ANACONDA CO v GENERAL ACCIDENT FI
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No. 79-1 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1980 ANACONDA COMPANY, a Delaware Corp., P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , -vsGENERAL ACCIDENT F I R E & L I F E ASSURANCE C O R P . , -LTD, a B r i t i s h c o r p . , and ARTHUR G. McKEE & CO., a D e l a w a r e C o r p . , D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e a l From: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r Bow, t h e H o n o r a b l e J a m e s D. F r e e b o u r n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : Corette, Smith,&em, Pohlman & A l l e n , Butte, '. Montana R.D. C o r e t - t e argued, B u t t e , M o n t a n a G r e g o r y C. ~ m - a r g u e d , B u t t e , M o n t a n a k For R e s p o n d e n t : Poore, Roth, Robischon & Robinson, Butte, Montana J a m e s H a r r i n g t o n argued, B u t t e , M o n t a n a Submitted: May 28, 1 9 8 0 D e c i d e d : d G 1 3 t ( l ---& Filed: SP 8 - 1980 g k t :& Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . Appellants General Accident F i r e & L i f e Assurance C o r p o r a t i o n ( G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t ) and A r t h u r G . M c K e e & Company (McKee) a p p e a l from t h e o r d e r and judgment of t h e S i l v e r Bow County D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t Anaconda Company's (Anaconda) m o t i o n f o r summary judgment. Anaconda c r o s s - a p p e a l s from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s amended judgment, entered upon m o t i o n by McKee and G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t which d e l e t e d r e c o v e r y o f a t t o r n e y f e e s of $3,561.89. On May 1 5 , 1971, McKee and Anaconda e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n t r a c t t o expand t h e c a p a c i t y and i n s t a l l f a c i l i t i e s r e l a t i n g t o e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n t r o l s a t Anaconda's smelter f a c i l i t i e s a t Anaconda, Montana. P a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t d e a l t w i t h i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e and r e q u i r e d M c K e e o r any subcont r a c t o r s o f M c K e e t o name Anaconda a s a n a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r e d u n d e r t h e i r l i a b i l i t y p o l i c i e s , i n s u r i n g a g a i n s t r i s k s of a n y k i n d r e l a t i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e smelter f a c i l i t i e s u n d e r t a k e n by M c K e e o r i t s s u b c o n t r a c t o r s p u r s u a n t t o the contract. M c K e e complied w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t by naming Anaconda a s a n a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r e d u n d e r p o l i c i e s i s s u e d by G e n e r a l Accident. These p o l i c i e s p r o v i d e d c o v e r a g e f o r p u b l i c , c o n t r a c t o r ' s and a u t o m o b i l e l i a b i l i t y . Some o f t h e sub- c o n t r a c t i n g work on t h e p r o j e c t was u n d e r t a k e n by Midland I n d u s t r i a l E l e c t r i c Company ( h e r e i n r e f e r r e d t o a s M i d l a n d ) , a w h o l l y owned s u b s i d i a r y o f M c K e e . I n accordance with t h e c o n t r a c t , Midland named Anaconda a s a n a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r e d u n d e r a p o l i c y i s s u e d by G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t , a l s o p r o v i d i n g p u b l i c , c o n t r a c t o r ' s and a u t o m o b i l e l i a b i l i t y c o v e r a g e . James W . H o r n e r , a n employee o f Midland, was i n j u r e d on November 1 8 , 1975, w h i l e working a t t h e Anaconda S m e l t e r . A t t h a t t i m e ò id land was i n s t a l l i n g pumps on o l d s l u r r y t a n k s i n a b u i l d i n g a t t h e Anaconda S m e l t e r , commonly ref e r r e d t o a s t h e " 2 8 ' t a n k house. " G e r a l d K i t c h e n and Ron M a r s h a l l , Anaconda employees, were p r e p a r i n g t o p a i n t t h e c e i l i n g o f t h e " 2 8 ' t a n k house" a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . They w e r e r i g g i n g a s c a f f o l d i n g n e a r t h e c e i l i n g by l a y i n g 2" x 1 2 " x 1 8 ' p l a n k i n g o v e r 4" x 5" x 1 8 ' t i m b e r s which w e r e s u p p o r t e d by e x i s t i n g t r u s s e s . The Anaconda employees l o s t c o n t r o l o f o n e o f t h e t i m b e r s and i t f e l l some 30 f e e t t o t h e ground below. H o r n e r , w h i l e working i n t h e c o u r s e a n d s c o p e o f h i s employment f o r Midland, was s t r u c k by t h e f a l l i n g t i m b e r and was i n j u r e d . On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1977, Horner f i l e d a s u i t a g a i n s t Anaconda i n S i l v e r Bow County a l l e g i n g t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f Anaconda employees. By a l e t t e r of J a n u a r y 24, 1977, Anaconda made a f o r m a l demand o f G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t t o i n s u r e and d e f e n d Anaconda i n t h e a c t i o n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t i t by Horner. By a l e t t e r of A p r i l 8 , 1977, G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t r e j e c t e d Anaconda's demand