STATE v McKENZIE

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. 13011 .................................................. STATE OF MONTANA VS . DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. S h e a D i s s e n t --------------_---_-----------------------.-March 28, 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g : B e f o r e s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e b a s i s of m d i s s e n t , it would y p e r h a p s be h e l p f u l t o p l a c e t h i s c a s e i n i t s p r o c e d u r a l p r o s p e c t i v e . T h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d t h e f i r s t McKenzie c a s e on November 1 2 , 1976. S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023. n o t a member of t h i s C o u r t a t t h a t t i m e . I was The c a s e t h e n t r a v e l e d t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f certiorari. On J u l y 29, 1977, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t remanded t h e c a s e t o b e r e h e a r d i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v . New York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 1 9 7 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. When t h e c a s e was a g a i n o r a l l y a r g u e d , I was a member o f t h i s C o u r t . In addition t o a d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f t o t h e P a t t e r s o n v. New York i s s u e , t h i s Court again i s s u e d a f u l l opinion. Other than t h e P a t t e r s o n i s s u e , i t was f o r t h e most p a r t , s i m p l y a r e p e a t of t h e f i r s t McKenzie d e c i s i o n . - S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. Mont . I I d i s s e n t e d t o t h a t o p i n i o n on t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n and on t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y q u e s t i o n ( 5 8 1 P. 2d 1235-1277). THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE QUESTION I concluded t h a t t h e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s i n t h i s c a s e b l a t a n t l y v i o l a t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s under t h e Montana and United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d and t h e f r u i t s of t h e i l l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e s h o u l d have been s u p p r e s s e d . 581 P.2d 1235-1266. Defendant was c o n v i c t e d by t h e u s e of i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e and was t h u s e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l . M views have n o t changed on t h e y s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n ; i n d e e d , t h e y a r e even more r e s o l u t e . T h i s i s a v e r y s t r o n g c a s e f o r s u p p r e s s i o n of e v i d e n c e . Expressed a s m o d e r a t e l y a s p o s s i b l e , t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e v i o l a t i o n s which o c c u r r e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e a p p a l l i n g . There is no need, however, to again set forth my dissent in this opinion. My views expressed in the second McKenzie case (581 P.2d 1235-1266) shall constitute my views here on the search and seizure questions. No doubt I could write a stronger dissent, but time constraints do not permit a rewriting. I think it appropriate, however, to comment on one case that we have decided since the second McKenzie case. In Thomson v. Onstad (1979), Mont . , 594 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 910, this Court unanimously confirmed whatmy position had always been in relation to Montana law and the requirement that an application for a search warrant must contain probable cause within the four corners of the document itself, without reference to any extraneous oral statements or testimony. This Court reconfirmed the four-corner requirement: "However, regardless of whatever additional information Hallett provided to the judge who issued the warrant, the failure to put that information in writing precludes our consideration of whether it might have cured the insufficient affidavit. This Court has previously construed Article 11, Section 11 of the 1972 Montana Constitution all to require that - the facts relied upon by the issuing magistrate be included in writing in the sworn affidavit. State ex rel. Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 362-63, 543 P.2d 193, 196. See also, United States v. Anderson (9th Cir. 1971), 453 F.2d 174, 177 & n. 3; Petition of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 520, 473 P.2d 532, 537. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 473, n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at 3042, n. 3, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1075, n. 3." 594 P.2d at 1139. From this quotation there is no doubt that this Court not only considers this to be the law, but also that this has always been the law in this state. These constitutional requirements under both the United States and Montana Constitutions certainly predated the search and seizure involved in this case. For reasons that I am unable to comprehend, this Court has suspended the application of this law to defendant McKenzie here. This was one of the major points of my dissent on the search and seizure questions, and it is why I so meticulously set forth t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e . W e thus a r r i v e a t t h e issuance of t h e p r e s e n t opinion. T h i s case w a s a g a i n d e c i d e d b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d i r e c t e d u s t o do s o . The Supreme C o u r t o r d e r e d u s t o r e c o n s i d e r i t i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v. S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. The s p e c i f i c o r d e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t p r o v i d e d : "WHEREAS, l a t e l y i n t h e Supreme C o u r t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, t h e r e came b e f o r e you a c a u s e between The S t a t e of Montana, p l a i n t i f f and r e s p o n d e n t , and Duncan Peder McKenzie, J r . , d e f e n d a n t and a p p e l l a n t , No. 13011, w h e r e i n t h e judgment of t h e s a i d Supreme C o u r t was d u l y e n t e r e d on t h e s e v e n t h day o f J u n e , 1978, a s a p p e a r s by an i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i t o t h e s a i d Supreme C o u r t and t h e response t h e r e t o . "AND WHEREAS, i n t h e 1978 Term, t h e s a i d c a u s e h a v i n g F been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e SUPREME COURT O THE U N I T E D STATES on t h e s a i d p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i and r e s p o n s e t h e r e t o . "ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was o r d e r e d and adjudged on J u n e 25, 1979, by t h i s Court t h a t t h e judgment o f t h e Supreme C o u r t of Montana i n t h i s c a u s e be v a c a t e d , and t h a t t h i s c a u s e be remanded t o t h e Supreme C o u r t o f t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n l i g h t of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. (1979). "NOW, THEREFORE, THE CAUSE I S REMANDED t o you i n o r d e r t h a t s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s may be had i n t h e s a i d c a u s e , i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e judgment of t h i s C o u r t above s t a t e d , a s a c c o r d w i t h r i g h t and j u s t i c e , and t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and Laws o f t h e United S t a t e s , t h e s a i d w r i t notwithstanding." I n l i g h t of t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v . S t a t e of Montana, I do n o t know w h e t h e r t h i s C o u r t was a g a i n r e q u i r e d t o i s s u e a f u l l o p i n i o n o r s i m p l y t o r u l e on t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e Sandstrom c a s e . Whatever t h e c a s e may b e , t h e m a j o r i t y i s s u e d a f u l l o p i n i o n on a l l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s I assume t h e o p i n i o n s p e a k s from t h e d a t e o f d e c i s i o n on a l l i s s u e s d e c i d e d . If s u c h i s t h e c a s e , I f a i l t o u n d e r s t a n d why t h e m a j o r i t y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n a g a i n and d e c i d e it i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f a v o r . Thomson v . Onstad, s u p r a , r e q u i r e s t h i s r e s u l t . The majority opinion ignores any reference to Thomson v. Onstad. The search and seizure violations committed are against Thomson/pale beside the violations committed in this case. Why? There is no doubt that this Court has not given the full and fair consideration to McKenziets claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Indeed, by its decision it is clear beyond any doubt that the Court has carved out another special McKenzie rule in the law of search and seizure. As to McKenzie, the Fourth Amendment is dead and buried. THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES In the second McKenzie case, I dissented on the question of whether the sentencing statutes and appellate review statutes in existence at the time of the commission of the crimes involved, passed constitutional muster. I concluded that they did not. Undoubtedly, by writing another dissent here on the same question, I could better state my position. Time constraints, however, do not permit me to do so. For this reason, my dissent in State v. McKenzie (1978), Mont. , 581 P.2d 1235-1277, 35 St.Rep. 799A-799JJ shall constitute my dissent here on the same question. I do have a few brief comments, however, in relation to the majority adding the case of State v. Coleman (1979), - Mont. 605 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 1134, in suport of its position on the death penalty. The majority states: "In short, we believe that the Montana statutory scheme in existence at the time of the crimes herein, affords defendant the procedural safeguards necessary to protect the substantive rights to be sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice. State - P.2d I v. Coleman (1979), - Mont . - 1 3 6 St.Rep. I1 Other than citing Coleman, the statement made is precisely the same as made in the second