PETRITZ v ALBERTSONS INC

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 14837 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 MARY PETRITZ , Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. ALBERTSONS, INC. an Idaho corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver Bow. Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Poore, Roth, Robischon & Robinson, Butte, Montana Donald Robinson argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Michael J. McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana David L. Holland, Butte, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: 5 4 -2 - February 27, 1980 Api~ ii -19a Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an action alleging unlawful discharge in employment. Plaintiff-respondent, Mary Petritz, filed a compl-aint. against defendant-appellant, Albertsons, Inc., on August 16, 1977, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Silver BOW, alleging that she was unlawfully discharged from her employment with Albertsons, Inc., where she was employed as a meat wrapper. The complaint alleged that her discharge was discriminatory, in violation of both the Montana State Constitution and a labor agreement between the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 333, AFL-CIO, of which she was a member. Plaintiff sought back wages, seniority benefits, and general damages. Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint on December 28, 1977, denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses. On the same day, a pretrial conference was held at which the District Court ordered that, if the parties desired to introduce exhibits in addition to those listed at the pretrial conference, they would supply copies of such exhibits to opposing counsel at least ten days prior to trial. The District Court also entered a similar order with respect to witnesses, requiring that counsel serve a list of any additional witnesses upon opposing counsel at least twenty days before trial. Defendant engaged thereafter in extensive pretrial discovery, taking several depositions. a trial by jury on April 3, 1979. The case was set for ~ive days prior to trial, on March 28, 1979, defendant was served with a list of witnesses plaintiff intended to call at the time of trial. The list contained the names of seven people who had not been listed as witnesses at the pretrial conference. Accompanying the list was a notice for the taking of the depositions of two witnesses whose names were supplied at the conference. The time set for the taking of these depositions was April 2, 1979, the day before trial. On March 29, 1979, defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict and a brief in support thereof. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the new witnesses and a motion to quash the taking of the deposition of the two witnesses. Hearings were held with regard to these motions on March 30, 1979. The District Ccurt granted the motion to quash and reserved a ruling on the motion in limine until trial. On the day before trial, April 2, 1979, plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice to her right to refile another action against defendant. The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2), M.R.Civ.P. A hearing was held upon the motion. At the hearing, plaintiff argued that the motion for voluntary dismissal should be granted because new witnesses had been discovered which would support an additional theory of liability against the defendant for wage and sex discrimination. Plaintiff advised the court that these witnesses had not been known prior to ~ p r i l2 , and that, when they were discovered, their names were immediately served upon counsel for defendant. Defendant opposed the motion for dismissal on the grounds that it had engaged in extensive p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y , t h a t t h e motion was b e i n g employed a s a t a c t i c t o a v o i d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , and t h a t i f t h e t r i a l were d e l a y e d , d e f e n d a n t would i n c u r a n o t h e r y e a r ' s l i a b i l i t y f o r back wages i f a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f were e v e n t u a l l y recovered. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s motion and e n t e r e d a n o r d e r t h a t t h e a c t i o n be d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t prejudice. Defendant t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e o r d e r , o r t o c o n d i t i o n s u c h d i s m i s s a l upon t h e attachment of c e r t a i n conditions. I n s u p p o r t of i t s motion, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a f f i d a v i t s of a t t o r n e y f e e s , c o s t s and e x p e n s e s which i t f e l t c o u l d n o t be o f b e n e f i t i n any f u t u r e action. The c o s t s t o t a l e d $881.93. Defendant a l s o e s t i - mated i t s p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y f o r back wages i n a f u t u r e a c t i o n t o be a p p r o x i m a t e l y $17,573.34. Defendant moved f o r a n o r d e r t o l l i n g back-pay l i a b i l i t y from t h e day which had been o r i g i n a l l y s e t f o r t h e t r i a l t o t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y o f a judgment i n any f u t u r e a c t i o n . I n response t o t h e s e motions, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d a n o r d e r on A p r i l 2 4 , 1979 amending i t s A p r i l 2 o r d e r . That o r d e r d i r e c t e d p l a i n t i f f t o pay d e f e n d a n t $85 f o r f i l i n g c o s t s and a t t o r n e y fees presently incurred, i f the p l a