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i No. 80-159 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1980 THE STATE O M N A A F O T N , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, vs . CRISS ALLEN CASE, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k . Honorable P e t e r Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: H u l l and S h e r l o c k , H e l e n a , Montana J e f f r e y S h e r l o c k a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana C h a r l e s G r a v e l e y , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: OEC 2 9 1980 November 1 8 , 1980 BEG 2 9 5980 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Court. . Sheehy d e l i v e r e d the Opinion of the D e f e n d a n t C r i s s A l l e n C a s e a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n i n the D i s t r i c t Court, First Judicial District, C l a r k C o u n t y , o f one c o u n t o f r o b b e r y . Lewis and For r e a s o n s h e r e i n - a f t e r s e t f o r t h , we r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and d i s m i s s t h e charge. D e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l : Was 1. defendant denied his right to a speedy t r i a l where 3 4 0 d a y s e l a p s e d b e t w e e n t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and t r i a l ? Was 2. sufficient evidence presented at trial to support a conviction? Was 3. the accomplice t e s t i m o n y o f Ron Worden s u f - f i c i e n t l y corroborated? 4. Was e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d ? 5. Did jury instructions allowing permissive infer- e n c e s s h i f t t h e burden of p r o o f ? C a s e and h i s t h r e e c o d e f e n d a n t s R i c k Worden, Ron Worden and A u s t i n M e t c a l f d r o v e t o Montana t o g e t h e r from C a l i f o r n i a i n November 1 9 7 8 . D u r i n g t h e t r i p , t h e men d i s c u s s e d p l a n s f o r r o b b e r i e s o f r o a d h o u s e s a l o o n s , p u r c h a s e d a gun and t a p e for restraining victims, and cased a number of bars as p o t e n t i a l r o b b e r y s i t e s b e f o r e a r r i v i n g i n Montana. On November 7 , 1 9 7 8 , t h e Worden B r o t h e r s r o b b e d Mac's Bar i n Wolf C r e e k w h i l e C a s e and M e t c a l f r e m a i n e d o u t s i d e i n the car. The victims Marcus p r e s e n t e d the robbery, C h a r l e s and C a r o l no e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t , neither could crime. E m i l Kersey, preceding of identify him as having p a r t i c i p a t e d in and the a p a t r o n who l e f t t h e b a r i m m e d i a t e l y t h e robbery, saw t h e g e t a w a y c a r a s h e d e p a r t e d and n o t i c e d someone h e i d e n t i f i e d a s a b l o n d e woman s i t t i n g in the driver's position. Wolf Creek Other testimony concerning t h e p r i m a r i l y by Ron Worden, r o b b e r y was p r e s e n t e d who had t u r n e d S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e , and a l s o by Deputy R i c h a r d Hammerbacker who had t a k e n s t a t e m e n t s f r o m R i c k Worden and Metcalf. On t h e e v e n i n g o f November 8 , 1978, t h e day f o l l o w i n g t h e M a c ' s Bar r o b b e r y , d e f e n d a n t and h i s companions r o b b e d a i n L o r i n g , Montana. bar robbery, which All f o u r men p a r t i c i p a t e d in that i n v o l v e d m u l t i p l e k i d n a p p i n g s and h o m i c i d e s a s w e l l a s robbery. D e f e n d a n t h a s a l r e a d y been t r i e d and convicted f o r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Loring robbery. h a s been sentenced to a total of 175 y e a r s He i n connection T h a t s e n t e n c e i s u n r e l a t e d t o and n o t with t h a t incident. a f f e c t e d by t h i s a p p e a l . On November 30, 1 9 7 8 , C a s e was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n i n Lewis and C l a r k C o u n t y w i t h r o b b e r y . that o f f e n s e under 45-2-302, MCA. 5, 340 1979, the He was t r i e d accountability statute, for section T r i a l was e v e n t u a l l y commenced on November days after the filing of the information. D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s f r o m a v e r d i c t and judgment o f g u i l t y . The Attorney General did not participate in oral argument. The s p e e d y t r i a l i s s u e h e r e i s e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o the issue Worden presented (1980), and Mont. discussed , in detail 6 1 1 P.2d in 185, S t a t e v. 37 S t . R e p . The o n l y m a t e r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n h e r e f r o m Worden i s a 869. d e l a y o f an a d d i t i o n a l 19 d a y s b e f o r e commencement o f trial. this The r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r