McKenzie case Coleman has absolutely no application to this case. The question in Coleman was whether the 1977 death penalty statutes could be retroactively applied to crimes committed in 1974. The question I here is whether the general sentencing statutes and general appellate review statutes in existence at the time of the commission of the crimes (January 21, 1974) provided sufficient procedural and substantive protections to satisfy the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Coleman therefore, lends no support to the death penalty issues presented in this case. By concentrating in this dissent on the issues raised by the Sandstrom-type instructions used in this case, I do not mean to imply that I agree with all those portions of the majority opinion upon which I have no specifically expressed disagreement by writing a dissent. The simple fact is that the entire opinion is lacking, but I do not have the time to address all of those issues raised. Suffice to say that if ever a case came to an appellate court as a monumental mess, this is it. I direct the remainder of this dissent to the issue of whether the repeated use of the Sandstrom-type instructions in this case are, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless error. I do not believe that any appellate court could, under the circumstances of the repeated use of these unconstitutional instructions, declare that the error is harmless. For this reason, I believe that the convictions must be reversed. In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the presumption that one intends the consequences of his voluntary act is unconstitutional. his Court had not, however, passed on the issue of whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For this reason the United States Supreme Court did not decide this issue and remanded the case to this Court for our initial consideration. In effect, that is what the United States Supreme Court directed this Court to do in the present case. -60- In granting Sandstrom a new trial after the constitutional issue was again argued in this Court, we declared that Sandstrom was entitled to a new trial because we could not declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional presumption did not influence to some degree the decision of the jury. v. Sandstrom (1979), 2099. - Mont . , State 603 P.2d 244, 36 St.Rep. In Sandstrom, we also set forth what we considered the correct test to be for the assessment of constitutional error. I fail to see how McKenzie should not have the benefit of the same decision--that is, granting him a new trial. The errors comrnited in this case are overwhelming in comparison to the one unconstitutional presumption which tainted the Sandstrom conviction and required a reversal and new trial. THE - MAJORITY APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR ELIMINATES - THE NEED TO INSTRUCT - JURY ON - - - THE CASE THE - - THE LAW OF - -In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, the United States Supreme Court declared that in determining whether constitutional error in instructions is harmless, an appellate court must review the instructions as reasonable jurors would view them. U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. at 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d at 45. 442 The focus is clearly on the instructions rather than on the evidence. Indeed, any other view would ignore the issue. 'In adopting the "overwhelming evidence" test here, the majority has totally eliminated any need to focus on the jury instructions to assess the possible impact they had on the decision making process of the jury. In holding that the unconstitutional jury instructions constitute harmless error, the majority takes essentially a four-step approach. The fourth step is the actual application of the "overwhelming evidence" test for assessing the impact of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. analysis defies logic. -61- The First, the unconstitutional instructions are analyzed and the Court determines that a reasonable jury would conclude the presumptions created are rebuttable rather than conclusive. Second, the Court declares that even the rebuttable presumptions are unconstitutional under the rationale of Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and therefore that a constitutional error analysis must be undertaken. I note here, however, that this second step is not necessary. The United States Supreme Court had already declared in Sandstrom that similar instructions were unconstitutional regardless of whether they created conclusive presumptions or rebuttable presumptions. The case was sent back here for the sole purpose of determining whether or not the constitutional error was harmless. Third, the majority then decides that the best test for assessing the impact of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions is the "overwhelming evidence" test. Milton v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1, is cited as authority for application of the "overwhelming evidence test". And fourth, the Court then confines itself solely to an analysis of the evidence (rather than to an analysis of the unconstitutional instructions) and declares that the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and therefore the verdicts must be upheld. This approach constitutes a total abdication of our duty, which is to assess the impact of the unconstitutional instructions on the decision making process of the jury. It is not our function to be the fact finder. This approach to constitutional error obviates the need to ever instruct the jury on the law, and therefore obviates the need for the jury to ever follow the law. All that is required now, it seems, is that the jury be provided only with the appropriate verdict forms and a conviction will be sustained if, in the minds of the majority of an appellate court, the -62- evidence of guilt is overwhelming. I do not believe the United States Supreme Court could, in good conscience, let this Court get away with this approach to the assessment of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. It is not simply that this Court has adopted an entirely unacceptable test for the assessment of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. Moreover, this Court, in two recent cases, adopted and used a different standard to assess the impact of jury instructions on the ultimate decision of the jury. State v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . 244, 36 St.Rep. 2099; State v. Hamilton (1980), , 603 P.2d Mont .I 605 P.2d 1121, 375 St-Rep. 70. No explanation whatsoever is offered for the failure to use the same test in this case. BY TEST TO THIS - ADOPTING THE 'OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE' - -TO APPLY - CASE,- COURT HAS IGNORED - - V. SANDSTROM AND STATE V. STATE - THE HAMILTON In adopting the "overwhelming evidence" test, the majority states: "We find nothing in Sandstrom inconsistent with adopting this approach to determing harmless error. In Sandstrom the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to reach the issue of harmless error as an initial matter as the Montana Supreme Court had not ruled on this issue. On a new - remand, we granted - - trial to Sandstrom on grounds unrelated - - overwhelming evidence to the in standard - assessing harmless error." (Emphasis added. ) It is true that the United States Supreme Court did no,tdirect us to follow any particular test in assessing the impact of the unconstitutional instructions on the verdicts of the jury. But it is equally true that we were directed to consider the impact of the unconstitutional instruction on a reasonable jury. How would a reasonable jury view the un- constitutional instruction? We were not freed, as the majority implies here, to confine our analysis to the so-called "overwhelming evidence of guilt", which is precisely what the majority has done. -63- Nor c a n I make any s e n s e o u t o f t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t e m e n t t h a t "on remand, w e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l t o Sandstrom on grounds u n r e l a t e d t o t h e overwhelming e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d i n a s s e s s i n g harmless e r r o r . " The f a c t i s t h a t on remand w e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l t o Sandstrom b e c a u s e , i n a n a l y z i n g t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n and i t s p o s s i b l e impact on t h e j u r y , w e c o u l d n o t d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s h a r m l e s s . I f w e a p p l i e d t h i s s t a n d a r d i n d e c i d i n g t h e Sandstrom c a s e on remand, why d i d n ' t w e u s e t h e same s t a n d a r d h e r e ? I s n ' t defendant McKenzie e n t i t l e d t o an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e same t e s t a s w e used i n Sandstrom? I f n o t , why n o t ? I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e impact of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e t e s t f o r a s s e s s i n g t h i s i m p a c t , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n t h e Sandstrom d e c i s i o n on remand: " I n summary, t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s whether t h e erroneous i n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d harmless e r r o r a s a g a i n s t t h e defendant. The i n s t r u c t i o n r e a d s : 'The law presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . ' " B e f o r e a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r can b e h e l d h a r m l e s s , t h e c o u r t must b e a b l e t o d e c l a r e a b e l i e f t h a t i t w a s h a r m l e s s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Chapman v. S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 8 , I n s o holding, t h e 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. Supreme C o u r t i n Chapman r e a f f i r m e d i t s h o l d i n g i n Fahy v . S t a t e of C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 375 U.S. 85, 1 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 7 1 , 173: ' [ t l h e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e complained o f might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n . "Under Fahy and Chapman, u n l e s s w e can f i n d h a r m l e s s e r r o r , t h e c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d . To cons t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s a Court t h a t t h e o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n could n o t r e a s o n a b l y have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . In c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e n t was t h e main i s s u e i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t r i a l w e c a n n o t make t h a t a s s e r t i o n . The e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n g o e s t o a v i t a l e l e m e n t of t h e proof of t h e c r i m e , namely t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t Sandstrom i n comm i t t i n g t h e homicide. I f t h e jury followed t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , it would have presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 603 P.2d a t 245, 36 St.Rep. a t 2100. I t i s p a t e n t l y c l e a r t h a t i n Sandstrom, t h i s C o u r t used a d i f f e r e n t t e s t f o r measuring t h e impact o f cons t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t h a n what t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h e present case. