CAVANAUGH MESLER v CRIST

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No. 80-194 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 JAMES P. CAVANAUGH AND JAMES I. MESLER, Petitioners, -vsROGER W. CRIST, Warden, Montana State Prison, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Petitioners: James P. Cavanaugh, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana James I. Mesler, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: BUG 14 1986 July 29, 1980 AUG 14 1980 J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. T h i s i s a n o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s i n which p e t i t i o n e r s James Cavanaugh and James Mesler j o i n t l y c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 46-18202 ( 2 ) , MCA. T h a t s e c t i o n p e r m i t s d i s t r i c t judges t o sen- t e n c e p e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d of f e l o n i e s t o imprisonment w i t h no p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r i s o n e r f u r l o u g h program. James Cavanaugh r e c e i v e d c o n c u r r e n t s e n t e n c e s of one hundred y e a r s and twenty y e a r s f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and aggravated a s s a u l t . . f o r robbery. James Mesler was s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s The d i s t r i c t judges imposed t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o f s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, on b o t h p e t i t i o n e r s . Both pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e s charged. The a p p l i c a t i o n f o r habeas c o r p u s r e l i e f a l l e g e s t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , due p r o c e s s and vagueness grounds and a s a n u n l a w f u l d e l e g a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . Among t h e numerous c o n t e n t i o n s r a i s e d by p e t i t i o n e r s i s t h a t t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s and s e n t e n c e s a r e i n v a l i d . However, t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l a t t a c k on t h e s t a t u t e i s n o t a n a t t a c k on t h e underlying convictions. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n whether t o impose t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n s of s e c t i o n 46-182 0 2 ( 2 ) o c c u r s s u b s e q u e n t t o and d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e under- lying conviction. T h e r e f o r e , t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s one of a sentencing s t a t u t e . I f i t were t o b e found u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l , t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e remedy would b e t o remand f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g and n o t o v e r t u r n t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . T h i s C o u r t w i l l a d d r e s s o n l y t h e i s s u e of whether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on p e t i t i o n e r s ' p a r o l e and p r i s o n e r f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y imposed p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, are constitutional. I n 1977, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 95-2206, 1947, which s e t o u t t h e s e n t e n c i n g o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e R.C.M. . t o a d i s t r i c t judge by a d d i n g s u b d i v i s i o n ( 3 ) (b) C h a p t e r 580, Laws of 1977. 18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, See T h a t p r o v i s i o n , now s e c t i o n 46- states: "Whenever t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t imposes a s e n t e n c e of imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m e x c e e d i n g 1 y e a r , t h e c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t t h e defendant be i n e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r i s o n e r If f u r l o u g h program w h i l e s e r v i n g h i s t e r m . s u c h a r e s t r i c t i o n i s t o be imposed, t h e c o u r t If s h a l l s t a t e t h e reasons f o r it i n writing. t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s necess a r y f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y , i t s h a l l as pa -impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n - - r t of t h e s e n t e n c e and t h e judgment s h a l l c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t of t h e reasons f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i o n . " (Emphasis added. ) The c l e a r e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) i s t o permit a d i s t r i c t judge t o c l o s e one avenue f o r e s c a p i n g t h e f u l l f o r c e of a s e n t e n c e . T h i s complete r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y i s d i s t i n c t from t h e p a r t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t f o l l o w s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s - t r i c t Court t h a t a defendant i s i n e l i g i b l e f o r designation a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . See s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA. In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , a d e f