a d d i t i o n a l d e l a y h e r e u n d e r t h e same f a c t s a s Worden i s n o t s o s u b s t a n t i a l a s t o p u r s u a d e u s t o abandon t h e p o s i t i o n w e a d o p t e d i n Worden. D e f e n d a n t was n o t denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . D e f e n d a n t q u e s t i o n s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e on t h r e e separate bases: was never Worden directly indicated t h e e s s e n t i a l element of (1) established; defendant's (2) the actions testimony of did w i t h i n t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y s t a t u t e ; and, fear not bring Ron him (3) a f a t a l variance e x i s t e d between t h e m a t t e r s a l l e g e d i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e proof adduced at trial. None o f t h e s e arguments a r e persuasive. Defendant u r g e s t h a t under S t a t e v. Merseal ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 412, 538 P.2d 1366, the State's d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y from t h e M a r c u s ' failure to elicit t h a t t h e y were p l a c e d fear leaves that e l e m e n t unproven. here is s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n in The f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n that i n Merseal, and t h e l a t t e r does n o t c o n t r o l . I n Merseal, d e f e n d a n t was driving p o l i c e o f f i c e r was a p a s s e n g e r . a car in which a Defendant slowed t h e c a r , moved t o jump o u t of t h e v e h i c l e and a l s o r e a c h e d t o w a r d t h e f l o o r o f t h e a u t o , where i t was s u s p e c t e d h e had a c o n c e a l e d gun. The officer, who restrained defendant. was armed, drew his weapon and The o f f i c e r , a l l e g e d l y t h e v i c t i m o f a n a s s a u l t , d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t h e had e x p e r i e n c e d f e a r . H e r e t h e r o b b e r s w e r e i n more c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o f t h e situation. gunpoint Rick if he Worden inquired understood about of Charles robbery. Marcus Charles at and C a r o l Marcus were p l a c e d f a c e down on t h e f l o o r , and bound with tape, while the robbers took w h i s k e y and c i g a r e t t e s . t h e money i n t h e till, The v i c t i m s w e r e t h e n admonished n o t t o move f o r a q u a r t e r h o u r a f t e r t h e t h i e v e s ' d e p a r t u r e . W h i l e t h e o n l y t e s t i m o n y which f e a r was C a r o l M a r c u s ' served a s statement: "Well, an admission of I understood it t h a t t h e y meant t h e y would k i l l u s i f we d i d n ' t ( r e m a i n on t h e f l o o r ) ," a c t u a l f e a r may be d e d u c e d by t h e j u r y when t h e victims are placed under such total domination by the offenders. I t is w e l l w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of the jury to determine t h a t f e a r e x i s t s i n such a s i t u a t i o n . R i c k Worden's anything less victims in b r a n d i s h i n g of than sufficient fear. o r d e r s and t h e i r The t h e gun c o u l d h a r d l y be circumstances Marcus' compliance common person experience would place with the Worden's t o t a l submission i n d i c a t e d a f e a r of c o n s e q u e n c e s of f a i l u r e t o d o s o . the to of experience robber w i e l d i n g a gun. I t would be c o n t r a r y t o a l l mankind no the fear to Daellenbach v. that a confronted when conclude with a S t a t e (Wyo. 1 9 7 7 ) , 562 P.2d 679. D e f e n s e c o u n s e l e l i c i t e d u n d i s p u t e d t e s t i m o n y f r o m Ron Worden that proscribed robbery or if did not engage by s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 3 0 2 ( 3 ) , during Mac's Ba r. arose, Case time the in MCA, any of either t h e Wordens w e r e the acts before the actually in Defendant t h e r e f o r e a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o m p l i c i t y at all, o n l y a f t e r t h e r o b b e r y had c o n c l u d e d -- t h u s removing C a s e f r o m any a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e r o b b e r y . Ron Worden a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t C r i s s C a s e d r o v e t h e c a r D e f e n d a n t ' s argument h e r e i s d u r i n g t h e g e t a w a y from M a c ' s . d e p e n d e n t on t h e v a l i d i t y o f h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r o b b e r y ended t h e moment bar. However, t h e Worden brothers stepped outside the i n Montana, t h e e n s u i n g f l i g h t i s c o n s i d e r e d p a r t and p a r c e l o f a r o b b e r y u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s t h e c r i m i n a l p u r p o s e , i n c l u d i n g c a r r y i n g away o f t h e s p o i l s o f t h e c r i m e , is completed. 