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e C o u r t i n Sandstrom f o c u s e d on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f . Thus t h e s t a t e m e n t : "If the j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t c o u l d have presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " I t i s equally c l e a r , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e Sandstrom t e s t we a p p l i e d d o e s n o t depend upon t h e q u a l i t y o r q u a n t i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e s t a c k e d up a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . R a t h e r , i t depends upon t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t which t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n had on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y . Any o t h e r t e s t i s not a test f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r inherent i n jury instructions. Even more r e c e n t l y , i n S t a t e v. Hamilton, s u p r a , t h i s C o u r t a p p l i e d t h e Sandstrom t e s t a l t h o u g h w e a f f i r m e d t h e conviction. ( I n d e e d , I f e e l now t h a t I was i n e r r o r i n s i g n i n g t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d e c l a r i n g t h e e r r o r i n Hamilton t o be h a r m l e s s . ) I n Hamilton, w e s t a t e d : " R e c e n t l y , t h i s C o u r t h a s made t h e f o l l o w i n g observation: 'To c o n s t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s a C o u r t t h a t t h e o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y have contributed t o t h e jury v e r d i c t . ' S t a t e v. Sandstrom (19791, Mont , 603 P.2d 2 4 4 , a t 245, 36 St.Rep. 2099, 2100. This statement i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e law i n Montana a s t o h a r m l e s s e r r o r i s c l o s e r t o t h e H a r r i n g t o n t e s t . That i s , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h e impact of t h e e r r o r upon a r e a s o n a b l e jury. I f t h e impact of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t have r e a s o n a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e v e r d i c t t h e n t h e That s u c h an approach i s c o r r e c t e r r o r i s harmless. i s emphasized by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . They s a i d t h a t t h e p r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f an i n s t r u c t i o n b e g i n s w i t h ' t h e way i n which a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r 4 4 2 U.S. a t c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . ' 99 S . C t . a t , 61 L.Ed.2d a t 45." 605 P.2d . . T h i s language a g a i n l e a v e s no d o u b t t h a t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t McKenzie case, t h i s C o u r t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t s d u t y i n a s s e s s i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n h e r i n g i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , was t o a n a l y z e and a s s e s s t h e impact of t h e o f f e n d i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y . Now, however, i n less t h a n two months' t i m e , t h i s C o u r t h a s , a t l e a s t f o r t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , c o m p l e t e l y abandoned t h e Sandstrom and Hamilton t e s t , and r e p l a c e d it w i t h a m e a n i n g l e s s "overwhelming e v i d e n c e " t e s t . I f w e a r e going t o change t h e r u l e s e v e r y c o u p l e months, w e s h o u l d a t l e a s t e x p l a i n why w e a r e d o i n g s o by c i t i n g t h e c a s e s w e a r e abandoning o r d i s r e g a r d i n g , and e x p l a i n why t h e s e c a s e s e i t h e r do n o t a p p l y o r why w e choose n o t t o a p p l y them. The f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w t h e t e s t s e t f o r t h i n Sandstrom and Hamilton can o n l y be e x p l a i n e d a s t h e c a r v i n g o u t o f a s p e c i a l and m e a n i n g l e s s t e s t f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t o a p p l y t o d e f e n d a n t McKenzie. AUTOMATIC REVERSIBLE ERROR - - CAN BE THE CONSEQUENCE - O F THE FAILURE - STATE APPELLATE COURTS - FAITHFULLY ADHERE O F TO TO THE RULE SET FORTH - CHAPMAN V . CALIFORNIA IN --- Not l o n g a f t e r t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i d e d Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a , Chief J u s t i c e Traynor o f t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t w r o t e an i n f o r m a t i v e book e n t i t l e d , The R i d d l e of Harmless E r r o r ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Ohio U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . H i s main 7 theme was t h a t t h e Chapman t e s t f o r measuring c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i s t o o s t r i n g e n t and t h a t a less e x a c t i n g s t a n d a r d c o u l d and s h o u l d be a d o p t e d w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e r i g h t s o f a defendant. But he a l s o warned s t a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s t h a t i f t h e y d i d n o t a d h e r e t o t h e Chapman t e s t i t would be s u p p l a n t e d with a r u l e of automatic r e v e r s a l . He stressed that the s t a t e m e n t i n Chapman t h a t "'we c a n n o t l e a v e t o t h e S t a t e s t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e l a w s , r u l e s , and r e m e d i e s d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t p e o p l e from i n f r a c t i o n by t h e S t a t e s o f f e d e r a l l y g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t s ' " was a s u r e s i g n t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t demands a d h e r e n c e t o t h e Chapman t e s t . t h i s q u o t e from Chapman, h e s t a t e d : -66- With r e f e r e n c e t o ". . . T h a t s t a t e m e n t i s of some i m p o r t i n t h e l i g h t of t h e C o u r t ' s l a t t e r - d a y p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s f o r c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s . Unless s t r i c t l y monitored c o u r t s n o t i n sympathy w i t h t h e s e s a f e g u a r d s c o u l d v i t i a t e them by h o l d i n g t h e i r v i o l a t i o n harmless. The Supreme C o u r t may have been a p p r e h e n s i v e of a n e a s y r o u t e t o a f f i r m a n c e d e s p i t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r , v i a t e s t s more l e n i e n t t h a n t h e Chapman t e s t and more d i f f i c u l t t o m o n i t o r . The v e r y s t r i n g e n c y of t h e Chapman t e s t i s enough t o s u g g e s t t h a t u n l e s s it i s f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d , t h e Supreme C o u r t w i l l s u p p l a n t i t w i t h a r u l e o f a u t o matic reversal. "The Chapman t e s t i t s e l f comes c l o s e t o a u t o m a t i c A c o u r t f a i t h f u l t o t h e Chapman t e s t c o u l d reversal. hold t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e judgment, and hence was harmless o n l y i f i t c o u l d d e c l a r e a b e l i e f t o t h a t e f f e c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a b e l i e f a p p r o a c h i n g 386 U . S . 43, 4 4 . certainty.. . ." I f what t h i s C o u r t h a s done i n t h i s c a s e i s any i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e a t t i t u d e of most s t a t e c o u r t s toward f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , I c a n t h i n k of no more c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o a d o p t a r u l e o f a u t o m a t i c reversal. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t i s i n p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e of s t a t e c o u r t s b e c a u s e o f i t s own f a i l u r e t o a d o p t an u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e e f f e c t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s e s o f a j u r y . But whatever t h e t e s t may b e , I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t w i l l n o t a c c e p t t h e t e s t and a n a l y s i s t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h i s c a s e . THE. "OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE" TEST AS ADOPTED AND APPLIED HERE, -- OMITS THE ESSENTIAL I N G R E D I E N T O ASSESSING THE IMPACT - F O THE F UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUCTIONS Out of t h e v o i d c r e a t e d by t h e a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e o r i n a b i l i t y o f t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o f a s h i o n an u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r , t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e h a s d e c l a r e d t h a t it i s f r e e t o a d o p t any one o f t h r e e r u l e s t h a t a p p e a r t o have m e t t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . described a s follows: The c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e a r e ". . . At least three definable approaches appear in Uniked States Supreme Court cases: (1) Focusing on the erroneously admitted evidence or other constitutional error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction. e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 375 U.S. 85, 54 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171; (2) excluding the constitutional infirmity where overwhelming evidence supports the conviction e.g., Milton v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1; (3) determining whether the tainted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence e.g., Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284." The majority cites two law review articles which apparently support the conclusion that three distinct rules exist for the assessment of constitutional error. Assessing the Harm- In Need lessness of Federal Constitutional Error--A Process - of - -a Rationale, Univ. of Pennsylvania L.Rev., Dec. 1976, Vol. 125, No. 2; Harmless Error, - - - The Need for a Uniform Standard, St. John's L.Rev., Vol. 53, Spring 1179, No. 3. The majority neglects to mention, however, that neither article remotely touches upon the issue of how to treat constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. The most probable reason is that the authors of both articles assumed, as most people would assume, that unconstitutional jury instructions cannot be treated in the same manner as evidence which has been invalidly admitted at a defendant's trial. Assuming, moreover, that Milton v. Wainwright, supra, sets forth a separate "overwhelming evidence" test for the assessment of constitutional error, I fail to see how it can be applied to unconstitutional jury instructions. In Milton v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held that an invalidly obtained confession admitted as evidence was harmless error because three additional confessions made by the defendant had been validly admitted as evidence. There, a police officer posing as a fellow prisoner, was confined in the same cell as the defendant in order to obtain his confidence, and then illegally obtained the defendant's confession. This confession was admitted as evidence at defendant's trial in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. But the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the State had validly admitted three additional confessions, the illegally admitted confession was merely cumulative to the three validly admitted confessions, and thus the constitutional error was declared, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be harmless. I do not believe that Milton v. Wainwright has any viability in relation td an application to unconstitutional jury instructions. But if the basic analytical approach has any application, an appellate court would then be required to look at all the instructions together to determine if the impact of the unconstitutional jury instructions was somehow nullified or neutralized by additional instructions on the same point which properly stated the law. This approach breaks down, however, because an appellate court would then be placed in the untenable position of declaring that the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, followed the valid instructions as opposed to the invalid instructions. I doubt that an appellate court would have the temerity to declare that beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury disregarded the unconstitutional instructions and followed only the constitutional instructions in its decision making processes. Any test for harmless error with relation to unconstitutional jury instructions must minimally involve a consideration of whether the jury was influenced by the unconstitutional instructions. Here, the majority has omitted this analysis in adopting its "overwhelming evidence" test. In stating its reasons for adopting the "overwhelming evidence" test the majority first declares that this test "addresses the realities of the jury trial to a greater degree -69- than the others - context - - McKenzie case. in of the (Emphasis added.) What does this statement mean? . ." Is the Court declaring that a special test must be applied to McKenzie that would not be applied to other cases involving unconstitutional jury instructions? What is so special about the McKenzie case which requires a special test for assessing the impact of constitutional error? The opinion sheds no light on these questions. But in the next breath, the Court seems to be adopting an "overwhelming evidence" test to apply to all cases involving constitutional error. This test is preferable, the Court declares, because "an appellate court should view the case as a whole in assessing harmless or prejudicial error and not confine itself to a review of only one component of the case in artificial isolation, in this case the jury instructions." Is the Court here adopting an undeviating rule for the assessment of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions? If so, why didn't the court overrule State v. Sandstrom, supra, and State v. Hamilton, where, just a short while ago, we used a different test for the assessment of the impact of constitutional error? Again, the opinion sheds no light on these question. I agree that unconstitutional jury instructions should not be treated as in a vacuum, that is, not assessed in terms of the evidence and issues existing in the particular case. Nor does the United States Supreme Court require us to so consider them. Essentially, an appellate court has three choices in viewing the impact of the constitutional error: to focus exclusively on the unconstitutional instructions (a clearly unacceptable choice); to focus exclusively on the evidence (another clearly unacceptable choice and the one adopted by the majority here); or to focus on the unconstitutional instructions in relation to the issues and -701- evidence existing in the case. In the absence of a rule of automatic reversal for unconstitutional jury instructions, the only meaningful choice is the last. AN APPELLATE COURT MUST ASSUME THAT JURORS UNDERSTAND THE LAW - AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY APPLY - - - - THE CASE - - THE LAW TO An appellate court can, in determining whether or not erroneous jury instructions constitute harmless error, view them in three ways. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error - (19.69),the Ohio University Press, pp. 73-74. Obviously, the impact of an erroneous instruction (or instructions) depends upon the view taken. Under the first view the appellate court assumes "that a jury understands and faithfully follows the court's instructions." (Id at 73.) This being the case, "any substantial error in an instruction is bound to influence the jury and therefore calls for a reversal." (Id at 73.) This view according to Traynor, is the only respectable view of appellate court can take if the law is to have any meaning at all. Applied to unconstitutional error inhering in jury instructions, this would mean that an appellate court must assume that the jury followed the unconstitutional instructions and thus a reversal would be required. On the other hand, the opposite view operates on the premise "that a jury in the main is mystified by the legal abstractions in an instruction even when the instruction is not unduly complicated by abtruse language." (Id at 73.) Operating on this assumption, an appellate court could then declare that "errors [in the instructions] would have no more influence on the jury than the instruction itself and hence would ordinarily be harmless." (Id at 73.) Although the majority here has not adopted this position in so many words, it is clear that the adoption of and application of the "overwhelming -71- evidence" test to this case is premised on an assumption that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing. underlying the court's opinion is an assumption that the jury paid no attention to any of the trial court's instructions, and therefore that the jury could not have paid any attention to the unconstitutional instructions. The middle ground position operates on the premise that "instructions are indeed mystifying but it is impossible to know whether or not a jury managed to comprehend them." Id at 72. This being the case, "an appellate court is unable to declare a belief one way or the other as to the effect on the verdict of an error in an instruction. Hence the error would ordinarily be deemed prejudicial rather than harmless." Id at 73. Traynor suggests, however, that the only honorable choice is to assume that juries do understand and follow the instructions. "In the absence of definitive studies to the contrary, we must assume that juries for the most part understand and faithfully follow instructions. The concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied the law to all material issues in the case.. . ." Id at 73-74. If a jury is not required to follow the law as instructed by the trial court it is freed to decide the case on any basis it chooses as long as the appellate court can, on appeal, make a determination that the verdict is supported by "overwhelming evidence." Obviously, if a jury does not have to follow the law, there is no need to give the law to the jury to follow. This approach has as its bedrock, an assumption that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing. But if the law is to have any meaning at all the legal system cannot tolerate this state of affairs for it would mean no less than jury anarchy condoned by the judiciary. Here, the unconstitutional jury instructions (eight in number) played no role whatsoever in the majority opinion finding harmless error. The majority jumped over the unconstitutional instructions, landed on the "overwhelming evidence" and in the same breath affirmed the convictions. I cannot believe for one moment that the United States Supreme Court would declare this to be an acceptable test for assessing the impact of constitutional error. Aside from the unconstitutionality of several jury instructions, there is a very real problem existing in this case with.relation to the instructions. The instructions were long, confusing, and often contradictory. No doubt much of the confusion was caused by the horrible form in which the charges were filed. This situation alone, absent the unconstitutional instructions, would be sufficient