e n d a n t must s e r v e a t l e a s t one-half of h i s f u l l term, l e s s good t i m e , t o b e e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e . A d e f e n d a n t who i s d e s i g n a t e d a nondangerous o f f e n d e r becomes e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e a f t e r s e r v i n g o n e - q u a r t e r of h i s f u l l term, l e s s good t i m e . S e c t i o n 46-23-201, s e n t e n c e d under s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, MCA. Unless he i s a d e f e n d a n t may a p p l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f u r l o u g h program a f t e r s e r v i n g a t l e a s t one-half parole. of t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t o b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r S e c t i o n 46-23-411, MCA. P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) f a i l s t o i n c l u d e p r o c e d u r a l e l e m e n t s which t h e y a l l e g e a r e r e q u i r e d t o m e e t due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s . The e l e m e n t s p r e s e n t e d a r e : (1) n o t i c e t h a t a c o m p l e t e r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r - l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y may be imposed a s a p a r t of t h e sentence; (2) a jury t r i a l s p e c i f i c a l l y addressing t h i s m a t t e r ; and ( 3 ) p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s required. P e t i t i o n e r s r e l y on d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g s e n t e n c e enhancement s t a t u t e s and c i t e S p e c h t v . P a t t e r s o n ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 1 8 L.Ed.2d 326, a s c o n t r o l l i n g . In S p e c h t t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of " i n d e c e n t l i b e r t i e s " under a Colorado s t a t u t e which c a r r i e d a t e n - y e a r maximum sentence. The d e f e n d a n t , however, was s e n t e n c e d under t h e s t a t e ' s Sex O f f e n d e r A c t which p e r m i t t e d a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m of from one day t o l i f e . H i s sentencing followed a s e p a r a t e commitment p r o c e e d i n g conducted p u r s u a n t t o t h e a c t , t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t of b o d i l y harm t o members of t h e p u b l i c , o r i s a n h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r and m e n t a l l y ill. The d e f e n d a n t was n o t given n o t i c e o r an opportunity t o be heard a s t o t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n and argued t h a t t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e was, t h e r e fore, violated. The Supreme C o u r t a g r e e d . The C o u r t found i n S p e c h t t h a t t h e Colorado a c t required t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o determine a f a c t t h a t w a s n o t an i n g r e d i e n t of t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e and compared t h e a c t ' s p r o c e e d i n g s t o " t h o s e under r e c i d i v i s t s t a t u t e s where a n habitual criminal issue i s a ' d i s t i n c t issue' . . . on which a d e f e n d a n t 'must r e c e i v e r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e and a n opport u n i t y t o be h e a r d . ' " S p e c h t v. P a t t e r s o n , 386 U.S. a t 610. The C o u r t r u l e d where s u c h commitment p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i n v o l v e d , due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be p r e s e n t w i t h c o u n s e l , t o have a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d , t o c o n f r o n t w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him, and t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s o f h i s own. Due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s a r e r e q u i r e d where a s e n t e n c e i s t o be enhanced on t h e b a s i s of a p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n and p a s t b e h a v i o r and p u r s u a n t t o a s e p a r a t e a c t ( a s i n S p e c h t ) . I t i s n o t r e q u i r e d f o r s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA. s t a t u t e i s n o t a s e n t e n c e enhancement s t a t u t e . This The s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p e r m i t d i s t r i c t judges t o add any t i m e beyond t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . r e s p e c t , s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) In this i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from t h e k i n d s of s t a t u t e s examined i n t h e c a s e s p e t i t i o n e r s cite. I n Specht, f o r i n s t a n c e , while t h e underlying o f f e n s e c a r r i e d a t e n - y e a r maximum s e n t e n c e , t h e Sex O f f e n d e r A c t p e r m i t t e d a s e n t e n c e o f from one day t o l i f e . The Montana s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p e r m i t enhancement. It i n s u r e s t h a t t h e l e n g t h o f t h e p e n a l t y e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and imposed by t h e c o u r t i s c a r r i e d o u t . The r e s t r i c - t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) h a s no e x i s t e n c e beyond t h e t e r m of t h e sen- t e n c e imposed f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . The S p e c h t - t y p e s t a t u t e e n t a i l s a p r o c e e d i n g which i s s e p a r a t e from t h e ordinary sentencing proceeding. A s t h e Supreme C o u r t empha- s i z e d i n S p e c h t , t h e Colorado Sex O f f e n d e r Act "makes one c o n v i c t i o n t h e b a s i s f o r commencing a n o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g under another A c t . . ." 