MARRIAGE OF MARKEGARD
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No. 80-51 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MARKEGARD , MERRIE DAWN Petitioner and Appellant, VS . JOHN ERIC MARKEGARD , Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Davidson, Veeder, Baugh, Broeder & Poppler, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: April 24, 1980 ~ecided : Filed: /\u & 2 , A11 6 2 ;1988 M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Merrie Markegard ( h e r e i n r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e mother) a p p e a l s from t h a t p o r t i o n of a m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e e n t e r e d i n Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarding cust o d y of t h e p a r t i e s ' twenty-month o l d son t o John Markegard (herein referred t o a s the father). The mother c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n t h e following respects: (1) t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i g n o r e d t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212, d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c u s t o d y ; MCA, w i t h r e g a r d t o a (2) t h a t the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d t o c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s ; and ( 3 ) t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n i s bottomed on a d e t e r m i n a t i o n which i n e s s e n c e d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t t h e mother b e c a u s e s h e i s now a n Oregon r e s i d e n t . W v a c a t e t h e o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t e b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f a c t o r s cont a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212. The m a r r i a g e was of s h o r t d u r a t i o n . The p a r t i e s w e r e m a r r i e d on May 30, 1976 and i n October 1978, t h e mother f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o d i s s o l v e the marriage. of t h e m a r r i a g e . A son was b o r n The mother i s a n u r s e and c u r r e n t l y r e s i d e s i n P o r t l a n d , Oregon, where h e r p a r e n t s a l s o r e s i d e . The f a t h e r l i v e s on a farm between L a u r e l and P a r k C i t y , Montana. He h a s r e s i d e d i n Montana a l l of h i s l i f e and farms l a n d l e a s e d from h i s f a t h e r . A f t e r f i l i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n a c t i o n , t h e mother c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e i n Montana f o r a s h o r t t i m e , l i v i n g with friends. She w a s , however, u n a b l e t o f i n d employment and moved from B i l l i n g s t o P o r t l a n d i n November 1978 t o f i n d employment. She had temporary c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d and t h e f a t h e r w a s p a y i n g temporary c h i l d s u p p o r t . A f t e r a h e a r i n g on c h i l d c u s t o d y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d judgment f i n d i n g t h a t b o t h p a r e n t s l o v e d t h e c h i l d , b o t h w e r e f i t and p r o p e r p a r e n t s , and b o t h p a r e n t s wanted c u s t o d y . The c o u r t concluded t h a t a l l t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d would be b e t t e r s e r v e d by k e e p i n g t h e c h i l d i n Montana and t h e r e f o r e awarding c u s t o d y t o the father. The a p p a r e n t r e a s o n i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e would be a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d and promote t h e c h i l d ' s w e l f a r e and b e s t interests. Why a c o u r t i n Oregon, s h o u l d t h e need a r i s e , n o t be a b l e t o do t h e same t h i n g , we a r e n o t informed. The mother was g i v e n v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . S e c t i o n 40-4-212 This appeal followed. s e t s forth the c r i t e r i a for a t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r and weigh i n d e c i d i n g t h e i s s u e of c h i l d c u s t o d y . Although t h r e e of t h e f i v e f a c t o r s a r e n o t p e r t i n e n t h e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on t h e o t h e r two f a c t o r s a r e n o t h i n g more t h a n c o n c l u s o r y s t a t e m e n t s , n o t reflecting a t a l l the evidentiary basis f o r the decision. I n d e t e r m i n i n g c h i l d c u s t o d y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s must c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a , Counts v . Chapman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. , - 589 P.2d 151, 36 St.Rep. 89, 93; and a s a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t w e c a n o n l y d e t e r m i n e i f t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t o r s were c o n s i d e r e d and i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t s made a p p r o p r i a t e f i n d ings with r e l a t i o n t o these c r i t e r i a . Capener (1978) , - Mont. -, 582 P.2d I n Re M a r r i a g e of 326, 328, 35 St.Rep. 1026. Admittedly, s e v e r a l f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e s t a t u t e are n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case. S e c t i o n 40-4-212(3), how- ever, requires the t r i a l c o u r t t o consider the i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d w i t h h i s p a r e n t o r p a r e n t s , h i s s i b l i n g s , and any o t h e r p e r s o n who may s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t . The f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o the f a t h e r a r e s u f f i c i e n t b u t they a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e mother. W e