to reverse the case and grant a new trial. My analysis of the jury instructions, however, rests on the assumption that the jury understood (or attempted to understand as best it could) the jury instructions and conscientiously applied them (as best it could) to the issues existing in this case. THE CHARGES FILED - - -CASE IN THIS The charges filed in this case, together with the jury instructions attempting to cover the charges involved, permit only one rational conclusion--total confusion. In the context of this case there is no way that one can plod his way through the morass of instructions and determine the processes by which the jury reached its guilty verdicts. On January 1, 1974, the new substantive crimes code went into effect in this state. The offenses charged in this case were allegedly committed on January 21, 1974, and therefore the crimes were charged under the new criminal code. Perhaps the new code helps to a degree in explaining the confusion surrounding this case. - 7 3- The c h a r g e s f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e v i r t u a l l y incomprehensible. Out o f a r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e f a c t p a t t e r n comes s u c h a s c a t t e r gun a p p r o a c h t h a t i t would a g r e a t amount o f t i m e f o r t h e b e s t law f i r m t o u n r a v e l . A t t h e conclusion of t h e t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n t h e Instruction 6, p r e c i s e wording o f t h e c h a r g e s as f i l e d . ment ~ t a t e / o f the Case. One can a p p r e c i a t e t h e c o m p l e x i t y and i n t r i c a c y o f t h e c h a r g e s o n l y by v i e w i n g t h e c h a r g e s a s g i v e n t o t h e jury. They r e a d a s f o l l o w s : " T h a t Duncan P e d e r McKenzie, J r . , l a t e o f t h e County o f P o n d e r a , on o r a b o u t t h e 2 1 s t o f J a n u a r y , A.D. 1974, a t t h e County o f Pondera i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana, committed t h e crimes c h a r g e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c o u n t s , a l l a t l o c a t i o n s i n Pondera County, Montana: "COUNT I : THAT DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE J R . , committed t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N AA HARDING, a human b e i n g ; i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-101 and S e c t i o n 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947. "COUNT 11: THAT DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N AA HARDING, a human b e i n g , w h i l e t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , was engaged i n t h e commission o f , o r i n an a t t e m p t t o c o m m i t , o r f l i g h t a f t e r committing o r a t t e m p t i n g t o commit: "1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, a f e l o n y , by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u s e w i t h t h e s a i d LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a male person; o r "2. A G A A E ASSAULT, a f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e u s e G R V TD o r t h r e a t of p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e s a i d LANA HARDING by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g : "a. or S e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: L "b. B o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G w i t h a weapon, namely: " (1) a r o p e by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r "(2) a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d L N AA HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ; o r " t h a t t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed t h e c r i m e of DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y a s above a l l e g e d , by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: "1. by means o f t o r t u r e ; o r "2. by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-101, 94-5-102, 94-5-503, and 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. "Count 3. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . committed t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y r e s t r a i n i n g L N HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g AA t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by using or threatening t o use physical f o r c e with t h e p u r p o s e of f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission, o r f l i g h t t h e r e a f t e r , of t h e f e l o n y : "1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e s a i d LANA HARDING a female n o t h i s spouse, without consent, t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a m a l e p e r s o n ; o r AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly "2. causing: " (a) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d L N HARDING; AA or " ( b ) b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING w i t h a weapon, namely: "1. a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e a r o u n d t h e neck of t h e s a i d L N HARDING: o r AA "2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING upon h e r head w i t h t h e s a i d heavy o b j e c t ; " i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n s 94-5-303, 94-5-503, and 941947, t h e s a i d LANA HARDING h a v i n g d i e d 5-202, R.C.M. a s a r e s u l t of s a i d c r i m i n a l conduct. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed "COUNT 4 . t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y r e s t r a i n i n g LANA HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by using or threatening t o use physical force, with t h e p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e s a i d L N AA HARDING o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING, i n 1947, t h e s a i d v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. L N HARDING h a v i n g d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f s a i d c r i m i n a l AA conduct . "COUNT 5. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, JR. a m a l e p e r s o n committed t h e crime o f SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, a f e l o n y , by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed "COUNT 6 . t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA HARDING, i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 9-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. "COUNT 7. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , JR. committed t h e crime o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA HARDING w i t h a weapon, namely " 1 . a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r "2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ; " i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947." From t h i s maze o f c h a r g e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t was e x p e c t e d t o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. task t o say the l e a s t . A formidable B e f o r e t h e c a s e was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y f o r i t s d e c i s i o n t h e " c h a r g e " o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d . I n s t r u c t i o n 52 t o l d t h e jury: "The c h a r g e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Lying i n W a i t o r Ambush h a s been d i s m i s s e d by t h e C o u r t and you v are n I - -o t t o c o n c e r n v o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h i s c h a r ~ e n -Count I1 o f t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o nf i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court on t h e remand from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i s whether t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstromt y p e p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n a t l e a s t e i g h t i n s t r u c t i o n s , had any e f f e c t on t h e v e r d i c t s of t h e j u r y . T h a t i s , d i d t h e un- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s p l a y any p a r t i n t h e d e c i s i o n making processes of t h e jury i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t s ? Before an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n uphold t h e c o n v i c t i o n s i t must be p r e p a r e d t o s t a t e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e n o t a f f e c t e d a t a l l by t h e u s e of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o make t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e v e r d i c t s must be r e v e r s e d . One o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g problems i n t h i s c a s e which subs t a n t i a l l y d e f e a t s t h e a b i l i t y o f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o c o n d u c t meaningful r e v i e w i s t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which p a t h o r p a t h s t h e j u r y t o o k t o e a c h of t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . Here, t h e r e w e r e m u l t i p l e c h a r g e s and t h e j u r y was p e r m i t t e d t o a d o p t one o r more t h e o r i e s i n f i n d i n g d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of e a c h o f the offenses. I n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t h s which a j u r y t o o k s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r s , i f it does n o t make i t i m p o s s i b l e , t h e a b i l i t y o f a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e o n e way o r t h e o t h e r whether t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y . Of n e c e s s i t y , an a n a l y s i s of t h e p o s s i b l e impact o f t h e unc o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s , must be based on s p e c u l a t i o n . Indeed, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s by which i t can be d e t e r m i n e d how y t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t , it i s , i n m judgment, t o r e v e r s e t h e c a s e on t h i s b a s i s a l o n e . sufficient The b e n e f i t o f any r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s t o how t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t s s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s it must be assumed t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e impacted by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . According t o t h e enumerated