370. Here, S t a t e v. J a c k s o n ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 7 1 Mont. 421, 230 P. defendant's involvement commenced before the r o b b e r s had r e a c h e d a p l a c e o f s e e m i n g s e c u r i t y and b e f o r e t h e proceeds had been divided. By s e r v i n g a s a getaway d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t a i d e d t h e Wordens i n t h e commission o f t h e robbery, and 45-2-302, MCA. became liable for the robbery under section Defendant's third assault on the evidence adduced at trial is that it failed to establish the robbery in the mode specified in the information -- purposely or knowingly put the bar owners in fear of immediate bodily injury. Defendant argues that the state's failure specifically to prove fear, where fear was specifically alleged, is fatal. This argument evaporates in light of our above ruling that the fear element was indeed sufficiently established. We turn now to the issue of corroboration of accomplice The state's major witness was Ron Worden, who testimony. testified regarding the events which occurred from the time the four men left California through the commission of the Loring robbery. It was Worden's testimony that placed Case behind the wheel in the getaway vehicle. testimony The only other regarding defendant's possible participation was presented by Kersey, presence and Hammerbacker and Officer Ralph Schmoldt, a jailer who overheard express anger at Ron Worden because, defendant "Ronny had turned State's evidence on some robberies and other things that had gone on.'' The District Court ruled Kersey's testimony sufficient to corroborate Worden. Section testimony be 46-16-213, corroborated MCA, mandates by other that accomplice independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the offense. quantum and character recently discussed , of this in State v. requisite proof Kemp (1979), 597 P.2d 96, 36 St.Rep. 1215: "To be sufficient, corroborating evidence must show more than that a crime was in fact committed or the circumstances of its commission. (Citation.) It must raise more than a suspicion of the defendant's involvement in, or opportunity to commit, the crime charged. (Citation.) But corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, by itself, to support a defendant's conviction or even to make out a prima facie case against him. has The been Mont . (Citations.) C o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ( C i t a t i o n . ) and c a n come from the defendant or h i s witnesses. (Citation.) " With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n m i n d , e a c h c a s e m u s t be examined on i t s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e t e n d s , i n and o f i t s e l f , t o prove d e f e n d a n t ' s connection with t h e crime charged. "One a c c o m p l i c e c a n n o t s u p p l y t h e i n d e p e n d e n t evidence necessary t o corroborate another accomplice. (Citations.)" 597 P.2d a t 9 9 , 36 S t . R e p . a t 1217-1218. The c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e m u s t c l e a r l y : (1) B e independent (2) P o i n t t o w a r d d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t , and (3) Provide a l e g a l l y sufficient connection between d e f e n d a n t and o f f e n s e . See, Civil Procedure and S u r v e y , 4 1 Mont.L.Rev. Evidence, Montana Supreme C o u r t 293, 319 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . D e p u t y Hammerbacker's t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n e d s t a t e m e n t s h e had t a k e n from R i c k Worden and A u s t i n M e t c a l f i n L a s V e g a s , Nevada. Coming from a c c o m p l i c e s , considered independent. the e v i d e n c e c a n n o t be Kemp, s u p r a . E m i l Kersey p r o v i d e d i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e i n s o f a r a s he saw a p e r s o n , a blonde female, i n t h e d r i v e r ' s p o s i t i o n of t h e getaway v e h i c l e . Kersey could n o t i d e n t i f y t h e husky r e d - h a i r e d d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t p e r s o n , however. thus i m p l i c a t e s d e f e n d a n t o n l y when v i e w e d The t e s t i m o n y in conjunction w i t h Ron W o r d e n ' s and t h e r e f o r e i s a l s o n o t i n d e p e n d e n t . O f f i c e r S c h m o l d t ' s t e s t i m o n y was f u l l y i n d e p e n d e n t , b u t vague. T h e Wolf defendant, whose Creek anger robbery was not mentioned a t Worden c o u l d j u s t a s e a s i l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e L o r i n g r o b b e r y o r some o t h e r incident. i s n o t more c o n s i s t e n t with complicity than noncomplicity i n t h e Wolf robbery. corroboration. It