cannot overlook t h i s f a c t o r i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c h i l d l i v e d with t h e mother i n P o r t l a n d f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one y e a r b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n h e a r i n g and t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s m a t e r n a l g r a n d parents a l s o l i v e i n Portland. S e c t i o n 40-4-212 ( 4 ) , MCA, requires the t r i a l court t o c o n s i d e r t h e c h i l d ' s a d j u s t m e n t t o h i s home, s c h o o l , and community. School i s n o t a f a c t o r h e r e , b u t t h e c h i l d ' s a d j u s t m e n t t o h i s home i s a n i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r which must b e c o n s i d e r e d and f i n d i n g s made. N such f i n d i n g s were made o here. S e c t i o n 40-4-212(5), MCA, r e q u i r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d . There a r e no f i n d i n g s a t a l l w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h i s f a c t o r . Although t h e r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e w i t h e v i d e n c e rel a t i n g t o t h e m o t h e r ' s m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h , t h e r e a r e a b s o l u t e l y no f i n d i n g s w i t h r e l a t i o n t o h e r h e a l t h . Further- more, t h e c h i l d h a s a n e y e problem which h a s r e q u i r e d m e d i c a l and s u r g i c a l a t t e n t i o n which was n o t e x p r e s s l y a d d r e s s e d . A 1 though w e must v a c a t e t h e judgment and remand f o r a n o t h e r h e a r i n g , t h e r e a r e two m a t t e r s t h a t w e w i l l a d d r e s s . The mother c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r o r a p p l y t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d t o c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s . statutory, T h i s presumption i s no l o n g e r W e s t a t e d i n t h e c a s e of I n R e ~ a r r i a g e of Tweeten ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 404, 409, 563 P.2d 1 1 4 1 , 1 1 4 4 , t h a t t h i s presumption s t i l l e x i s t s . R e f l e c t i o n on t h i s q u e s t i o n , however, c a u s e s u s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e presumption s h o u l d n o t e x i s t i n t h e a b s e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e s o d e c l a r ing. W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e i s a sound t h e o r y o r r a t i o n a l e i n s u p p o r t of a j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t such a presumption e x i s t s . W e f u r t h e r b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s presump- t i o n i s o u t d a t e d i n l i g h t of t h e enactment of t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and Divorce A c t i n t h i s s t a t e . The presumption s e r v e s o n l y t o c o n f u s e t h e p a r t i e s and t o burden t h e c o u r t s . For t h i s r e a s o n , w e o v e r r u l e Tweeten w i t h r e s p e c t t o the t e n d e r y e a r s presumption. The second m a t t e r upon which w e choose t o comment i s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d would b e b e t t e r o f f i n Montana. Although we c a n n o t s a y t h a t resi- dence w a s t h e s o l e b a s i s underlying t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n awarding c u s t o d y t o t h e f a t h e r , i t a p p e a r s from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e r e s i d e n c e of t h e p a r t i e s was a n i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Under s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, residency i s a f a c t o r t o be considered i n determining custody. But t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e i s t h a t somehow t h e Montana c o u r t s c o u l d p r o t e c t t h e w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d b u t t h e Oregon c o u r t s could not. Because t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c h i l d needed c o u r t p r o t e c t i o n o r i n t e r v e n t i o n - - b o t h p a r t i e s w e r e d e c l a r e d f i t and p r o p e r and b o t h wanted custody--we see n o t h i n g t h a t a Montana c o u r t c o u l d do t h a t a n Oregon c o u r t c o u l d n o t a l s o do. f a c t s i s misapplied. Any c o n c e p t of p a r e n s p a t r i a e under t h e s e To h o l d c o n t r a r y would r e s u l t i n p e n a l i z i n g a p a r e n t b e c a u s e he o r s h e h a s moved t o a n o t h e r state. T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d h e r e t o show t h a t a c o u r t p r o b a b l y would be i n v o l v e d i n t h e f u t u r e w i t h r e l a t i o n t o the child. W e vacate t h e decree with r e l a t i o n t o c h i l d custody and remand f o r a n o t h e r h e a r i n g , and d i r e c t t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s be e n t e r e d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. W concur: e - Chief ~ u s t c c ; J u s t i c e John C. i n part: Mr. Sheehy c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e mother s h o u l d n o t have c u s t o d y of a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s a s a matter of presumption. However, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d o e s n o t s t a t e , a s I t h i n k i t s h o u l d , t h a t when a c h i l d i s o f t e n d e r y e a r s i n a c u s t o d y d i s p u t e , t h e t e n d e r a g e of t h e c h i l d s h o u l d be a f a c t o r i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether c u s t o d y s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e mother. A s t o t h e rest of t h e o p i n i