c h a r g e s , t h e r e w e r e seven s e p a r a t e counts: Count 1, D e l i b e r a t e Homicide; Count 2 , D e l i - b e r a t e Homicide; Count 3 , Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 4 , Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 5 , S e x u a l I n t e r c o u r s e Without Consent; Count 6 , Aggravated A s s a u l t ; and Count 7 , Aggravated A s s a u l t . But t h e c h a r g e s a r e even more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h i s , f o r w i t h i n e a c h broad c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , a r e s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e methods by which t h e d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h having committed t h e crimes. A l l t o l d , d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h committing t h e c r i m e s i n v o l v e d i n a t l e a s t s e v e n t e e n a l t e r n a t i v e ways. The e v i l s i n h e r e n t i n r e v i e w under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h (and may have been c o n v i c t e d ) of t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means - t o r t u r e w - - a n o n e x i s t e n t c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e . of F u r t h e r m o r e , i n b o t h of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g k i d n a p p i n g c o u n t s t h e a d d i t i o n a l a l l e g a t i o n was thrown i n t h a t d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d t h e death of t h e victim. The d e a t h o f t h e v i c t i m i s n o t , however, an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . It is, r a t h e r , an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e which, - - - - t h e i f found by c o u r t , may r e s u l t i n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a b s e n t m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. - 77 - THE JURY -- INSTRUCTIONS ~ h e unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate the instructions given to the jury in this case. Instruction 31 sets the general tone by covering in great detail the use of presumptions as a tool in satisfying the proof in relation to the mental element involved with the particular crime. Further- more, almost every count charged has corresponding instructions whereby Sandstrom-type presumptions are set forth. In Count 1, Deliberate Homicide, the jury was told by Instruction 33 that the mental element involved could be proved by use of these Sandstrom-type presumptions. Count 2, Deliberate Homicide, involves essentially the invocation of the felonymurder rule, charging that defendant committed the homicide while committing, attempting to commit, or in withdrawing from the felonies of sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated assault. By Instruction 37, the jury was told that the element involved in sexual intercourse without consent could be proved by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. By Instruction 38, the jury was told that the mental element involved in aggravated assault could be proved by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. A more detailed analysis will follow in another section of this dissent. In Count 3, Aggravated idn nap ping, Instructions 37 and 38, supra, also have a direct bearing on this charge. Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping while attempting to commit, committing, or withdrawing from bhe felonies of sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated assault. Thus Instruction 37, mental element in relation to sexual intercourse without consent, and instruction 38, mental element in relation to aggravated assault, must also be applied in the context of this charge of aggravated kidnapping. presumptions are involved. Again, the Sandstrom-type A more detailed analysis will follow in another section of this dissent. -73- The only count which possibly was not impacted by the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions is Count 4, Aggravated Kidnapping. It appears that a jury could have fought its way through the maze of instructions and not used any of the Sandstrom-type presumptions to determine defendant's guilt under this count. But because of the deficient jury verdict forms, an appellate court does not know if the jury found defendant guilty of Count 4. Thus an appellate court would have to speculate that the jury did in fact convict defendant on Count 4 before it could undertake an analysis of the effect of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions on the ultimate determination of guilt. A more detailed analysis will follow in another section of this dissent. Count 5 charges sexual intercouse without consent, and Instruction 37 directs the jury to use the Sandstrom-type presumptions to find proof of the mental element involved. Counts 6 and 7 charge aggravated assault in alternative ways, and Instruction 38 applies to both counts and directs the jury to use the Sandstrom-type presumptions as proof of the mental element involved. VERDICT FORM INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORMS In seeking to explain the maze of charges to the jury, the trial court attempted to put them in some kind of perspective by explaining in Instruction 6, Statement of the Case, the number of counts, and the number of potential convictions: "Although defendant is charged with two counts in each of the offenses of Deliberate Homicide, Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault, only one offense of Deliberate Homicide and one offense of Aggravated Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated Assault are involved in this case. Leave was granted - State the of Montana to charge - in this manner, and to also charqe the offense of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent, to meet the in - o;der - - - problems of proof that arise when an offense or offenses - - committed in different can be ways, or bydifferent means, - - different purposes. -or for "The d e f e n d a n t - - c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d can be on - - r a l l of s a i d o f f e n s e s -y o u may f i n d any o - - as --t h e a l l e g a t i o n s - e a c h - - c o u n t s proved i n -of s a i d o r no - -t proved, b u t i n no e v e n t may be s e n t e n c e d f o r more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f A s s r a v a t e d A s s a u l t even though you may f i n d b o t h of t h e c o u n t s w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d t o have been proved beyond a ( ~ m p h a s i sa d d e d . ) reasonable doubt." Instruction 6. By t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e j u r y w a s f r e e t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of b o t h c o u n t s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide (Counts 1 and 2 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g (Counts 3 and 4 ) . The j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t (Counts 6 and 7 ) . The c o u r t s t a t e d : any - l l o "The d e f e n d a n t c a n be c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d on - o r a - f said offenses. . ." Instruction 6. (Emphasis a d d e d . ) But even I n s t r u c t i o n 6 i s m i s l e a d i n g a s t o t h e number o f c h a r g e s , f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h many a l t e r n a t i v e ways. Count 1 c h a r g e s o n l y one method of h a v i n g committed d e l i b e r a t e homicide. But Count 2 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed i n a t l e a s t f i v e a l t e r n a t i v e ways. One o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s w i t h i n Count 2 i s t h a t t h e homicide was committed und-er c i r cumstances which would c a l l f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e f e l o n y - (0 n murder r u l e p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b), R.C.M. 1947. The f e l o n i e s a l l e g e d l y committed w e r e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t consent o r aggravated a s s a u l t . The d e l i b e r a t e homicide c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n Count 2 are f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e homicide was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e " o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush." I n d e e d , n e i t h e r d e a t h c a u s e d "by means o f t o r t u r e " , o r d e a t h c a u s e d as a r e s u l t of " l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush", i s an e l e m e n t of t h e crime o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Rakher, e a c h o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s i s an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e under s e c t i o n 94-5-105, R.C.M. 1947, whereby t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may b e imposed upon a f i n d i n g of -813- t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e , u n l e s s t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t f i n d s m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. Notwithstanding t h i s r a t h e r fundamental f a c t , t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h a s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e " - - and "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" and b o t h w e r e t r e a t e d t h e r e a f t e r a s separate substantive offenses. Although t h e c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e it r e a c h e d t h e j u r y , the c h a r g e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " w a s cons i s t e n t l y t r e a t e d a s a separate substantive offense. The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t was a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e , and a p p e a r s t h a t t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f s u c h c h a r g e . Of a l l t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e j u r y , there is no way o f d e t e r m i n i n g . w h i c h one o r more o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e methods t h e j u r y u s e d i n c o n v i c t i n g d e f e n d a n t of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Indeed, t h e t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t t h e v e r d i c t s it reached d i d n o t have t o r e v e a l t h e p