PHILLIPS v MT EDUCATION ASSOCIATIO

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No. 14846 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 LARRY PHILLIPS, Plaintiff and Appellant, THE MONTANA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation; JOHN BOARD; C. D. "BUD" BEAGLE; MAURICE HICKEY; NOEL FURLONG and BETTY LOCKEY, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicid District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Joseph Duffy argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Hilley and Loring, Great Falls, Montana Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great Falls, Montana Alexander Blewett I11 argued, Great Falls, Montana - - Submitted: December 12, 1979 Decided : at k . , Filed: 9.;- L 2 2 1980 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Appellant Larry L. Phillips appeals from an order and judgment of the Lewis and Clark County District Court granting a motion by the Montana Education Association (herein referred to as MEA); and John Board, C. D. " ~ u d " Beagle, Maurice Hickey, Noel Furlong, and Betty Lockey (herein referred to as individual defendants) for summary judgment. Phillips was hired by the MEA on April 2, 1974, and commenced employment on July 1, 1974. The terms of his employment as executive secretary were specified in a written, two-year contract. On December 30, 1974, the Board of Directors of the MEA terminated Phillips' contract and employment as of December 30, 1974. On January 28, 1975, Phillips filed a complaint against the MEA alleging breach of employment contract and failure to give the requisite three months notice of termination. On March 19, 1976, Phillips filed an amended complaint and alleged five counts which included the earlier claims, and added claims for slander, malicious inducement by agents of the MEA to breach the employment contract, and that the MEA had blacklisted him from further employment. The amended complaint added eight John and Mary Does as defendants. The MEA made a number of motions to dismiss, strike, to make more definite statements and to dismiss defendants. In an order dated November 8, 1976, the District Court dismissed the slander count for failure to state a claim, and struck Phillips' claim for punitive damages, penalties and attorney fees. Phillips appealed to this Court, and the MEA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the order was not appealable. This Court granted the MEA's motion to dismiss the appeal, and the cause was remanded to the District Court. On August 1, 1977, the MEA deposed Phillips and he was unable to provide information concerning the alleged malicious inducement of breach of contract; and three days after that deposition, the MEA served interrogatories on Phillips seeking answers concerning the alleged malicious inducement of breach of contract. Phillips did not answer the inter- rogatories, and on April 3, 1978, the MEA filed a motion to compel answers. A hearing was held on May 2, 1978, and the District Court ordered Phillips to answer the interrogatories. Phillips did not answer the interrogatories within the time ordered by the District Court; and on August 31, 1978, the MEA again filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. A hearing was held on September 26, 1978, and the District Court found that Phillips had violated the court order by not answering the interrogatories; and ordered that the amended complaint would be dismissed with prejudice if Phillips did not answer the interrogatories by October 13, 1978. The District Court further found that Phillips had failed to comply with a previous court order by not having filed a second amended complaint, and ordered that Phillips' complaint would be dismissed with prejudice if Phillips did not file a second amended complaint by October 13, 1978. Phillips filed a second amended complaint and answers to the interrogatories on October 13, 1978. On November 16, 1978, the MEA and the individual defendants moved for summary judgment on count two, the alleged malicious inducement of breach of contract; and count three, the alleged MEA blacklisting of Phillips from further employment, of Phillips' second amended complaint. The motion w a s b r i e f e d and a h e a r i n g h e l d ; and on A p r i l 4 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion f o r summary judgment. On A p r i l 1 0 , 1979, f i n a l judgment was e n t e r e d p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M0nt.R.Civ.P. The judgment s p e c i - f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t P h i l l i p s was e n t i t l e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h c o u n t s one and f o u r of t h e second amended c o m p l a i n t concerni n g t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . Phillips h a s n o t a p p e a l e d t h e g r a n t i n g of summary judgment on c o u n t t h r e e ; therefore, P h i l l i p s ' appeal i s limited t o the granti n g o f summary judgment on c o u n t two. The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e i s r a i s e d