on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t d i d n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e " d e s c r i p t i o n of o p e r a t i o n s c o v e r e d " i n t h e policy. On A p r i l 20, 1977, Anaconda a g a i n r e q u e s t e d t h a t G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t i n s u r e and d e f e n d Anaconda i n H o r n e r ' s s u i t , which G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t a g a i n r e f u s e d t o d o . Anaconda t h e n h i r e d c o u n s e l t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t H o r n e r ' s s u i t ; and subsequently, an out-of-court s e t t l e m e n t o f $125,000 was reached. Anaconda t h e n f i l e d t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n a g a i n s t M c K e e and G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t was o b l i g a t e d t o i n s u r e and d e f e n d Anaconda i n Horner's lawsuit. Anaconda moved f o r summary judgment and a h e a r i n g was h e l d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r a d o p t i n g Anaconda's f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w ; and judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t M c K e e and General A c c i d e n t p u r s u a n t t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g o f Anaconda's motion f o r summary judgment. Judgment was i n t h e amount of $125,000, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e amount p a i d by Anaconda i n s e t t l e m e n t w i t h Horner, p l u s $5,843.23 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s expended by Anaconda i n d e f e n s e of t h e s e t t l e d c l a i m , and $3,561.89 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s expended by Anaconda i n t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n . McKee and G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t f i l e d a motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion t o amend, i n p a r t , by d e l e t i n g t h e award of a t t o r n e y f e e s of $3,561.89, p r e v i o u s l y awarded i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e l i t i g a t i o n of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . T h i s a p p e a l by McKee and G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t and Anaconda's c r o s s - a p p e a l followed. The i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g Ana- c o n d a ' s motion f o r summary judgment, f i n d i n g t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t e d , and e n t e r i n g judgment f o r Anaconda. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying Ana- conda a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c u r r e d i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h i s case. G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t and McKee c o n t e n d t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g Anaconda's motion f o r summary judgment. They a r g u e t h a t i t was improper f o r t h e c o u r t t o g r a n t summary judgment b e c a u s e t h e r e remained u n r e s o l v e d q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . They i n s i s t t h a t l i a b i l i t y of G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t i n t h i s a c t i o n i s p r e d i c a t e d on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether o r n o t t h e Anaconda employees were working p u r s u a n t t o C o n t r a c t No. 2081 a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t : puted i s s u e . a dis- Anaconda c o n t e n d s , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d , t h a t i t d o e s n o t m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e Anaconda employees w e r e working p u r s u a n t t o t h e c o n t r a c t a t t h e t i m e of t h e i n j u r y ; what m a t t e r s i s w h e t h e r t h e i n j u r e d employee was working pursuant t o the contract. A review of t h e record i n d i c a t e s i t h a s been a d m i t t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t t h e i n j u r e d workman was working w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e work t o b e performed u n d e r C o n t r a c t N o . Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., 2081. s t a t e s t h a t summary judgment s h a l l be rendered o n l y i f : ". . . . . . t h e pleadings, d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a n y m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law." The q u e s t i o n t o b e d e c i d e d on a m o t i o n f o r summary judgment i s w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t and n o t how t h a t i s s u e s h o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d ; t h e h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n i s n o t a t r i a l . 