S t a t e v. is anger intervening a t Worden Creek The e x p r e s s i o n o f by therefore Keckonen insufficient ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. as 253, 2 6 4 , 8 4 P.2d 3 4 1 , 346. The S t a t e h a s c l e a r l y f a i l e d corroborative of accomplice t o present any e v i d e n c e testimony. This failure necessitates reversal. The State Worden, of robbery. of the testimony planning and at trial, commission through of the Ron Loring The e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e l i m i t e d p u r p o s e showing defendant's intent, preparation, The knowledge. other presented details of specific its commission, than a r g u e s on a p p e a l were have widespread Loring revealed. t h a t a l l evidence r e l a t i n g r o b b e r y was i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . W e not the repeatedly use of plan and robbery, Defendant t o t h e Loring W e agree. expressed our concern other crimes evidence. over the Our a p p r e h e n s i o n h a s l e d us t o a p p l y t h e g e n e r a l r u l e a g a i n s t use of evidence of other crimes, closely limited established St.Rep. circumstances. substantive a p p l i c a t i o n of S t a t e v. and t o a l l o w s u c h e v i d e n c e o n l y u n d e r the exception, J u s t (1979), 1649. and Toward this procedural which w e we have guidelines have , Mont. end, set for forth in 957, 36 602 P.2d I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , n e i t h e r t h e s u b s t a n t i v e nor t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s have been f u l f i l l e d . Admissibility of evidence of other crimes is to be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o a f o u r e l e m e n t test: (1) S i m i l a r i t y o f c r i m e s ; (2) N e a r n e s s i n time; (3) Tendency to establish a common scheme, p l a n o r system, and; (4) The p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e e v i d e n c e is n o t sub- s t a n t i a l l y o u t w e i g h e d by p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . s u p r a , 602 P.2d a t 961, 36 S t . R e p . a t 1653. Just, Only t h e time f a c t o r h a s been m e t h e r e . First, t h e Wolf dissimilar to exception. allow Where Creek the and Loring State to the alleged were robberies invoke the other similarities too crimes between the crimes r e v e a l l i t t l e i n common o t h e r t h a n a s e q u e n c e o f t i m e from the crime distinctive similarity charged, enough element (198o)t Mont to the acts come of the . , are within the exception. 608 P.2d not unusual purview State and of v. the Hansen 1 0 8 3 , 1 0 8 7 , 37 S t . R e p . 6 5 7 , 661. I n Wolf force other the car. Creek, the Wordens robbed the no w h i l e C a s e and M e t c a l f w a i t e d i n than t h r e a t s , a predesignated duty station, v i o l e n c e r e s u l t e d i n m u l t i p l e homicides. similar That using I n L o r i n g , a l l f o u r men e n t e r e d t h e b a r , e a c h man assumed are bar sole only in t h a t both similarity and the The two i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v e d barroom between the ensuing two is robberies. clearly not s u f f i c i e n t t o trigger the exception. Next, the crimes do scheme, p l a n o r s y s t e m . not tend Again, to establish a common t h e c r i m e s were c a r r i e d o u t i n v a s t l y d i s s i m i l a r f a s h i o n w i t h i n t h e p e r v a s i v e l y common s c e n a r i o o f t h e barroom h o l d u p . distinguishing event A b s e n t p r o o f o f any f u r t h e r peculiar to c r i m e s , no common scheme e x i s t s . Finally, weighed other crimes prejudice to a prejudice was certain of inherently the other connected here, the of both e v i d e n c e must defendant. result degree. compounded been h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d . the will invariably defendant to commission Hansen, s u p r a . t h e p r o b a t i v e value of against evidence the The where in Evidence prejudice likelihood the other of to be of a such c r i m e had The l a c k o f p r o b a t i v e v a l u e o f t h e crime, with the coupled with admission of the prejudice such evidence, compels our conclusion that the prejudicial effect outweighed i t s p r o b a t i v e value. This case exception to crimes. does the not on general The i m p r o p e r its rule facts barring admission of fall within evidence of the other t h e evidence under the exception is r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Once h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s i s a d m i s s i b l e , which we a g a i n e m p h a s i z e s h o u l d o n l y o c c u r u n d e r limited conditions justifying rule, a d e p a r t u r e from t h e g e n e r a l t h e c o u r t must f o l l o w