by P h i l l i p s f o r o u r cons i d e r a t i o n on a p p e a l : Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment on c o u n t two o f t h e second amended c o m p l a i n t wherein P h i l l i p s a l l e g e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s were p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t of m a l i c i o u s inducement of b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . Causes of a c t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c o n t r a c t r i g h t s have l o n g been r e c o g n i z e d i n Montana. (19781, - Mont. , P e l t o n v . Markegard 586 P.2d 306, 35 St.Rep. 1593; T a y l o r v . Anaconda F e d e r a l C r e d i t Union ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 51, 550 P.2d 151; Q u i n l i v a n v . Brown O i l Co. ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 96 Mont. 1 4 7 , 29 P.2d 374; Burden v. E l l i n g S t a t e Bank ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 2 4 , 245 P.958; 938. Simonsen v. B a r t h ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 64 Mont. 95, 208 P. See a l s o W. ( 4 t h Ed. 1975). P r o s s e r , - - -of T o r t s , 5129 a t 927 The Law A c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g damages f o r i n d u c i n g a b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t i s s u f f i c i e n t where i t a l l e g e s (1) t h a t a c o n t r a c t was e n t e r e d i n t o , refused, ( 2 ) t h a t i t s performance was ( 3 ) t h a t s u c h r e f u s a l was induced by t h e u n l a w f u l ac and m ~ ~ l i c i o u s t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , and ( 4 ) t h a t damages have r e s u l t e d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . P e l t o n v . Markegard, s u p r a , 586 P.2d a t 308; Burden v. E l l i n g S t a t e Bank, s u p r a , 245 P . a t 959. The law, i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t , imposes upon s t r a n g e r s t o a c o n t r a c t t h e duty n o t t o i n t e r f e r e with i t s performance. The v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s d u t y i s a t o r t , t h e remedy f o r such i n t e r f e r e n c e i s by a c t i o n i n t o r t . Burden v . E l l i n g S t a t e Bank, s u p r a , 245 P. a t 959. One t y p e o f i n t e r - f e r e n c e w i t h economic r e l a t i o n s h a s been marked o u t r a t h e r d e f i n i t e l y by t h e c o u r t s , and r e g a r d e d a s a s e p a r a t e t o r t , under t h e name of i n d u c i n g b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . The p a r t i e s do n o t d i s p u t e t h e f a c t t h a t P h i l l i p s h a s a cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e corporation f o r t h e a l l e g e d b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t , and t h i s c a u s e of a c t i o n i s pending i n D i s t r i c t Court. The f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a n a v a i l a b l e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y who b r e a k s t h e c o n t r a c t i s no d e f e n s e t o t h e one who i n d u c e s t h e b r e a c h , s i n c e t h e two are j o i n t wrongdoers, and e a c h i s l i a b l e f o r t h e l o s s . s u p r a , S129 a t 948. Prosser, I n t e r m s of l e g a l t h e o r y , i t i s t h e r e - f o r e p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g s u i t f o r b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t and a l s o t o b r i n g s u i t f o r t h e t o r t o f i n d u c i n g b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . The s p e c i f i c i s s u e o f whether a g e n t s , employees, o f f i c e r s and d i r e c t o r s o f a c o r p o r a t i o n may be h e l d i n d i v i d u a l l y l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t o f m a l i c i o u s inducement o f b r e a c h of a n employment c o n t r a c t i s o n e of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana. P h i l l i p s c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e MEA and t h e i n d i v i d u a l defendants a r e i n f a c t j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s . H e argues t h a t t h e t o r t of m a l i c i o u s inducement of b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t i s impugnible i n d i v i d u a l l y t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s who s o u g h t t o , and t o o k s t e p s t o s e e t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n d i d b r e a c h t h e employment c o n t r a c t . P h i l l i p s f u r t h e r contends t h a t i n d i v i d u a l o f f i c e r s c a n n o t , w i t h i m p u n i t y , commit t o r t s and be a l l o w e d t o h i d e behind t h e c o r p o r a t e v e i l i n o r d e r t o e s c a p e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h o s e t o r t s . The i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s c o n t e n d t h a t o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s and employees a r e t h e o n l y p e r s o n s who c a n a c t on b e h a l f of a c o r p