MICHAELSON v WARDELL
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No. 14852 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 LARRY A. MICHAELSON and SYLVIA MICHAELSON, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS . CALLIS WARDELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Small, Hatch and Doubeck, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Robert T. Cummins, Helena, Montana Jackson and Kelley, Helena, Montana Submitted on briefs: November 14, 1979 Decided: .jJ/,;1 L Filed: i s : - - - , - P 9 ,- Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. his appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of the respondents who alleged they were entitled to a permanent easement over appellant's land by operation of law. parties filed motions for summary judgment. ~oth Pursuant to these motions, the District Court granted respondents an implied easement by reservation. Appellant filed a motion with the District Court to alter and amend a portion of its order. No action was taken on this motion, and appellant brought this appeal. Prior to 1969 appellant, as a principal stockholder of Cal-Mart Corp., was the owner of the land now owned by respondents. Also, prior to 1969, appellant built the house presently inhabited by respondents, and built and improved the access road presently in issue. This road traverses several hundred feet of appellant's property, enters respondents' property and becomes respondents' driveway. The road was built by appellant to serve the house on the property and also to serve part of appellant's fields. In 1969 appellant conveyed the property presently owned by respondents to James and Grace Fournier. The conveyances were made by warranty deed and contained no easements. The roadway across appellant's property was used by the ~ourniers to reach their property. Appellant also used this road to drive through the Fourniers' property to get to his fields. The Fourniers conveyed the property to Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield. In 1972 the Greenfields conveyed the property to the respondents. easement. This deed did not contain an express Although a p p e l l a n t had n e v e r g i v e n t h e r e s p o n d e n t s s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n o r o r a l permission t o use t h e access road, r e s p o n d e n t s used i t c o n t i n u o u s l y , w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s knowledge and c o o p e r a t i o n from t h e t i m e t h e y p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y . The a c c e s s r o a d was and s t i l l i s t h e o n l y r e g u l a r l y used means o f a c c e s s t o r e s p o n d e n t s ' house. Respondents used t h e r o a d u n t i l March 1978. A t that t i m e a p p e l l a n t removed a c a t t l e g u a r d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e a c c e s s r o a d on a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y and blocked t h e r o a d T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e a p p e l l a n t with a concrete culvert. had e v e r i n t e r f e r e d w i t h r e s p o n d e n t s ' o r t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s ' u s e of t h e a c c e s s r o a d . A p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n prompted r e s p o n d e n t s t o bring t h i s s u i t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s d i d n o t have a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n b e c a u s e t h e u s e was p e r m i s s i v e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d f i n d , however, t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s have a n i m p l i e d easement by r e s e r v a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 7020-308, MCA. I t i s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f law t h a t forms t h e o n l y i s s u e f o r r e v i e w by t h i s C o u r t . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h e u s e of t h e roadway by r e s p o n d e n t s and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s w a s e n t i r e l y w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n s e n t and p e r m i s s i o n and w a s i n t h e n a t u r e of a l i c e n s e , t h e r e f o r e , no easement of any k i n d would a r i s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e u s e of t h e r o a d . W e disagree. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y found t h a t , w h i l e r e s p o n d e n t s do n o t have a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e y have an i m p l i e d easement by r e s e r v a t i o n o v e r t h i s r o a d . The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s s e c t i o n 70-20-308, reads: MCA. It "Easements t o p a s s w i t h p r o p e r t y . A t r a n s f e r o f real p r o p e r t y p a s s e s a l l easements a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o and c r e a t e s i n f a v o r t h e r e o f a n e a s e m e n t t o -e o t h e r r e a l property o f -e p e r s o n whose - us - th e s t a t e i s t r a n s f e r r e d - -e same manner - -o i n th and t t h e s a m e e x t e n t - -c h p r o p e r t y was o b v i o u s l y as su -a n d p e r m a n e n t l y u s e d & t h e p e r s o n whose e s t a t e is for the a t th - t r a n s f e r r e d - - b e n e f i t t h e r e o f - -e t i m e when t h e t r a n s f e r was a g r e e d - -o-comupon r --pleted. " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) T h i s s t a t u t e , i n p a r t , r e c i t e s t h e common l a w p r i n c i p l e t h a t a n e a s e m e n t i s r e s e r v e d when t h e d o m i n a n t t e n e m e n t i s conveyed and a s e r v i e n t t e n e m e n t i s r e t a i n e d . E m m e t t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. Spaeth v. 231, 383 P.2d 812, 816. T h i s s t a t u t e , however, e x t e n d s t h e common law and c r e a t e s a n e a s e m e n t , n o n e x i s t e n t p r i o r t o t h e conveyance, i n c a s e s where t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n was " o b v i o u s l y and p e r m a n e n t l y " u s e d by t h e g r a n t o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f w h a t becomes t h e dominant e s t a t e . McPherson v . Monegan ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 120 Mont. 454, 187 P.2d 542, 545. I n McPherson w e u p h e l d a n i m p l i e d e a s e m e n t o f a r o a d u n d e r s e c t i o n 70-20-308, MCA ( t h e n , 86865, Rev. on f a c t s n o t d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e p r e s e n t e d h e r e . Codes 1 9 3 5 ) , "The f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e d i s c l o s e a n implied g r a n t of easement which p a s s e d w i t h t h e p r o p e r t y u n d e r o u r s t a t u t e (sec. 6865) and which a r o s e o u t o f t h e f a c t t h a t M r s . Samson s o l d l a n d bounded i n p a r t by a r o a d which had t h e r e t o f o r e been c o n t i n u o u s l y u s e d by s a i d g r a n t o r a s a means o f access t o s a i d land . . ." 1 8 7 P.2d a t 545. The f a c t s i n t h i s case, a s found by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , r e v e a l such a n implied g r a n t o f easement. Appellant w a s t h e owner i n common o f h i s p r e s e n t p r o p e r t y and r e s p o n d e n t s ' present property. Before s e l l i n g any of h i s p r o p e r t y , a p p e l l a n t b u i l t t h e access r o a d t o s e r v e t h e r e s i d e n c e now owned by r e s p o n d e n t s . T h a t r o a d w a s c o n t i n u o u s l y u s e d by respondents and their predecessors to serve the residence. The road was and still is the only means of access used by respondents and their predecessors. When appellant conveyed the property to the first grantees, the Fourniers, he created under the above statute a permanent easement for use of the roadway as an access to respondents' residence. The roadway is being used for the same benefit to respondents as it was to the original owner. The requirements of the statute were met, McPherson v. Monegan, supra; Spaeth v. Emmett, supra; Godfrey v. Pilon (1974), 165 Mont. 439, 529 P.2d 1372; and, there were no genuine issues as to any material fact. The District Court acted properly in ruling the respondents have an implied easement by reservation in the road crossing appellant's property and in granting respondents' motion for summary judgment. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. / L . kL724' Justice We concur: 3*&k4 Chief Justice
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