t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s s e t f o r t h i n J u s t , 602 P.2d a t 963-964, Failure to adhere constitutes error. to the 36 S t . R e p . procedural a t 1657-1658. mandates of J u-s t ~ h i s a s e was t r i e d two months a f t e r w e c handed down J u s t , y e t n o n e o f t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s w e r e met. First, the defendant, evidence S t a t e must before is to be the case provide written is called produced. The for notice notice trial, must to the that the include a statement of t h e p u r p o s e s f o r which t h e e v i d e n c e is t o be presented. Here, whatsoever; before defendant trial received no written t h e S t a t e had v e r b a l l y notice indicated o n l y t h a t it might p r e s e n t s u c h e v i d e n c e ; and t h e d e f e n d a n t was f i n a l l y apprised of the State's definite intention to p r e s e n t t h e e v i d e n c e , and o f t h e p u r p o s e f o r t h a t p r e s e n t a t i o n , only a t t h e conclusion of t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l . Next, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must, a t t h e t i m e t h e evidence is introduced, e x p l a i n t o t h e j u r y t h e purpose of t h e evidence and admonish t h e j u r y t o w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e o n l y f o r t h o s e purposes. The C o u r t d i d n o t s o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y . The f i n a l p r o c e d u r a l s t e p r e q u i r e s : "In its f i n a l charge, t h e c o u r t should i n s t r u c t the jury i n unequivocal terms t h a t s u c h e v i d e n c e was r e c e i v e d o n l y f o r t h e l i m i t e d p u r p o s e s e a r l i e r s t a t e d and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t b e i n g t r i e d and may n o t be convicted for any o f f e n s e e x c e p t t h a t c h a r g e d , w a r n i n g them t h a t t o c o n v i c t f o r o t h e r o f f e n s e s may r e s u l t i n u n j u s t d o u b l e punishment." 602 P.2d a t 9 6 4 , 36 S t . R e p . a t 1658. The jury was instructed regarding such evidence as follows: " E v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s , w r o n g s , o r a c t s i s n o t t o be u s e d by you t o p r o v e t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n fo r m i t y t h e r e w i t h , nor is such e v i d e n c e t o be u s e d by you a s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c o m m i t t e d t h e a c t w i t h which h e i s c h a r g e d . However, e v i d e n c e of o t h e r c r i m e s , w r o n g s o r a c t s may be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y f o r o t h e r purposes such a s proof of i n t e n t , opportunity, maintenance, preparation, plan or knowledge. " The specifically possibility for Hence, the jury Again, the required unjust was unequivocal warning of the d o u b l e p u n i s h m e n t was n o t i n c l u d e d . inadequately instructed its in final charge. failure safeguards prejudiced to provide defendant. necessary This procedural failure, of itself dictates reversal. Finally, improperly defendant shifted argues t h e burden certain of jury proof. instructions The i n s t r u c t i o n s c o m p l a i n e d of a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o i n f e r knowledge and i n t e n t on the part of the defendant. Defendant submits the i n s t r u c t i o n s v i o l a t e d t h e s p i r i t and i n t e n t o f S a n d s t r o m v . Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 442 U.S. 5 1 0 , 99 S . C t . 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. W disagree. e W have p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e v a l i d i t y of e similar i n s t r u c t i o n s a l l o w i n g p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e s , S t a t e v . Sunday (1980)I , Mont. S t a t e v . Wogamon ( 1 9 8 0 ) , St.Rep. 609 P.2d 1188, , Mont. 37 St.Rep. 610 P.2d 561; 1 1 6 1 , 37 8 4 0 , and h a v e d e t e r m i n e d s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e no b u r d e n on d e f e n d a n t s . "Since a W s t a t e d i n Sunday: e permissive inference is involved, S u n d a y must show t h e i n v a l i d i t y of t h e i n f e r e n c e a s a p p l i e d t o him. Sunday must show t h e r e i s n o r a t i o n a l way u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a u s e f o r t h e j u r y t o make t h e c o n n e c t i o n p e r m i t t e d by t h e i n f e r e n c e . Only t h e n i s t h e r e a r i s k the p r e s u m p t i v e l y r a t i o n a l j u r y w i l l u s e t h e i n f e r e n c e t o make an erroneous factual determination. (Citation.) Sunday h a s n o t c a r r i e d h i s b u r d e n upon a p p e a l . " 609 P.2d a t 1 1 9 6 , 37 St.Rep. a t 