o n , I dissent. The w i f e d i d n o t come t o t h i s a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had n o t made f i n d i n g s on t h e c r i t e r i a i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212(4), opinion. a t all. MCA t h a t a r e s e t o u t i n t h e m a j o r i t y The w i f e does n o t c o n t e n d f o r t h a t i n t h i s a p p e a l R a t h e r , t h e w i f e contended t h a t as between t h e mother and t h e f a t h e r , " t h e t r i a l c o u r t [had] s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t a l l t h i n g s a r e e q u a l between t h e p a r t i e s " and t h a t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , t h e presumption e n t i t l e d t h e mother t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e minor c h i l d . I n t h e language of t h e w i f e ' s b r i e f , h e r c o n t e n t i o n under s e c t i o n 40-4-212 was: " I f t h e presumption t h a t t h e mother i s e n t i t l e d t o custody of c h i l d r e n of tender y e a r s i s t o have any b e a r i n g a t a l l , s u r e l y i n t h i s c a s e n o t only we where a i l t h i n g s --- r e p e q u a l b u t a l s o -were d e c l a r e d - - -e c o u r t , c u s t o d y must s o by t h r e s i d e i n t h e mother - . . ." The m a j o r i t y i s t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d by t h e w i f e and moreover, n o t subs t a n t i a t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d a t t h e t r i a l . For example, t h e m a j o r i t y r e f e r s t o t h e " i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e c h i l d w i t h h i s p a r e n t " and s t a t e s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a t h e r were s u f f i c i e n t b u t a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e mother. The r e a s o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n make no f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d with t h e -7- mother, and the maternal grandparents, is that for some reason not disclosed by the record, the mother offered no evidence of how her child was reacting to the family environment in Portland where the child had been residing with the mother and the maternal grandparents at the time of the trial. Thus, the decision of the District Court here in favor of the father is being reversed out of the failure of the mother to produce the evidence which this Court says should result in findings. Nor do I agree that the trial court did not consider the mental and physical health of all the individuals involved. The mother made a point during the trial that her husband had not kept the ch temporary child=' @ C d's glasses on the child when he had The father refuted this by producing eighteen pictures of himself with Eric, all showing the child wearing his glasses. The father's health is evident from the fact that he is an active farmer near Laurel, working long hours in pursuing his occupation. The mother's health indicated that she had had a very difficult labor in the childbirth of Eric; that she had gone to the hospital after using hashish; that she was diagnosed as manic depressive at the time; that she had been on a number of medications which her second doctor thought were unnecessary; that she "couldn't stand sitting at home" after the baby was born, volunteered to do nursing work at Planned Parenthood, and celebrated this occupation by going out with a Mr. Schuster and buying him a bottle of wine. It was during her evening with Mr. Schuster that the hashish incident happened and she was removed to the hospital. I think the court fully considered her health in determining the custody of Eric. Nor do I construe the District Court's placing custody of Eric with the father in Montana implicitly meant that Montana -8- was a better place than Oregon to raise children. The finding of the District Court provides in part: ". . . that in the immediate area of the respondent's home are the respondent's father and mother and the respondent's brother and sister-in-law together with their children; that during the course of the marriage the sister-in-law baby-sat the minor child from time to time; that the entire Markegard family is well thought of in the community, is a good and substantial family, and are all concerned as to the welfare of the minor child and his opportunity to grow up within the family; to grow up with his cousins, his uncles and aunts, and his grandparents; that the welfare of the child would be best promoted by having an opportunity to grow up in the environment of the Markegard community. The interest of the Markegard family in the welfare of the minor child is so great that a number of the aunts and uncles traveled to Portland, Oregon, on two occasions to visit the child, in the custody of the mother, during the year 1979." I do not derive any implicit statement that Montana is a better place to grow up than Oregon from the above finding. In the face of the lack of evidence regarding the Oregon environment for this child, the court had no choice but to decide that the Laurel community was in the best interests of the child. What the District Court did in this case was to choose between certainty and uncertainty. If this Court had granted custody to the mother, I should have been greatly concerned about the uncertainty of the mother's occupation, her ability to cope with pressure situations, of the situation at the home of the maternal grandparents, from which home both the mother and her sister departed because of the unrefuted contention of the mother that her parents were "crazy". For the foregoing reasons, I would sustain the custody decision of the District Court. Justice
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