167 Mont. Fulton v. Clark (1975), 399, 538 P.2d1371; M a t t e u c c i ' s S u p e r S a v e Drug v . Hustad C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 311, 491 P.2d 705. The p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment h a s t h e b u r d e n o f showing t h e c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e o f any g e n u i n e i s s u e s a s t o a l l f a c t s which a r e deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t o f t h o s e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law. H a r l a n d v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. I n Kober v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. P.2d 4 7 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , 417 t h i s C o u r t c i t e d 6 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e , " 'The c o u r t s h o l d t h e movant t o a s t r i c t s t a n dard. To s a t i s f y h i s burden t h e movant must make a showing t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r what t h e t r u t h i s , and t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y r e a l d o u b t a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y g e n u i n e i s s u e o f material fact. " ' S i n c e it i s n o t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o a d j u d i c a t e genuine f a c t u a l i s s u e s a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n f o r summary judgment, i n r u l i n g on t h e m o t i o n a l l i n f e r e n c e s of f a c t from t h e p r o o f s p r o f f e r e d a t t h e h e a r i n g must be drawn a g a i n s t t h e movant and i n f a v o r of t h e p a r t y o p p o s i n g t h e motion. And t h e p a p e r s supporting movant's p o s i t i o n a r e c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e d , w h i l e t h e opposing p a p e r s a r e i n d u l g e n t l y t r e a t e d , i n determining whether t h e movant h a s s a t i s f i e d h i s b u r d e n . ' 11 1 ... I f t h e r e i s any doubt a s t o t h e pro- p r i e t y of a motion, c o u r t s should, w i t h o u t h e s i t a n c y , deny t h e s a m e . ' " Kober v . S t e w a r t , 148 Mgnt. a t 122. The u n d e r l y i n g d i s p u t e between t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s a p p e a l r e s t s on a q u e s t i o n o f f o c u s . G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t and M c K e e i n s i s t t h a t t o d e t e r m i n e l i a b i l i t y o n e must f o c u s on t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e Anaconda employees who c a u s e d t h e a c c i dent. Anaconda, on t h e o t h e r hand, a r g u e s t h a t t h e f o c u s s h o u l d b e on t h e i n j u r e d workman. Both p a r t i e s b a s e t h e i r a r g u m e n t s on v a r y i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f two p r o v i s i o n s i n C o n t r a c t No. " A r t i c l e 10. 2081: Insurance. " ( d ) C o n t r a c t o r a g r e e s t o c a u s e owner t o be made a n a d d i t i o n a l named i n s u r e d u n d e r a l l o f c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i a b i l i t y p o l i c i e s i n s u r i n g r i s k s o f a n y k i n d rel a t i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and t o a r r a n g e , i n terms a p p r o v e d i n advance by owner, t h a t s u c h policies w i l l c o n s t i t u t e primary coverage i n t h e e v e n t o f a n y c l a i m s a g a i n s t owner t h a t a r e i n s u r a b l e under any of such p o l i c i e s . " " A r t i c l e 15. Subcontracts. " ( d ) Contractor s h a l l bring the insurance requirements o f P a r a g r a p h 1 0 h e r e o f t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f a l l persons i n v i t e d t o submit b i d s f o r s u b c o n t r a c t s , a t t h e t i m e o f a n y s u c h i n v i t a t i o n , and t o a l l p e r s o n s who a r e p r o s p e c t i v e s u b c o n t r a c t o r s f o r subc o n t r a c t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o which t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f b i d s i s n o t t o be i n v i t e d , a s e a r l y a s p r a c t i c a b l e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o s u c h subcont r a c t s , and s h a l l a s s u r e t h a t s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e m e t by a n y s u c c e s s f u l s u b c o n t r a c t b i d d e r . " More s p e c i f i c a l l y , b o t h p a r t i e s f o c u s t h e i r arguments on t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o be g i v e n t o t h e l a n g u a g e " r i s k s of any k i n d r e l a t i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n " which i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e above q u o t e d p o r t i o n s of C o n t r a c t No. 2081. N mention i s o made by e i t h e r p a r t y of any p r o v i s i o n i n t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s t h e m s e l v e s which would e x c l u d e c o v e r a g e h e r e . F u r t h e r , a r e v i e w of t h e s e p o l i c i e s d i d n o t b r i n g any such exclusions t o the surface. I t a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s a p p e a l i s c o n t i n g e n t on t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n w e g i v e t h e above q u o t e d language. A s s t a t e d e a r l i e r , both p a r t i e s approach t h e problem from d i f f e r e n t f o c a l p o i n t s . I t a p p e a r s , how- e v e r , t h a t t h e r e a l i s s u e f a c i n g u s i s what t y p e of r i s k s d i d t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d t o c o v e r under t h e i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s of C o n t r a c t No. 2081. A s w e s t a t e d i n G l a c i e r Campground v . Wild R i v e r s , (1978) , - Mont. 597 P.2d 689, 35 St.Rep. Inc. 1894, t h e i n t e n t i o n of p a r t i e s t o a c o n t r a c t i s t o be a s c e r t a i n e d , i f p o s s i b l e , s o l e l y from l a n g u a g e used i n t h e i n s t r u m e n t , and r e s o r t may be had t o e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e o n l y when t h e cont r a c t , on i t s f a c e , a p p e a r s ambiguous o r u n c e r t a i n . a l s o s e c k i o n s 28-3-303; 28-3-306 ( 2 ) , MCA. See Being t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s a p p e a l , t h e language " r i s k s of any k i n d r e l a t i n g t o c o n s t r u c t i o n " a p p e a r s ambiguous o r u n c e r t a i n . T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t summary judgment i s u s u a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e where t h e i n t e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i s an important consideration. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. F u l t o n v. C l a r k 399, 403, 538 P.2d 1371, 1373; Kober v . S t e w a r t ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 117, 122, 123, 417 P.2d 476, 479; 6 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 7156.17[41.-11. General Accident admits t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e which named Anaconda as a n a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r e d w a s i s s u e d t o p r o t e c t p e r s o n s from r i s k s c r e a t e d by t h e n e g l i gence of t h e i n s u r e d . T h i s t y p e o f c o v e r a g e h a s been ex- plained i n general t e r m s : "A c o n t r a c t o f c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e w i l l g e n e r a l l y r e q u i r e t h a t t h e harm be work-related o r otherwise s p e c i f y t h a t t h e r e b e some c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s [ i n s u r e d ' s ] a c t i v i t y and 1 t h e harm which i s s u s t a i n e d . " 1 Couch on I n s u r a n c e , S e c . 44:338 , ( 2 d e d . 1 9 6 3 ) . T h e r e must b e some r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e r i s k c r e a t e d by t h e a l l e g e d i n s u r e d t o r t f e a s o r s , t h e Anaconda employees, and t h e harm s u s t a i n e d . I n determining t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p it i s n e c e s s a r y t o l o o k a t t h e employment c o n t r a c t which c r e a t e d t h e r i s k and t h e work t o be done p u r s u a n t t h e r e u n d e r . Were w e t o f o c u s m e r e l y on t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i n j u r e d workman and n o t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e named i n s u r e d s , w e would r e n d e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f C o n t r a c t No. 2081 o v e r l y b r o a d and make G e n e r a l A c c i d e n t t h e i n s u r e r o f a l l Anaconda a c t i v i t i e s a t t h e S m e l t e r t h a t r e s u l t e d i n i n j u r i e s t o anyone working p u r s u a n t t o t h e c o n t r a c t , r e g a r d l e s s o f c o n t r o l and b e n e f i t . T h i s C o u r t w i l l p l a c e no s u c h burden on anyone. I n t h e r e c o r d t h e r e i s c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e a s t o whet h e r t h e work b e i n g performed by t h e Anaconda employees a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t was u n d e r t a k e n p u r s u a n t t o C o n t r a c t No. 2081. W e h o l d t h i s i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . The i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denyi n g Anaconda a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c u r r e d i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h i s case i s n o t r i p e f o r review a t t h i s t i m e . P l a i n t i f f s have n o t m e t t h e i r b u r d e n of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e a b s e n c e o f any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . judgment i s v a c a t e d and s e t a s i d e . t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t r i a l . The summary The c a u s e i s remanded t o We c o n c u r : Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, dissent: The purpose of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, is to eliminate unnecessary trial, delay, and expense. Silloway v. Jorgenson (1965), 146 Mont. 307, 406 P.2d 167. Under a motion for summary judgment, the formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and the court must consider the depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, oral te,stimony, and exhibits presented to determine who should prevail on the motion. Mont. 531, 410 P.2d 447. Hager v. Tandy (1965), 146 When the facts established under the motion for summary judgment are undisputed, and under those undisputed facts the plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on any legal theory, this Court on review should affirm the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff. The salient undisputed facts that should decide this appeal are these: 1. General Accident and Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., issued its liability policy, including comprehensive general liability, in which policy Arthur G. McKee & Company is the named insured, and the Anaconda Company by endorsement is an additional insured. 