a t h o r p a t h s i t c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g the verdicts. With r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e p a r a t e c o u n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury: ". . . even though you may f i n d more t h a n one o r more o f s a i d c h a r g e s t o have been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s o n l y one d e a t h i s a l l e g e d , o n l y one G u i l t y o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide v e r d i c t form i s r e q u i r e d . I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , p a r t 11-V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide. . ." And, o f c o u r s e , t h e v e r d i c t form r e t u r n e d and s i g n e d by t h e j u r y , i s equally a s nonrevealing a s t o t h e p a t h o r paths taken t o reach i t s verdict: "A. W e , t h e j u r y i n t h e above e n t i t l e d c a u s e f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide a s c h a r g e d . "B. W e f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide was [ues n e t ] by Means o f T o r t u r e . " ( S t r i k e o u t t h e b r a c k e t e d word o r words which do not apply.) " The same is true of the aggravated kidnapping charges. It cannot be determined which alternative or alternatives were used in reaching its verdict. The trial court instructed the jury : "Since only one Aggravated Kidnapping is alleged, though in different ways and for different purposes, you are to consider all of the charges of Aggravated Kidnapping made against the defendant and even though you may find more than - - all of the charges of - - - - - - - - one or Aggravated Kidnapping to have been proved beyond a you are reasonable doubt - - furnished with only one --verdict form upon which to return a verdict of Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping. "If you adopt the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping form you will be required to find on that form whether Lana Harding did or did not die as a result of the Aggravated Kidnapping." Instruction 5 4 , part 111-Verdict Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping. (Emphasis added.) The guilty of aggravated kidnapping verdict form which the jury adopted and signed, reads as follows: "A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged. "B. We further find that Lana Harding (did) (d*d n e t ) die as a result of said Aggravated Kidnapping. "(Strike out bracketed word or words that do not apply)." Thus, the trial court's own instructions, combined with the verdict forms he provided to the jury, present a situation on appeal where the appellate court has no way of determining the theory or theories used by the jury in finding defendant guilty of deliberate homicide and in finding him guilty of aggravated kidnapping. It is impossible'to say, under these circumstances, that the Sandstrom-type presumptions did not figure in the decision making processes of the jury. For this reason alone, an appellate court should declare that under these circumstances constitutional error will be presumed to have affected the decisions of the jury. should be reversed. Accordingly, the convictions The jury could have, furthermore, failed to unanimously agreed to any single theory or set of theories in arriving at its decision. If this is the case defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Mon- tana Constitution, Art. 11, 826; section 95-1901, R.C.M. 1947. $3. As stated in United States v. Gipson (1977), 553 F.2d 457: A "The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous jury verdict is protected unless this prerequisite of jury concensus as to the defendant's course of action is also required." 553 F.2d at 4-5+-%9. 457 -459 In reversing a defendant% conviction because the court was not able to ascertain the basis of the jury verdict, the court in Gipson, further stated: "During argument, the government admitted, and the record shows that the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that Gipson performed each of these six acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 82313. The possibility that the jury may have returned a guilty verdict in the face of a substantial rift among the jurors over the facts in the case, is, therefore, a real one. Because it is impossible to determine whether all of the jurors agreed that the defendant committed acts falling within one of the two conceptual groupings, we cannot say that the district court's instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 7 - M . " 553 F.2d 459. 705 Here, defendant was charged alternatively under two broad theories: (1) Deliberate homicide with the element required of "knowingly or purposely"; (2) Deliberate homicide under the felony murder rule where the state does not have to prove the mental element of "knowingly or purposely." Con- ceivably the jury could have avoided the Sandstrom-type presumptions by taking the felony-murder route to its verdict. But since there is no way of knowing that the jury did take this route, the rule of Chapman v. California, cited in Gipson, above, requires that the deliberate homicide conviction be reversed. Furthermore, because one cannot state beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury followed a constitutional path in reaching the aggravated-kidnappingverdict, it too, must be reversed. Analysis of the impact of the unconstitutional Sandstromtype instructions should not have to proceed beyond this point. Where the path or paths the jury took to its verdict cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, any analysis of the path or paths it could have taken, is pure speculation. Nonetheless, because the majority has omitted entirely any analysis of the unconstitutional instructions in relation to their possible use by the jury in reaching its verdicts, I will do so. First, I will discuss the deliberate homicide conviction, and second the aggravated kidnapping conviction. DELIBERATE HOMICIDE--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ON THE - - DELIBERATE HOMICIDE CONVICTION As I previously stated, at some point before the case reached the jury for its deliberations, the charge of deliberate homicide "by lying in wait or ambush" was dismissed (see Instruction 52, supra). However, the so-called charge of deliberate homicide "by means of torture" remained for the jury's decision. - I must digress at this point to a vitally important and fundamental fact. Defendant was charged with deliberate homicide "by means of torture", the jury was instructed that it was a separate offense, and instructions were given defining this so called offense. Furthermore, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may have convicted him of this offense. If this is so, defendant has been sentenced to death for a crime which does not exist in the statutes of this state. The statute defining deliberate homicide at the time of the alleged crimes in this case, is section 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947. The entire statute reads as follows: "94-5-102. Deliberate homicide. " (1) Except as provided in section 94-5-103 (1)(a), criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide if: "(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or "(b) it is committed while the offender is engaged in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, arson, burglary, kidnapping, felonious escape or any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. " ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h as p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 94-5-105, o r by imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one hundred (100) y e a r s . " There i s no o t h e r s t a t u t e which c r e a t e s o r d e f i n e s d e l i b e r a t e homicide. I t i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t t h a t d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " i s n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . I t i s , however, one o f t h e s t a t u t o r y l i s t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s which, i f found by t h e c o u r t a f t e r a c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, may j u s t i f y t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , a b s e n t m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. S e c t i o n 94-5-105, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(2) above, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : "94-5-105. S e n t e n c e o f Death f o r D e l i b e r a t e Homicide. " (1) When a d e f e n d a n t i s c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e c o u r t s h a l l impose a s e n t e n c e of death i n t h e following circumstances, unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances: " ( a ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by a p e r s o n s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e o f imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e prison; o r " ( b ) The d e f e n d a n t was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f a n o t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide; o r " ( c ) The v i c t i m of t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was a peace o f f i c e r k i l l e d while performing h i s duty o r " ( d ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by means of t o r t u r e ; o r 7 " ( e ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed - -a by p e r s o n l y i n g - - i t o r ambush; o r i n wa" ( f ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed a s a p a r t of a scheme o r o p e r a t i o n which, i f completed, would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h o f more t h a n one p e r s o n . " (Emphasis added. ) I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t t h e prosecutor mistakenly c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" when t h e r e was no s t a t u t o r y b a s i s t o c h a r g e him w i t h s u c h a s a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . Nonethe- l e s s , t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t t h e j u r y may have convicted defendant of t h i s so-called offense. I n t h e v e r d i c t form i n s t r u c t i o n s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t 