i n t i f f sought t o i n s t i t u t e another a c t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r , however, t h e t o l l i n g of any back-pay l i a b i l i t y d u r i n g t h e pendency of any new action. On May 1 8 , 1979, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a n o t h e r s e p a r a t e a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t and h e r union i n which s h e a l l e g e d t h a t s h e had been u n l a w f u l l y and d i s c r i m i n a t o r i l y d i s c h a r g e d from h e r employment. I n t h e complaint, p l a i n t i f f sought a l l l o s t wages, s e n i o r i t y b e n e f i t s and g e n e r a l damages. a c t i o n i s s t i l l pending. hat Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e r u l i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n i t s A p r i l 2 and A p r i l 24 o r d e r s . Three i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n upon appeal : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g p l a i n - t i f f ' s motion t o d i s m i s s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e on t h e day b e f o r e trial? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o t o l l back-pay l i a b i l i t y o f d e f e n d a n t which w i l l a c c r u e from t h e d a t e o r i g i n a l l y scheduled f o r t r i a l t o t h e d a t e of e n t r y o f any judgment r e c o v e r e d i n a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n ? 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g t h a t , as a condition precedent t o p l a i n t i f f bringing another a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f pay d e f e n d a n t a sum i n t h e amount of $85 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s and f i l i n g c o s t s a l r e a d y i n c u r r e d ? The i s s u e s r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s case r e q u i r e t h i s C o u r t t o i n t e r p r e t Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) of t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l Procedure. This r u l e i s i d e n t i c a l i n a l l r e s p e c t s t o Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) o f t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , which h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d by many a u t h o r i t i e s . The i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n s under t h e f e d e r a l . r u l e have p e r s u a s i v e a p p l i c a t i o n t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t e r u l e b e c a u s e o f t h e i d e n t i c a l language. Rule 4 1 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Voluntary d i s m i s s a l - e f f e c t t h e r e o f . (1) By p l a i n t i f f - by s t i p u l a t i o n . Subject t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Rule 2 3 ( c ) , of Rule 6 6 , and of any s t a t u t e of t h e s t a t e of Montana, a n a c t i o n may b e d i s m i s s e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f w i t h o u t o r d e r o f c o u r t ( i )by f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f d i m i s s a l a t any t i m e b e f o r e s e r v i c e by t h e a d v e r s e p a r t y o f a n answer o r of a motion f o r summary judgment, which e v e r f i r s t o c c u r s , o r (ii)by f i l i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n of d i s m i s s a l s i g n e d by a l l p a r t i e s who have a p p e a r e d i n t h e a c t i o n . Unless otherwise s t a t e d i n t h e n o t i c e of d i s m i s s a l o r s t i p u l a t i o n , t h e d i s m i s s a l i s without prejudice. " (2) By order of court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. . Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice." .. It is clear that the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 (a)(2) is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Armstrong v. Frostie Co. (4th Cir. 1971), 453 F.2d 914, 916; La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Division, Fruehauf Corp. (5th Cir. 1971), 444 F.2d 1366, 1368. It is not a matter of right. In using its discretion, the court should consider the expense and inconvenience that will result to the defendant, other prejudicial consequences, and whether terms and conditions attached to the dismissal may make the defendant reasonably whole. Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 5912 at 116-117. "It is the prejudice to the defendant, rather the convenience of the court, that is to be considered in passing on a motion for dismissal. If the motion is made at an early stage of the case, before much has happened, it is more likely to be granted. Although dismissal may still be allowed at later stages, an especially strong showing is required to warrant voluntary dismissal without prejudice after the plaintiff has concluded his evidence or the defendant has moved for a directed verdict or a verdict has been directed for defendant." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 52364 at 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 7 The general rule is that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, 1141.05 at 41-72; Wright and Miller, supra, S2364 at 165. It is no bar to a dismissal that the plaintiff may obtain a tactical advantage. Barron and Holtzoff, supra, 5912 at 114; Moore's Federal Practice, supra. The p u r p o s e of Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) " i s p r i m a r i l y t o p r e - v e n t v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l s which u n f a i r l y a f f e c t t h e o t h e r s i d e , and t o p e r m i t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c u r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . " Wright and M i l l e r , supra. When a t r i a l c o u r t d e c i d e s t o g r a n t a motion f o r volunt a r y d i s m i s s a l under Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) , i t i s v e s t e d w i t h wide d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g what c o n d i t i o n s may a t t a c h t o t h e dismissal. I t may, f o r example, r e q u i r e a p l a i n t i f f t o pay c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s , o r i t may choose t o impose no c o n d i t i o n s a t a l l : "The t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s t h a t may be imposed upon t h e g r a n t i n g o f a motion f o r v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l a r e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t , and i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o p e r o b j e c t i o n s o r showing o f p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n s , t h e c o u r t may dismiss without conditions. Each p a r t y may be r e q u i r e d t o pay h i s own c o s t s , b u t o r d i n a r i l y t h e d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d b e c o n d i t i o n e d upon t h e payment of c o s t s by p l a i n t i f f . " Barron and H o l t z o f f , s u p r a , 5914 a t 123. P l a i n t i f f contends i n t h i s case t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e a c t i o n and awarding d e f e n d a n t $85 f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . plain- t i f f argues t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l w a s proper because of r e c e n t l y d i s c o v e r e d w i t n e s s e s and t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s u f f e r e d no p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l had n o t y e t commenced. P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t s t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l was n o t s o u g h t a s a t a c t i c a l d e v i c e t o e s c a p e t h e motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t o r t o a v o i d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . Defendant c o n t e n d s , however, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i t s u f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u - d i c e by t h e d i s m i s s a l - - n o t o n l y had i t engaged i n e x t e n s i v e p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y , b u t i t was f a c e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g backpay l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d a n u n f a v o r a b l e judgment e v e n t u a l l y be r e c o v e r e d . I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , w e n o t e f i r s t t h a t t h e r e i s supporting f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y f o r both sides. O o n e hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have a l l o w e d p a r t i e s t o n d i s m i s s when t h e y have d i s c o v e r e d new e v i d e n c e l a t e i n t h e proceedings. S e e , Gold v . Geo. T. Moore S o n s , I n c . 2 0 1 ; Union N a t . 3 F.R.D. S t e e l Corp. (1943), Bank of Youngstown v. S u p e r i o r ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 9 F.R.D. 117. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s a l s o e x p r e s s e d i t s a p p r o v a l o f a motion t o d i s m i s s u n d e r Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e h a s been a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a t e c h n i c a l f a i l u r e of p r o o f , nevertheless a meritorious claim. Pulp L.Ed. & P a p e r Co. 849. ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 330 U.S. there is Cone v . W e s t V i r g i n i a 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 On t h e o t h e r hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have d e n i e d m o t i o n f o r v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l where a n a c t i o n h a s been p e n d i n g f o r a l o n g t i m e and a p a r t y was n o t d i l i g e n t i n discovery. Pace v. S o u t h e r n E x p r e s s Co. (7th C i r . 409 F.2d 331; P a t u r z o v . Home L i f e I n s . Co. 503 F.2d 333; S h a f f e r v . Evans ( 1 0 t h C i r . 134; Walker v . S p e n c e r ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1969), (4th C i r . 19741, 1 9 5 8 ) , 263 F.2d 1 9 4 1 ) , 1 2 3 F.2d 347. W a l s o n o t e t h a t t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be no w e l l - s e t t l e d e r u l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of whether a p a r t y ' s l i a b i l i t y may b e t o l l e d and a t t a c h e d a s a c o n d i t i o n i n t h e g r a n t i n g of a v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l . While a c o u r t i s g e n e r - a l l y g i v e n wide d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing c o n d i t i o n s under Rule 4 1 (a)( 2 ) , and s u c h c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t m e r e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e payment o f money, c a s e s which have a d d r e s s e d a d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t i n u i n g l i a b i l i t y f o r p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n s have r e a c h e d opposite results. S e e , Union Nat. Bank o f Youngstown v . s u p e r i o r S t e e l Corp., K e r o t e s t Mfg. Co. (D.C. s u p r a ; ~ h i l a d e l p h i aGear works v . Pa. 1 9 5 1 ) , 1 0 1 F.Supp. 820. I n u n i o n Nat. Bank, a n a c t i o n f o r i n f r i n g e m e n t upon -p a t e n t s , t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a t t a c h as