentencing hearing. The w i t n e s s e s were young g i r l s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a l l e g e d a c t s and t h e i r t e s t i m o n y y e a r s l a t e r , a s c o u l d w e l l be e x p e c t e d , was i n e x a c t a s t o d a t e s and times. filed against defendant transgressions. as No c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s w e r e the result of these alleged I n f a c t , t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t show t h a t t h e g i r l s complained a t t h e t i m e t o anyone. A t least the State made no a t t e m p t t o c o r r o b o r a t e t h e i r t e s t i m o n y by p r o d u c i n g witnesses whether to statements the witnesses of fresh complaint. c o m p l a i n e d many y e a r s Therefore, ago to their co,7ducf parents or to anyone else concerning the defendant's/ is anyone's guess. While incidents occurring many years ago do not a u t o m a t i c a l l y immunize a d e f e n d a n t from i n q u i r i e s i n t o h i s past for sentencing circumstances here--lack time--should assuming render that these purposes, the combination of o f c o r r o b o r a t i o n and r e m o t e n e s s i n the testimony alleged inadmissible. transgressions Even could be c o r r o b o r a t e d by p r o d u c i n g w i t n e s s e s t o f r e s h c o m p l a i n t s , t h e f a c t o r o f r e m o t e n e s s o f time h a s s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o defend a g a i n s t such accusations. person cannot e f f e c t i v e l y defend o c c u r r e d s o many y e a r s a g o . against A e v e n t s t h a t have Due p r o c e s s o f l a w d o e s h a v e a p l a c e a t a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , and h e r e i t would p r e v e n t t h e use of s u c h t e s t i m o n y . A final a r g u m e n t of t h e S t a t e c o n c e r n i n g t h e s u r p r i s e t e s t i m o n y , d e s e r v e s comment. The t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t r e f e r t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e two women e i t h e r i n t h e r e c o r d o f the sentencing or in the judgment. The S t a t e t h e r e f o r e argues t h a t the t r i a l court did not consider t h i s testimony as a factor in his sentencing decision, and that the evidence could n o t have i n f l u e n c e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n . T h i s argument i g n o r e s r e a l i t y . inherently admitted, court prejudicial and Where e v i d e n c e o f inflammatory s u c h an character is no a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d assume t h a t t h e t r i a l paid no attention to it simply because he d i d not comment on s u c h e v i d e n c e d u r i n g t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g o r i n t h e judgment. I f the t r i a l court admitted the evidence, a s i t d i d h e r e , i t i s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t t h e c o u r t considered appeal, in it reaching the sentencing decision. On t h e b u r d e n s h o u l d b e p l a c e d on t h e S t a t e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t consider t h e inflammatory evidence i n reaching the the s e n t e n c i n g judgment. evidence for the express Where t h e S t a t e o f f e r s purposes of moving the s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o impose a more s e v e r e s e n t e n c e , t h e S t a t e s hould have t h e burden o f p r o v i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t u s e the evidence i n reaching h i s decision. Once t h e e v i d e n c e i s admitted, it would not be fair all defendant t o prove that the trial evidence. I t would impose a n i m p o s s i b l e b u r d e n on h i m . The proper at to require the court did consider the d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g i s s u e , is t o v a c a t e t h e s e n t e n c e , which h a s been done, b u t a l s o t o o r d e r t h a t a t the resentencing, t h e S t a t e cannot again o f f e r t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e two women w i t n e s s e s t o e v e n t s t h a t o c c u r r e d s o long ago. THE PLAN TO GET E V I D E N C E ON THE DEFENDANT -to P T h e P l a n ----- u t t h e Boy Back i n t h e Swimminq P o o l w i t h t h e Defendant Although it d o e s n o t bear on t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f any i s s u e r e s o l v e d i n t h i s a p p e a l , t h e p l a n t o p u t t h e boy back i n t h e swimming p o o l w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t shows a g r o s s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e f e e l i n g s o f t h e boy. Law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s , w i t h t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f b o y ' s p a r e n t s and t h e boy h i m s e l f , back i n t h e defendant d e c i d e d t o p u t t h e boy swimming p o o l w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t s o t h a t could be the o b s e r v e d making overtures to the t h e boy. The boy went t o t h e swimming p o o l f o r t h e e x p r e s s p u r p o s e o f l u r i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t o an i n c r i m i n a t i n g s i t u a t i o n . Law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s , i n c o g n i t o , a c c o m p a n i e d t h e boy t o t h e pool, hoping to t h e r e f o r e make observe a tighter the defendant's activities c a s e a g a i n s t him. and The o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t want a n o t h e r s e x u a l c o n t a c t t o take place, but only that they wanted to observe d e f e n d a n t making f r i e n d l y o v e r t u r e s t o t h e boy. however, waited went until another step--the disguised actually approached defendant the The e v e n t s , law o f f i c e r s the boy and engaged i n s e x u a l c o n t a c t b e f o r e t h e y t o o k any a c t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e boy was i n no p h y s i c a l d a n g e r ( o n e o f t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s was another in the swimming p o o l ) , permitting sexual c o n t a c t t o t a k e p l a c e demonstrated a g r o s s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e young boy. The r e c o r d d o e s n o t show how t h i s may h a v e a f f e c t e d t h e boy, b u t e v e n t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r traumatic effects should have dissuaded permitting another sexual contact. the police from The d e s i r e o f t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t o o b t a i n more c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct is possible laudable. emotional But again subjecting t r a u m a by p e r m i t t i n g the another boy to sexual c o n t a c t , c a n n o t b e c o n d o n e d , however l a u d a b l e t h e o b j e c t i v e . The plan may well have h e l p e d t o c h a l k up a n o t h e r )-loc~ r\ c o n v i c t i o n , b u t it should have been undertakrrsq a t t h e b o y ' s f\ expense. I n concluding t h i s d i s s e n t , have trampled I again reiterate that we on some p r e t t y f u n d a m e n t a l l a w i n a f f i r m i n g the a s s a u l t convictions. That law does n o t change because of t h e n a t u r e of t h e c a s e t h a t is b e f o r e u s f o r review.

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