386 U.S. S e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), effect. a t 608. on t h e o t h e r hand, h a s no s u c h The r e s t r i c t i o n of p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h Program e l i g i b i l i t y i s " a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e " by t h e e x p r e s s t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e and d o e s n o t i n v o l v e any p r o c e e d i n g e x c e p t t h e o r d i n a r y sentencing proceeding. I t r e p r e s e n t s one o p t i o n , among o t h e r s , t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s made a v a i l a b l e t o d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e c o u r s e of o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c i n g . The f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) h a s no e x i s t e n c e a p a r t from t h e s e n t e n c e imposed f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . P e t i t i o n e r s f u r t h e r contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) i s s i m i l a r t o t h e Specht-type s t a t u t e i n t h a t t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y must b e n e c e s s a r y f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . " They a r g u e t h i s i s a f a c t determination t h a t r e q u i r e s a jury. D i s t r i c t C o u r t s a r e r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y i s n e c e s s a r y f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y " when a p e r s o n i s This matter i s n o t an element sentenced a f t e r conviction. of d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e was committed. A f t e r c o n v i c t i o n , such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as t o " p r o t e c t s o c i e t y from t h e a c t i o n s of t h e g u i l t y " i s a m a t t e r of t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e e d i n g s . The s o u r c e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s a n c t i o n i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a x a t i o n of t r i a l s t a n d a r d s i s W i l l i a m s v. N e w York ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 337 U.S. 2 4 1 , 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337. I n W i l l i a m s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d of murder and t h e n s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h , r a t h e r t h a n l i f e imprisonment, l a r g e l y on t h e b a s i s of background i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t p r e p a r e d by p r o b a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s . H e c h a l l e n g e d t h e s e n t e n c e b e c a u s e h e had been g i v e n no o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n f r o n t and cross-examine information i n t h e report. t h e w i t n e s s e s who s u p p l i e d t h e The Supreme C o u r t upheld t h e s e n t e n c e and approved t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s u s e of s u c h u n c h a l lenged evidence. I t r e l i e d on a n o n a d v e r s a r i a l t h e o r y of penology i n which punishment i s i n d i v i d u a l i z e d t o f i t t h e offender and not merely the crime. The sentencing judge should be concerned with obtaining as much information about the defendant as possible, the Court asserted, and most information that courts relied upon in the "intelligent imposition of sentences" would become unavailable if it could be obtained only in open court and subject to crossWilliams, 337 U.S. at 250. examination. The Supreme Court allowed very broad judicial discretion, based on the principle that courts should not be encumbered by the procedural formality required at trial. This remains the rule. The Specht court classified Williams as "a case where at the end of the trial and in the same proceeding the fixing of the penalty for first degree murder was involved." Specht, 386 U.S. at 606-607. Here is a case where the admissions of guilt and the fixing of the penalties for the crimes admitted were conducted in the same proceeding. The judge in Williams, in sentencing the defen- dant to death rather than life imprisonment, relied on the information in the presentence report. Since the Court in Specht specifically announced it would adhere to Williams, which permitted the judge to make such a finding on the basis of hearsay, then Williams is controlling in these facts. While the trial judge in Williams examined past events, he was doing so only to predict the defendant's future behavior rather than impose a separate punishment for past actions. The same is true here. Federal courts have consistently declined to extend full procedural due process protections to defendants whose sentences were enhanced by federal statute. In United States v. Bowdach (5th Cir. 1977), 561 F.2d 1160, the court rejected the argument that such proceedings must include an o p p o r t u n i t y t o have a j u r y d e t e r m i n e t h e r e q u i s i t e f a c t s . See a l s o United S t a t e s v. S t e w a r t ( 6 t h C i r . 