a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t any c l a i m s which w e r e based upon o t h e r p a t e n t s which p l a i n t i f f m i g h t have p o s s e s s e d d u r i n g t h e pendency of t h e c o m p l a i n t . Yet, i n P h i l a d e l p h i a Gear Works, a n o t h e r p a t e n t i n f r i n g e m e n t s u i t , t h e motion t o d i s m i s s was g r a n t e d on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f would n o t a s s e r t a c l a i m a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t o r h i s vendees o r s u c c e s s o r s i n title. A u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e cases a l s o a d o p t p o s i t i o n s t h a t vary. While one a u t h o r i t y p h r a s e s t h e g e n e r a l r u l e by s t a t i n g t h a t a c o u r t "may c o n d i t i o n d i s m i s s a l on p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t c e r t a i n c l a i m s i n a n o t h e r a c t i o n , " another states t h a t " t h e c o u r t w i l l o r d i n a r i l y refuse" such conditions. Wright and M i l l e r , s u p r a , 82366 a t 181; B a r r o n and H o l t z o f f , s u p r a , 8914 a t 125-26. I n t h i s c a s e , what weighs most h e a v i l y i n o u r judgment i s t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d , i f any, by t h e d i s m i s s a l and w h e t h e r , i f s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e d i d o c c u r , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d have been made r e a s o n a b l y whole by t h e i m p o s i t i o n of any c u r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h e d t o t h e dismissal. Where such c o n d i t i o n s may be a t t a c h e d , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e f a v o r i n g t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e motion s h o u l d be followed. The f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t may s u f f e r t h e p r o s p e c t o f a second l a w s u i t o r t h a t p l a i n t i f f may o b t a i n some t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e by t h e d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d n o t b a r g r a n t i n g t h e motion. Barron and H o l t z o f f , s u p r a . H e r e , w e f i n d t h a t defendant suffered s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e by t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h e motion and t h a t t h i s p r e j u d i c e c o u l d have been c u r e d by imposing c o n d i t i o n s . I n view o f t h e u n s e t t l e d s t a t e of t h e l a w w i t h r e s p e c t t o t o l l i n g l i a b i l i t y i n f u t u r e a c t i o n s , however, we d e c l i n e t o s a y whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have a t t a c h e d t h e t o l l i n g of any l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s back pay a s a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e dismissal. W l e a v e t h i s m a t t e r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s cone s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l o f t h e second a c t i o n . W e do f i n d , however, i n view of t h e l a t e n e s s of p l a i n - t i f f ' s motion f o r d i s m i s s a l , and t h e e x t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n s e , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have a t t a c h e d a s a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e d i s m i s s a l a more r e a s o n a b l e award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . It is well s e t t l e d t h a t a n award of a t t o r n e y f e e s be based upon competent e v i d e n c e . F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bk. of Bozeman v. Tholkes ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 422, 429, 547 P.2d 1328, 1331; P h e n n i c i e v. P h e n n i c i e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 604 P.2d 787, 791, 36 St.Rep. 2378, 2383. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded d e f e n d a n t $10 f o r c o s t s and $75 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s . D e s p i t e t h i s f a c t , d e f e n d a n t sub- m i t t e d d e t a i l e d documentation t o t h e c o u r t t h a t i t had expended $881.93 i n c o s t s and l e g a l f e e s . The r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e v e a l whether p l a i n t i f f d i s p u t e d t h e amount o r d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e s e r v i c e s and e x p e n s e s . Nor d o e s t h e r e a p p e a r any r a t i o n a l e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r t h e award o r any cons i d e r a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f ' s f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o pay. The award a p p e a r s t o be n o t h i n g more t h a n a n a r b i t r a r y f i g u r e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court s e l e c t e d . T h e r e i s l i t t l e from which a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d r e v i e w t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e award. I n view of t h e documents and e x h i b i t s s u b m i t t e d i n t h e r e c o r d , w e f i n d t h a t a more r e a s o n a b l e award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s i s p r o p e r , and w e d i r e c t t h e c o u r t t o h o l d a h e a r i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s . Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part. The court is directed to hold a hearing and award a reasonable figure with respect to costs and attorney fees. We concur: & Justices

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.