STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA v NEWBERGER

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No. 79-100 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Respondent, ART NEWBERGER d/b/a AMUSEMENT CONSPIRACY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula. Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Goldman and Goldman, Missoula, Montana Jon Oldenburg argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana Harold Dye argued, Missoula, Montana Terry L. Adkins argued, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, North Dakota Submitted: Decided : Filed: JUL 1. - 1980 May 27, 1980 ,fu!.- 2 - lg8Q J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. c his i s an a p p e a l from a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t i n Missoula County ~ i s t r i c C o u r t f o r t h e r e c o v e r y of c e r t a i n monies t a l l e g e d l y owed t o North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y on a cont r a c t f o r t h e promotion of a r o c k c o n c e r t . Summary judgment was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t S t a t e of North Dakota. A p p e l l a n t Newberger a p p e a l s from t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e motion f o r summary judgment. A p p e l l a n t , t h r o u g h h i s b u s i n e s s , Amusement C o n s p i r a c y , promotes r o c k c o n c e r t s a t s e v e r a l u n i v e r s i t i e s and c o l l e g e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e Northwest. A p p e l l a n t i s a r e s i d e n t of t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a w i t h h i s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e s l o c a t e d i n Encino, C a l i f o r n i a . Appellant entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t with North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y t o promote a r o c k c o n c e r t a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y i n F a r g o , North Dakota, on F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1979. The c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n e d a c l a u s e which p r o v i d e d t h a t , i n t h e e v e n t of c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e c o n c e r t , p r o c e e d s from advance t i c k e t s a l e s and c e r t a i n promotion e x p e n s e s would be r e funded. Due t o t h e i l l n e s s of one of t h e p e r f o r m e r s , t h e r o c k c o n c e r t was n e v e r h e l d . A s a r e s u l t of t h e c a n c e l l a - t i o n , a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e d l y owed monies f o r promotion e x p e n s e s and advance t i c k e t sales. On March 2 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of M i s s o u l a , t o r e c o v e r t h e monies a l l e g e d l y owed. The c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d i n Missoula County b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t was a c t i v e l y promoting a n o t h e r r o c k c o n c e r t a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana f i e l d h o u s e i n M i s s o u l a . was s c h e d u l e d t o be h e l d on March 2 , 1979. The c o n c e r t I n f i l i n g the c o m p l a i n t , r e s p o n d e n t c a u s e d a summons t o be i s s u e d . However, a p p e l l a n t was n e v e r p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d w i t h t h e summons. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e complaint, respondent a l s o f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t of a prejudgment w r i t o f a t t a c h m e n t . Respondent s o u g h t t o a t t a c h t h e p r o c e e d s of t h e Missoula c o n c e r t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y would s a t i s f y t h e d e b t a l l e g e d l y owed t o North Dakota S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . After t e s t i m o n y was t a k e n a t a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r f o r a w r i t o f a t t a c h m e n t , and t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e Missoula c o n c e r t w e r e a t t a c h e d i n t h e amount r e q u e s t e d . On March 5, a p p e l l a n t , t h r o u g h h i s c o u n s e l , a p p e a r e d t o d i s c h a r g e t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t on t h e ground t h a t i t was i m p r o p e r l y and i r r e g u l a r l y i s s u e d . Appellant argued t h a t t h e w r i t s h o u l d b e d i s c h a r g e d b e c a u s e i t was accompanied o n l y by one u n d e r t a k i n g , t h e s u r e t y , and s e c t i o n 27-18-204, MCA, r e q u i r e d t h a t i t be accompanied by two. d i s c h a r g e was d e n i e d . The motion t o On March 28, 1979, a p p e l l a n t a g a i n a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and moved t h a t t h e a c t i o n b e d i s m i s s e d f o r improper venue and l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h a t motion, t o o , was d e n i e d . P r i o r t o a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s , on March 20, 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r t h i r t e e n a d m i s s i o n s from a p p e l l a n t . requests. A p p e l l a n t , however, d i d n o t respond t o t h e On J u n e 2 1 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t , b e c a u s e t h e r e had been a f a i l u r e t o answer t h e r e q u e s t s w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r o v i d e d by law, t h a t t h e m a t t e r s would be deemed a d m i t t e d . Again, a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t respond. On J u l y 1 7 , 1979, r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a motion f o r summary judgment, based upon t h e a d m i s s i o n s which had been o b t a i n e d . A p p e l l a n t t h e n f i l e d o n August 1 3 , 1979, a motion f o r t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f p r e v i o u s a d m i s s i o n s and a r e q u e s t f o r a n e x t e n s i o n of t i m e s o t h a t t h e answers c o u l d be f i l e d . A h e a r i n g was h e l d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e m o t i o n s f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s on August 23, 1979. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e answers and e n t e r e d summary judgment f o r r e s p o n d e n t . A p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on t h i s appeal: (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying a p p e l - l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n ? ( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying a p p e l - l a n t ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e answers t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e q u e s t s f o r admissions? ( 3 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n c o n t i n u i n g t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r l i e n s which may p o s s i b l y have been superior t o respondent's i n t e r e s t i n t h e attached proceeds? Appellant's f i r s t issue i s t o the e f f e c t t h a t the D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r him. in in A p p e l l a n t i s , o f c o u r s e , a n o n r e s i d e n t , and - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d o v e r n o n r e s i d e n t s by Montana's "long-arm s t a t u t e , " Rule 4 B , M.R.Civ.P., certain criteria are met. provided t h a t That r u l e provides i n p e r t i n e n t part: " A l l p e r s o n s found w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of Montana a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e . I n a d d i t i o n , any p e r s o n i s subj e c t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e a s t o any c l a i m f o r r e l i e f a r i s i n g from t h e d o i n g p e r s o n a l l y , t h r o u g h a n employee, o r t h r o u g h a n a g e n t , o f any of t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t s : " ( a ) t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o f any b u s i n e s s w i t h i n this state; " ( c ) t h e ownership, u s e o r p o s s e s s i o n of any p r o p e r t y , o r of any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , s i t u a t e d within t h i s s t a t e ; " (e) e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o n t r a c t f o r s e r v i c e s t o b e r e n d e r e d o r m a t e r i a l s t o be f u r n i s h e d i n t h i s s t a t e by such p e r s o n ; " I n i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t e "long-arm" s t a t u t e s , w e have s t a t e d t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a c o u r t may assume j u r i s d i c t i o n over a nonresident defendant without offending t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f due p r o c e s s i s a two-step p r o c e s s . "The c o u r t must f i r s t l o o k t o t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of t h e c a s e , and s e c o n d , t h e c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e whether i t would o f f e n d due p r o c e s s t o assert jurisdiction. , " May v . F i g g i n s (1980) , 607 P.2d 1132, 1134, 37 St.Rep. - Mont. 493, 495, q u o t i n g 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1 [ I ] a t 4 - 4 2 1 . W e have a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e i s a p r e v a i l i n g t r e n d toward expanding t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e f u l l e s t extent possible. 37 St.Rep. 156 Mont. May v . F i g g i n s , s u p r a , 607 P.2d a t 1134, a t 496; P r e n t i c e Lumber Company v . Spahn ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 68, 76, 474 P.2d 1 4 1 , 145. The b a s i c r u l e w i t h r e g a r d t o due p r o c e s s l i m i t a t i o n s in imposed upon a s t a t e ' s power t o e x e r c i s e - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t was s t a t e d i n t h e landmark case o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington ". . . due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t i n o r d e r t o s u b j e c t a d e f e n d a n t t o a judgment i n personam, i f he be n o t p r e s e n t w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e forum, he have c e r t a i n minimum c o n t a c t s w i t h i t s u c h t h a t t h e maintenance of t h e s u i t d o e s n o t o f f e n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and substantial justice.'" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a , 326 U.S. a t 316. The Supreme C o u r t went on t o e l a b o r a t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t : "Whether due p r o c e s s i s s a t i s f i e d must depend r a t h e r on t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e a c t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a i r and o r d e r l y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e laws which i t was t h e p u r p o s e of t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e t o i n s u r e . That c l a u s e does n o t c o n t e m p l a t e t h a t a s t a t e may make a b i n d i n g judgment i n personam a g a i n s t a n i n d i v i d u a l o r c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t w i t h which t h e s t a t e h a s no contacts, ties o r r e l a t i o n s . . . "But t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n e x e r c i s e s t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n a s t a t e , i t e n j o y s t h e b e n e f i t s and t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s o f t h a t S t a t e . The e x e r c i s e o f t h a t p r i v i l e g e may g i v e r i s e t o o b l i g a t i o n s ; a n d , s o f a r a s t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e o u t of o r a r e connected with t h e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e , a p r o c e d u r e which r e q u i r e s t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t o respond t o a s u i t b r o u g h t t o e n f o r c e them c a n , i n most i n s t a n c e s , h a r d l y be s a i d t o be undue." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a , 326 U.S. a t 319. The d o c t r i n e of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t h a s s i n c e been developed i n a l o n g l i n e of c a s e s . See Hanson v . Denckla ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. L.Ed.2d 355 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1283; M c G e e v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d q u e t C o n s o l i d a t e d Mining Co. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485; L.D. d u s t r i e s , Inc. 1228, 2 (1957), 223; P e r k i n s v . Ben- ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. Reeder C o n t r a c t o r s v . H i g g i n s I n - ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 5 9 ) , 265 F.2d 768; T r a v e l e r s H e a l t h A s s ' n . v . V i r g i n i a e x r e l . S t a t e C o r p o r a t i o n Comm'n I f a nonresident defendant's a c t i v i t i e s within a s t a t e a r e " s u b s t a n t i a l " o r " c o n t i n u o u s and s y s t e m a t i c , " t h e r e i s a s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e s t a t e t o s u p p o r t j u r i s d i c t i o n even though t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n i s d i s t i n c t from, u n r e l a t e d t o , o r d o e s n o t a r i s e o u t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i v i t y w i t h i n t h e forum s t a t e . s u p r a , 342 U.S. E x p r e s s Co. a t 446-447; W e l l s Fargo & Perkins, Co. v . Wells Fargo ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 556 F.2d 413; Data D i s c . , v . Systems Tech. Assoc., 1280; s e e a l s o Annot., Inc. ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F.2d 2 L.Ed.2d 1664, 1670. Inc. Applying t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , we f i n d a p p e l l a n t h a s s u f f i c i e n t and s u b s t a n t i a l "minimum c o n t a c t s " w i t h t h i s s t a t e f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o have assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s m a t t e r . Appellant purposely a v a i l s h i m s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e s and b e n e f i t s of t h e l a w s of t h i s s t a t e by c o n d u c t i n g h i s b u s i n e s s of promoting r o c k c o n c e r t s i n Montana and t h r o u g h o u t t h e Northwest. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s promoted c o n c e r t s i n Montana p r i o r t o t h e o n e i n M i s s o u l a a t which t h e p r o c e e d s were a t t a c h e d . As p a r t of h i s b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t a l s o e n t e r s i n t o c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s t o be p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s t a t e . I t i s o u t of a s i m i l a r and r e l a t e d c o n t r a c t t h a t r e s p o n - d e n t ' s claim f o r r e l i e f o r c o u r s e of a c t i o n arises. The b a s i s of r e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m i s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t t o t a l l y u n r e l a t e d t o o r d i s t i n c t from t h e a c t i v i t i e s of a p p e l l a n t i n this state. F u r t h e r , a t t h e t i m e of t h i s a c t i o n , a p p e l l a n t was i n p o s s e s s i o n of monies o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n t h i s s t a t e which were a l l e g e d t o have r i g h t f u l l y belonged t o respondent. I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t respondent chose t o f i l e t h i s a c t i o n i n Missoula. I t a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s "minimum c o n t a c t s " w i t h t h i s s t a t e ; a p p e l l a n t w a s found i n Montana, t r a n s a c t s b u s i n e s s i n Montana, had an i n t e r e s t i n p r o c e e d s i n Montana which were a t t a c h e d , and c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s t o be p r o v i d e d i n Montana. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 4B (1)( a ) , ( c ) and ( e ), M.R.Civ.P. W f i n d f u r t h e r t h a t , under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s e c a s e and f o r t h e r e a s o n s a f o r e m e n t i o n e d , t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e " w e r e n o t o f f e n d e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n . Respondent, by f i l i n g t h i s a c t i o n , i n no way s o u g h t t o "vex," "harass" or "oppress" appellant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. To the contrary, respondent chose the Missoula District Court because both appellant and the proceeds could be found there. While there may have been, from the choice of this forum, some inconvenience to both parties, it is clear that no advantages or obstacles to a fair trial were thereby created. To deny jurisdiction of this cause would be to thwart the public interest this state has in providing a forum for companies doing business and for the carrying on and enforcing of proper business practices, such as the payment and collection of debts. Prentice Lumber Company v. Spahn, supra. See We find, there- fore, that the District Court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In any event appellant through his counsel appeared without objection to jurisdiction over his person. He thereby waived any objection under Rule 12, M.R.Civ.P. Appellant's second issue concerns whether the District Court erred in denying appellant leave to file late answers to admissions which respondent had previously obtained. Appellant contends that there were compelling circumstances which explained the failure to answer, since he was hospitalized for a substantial period of time. Respondent served on appellant requests for thirteen admissions pursuant to Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P.; not respond within the time provided by law. appellant did After respon- dent gave notice to appellant that the matters would be deemed admitted, the District Court granted respondent summary judgment based upon the admissions. timetable is pertinent: The following March 20 Respondent r e q u e s t e d 1 3 admiss i o n s . No r e s p o n s e . June 19 Appellant hospitalized. June 2 1 Respondent