326, c e r t . d e n i e d , 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 1 9 7 6 ) , 531 F.2d 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 376; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. H o l t (D. Tex. 1 9 7 5 ) , 397 F.Supp. a f f i r m e d i n p a r t and v a c a t e d i n p a r t , F.2d 845, cert. d e n i e d , 429 U.S. L.Ed.2d 1397, ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 537 1051, 97 S.Ct. 764, 50 767; United S t a t e s v. Neary ( 7 t h C ; i x . 1977) , 552 F.2d 1184, c e r t . d e n i e d , 434 U.S. 864, 98 S.Ct. 197, 54 L.Ed.2d 139. I n H o l l i s v . Smith (2nd C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 571 F.2d 685, 693, t h e court said: . . . which h o l d s t h a t "There i s no a u t h o r i t y t h e procedure i n proceedings r e l a t i n g s o l e l y t o punishment, even when a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t h a s t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d , must conform p r e c i s e l y t o t h o s e i n p r o c e e d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o g u i l t , and w e s e e no b a s i s i n p r i n c i p l e f o r so holding. . ." While t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l on s e n t e n c i n g o r compelled a t t e n d a n c e of p e r s o n s s u p p l y i n g h e a r s a y informat i o n , W i l l i a m s v . N e w York, s u p r a , c e r t a i n p r o t e c t i o n s a r e necessary i n ordinary sentencing. A defendant has t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a t s e n t e n c i n g , Mempa v . Rhay ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 389 U.S. 1 2 8 , 88 S.Ct. 254, 1 9 L.Ed.2d 336, and t o have h i s s e n t e n c e based on a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , Townsend v. Burke (1948) , 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690. And, a s t h i s C o u r t h e l d i n S t a t e v . S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138, 1139, a d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e r i g h t t o b e f r e e from a d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s a b u s e of s e n t e n c i n g d i s c r e t i o n . I n addi- t i o n , a d i s t r i c t judge must now s t a t e r e a s o n s for t h e sent e n c e h e imposed i n t h e r e c o r d i n e v e r y c a s e . Stumpf (1980) , Mont. -, S t a t e v. 609 P.2d 298, 37 St.Rep. 673. Cavanaugh's s e n t e n c e and judgment shows t h a t he a p p e a r e d f o r s e n t e n c i n g , w i t h c o u n s e l , a p p r o x i m a t e l y one month a f t e r e n t e r i n g p l e a s of g u i l t y t o t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e s . Cavanaugh was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n m i t i g a t i o n of s e n t e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , b u t i n f a c t , p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e . Cavanaugh was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a d d r e s s t h e c o u r t b e f o r e s e n t e n c e was imposed. t o do s o . H e declined Material appearing i n t h e presentence r e p o r t , i n c l u d i n g h i s p a s t f e l o n y r e c o r d , w a s summarized by t h e court, Cavanaugh was a s k e d i f t h e r e w a s any l e g a l c a u s e why s e n t e n c i n g s h o u l d n o t b e imposed. H e o f f e r e d nothing. Mesler's record indicates likewise. Mesler, w i t h t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of c o u n s e l , waived a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t . t e s t i f i e d a t t h e sentencing proceeding. He Both p e t i t i o n e r s were a c c o r d e d a l l t h e p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c t i o n s r e q u i r e d by t h e court. P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, d e n i e s equal p r o t e c t i o n because it provides d i f f e r e n t punishments, o r d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s o f punishment, f o r d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s f o r t h e same a c t . This Court recognizes t h a t v i r - t u a l l y every sentencing provision has t h i s e f f e c t . A s the Supreme C o u r t n o t e d i n W i l l i a m s , t h e " p r e v a l e n t modern p h i l o s o p h y of penology [ i s ] t h a t t h e punishment s h o u l d f i t t h e o f f e n d e r and n o t m e r e l y t h e c r i m e . " Furthermore, " [ t l h e b e l i e f no l o n g e r p r e v a i l s t h a t e v e r y o f f e n s e i n l i k e l e g a l c a t e g o r y c a l l s f o r a n i d e n t i c a l punishment w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o p a s t l i f e and h a b i t s of a p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n d e r . " 337 U.S. at 247. P a r o l e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program, b o t h o f which r e l a t e t o punishment, a r e p r i v i l e g e s - - m a t