569. The same reasoning applies here. Defendant prejudiced through t h e use of permissive inferences. R e v e r s e d and d i s m i s s e d . Justice W Concur: e ....................... Chief J u s t i c e ....................... Justices was not Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell, s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g : I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t of t h e f o r e g o i n g o p i n i o n b u t n o t w i t h a l l t h e s t a t e m e n t s and d i s c u s s i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n . Chief J u s t i c e Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. S h e a c o n c u r s a n d w i l l f i l e a c o n c u r r i n g opinion a t a later t i m e . THE STATE O F MONTANA vs . No. 80-159 C R I S S ALLEN CASE CONCURRING O P I N I O N OF MR. J U S T I C E DANIEL J . SHEA ....................................................... Dated: January 5, 1 9 8 0 Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring: Generally, I concur in the majority opinion. The evidence was legally insufficient, and therefore a reversal and dismissal is required. Even if the evidence was sufficient to convict, the failure of the State to comply with the mandate of State v. Just, supra, as the opinion states, would require a reversal and a new trial. I would like to comment on the State's failure to comply with Just. I dissented in Just because the defendant was not given the benefit of the ruling--which would have required a reversal and a new trial. I also stressed the importance of the trial court to first assess the State's need for the similar-crimes evidence, and then determine whether be unduly prejudicial. the evidence, if admitted, would Undoubtedly, the State needed the evidence--with the testimony from the accomplice about the other robbery, it tended to show that defendant and the accomplice were involved in a common scheme or plan. This was an attempt of the State to pull accomplice testimony up by its own boot straps--clearly improper. Assuming the admissibility of the accomplice testimony as to the robbery at Loring, the trial court without question failed to consider the potential harmful effects that the testimony would have as to the Loring robbery. The so-called similar crime, was not only a robbery; it involved multiple brutal murders committed by the accomplice and the defendant. I doubt that any juror could fairly state that he had not heard nor read about the robbery and murders at Loring. Therefore, even if there was no direct reference to the murders committed in the process of the robbery at Loring, there is no doubt that the jury knew it had a person on trial who was involved in the Loring murders. Proper consideration of these factors before admitting the testimony, would have led to a decision -14- that the accomplice testimony as to the Loring robbery was loaded with prejudice that could never be overcome. I stress that just because State v. Just, supra, sets out the procedural requirements for admission of similar crimes, it does not mean that the trial court should always admit such evidence when it is offered. The trial court should carefully scrutinize the attempted use of such evidence and the potential prejudice that will ensue, and where he has any doubt, it should be resolved against use of such evidence. Finally, the conviction of defendant in this case, has, as its underlying cause, a manifest abuse of prosecutorial discretion. We must remember that at the time defendant was tried for the Wolf Creek robbery, he was already under sentence of 175 years in prison for the Loring robbery and murders. It is perhaps understandable that the prosecutor first filed robbery charges against defendant arising from the Wolf Creek robbery, for then the prosecutor was not confronted with the thin evidentiary case and the legal requirements as to corroboration of accomplice testimony. Maybe his initial charge was supported by legally sufficient probable cause, I don't know. But as the case neared the trial stage, the prosecutor knew or should have know that he did not have sufficient legal evidence on which to base a conviction that would withstand the legal requirements. Therefore, he had every reason to believe that a conviction would ultimately lead to a reversal and a dismissal. Also, assuming that the prosecutor was unaware of the rigorous requirements for accomplice testimony, it is sad that he succeeded in getting the Loring robbery evidence admitted when there was not even an attempt to comply with State v. Just. It is not unreasonable to conclude here that the Loring robbery evidence, coupled with the widespread press coverage of the Loring murders,sealed the defendant's fate before the jury. P&A+-

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