2. McKee provided the insurance policy to Anaconda by reason of a contract with Anaconda that recited: "Contractor [McKee] agrees to cause Owner [Anaconda] to be made an additional named insured under all of Contractor's liability policies insuring risks - of any kind relating - - construction and to arrange, to the in terms approved in advance by Owner, that such policies wiil constitute prima;y coverage in the event of any claims against Owner that are insurable under any of such policies." (Emphasis added.) - - 3. The insurance policy defines an "insured" as any person or organization qualifying as an insured under the policy, and further provides as to several insureds under the same policy: .. ". The insurance afforded applies separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought, except with respect to the limits of the company's [the insurance company] liability." (Emphasis added. ) 4. At the time of his injury, McKee's employee was on the Anaconda premises pursuant to work in progress under contract no. 2081, the contract between McKee as contractor and Anaconda as owner. 5. Anaconda's employees were negligent in dropping the planking that caused the injury to McKee's employee. In determining the liability of General Accident, if any, to Anaconda here, we look to the terms of the policy. An insurance policy, like any other contract, must be given that interpretation which is reasonable and which is consonant with the manifest object and intent of the parties. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company v. Colbrese (9th Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 405; cert.den. 386 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. G /\,b 18 L.Ed. 2d 336. The general rules of contract law apply to an insurance policy. Hildebrandt v. Washington National Insurance Company (1979), - Mont. - 593 P.2d 37, 36 St.Rep. , 628, (life insurance); Universal Underwriters Insurance Company v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company (1975), 166 Mont. 128, 531 P.2d 668, (garage liability policy). Under McKee's agreement with Anaconda, McKee agreed to make Anaconda an additional named insured in McKee's policies "insuring risks of any kind relating to the construction" which would constitute "primary coverage" in the event of a claim against Anaconda. If this policy had been purchased by Anaconda in its own right, there is no doubt that the injury to McKee's employee would be a risk that was insurable for Anaconda under the policy. It makes no difference that here the insurance contract was purchased by McKee and that Anaconda is named as an additional insured. By reason of the sev- erability of the interests clause which we have quoted above, in fact, here Anaconda and McKee are two separate insureds under the same policy, the only limitation being the limits of liability of General Accident under its policy. Each of the two entities, McKee and Anaconda, are separately insured under all the terms of the policy. As an example of the effect of the severability clause, see Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange (10th Cir. 1971), 443 F.2d 796. See also, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Pacific Clay Products Company (1970), 13 3d Cal.App.4304, 91 Cal.Rptr. 52; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Truck Insurance Exchange (Ore. 1966), 420 P.2d 66 (contribution allowed). Thus, the policy issued by General Accident comes within the provisions of contract no. 2081 between McKee and Anaconda that the policy provided by McKee will constitute "primary coverage in the event of any claims against [Anaconda] that are insurable under any of such policies." The majority opinion makes it "overly broad" that General Accident should be the insurer of all Anaconda activities at the Smelter that result in an injury to anyone working pursuant to the contract, regardless of control and benefit. That state- ment overlooks the clause of contract no. 2081 that Anaconda would be an additional named insured with respect to "risks of any kind relating to the construction". The endorsement which makes Anaconda an additional insured under the general liability policy is as follows: ". . . that the Anaconda Company, Anaconda, Montana, is an additional insured under this policy in accordance with provisions of contract no. 2081 with Arthur G. McKee and Company and dated May 15, 1971." McKee's employee was not an interloper on Anaconda's premises at the time of the injury. ance of contract no. 2081. He was there in further- The risk that he might be injured by Anaconda's employees was within the "risks of any kind relating to the construction" for which McKee agreed to provide insurance to Anaconda. There is no reason to return this case to the District Court under the guise of seeking the "intent" of the parties with respect to the insurance here provided. Where the language of the insurance policy admits of only one meaning, there is no basis for the interpretation of policy coverage under the guise of ambiguity. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company (1975), 166 Mont. 128, 531 P.2d 668. Since the injury to McKee's employee is plainly within the coverage extended to Anaconda by General Accident under this policy of insurance, the District Court was correct in awarding judgment to Anaconda for the amount required to settle the claim of McKee's employee, plus the cost of defense that Anaconda incurred in handling the claim against it by McKee's employee. The District Court in this case should be affirmed. I concur with the foregoing dissent. Chief Justice
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