THORNTON v COMMISSIONER OF DEPT O

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NO. 80-134 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1980 W Y E THORNTON, AN P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, STATE O MONTANA, F Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f J e f f e r s o n , Montana Honorable Frank B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: P a t r i c k F. F l a h e r t y a r g u e d , B o u l d e r , Montana F r o Respondents: M a r r a , Wenz, Iwen a n d J o h n s o n , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana James G a r d n e r a r g u e d , Dept. o f L a b o r , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: Decided: November 2 1 , 1980 DEC 2 q f$j@($j Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . On A u g u s t 1 0 , a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a wage c l a i m w i t h 1978, t h e Commissioner o f t h e Department o f Labor and I n d u s t r y . c o n t e s t e d c a s e h e a r i n g was h e l d 14, 1978. The respondents. hearings On M a r c h District Court of t h e County o f i n G r e a t F a l l s o n November officer favor of appellant petitioned 11, 1 9 7 9 , ruled the in District, the Fifth Judicial Jefferson, for judicial i n and review of The District C o u r t d i s m i s s e d agency decision. p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review. A for the final appellant's Appellant appeals. A p p e l l a n t was e m p l o y e d as a t r u c k d r i v e r b y r e s p o n d e n t s John and Simone terminated Furgeri or about employment his on on August $3.00 claimed per he hour drove ($186.00), and 17, 4, 1978. 1978, He due to A p p e l l a n t was h i r e d f o r $ . 1 3 p e r m i l e nonpayment o f wages. plus July for unloading miles 7,250 accumulated and loading. ($942.50), $86.39 in Appellant worked 62 expenses, hours totaling $1,214.89 due. On November held. The 14, 1978, hearings an administrative examiner ($942.50 plus 186.00). t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s had p a i d and $281.75 on October examiner subtracted appellant was 39-3-206, MCA, the no therefore entitled to there The examiner a p p e l l a n t $500.00 13, 1978, $781.75 entitled were determined e x p e n s e s d u e a n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t was $1,128.50 to in back wages. The and found $1,128.50 $346.75. Pursuant assessed a a l s o found on September 5 from examiner was hearing to penalty section on this p o r t i o n o f t h e wages d u e which r e s u l t e d i n a n e t amount d u e appellant of $693.50. hearings examiner found [Due t o $492.50 an arithmetical due appellant; error the however, using the same formula, the error was corrected h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . ] at the The e x a m i n e r a l s o denied a p p e l l a n t ' s prayer f o r attorney fees. On appeal the District Court affirmed the examiner's o r d e r and d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w . There are two issues presented to this Court for affirming the review: 1. decision Did of the the District hearings Court examiner err to in assess a statutory p e n a l t y t o t h e b a l a n c e due a t t h e t i m e o f t h e h e a r i n g r a t h e r t h a n t h e amount d u e a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s ? 2. Did the District Court err in affirming the d e c i s i o n of t h e h e a r i n g s e x a m i n e r r e f u s i n g t o award a t t o r n e y f e e s t o appellant a t the administrative hearing level? A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, imposes a m a n d a t o r y p e n a l t y on a n e m p l o y e r who f a i l s t o p a y wages t o an employee penalty hearing, on when the $346.75, rather wages which than on become was due $1,128.50, due. at By the which imposing time a of the at the was d u e i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e h e a r i n g s e x a m i n e r and t h e District Court made a clear error of law in direct c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e . A p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 39-3-214, p r o v i d e s a m a n d a t o r y award o f MCA, a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s f o r e m p l o y e e s who s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o v e a c l a i m f o r u n p a i d wages. The hearings examiner and the District Court erred in f a i l i n g t o award a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s a t e i t h e r s t a g e o f the proceedings. Respondents' c o n s t r u c t i o n of position is t h a t t h i s case involves two s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s - - s e c t i o n the 39-3-206, MCA (the penalty statute), and section 39-3-211, MCA (the statute giving the commissioner adjust claims upon assignment). discretion to settle or In an attempt to promote settlements and avoid lengthy litigation, the commissioner, pursuant to his section 39-3-211, MCA, authority, compromised the penalty because the employer partially paid the wages due appellant prior to the administrative hearing. Respondents contend there exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency. absence of a showing of manifest error by In the the party challenging the agency action, the agency order is deemed valid and enforceable. Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof; therefore, the District Court's order affirming the agency's decision should be affirmed. Concerning the second issue, respondents contend that, pursuant to section 39-3-214, MCA, an award of attorney fees is provided for only when it is necessary to institute "a suit at law" for the recovery of wages. hearing is not a suit at law. An administrative Therefore, neither the commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry nor the District Court has the authority to award attorney fees for representation in an administrative hearing. The District Court has statutory authority to award attorney fees on a wage claim only for the legal work performed at the District Court level. When reviewing an administrative order, there exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the decision of the agency, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it to show that it is erroneous. Partoll v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. (1949), 122 Mont. 305, 311, 203 P.2d 974; Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563. T h i s C o u r t may n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t of t r i a l c o u r t or agency a s t o t h e weight of t h e e v i d e n c e on questions MCA; of fact. Section Anaconda Aluminum Co. 2-4-704 ( 2 ) , ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 514, the Robins 575 P.2d v. 67. W may r e v e r s e o r m o d i f y t h e d e c i s i o n i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s e of the appellant administrative decisions are probative have been findings, clearly and prejudiced inferences, erroneous substantial in the of whole evidence MCA. S t o r a g e Company, the ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. we d e t e r m i n e d that I n Brurud v. a finding is record conviction leaves that a United S t a t e s v. W e record. J u d g e Moving and 249, 563 P.2d 558, it, a review of t h e has been committed. U n i t e d S t a t e s Gypsum Co. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. reliable, t h e c o u r t w i t h t h e d e f i n i t e and mistake or " c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " when, although t h e r e is evidence t o support entire the conclusions, view of Section 2-4-704(2)(e), Inc. because 5 2 5 , 5 4 2 , 92 L.Ed. firm See also ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 333 U.S. 746, 766. f i n d no s u c h p r e j u d i c e h e r e , and t h e decisions of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c y and D i s t r i c t C o u r t a r e a f f i r m e d . The r o l e of j u d g e s i n c o n s t r u i n g s t a t u t e s i s s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 1-2-101, This Court i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t r o l e i n MCA. amm mil! v . Young ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 81, 540 P.2d 971, which h e l d t h a t t h e c o u r t may n o t o m i t w h a t h a s been i n s e r t e d i n l e g i s l a t i o n nor the court Dunphy v. With is i n j e c t what h a s been o m i t t e d . simply Anaconda Co. t h i s mandate to construe the law a s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. i n mind, we must now 76, The d u t y o f it 438 P.2d construe s t a t u t e s which a r e t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . S e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, provides: finds the it. 660. two "Any e m p l o y e r , a s s u c h e m p l o y e r is d e f i n e d i n t h i s p a r t , who f a i l s t o pay any o f h i s e m p l o y e e s a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s p a r t o r v i o l a t e s any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s p a r t s h a l l be g u i l t y o f a misdemeanor. A p e n a l t y s h a l l a l s o be a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t and p a i d by s u c h e m p l o y e r and become d u e s u c h employee a s f o l l o w s : a sum e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e f i x e d amount o f 5% o f t h e wages d u e and u n p a i d s h a l l be a s s e s s e d f o r e a c h d a y , e x c e p t S u n d a y s and l e g a l h o l i d a y s , upon w h i c h s u c h f a i l u r e c o n t i n u e s a f t e r t h e d a y upon which s u c h wages w e r e d u e , e x c e p t t h a t s u c h f a i l u r e s h a l l n o t be deemed t o c o n t i n u e more t h a n 20 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a t e s u c h wages w e r e d u e . " S e c t i o n 39-3-211, MCA, provides: "Whenever t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r d e t e r m i n e s t h a t o n e o r more e m p l o y e e s h a v e c l a i m s f o r u n p a i d w a g e s , h e s h a l l , upon t h e w r i t t e n r e q u e s t o f t h e e m p l o y e e , t a k e an a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e c l a i m i n t r u s t f o r s u c h e m p l o y e e a n d may m a i n t