n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t t h a t m a t t e r s would b e deemed admitted. N response. o J u l y 17 Respondent moved f o r summary j udgment August 6 A p p e l l a n t r e l e a s e d from hospital. August 9 A p p e l l a n t moved f o r l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers. . T h i s C o u r t h a s r e c e n t l y had two o c c a s i o n s t o d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e of whether l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers s h o u l d have been a l l o w e d when p r e v i o u s a d m i s s i o n s had been o b t a i n e d by a p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o respond. H e l l e r v . Osburnsen ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 182, 510 P. 2d 1 3 ; Morast v . Auble ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 1 0 0 , 519 P.2d 157. I n H e l l e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court allowed a p a r t y t o f i l e l a t e answers b e c a u s e t h e d e l a y was c a u s e d by a mixup i n o f f i c e p r o c e d u r e and n o t by bad f a i t h . W e upheld t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and, q u o t i n g 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 1[15.05[21 a t 1156, s t a t e d t h e g e n e r a l r u l e : " ' * * * F a i l u r e t o t a k e any a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d s t a t e d i n t h e r e q u e s t r e s u l t s i n an adm i s s i o n of t h e f a c t s s t a t e d t h e r e i n , a l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t may p e r m i t t h e p a r t y t o f i l e h i s ans w e r a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of s u c h t i m e where t h e d e l a y was n o t c a u s e d by a l a c k of good f a i t h . O r i n t h e a b s e n c e of any p r e j u d i c e t o Heller , t h e p a r t y requesting t h e admission.'" 162 Mont. a t 190, 510 P.2d a t 17. (~mphasis added. ) I n c o n t r a s t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n Morast r e f u s e d p l a i n t i f f s l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers. one-half T h e r e , a n eight and month d e l a y o c c u r r e d and a n i n t e r v e n i n g a d m o n i t i o n d u r i n g a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e had been g i v e n and names had been f u r n i s h e d t o p l a i n t i f f s t h r o u g h i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s d u r i n g discovery. On a p p e a l , t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had not abused its discretion, emphasizing that a litigant's right to file a late response is "not a matter of right," but is rather "a matter resting within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." Morast. 164 Mont. at 105, 519 P.2d at 159. In this case, approximately a five-month delay occurred. During seven weeks in the latter part of the period, appellant was hospitalized. For the first three months, however, including the thirty-day period the law allows for a response to the requests, appellant was carrying on the normal daily affairs of his business. The transcript indicates that the District Court was well aware of this: "THE COURT: Well, where was he [appellant] from March until June 19th? "MR. OLDENBURG: I believe he was traveling in his business, Your Honor . . ." At no time during this traveling or the period of his hospitalization did appellant or his counsel ask for an extension of time to reply to the requests or indicate any reason for the failure to respond. Where respondent served notice of the consequences of failing to answer the requests, which is not required by the rules, appellant simply chose not to respond. In other courts, arguments similar to those advanced by appellant here have fallen on "deaf ears." See Oscola Inns v. State Highway Dept. (Ga. 1975), 213 S.E.2d 27, 29. Under these circumstances, we find that appellant has not demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion, and the District Court did not err in denying appellant leave to file late answers. Appellant's final issue concerns whether the District Court erred in continuing the writ of attachment over liens which p o s s i b l y may have been s u p e r i o r t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e a t t a c h e d proceeds. A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e motion f o r l e a v e t o f i l e l a t e answers and t h e motion f o r summary judgment, a p p e l l a n t made a b r i e f and p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t a t h i r d party allegedly held a perfected s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e proceeds. The t r i a l c o u r t con- t i n u e d t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r any o t h e r l i e n s i n t h e money. I n conducting our research, w e f i n d , a s both p a r t i e s acknowledged, t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y on t h i s i s s u e . Where t h e s i t u a t i o n h a s a r i s e n b e f o r e , t h e t h i r d p a r t y h a s intervened t o a s s e r t h i s perfected security i n t e r e s t i n the a t t a c h e d p r o c e e d s and s u b s e q u e n t l y moved t o d i s s o l v e t h e attachment. See Barocas v . Bohemia Import Co., 1 9 7 4 ) , 518 P.2d 850. Inc. (Colo. W e find that i f the third party's i n t e r e s t i s t o be a s s e r t e d a t a l l , s u c h i n t e r v e n t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y and d e f e n d a n t l a c k s s t a n d i n g t o r a i s e a t h i r d p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t a s a defense t o t h e attachment. Therefore, w i t h o u t s u c h i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n c o n t i n u i n g t h e w r i t of a t t a c h m e n t o v e r any l i e n s which may p o s s i b l y have been s u p e r i o r t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e proceeds. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s affirmed. We concur: $ b 4 ~ h r ( $ Justice

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