t e r s grace, not rights. Lopez v . C r i s t ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 578 P.2d 312, 314, 35 St.Rep. of Mont. , 622; P e t i t i o n of H a r t (19651, 145 Mont. 203, 206, 399 P.2d 984. The d i s t r i c t judges d i d n o t d e p r i v e p e t i t i o n e r s of a r i g h t when t h e y d e c i d e d t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s s h o u l d b e imprisoned w i t h no p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program. t r i c t judges w i t h h e l d g r a c e . The d i s - S e c t i o n 46-28-202(2), MCA, which a l l o w s a d i s t r i c t judge t o r e s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n a l rel e a s e , does n o t s i n g l e o u t a c l a s s without r a t i o n a l i t y . I n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g g o a l s must be m e t . Any k i n d of conditional r e l e a s e necessarily involves the r i s k t h a t p a r o l e e s " w i l l n o t b e a b l e t o l i v e i n s o c i e t y w i t h o u t committing additional anti-social acts." ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S.Ct. Morrissey v. B r e w e r 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. P e t i t i o n e r s a l s o c l a i m t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) must f a l l b e c a u s e i t i s t o o vague i n d e f i n i n g t h e supposed " o f f e n s e " c i t i n g L a n z e t t a v. New J e r s e y ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 306 U.S. 451, 5 9 S.Ct. Sec- 618, 83 L.Ed. t i o n 46-18-202(2) 888. P e t i t i o n e r s a r e misled. does n o t d e f i n e an offense. I t i s invoked n o t s o much on t h e b a s i s of p a s t a c t s a s on t h e b a s i s of a p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e b e h a v i o r . n o t on a p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . I t f o c u s e s on t h e o f f e n d e r , I t d o e s n o t c r e a t e a new o f f e n s e ; n o r d o e s i t f o r b i d o r r e q u i r e t h e d o i n g of a n a c t . I t s s o l e p u r p o s e i s t o p e r m i t a d i s t r i c t judge, i n t h e c o u r s e of o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c i n g , t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d s e r v e h i s f u l l s e n t e n c e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . F i n a l l y , p e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) unlawfully delegates l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o the j u d i c i a l and e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h e s of government. The r e a l t h r u s t of t h i s argument a p p e a r s t o be t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) vests t o o much d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s t r i c t judges and p r o s e c u t i n g attorneys. Petitioners allude t o prosecutorial vindictive- n e s s i n t h e u s e of t h i s s t a t u t e a s a d e v i c e t o p u n i s h def e n d a n t s who choose t o go t o t r i a l r a t h e r t h a n p l e a d g u i l t y . The f a c t t h a t b o t h p e t i t i o n e r s h e r e d i d p l e a d g u i l t y and were s u b s e q u e n t l y s e n t e n c e d w i t h o u t p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program i s c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t o the contrary. ~ i s t r i c j u d g e s , n o t county p r o s e c u t o r s , d e t e r m i n e t h e t punishment t h a t i s imposed f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n . Petitioners' a l l e g a t i o n t h a t p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y s somehow i n d u c e d i s t r i c t judges i n t o r e s t r i c t i n g p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y i g n o r e s t h e p l a i n language of t h e s t a t u t e ( " c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n .. ."). . .. the While a recommendation m i g h t b e made i n a g i v e n c a s e t h a t t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) s h o u l d b e imposed, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n whether t o do s o i s m a n i f e s t l y t h e d i s t r i c t judge's alone. This Court f i n d s t h e contention t h a t excessive j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n e x i s t s i n p e r m i t t i n g d i s t r i c t judges t o c h o o s e t o f u l l y r e s t r i c t p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s w i t h o u t merit. A d i s t r i c t judge i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l p o s i t i o n e d t o p r e d i c t whether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y i n l i g h t of t h e o f f e n d e r ' s p e r s o n a l and c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , a p p a r e n t w i l l i n g n e s s t o conform h i s beh a v i o r t o s o c i e t y ' s r u l e s , and o t h e r f a c t s t h a t a r e commonly weighed i n s e n t e n c i n g . For t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h p e t i t i o n e r s ' a w r i t of habeas c o r p u s i s d e n i e d . application f o r We concur: i i ustices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a special concurring opinion later.

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