o r a t i o n ; and t h a t no d i r e c t o r o r o f f i c e r would e v e r make a c o r p o r a t e d e c i s i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e performance o f a c o n t r a c t w i t h o u t f e a r of b e i n g sued f o r t h e t o r t of m a l i c i o u s l y i n d u c i n g t h e corporation t o breach a corporate o b l i g a t i o n . The i n d i v i - d u a l defendants f u r t h e r contend t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n s simply c o u l d n o t f u n c t i o n i f t h e o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s and employees were t o be exposed t o i n d i v i d u a l l i a b i l i t y on e v e r y o c c a s i o n when t h e c o r p o r a t i o n f a i l e d t o perform on a c o n t r a c t . Given t h e i n t e n t i o n t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h a c o n t r a c t , l i a b i l i t y u s u a l l y w i l l t u r n upon t h e u l t i m a t e p u r p o s e o r o b j e c t i v e which t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e e k i n g t o 4 advance. Genera l l y , an i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with t h e e x i s t i n g contract u a l r e l a t i o n s of a n o t h e r i s prima f a c i e s u f f i c i e n t f o r l i a b i l i t y and t h e burden o f p r o v i n g t h a t i t i s " j u s t i f i e d " r e s t s upon t h e d e f e n d a n t . The d e f e n d a n t may show t h a t t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s p r i v i l e g e d by r e a s o n of t h e i n t e r e s t s f u r t h e r e d by h i s c o n d u c t , b u t t h e burden rests upon him t o do so. The q u e s t i o n of p r i v i l e g e must be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e means a d o p t e d and t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e parties. P r o s s e r , s u p r a , 8129 a t 942-43. To d e t e r m i n e whether i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c o n t r a c t u a l relations is justified, examined. p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must be J u s t i f i c a t i o n o r p r i v i l e g e c o n s t i t u t e s t h e primary defense t o an a c t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e . ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 293 Minn. 409, 196 N.W.2d 478; E s t e s , Expanding I n The Law Horizons - - - -of T o r t s - - T o r t i o u s Drake L.Rev. 341, 358 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Johnson v . Radde I n t e r f e r e n c e , 23 One p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s , employees and a g e n t s of a c o r p o r a t i o n must be s h i e l d e d from p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y f o r a c t s t a k e n on b e h a l f o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e b r e a c h i n g of c o n t r a c t s i n f u r t h e r a n c e of c o r p o r a t e g o a l s , p o l i c i e s , and b u s i n e s s interests. T h i s c o r p o r a t e s h i e l d i s needed i n o r d e r t o allow corporations t o effectively function. A competing public policy consideration i s t h a t individual corporate a g e n t s , employees, d i r e c t o r s and o f f i c e r s s h o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d t o commit t o r t s a t w i l l , and t h e n be a l l o w e d t o h i d e behind t h e c o r p o r a t e v e i l i n o r d e r t o e s c a p e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r those t o r t s . C o r p o r a t e o f f i c e r s o r d i r e c t o r s are p r i v i l e g e d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h o r i n d u c e b r e a c h o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s cont r a c t s o r business r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r s a s long a s t h e i r a c t i o n s a r e i n good f a i t h and f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . Wilson v. McClenny ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 262 N.C. S.E.2d 569; A l l i s o n v. American A i r l i n e s ( N . D . 1 1 2 F.Supp. 37. 121, 136 Okla. 1 9 5 3 ) , Where a n o f f i c e r o r d i r e c t o r a c t s a g a i n s t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , a c t s f o r h i s own p e c u n i a r y b e n e f i t , o r w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o harm t h e p l a i n t i f f , he i s p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e . n i n g t o n Q u a r r y Co. Pennington T r a p Rock Co. v . Pen- (1944), 22 N . J . M i s c . 318, 38 A.2d 869; A. S. Rampell, I n c . v . H y s t e r Company ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 3 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d 475, 1 4 4 N.E.2d Manufacturing Co. 371; W. 369, 165 P. I v e r s o n & Co. v. ~ u n h a m ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 8 111.App.2d 152 N.E.2d Stell ~anufacturing Corp. v . Century I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . 1 5 App.Div.2d 87, 221 N.Y.S.2d 615; (1961), 528. I n Wilson v . McClenny, s u p r a , Wilson e n t e r e d i n t o a p r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n agreement w i t h s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s who l a t e r became d i r e c t o r s of a c o r p o r a t i o n c a l l e d Gateway ~ i f e Insurance Company. Under the agreement, Wilson became president of the corporation. Later, because of a drinking problem, ~ i l s o n was ousted as president during a directors' meeting. Wilson filed an action against the individual defendants for a breach of the preincorporation agreement and for tortious interference with his contractual rights with the corporation. In Wilson, the court found that the acts of the directors were found to have been for the benefit of the corporation, that Wilson offered no evidence to the contrary, and that there were no individual or separate torts by the individual defendants distinguishable from their acts on the corporation's behalf. The court found that Wilson had failed to state a claim against the individual defendants. We hold that the corporate veil should not be utilized as a protective devise by those who employ corporate power or authority to serve their own ends. Tort liability for the inducement of breach of contract should be imposed when a corporate agent, employee, officer or director induces a breach of contract for private benefit, or because of personal feelings and purposes relative to a third party. The privilege of limited liability should be applicable in those situations where actions are motivated and taken in the furtherance of corporate purposes, policies and ixterests. In the instant case, the record discloses that Phillips wrote a memorandum to the MEA Board of Directors in reference to terminating the employment of certain employees. A board member and some of the employees discussed the hilli ips memorandum, and then some of those individuals wrote a letter characterizing the function of the staff administration. They also requested a meeting with the Board of ~ i r e c - t o r s , e x c l u s i v e of P h i l l i p s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d , and w e a g r e e , t h a t t h e a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s were w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e i r employment, des i g n e d w i t h o u t m a l i c e , and i n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of c o r p o r a t e interests. P h i l l i p s h a s f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s were n o t t a k e n i n f u r t h e r a n c e of c o r p o r a t e p u r p o s e s and i n t e r e s t s . Therefore, the p r i v i l e g e o f l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y a p p l i e s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , and t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a r e s h i e l d e d from p e r s o n a l l i a h i l i t y . The r e c o r d shows t h e a b s e n c e of any g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t ; t h e r e f o r e , t h e o r d e r and judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment on c o u n t two, t h e t o r t c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r t h e m a l i c i o u s inducement of b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t i s affirmed. 1 W e concur: ~ _ A d Qg c d Chief J u s t i c e 4 ~ slt iceQ . A i k d 4 u c s J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n dissent later. Mr. DISSENT OF MR. JUSTICE DANIEL J. SHEA No. 14846 LARRY L. PHILLIPS, Plaintiff and appellant, THE MONTANA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, et al., Defendants and respondents. - MAY 6 1980 ELERK OF SUPREME COURT STATE _OL MONTANA A Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I would reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the second count and remand for trial on the factual issue of whether the conduct of the corporate agents was motivated primarily by personal considerations. There can be no question that the corporate veil should not be utilized as a protective device by those who employ corporate power or authority to serve their own ends. Tort liability for the inducement of breach of contract should be imposed when a corporate agent, employee, officer or director induces a breach of contract for private benefit, or because of personal feelings and purposes relative to a third party. The privilege of limited liability should be applicable only in those situations where actions are motivated and taken in the furtherance of corporate purposes and policies. I cannot agree, however, with the majority's determination that the trial court properly granted the individual defendant's motion for summary judgment on the tort cause of action for the malicious inducement of breach of contract. In a case in which an officer, director, agent or employee's act is for some ulterior motive of his own, but happens to be consistent with corporate interests, the question of whether to impose personal liability should be based upon the dominant reason motivating the officer, director, agent or employee. Caverno v. Fellows (1938), 300 