a i n any proceeding appropriate t o enforce the claim, including l i q u i d a t e d damages p u r s u a n t t o t h i s p a r t . With t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e a s s i q n o r , t h e commissio may e t l - n e r - -s- -t -e o r a a u s t a l l y c l a i m a s s i g n e d pursuant t o t h i s section." (Emphasis added.) The wage c l a i m s u b m i t t e d and s i g n e d b y a p p e l l a n t provided : "I hereby approve a proposed the claim. In authorize Commissioner t o t r a n s f e r , c o m m i s s i o n e r by Labor Commissioner compromise a d j u s t m e n t o r pursuance judgment t h e r e o n . " the thereof, I to settlement of authorize the Labor s e l l o r a s s i g n t h i s c l a i m o r any Pursuant t o the authority vested i n the s e c t i o n 39-3-211, p e n a l t y on t h e $500.00 MCA, h e compromised the and $281.75 p a i d on S e p t e m b e r 5 and October 13, 1978, r e s p e c t i v e l y . In the last two fiscal years, D i v i s i o n p r o c e s s e d an a v e r a g e o f year. Therefore, the Labor o v e r 900 wage c l a i m s p e r i n an a t t e m p t t o p r o m o t e s e t t l e m e n t s and avoid lengthy l i t i g a t i o n , t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r compromised t h e p e n a l t y on wages which w e r e p a i d p r i o r t o h e a r i n g . decision is Standards within the commissioner's Such a discretion and f a c i l i t a t e s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e Wage Payment A c t which i s t o c o l l e c t u n p a i d wages o f the ultimate liability employees. should However, first be i n each c a s e , determined and, t h e r e a f t e r , a compromise may be worked o u t from t h a t amount. S e c t i o n s 39-1-102 Appellant $781.75. and 39-3-209, was entitled Therefore, $346.75 MCA. to $1,128.50; d u e a p p e l l a n t $795.50. wages d u e imposed and was paid r e m a i n s d u e f o r u n p a i d wages. R e s p o n d e n t s owe a p p e l l a n t a n a d d i t i o n a l p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 39-3-206, he MCA, $346.75 in penalty b r i n g i n g t h e n e t amount Appellant has received a p o r t i o n of is e n t i t l e d t o u n p a i d wages p l u s a p e n a l t y thereon. No s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of a p p e l l a n t have b e e n p r e j u d i c e d and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r i s a f f i r m e d . A p p e l l a n t a s k e d f o r a n award o f a t t o r n e y f e e s . well-settled principle t h a t attorney f e e s a r e allowable only when p r o v i d e d f o r by c o n t r a c t o r s t a t u t e . MCA, I t is a S e c t i o n 39-3-214, provides: ( 1 ) Whenever " C o u r t c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s . i t s h a l l become n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e employee t o e n t e r o r m a i n t a i n a s u i t a t law f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o r c o l l e c t i o n o f wages d u e a s p r o v i d e d f o r by t h i s p a r t , a r e s u l t i n g judgment m u s t i n c l u d e a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e i n f a v o r of t h e s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y , t o be t a x e d a s p a r t o f t h e costs in the case. ( 2 ) Any j u d q m e n t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a proceeding pursuant t o t h i s a c t must i n c l u d e a l l c o s t s r e a s o n a b l y i n c u r r e d i n connection with the proceeding, including attorneys' fees." (Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 39-3-212, MCA, provides: "A d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e Commissioner of Labor and I n d u s t r y made a f t e r a h e a r i n g may be e n f o r c e d by a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e Commissioner t o a d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r an o r d e r o r judgment e n f o r c i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i f t h e time provided t o i n i t i a t e j u d i c i a l r e v i e w by t h e e m p l o y e r p a s s e d . " The p a r t i c u l a r an administrative l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e i n d i c a t e s t h a t hearing is not a "suit at law." A " d e t e r m i n a t i o n " made by t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r a s a r e s u l t o f t h e h e a r i n g is n o t a "judgment." I n Massa v . D e p t . R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 60, of S o c i a l 560 P.2d & 895, t h e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e d u r e s used c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l t h o s e used i n the case a t bar. I n t h a t c a s e t h i s C o u r t awarded a t t o r n e y I n t h e absence f e e s o n l y f o r s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d on a p p e a l . of statutory District a u t h o r i t y we m u s t Court and the denying a p p e l l a n t a t t o r n e 3 Affirmed. W concur: e Chief J u s t i c e affirm the Department of holding of Labor and the Industry

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