Mass. 331, 15 N.E.2d 483; Remy Beverages v. Myer (1945), 56 N.Y.S.2d l o I3 aff'd. (N.Y.App. 1945), 269 App.Div. W , 59 N.Y.S.2d 828, 371. If the dominant reason motivating a corporate agent is the furtherance of corporate interests or policies, the corporate agent should be shielded from personal liability. On the other hand, if the dominant reason motivating a c o r p o r a t e a g e n t i s one f o r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t , f e e l i n g s o r b e n e f i t , t h e n h e s h o u l d be h e l d i n d i v i d u a l l y l i a b l e . T h i s i s s o even i f t h e p e r s o n a l motive happens t o be cons i s t e n t with corporate i n t e r e s t s o r p o l i c i e s . The h e a r t o f t h e t e s t o f whether i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s i s whether t h e a c t s t a k e n by t h e c o r p o r a t e a g e n t i s i n good faith. See Smith v. G r e a t Basin G r a i n Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 98 I d a h o The r a t i o n a l e and p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b e h i n d t h i s approach i s s e t f o r t h i n Avins, L i a b i l i t y F o r I n d u c i n g A C o r p o r a t i o n - Breach I t s C o n t r a c t To L.Q. 4 3 Cornell 55, 65: " O f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s , a g e n t s o r employees who have an i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a corporation o r t h e duty t o advise o r d i r e c t s u c h a c t i v i t i e s s h o u l d be immune from l i a b i l i t y f o r inducing t h e corporation t o breach i t s c o n t r a c t , assuming t h e i r a c t i o n s are i n p u r s u i t of s u c h interests o r duties. P u b l i c p o l i c y demands t h a t s o l o n g as t h e s e p a r t i e s a c t i n good f a i t h and f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r c o r p o r a t i o n , t h e y s h o u l d n o t be d e t e r r e d by t h e d a n g e r of p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y . Any o t h e r p o s i t i o n would make t h e l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y o f a c o r p o r a t i o n somewhat meaningless. "On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c o r p o r a t e v e i l s h o u l d n o t s t a n d as a means of p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h o s e who choose t o employ c o r p o r a t e power t o s e r v e t h e i r own e n d s . T o r t l i a b i l i t y s h o u l d be s w i f t l y imposed whenever a n o f f i c e r , d i r e c t o r , employee o r stockholder induces a breach of c o n t r a c t f o r p r i v a t e b e n e f i t o r t o s a t i s f y personal feelings The l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y of against a t h i r d party. t h e corporate c h a r t e r w a s granted f o r corporate purposes. Where s u c h p u r p o s e s no l o n g e r e x i s t , t h e r e s h o u l d be no l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y . " The t r i a l c o u r t concluded, and t h e m a j o r i t y a g r e e d , t h a t t h e a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s w e r e w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e i r employment, d e s i g n e d w i t h o u t m a l i c e , and i n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e o f MEA c o r p o r a t e i n t e r e s t s . The i s s u e , however, a s t o whether t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a c t e d i n good f a i t h o r bad f a i t h i s a f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n which p r e c l u d e s summary judgment. See N o t t v. Booke (19791, Mont . , 598 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 1542. The i n d i v i d u a l c o n d u c t of t h e d e f e n d a n t s s h o u l d be examined t o d e t e r m i n e t h e dominant r e a s o n which e x i s t e d i n m o t i v a t i n g t h e i r c o n d u c t and a c t i o n s . The p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s i n e s s e n c e t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s named i n t h e second amended c o m p l a i n t , a c t i n g f o r p e r s o n a l r e a s o n s , m a l i c i o u s l y induced t h e MEA c o r p o r a t i o n t o b r e a c h i t s employment c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f . A genuine i s s u e of f a c t d o e s e x i s t i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n s and m o t i v e s r e l a t i n g t o u l t i m a t e l y inducing corporate a c t i o n terminating t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s employment c o n t r a c t . I t i s c l e a r t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e o r d e r and judgment of the t r i a l c o u r t i n g r a n t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment on t h e second c o u n t , t h e t o r t c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s inducement of b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t , s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d .

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