11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide) t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury: -85- " I f you a d o p t t h e G u i l t y of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide v e r d i c t form you a r e asked t o f i n d on t h a t form whether t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide was o r was n o t by Means o f T o r t u r e - -i- i s t h e most s e r i o u s o f as th s -t h e r e m a i n i n s c h a r s e s o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide made a g a i n s t t h e defendant. " A f t e r you have r e a c h e d a v e r d i c t on t h e c h a r g e s of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide, whether G u i l t y o r Not G u i l t y , you are s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o r e t u r n a v e r d i c t on t h e c h a r g e s o f a g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping. Have y o u r foreman d a t e and s i g n t h e v e r d i c t form upon which you a g r e e on t h e c h a r g e s of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide and t a k e up t h e Charges of Aggravated Kidnapping." I n s t r u c t i o n 11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide. (Emphasis added. ) The v e r d i c t form r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o u s e a two-step p r o c e s s F i r s t , t h e j u r y w a s t o d e t e r m i n e whether o r i n i t s decision. n o t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o any t h e o r i e s o r t h e o r i e s used i n a r r i v i n g a t t h i s decision). ( P a r t A , j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a . ) Second, t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e homicide w a s committed "by means o f t o r t u r e " ( P a r t B, j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a ) . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t form c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c t i o n 54, p a r t 11. I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t 11, t o l d t h e j u r y t o f i r s t d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e " . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e v e r d i c t form s i m p l y r e q u i r e s t h e j u r y t o f i r s t f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s by which t h e j u r y c o u l d r e a c h t h i s r e s u l t . Second, upon a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e o f f e n s e was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " Furthermore, it a p p e a r s t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , P a r t 11, above c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c t i o n 6 , supra. I n any e v e n t , one can s a f e l y s a y t h a t t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n a s t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s t h e jury took i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t . Count 1 of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t "knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y " c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of Lana Harding. This () 1 a l l e g a t i o n was made on t h e b a s i s of s e c t i o n 94-5-10 5( a ) . On t h e o t h e r hand, p a r t of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s under Count 2 , d e l i b e r a t e homicide, were p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e felony-murder r u l e p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b). This subsection of Count 2 a l l e g e d a t l e a s t two ways i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t committed a f e l o n y murder: e i t h e r sexual intercourse without consent, o r aggravated a s s a u l t . - The f e l o n y o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t was f u r t h e r d i v i d e d i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e methods o f commission. I n s t r u c t i o n 22 p r o v i d e d t h e b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide a s c h a r g e d i n Count 1 and a s c h a r g e d i n a p o r t i o n of Count 2 . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s a v e r b a t i m s t a t e m e n t of s e c t i o n 94-5-102(a) and ( b ) . This i n s t r u c t i o n i s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t . But a r e a l w r i n k l e i s thrown i n t o a p o r t i o n of t h e Count 2 c h a r g e s b e c a u s e t h e a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e i s made t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " In filing t h e c h a r g e s and by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h i s d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " was t r e a t e d a s a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e offense. I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t s t o d e f i n e t h e p u r p o r t e d s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " provides : " D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e i n s o f a r a s we a r e concerned w i t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n t h e r e o f i n t h i s case is: "Whoever p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t s a n o t h e r p h y s i c a l l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon t h e person s o a s s a u l t e d f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose of e n a b l i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t t o e i t h e r : "(a) e x t o r t a n y t h i n g from s u c h a p e r s o n ; " ( b ) o r t o persuade such person a g a i n s t h i s o r her w i l l , o r " ( c ) t o s a t i s f y some o t h e r untoward p r o p e n s i t y of t h e a s s a i l a n t , -87- It "and i n s o d o i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t c a u s e s t h e d e a t h o f t h e p e r s o n h e a s s a u l t s , i n t h e law i s g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means of T o r t u r e , whether o r n o t i t w a s t h e p u r p o s e o r i n t e n t i o n of t h e a s s a i l a n t t o c a u s e s u c h d e a t h . "'Untoward p r o p e n s i t y ' means any p e r v e r s e , wrong, bad o r c o r r u p t i n c l i n a t i o n o r t e n d e n c y . " Instruction 2 3 - - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide By Means o f T o r t u r e D e f i n e d . ) There i s a b s o l u t e l y no s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r t h e l a n g u a g e used i n I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t i n g t o d e f i n e t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " t h e t r i a l c o u r t found t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s . I do n o t know where I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , Methods of - Proof A p p l i c a b l e - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e , to --n o t o n l y r e p e a t s most o f t h e language c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n 2 3 , above, b u t a l s o a t t e m p t s t o set f o r t h t h e methods by which t h e e l e m e n t o f t h i s o f f e n s e can b e proved. The t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t s i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e had t o be p r o v e d , p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d n o t be used t o p r o v e t h e m e n t a l element involved. The l a s t p a r a g r a p h o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i d e s : "And i f you f i n d one o r more of s a i d p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s t o have been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t k i l l e d h e r w h i l e p u r p o s e l y s o i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon h e r , h e h a s committed t h e o f f e n s e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by means o f T o r t u r e , whether - -s- r- - n o t h i s i t w a o was (Emphasis added.) purpose - i n t e n t i o n - -l l h e r . " or to ki I w i l l have more t o s a y c o n c e r n i n g t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n b u t p r e s e n t l y it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t any a n a l y s i s o f t h e impact o f t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s must s t a r t o u t w i t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e e n t i t l e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e . " One c a n n o t t e l l whether o r n o t t h e j u r y a c t u a l l y c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t o f t h i s crime. But even i f t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e , t h e c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d f o r t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e , t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s notwithstanding. Minimum s t a n d a r d s of due p r o c e s s of l a w c a n n o t t o l e r a t e a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t d e f e n d a n t may have been c o n v i c t e d of and s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h f o r a c r i m e t h a t does not e x i s t . For purposes of a Sandstrom analysis however, I will operate on the assumption that whether or not there is a substantive crime of deliberate homicide "by means of torture", is not an issue. I start this analysis with what I believe is a required premise: unless an appellate court can declare beyond a reason- able doubt that the jury took a constitutional path to its deliberate homicide verdict (thereby avoiding application of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions), the conviction must be reversed. I see no other respectable way to approach the problem of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. Instruction 31 set the stage for all the Sandstrom-type presumptions which were to follow. It went into great detail as to how the mental element is proven in a criminal case. Part 2 of Instruction 31 specifically sets forth the Sandstrom type instructions and tells the jury how it is to use them: "2. Proof by Presumption - of Law. (Deductions which the law expressly directs you to make from particular facts): " [TIhe law presumes, that is, the law expressly directs the jury to reason: That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent and also that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act. "Further, unless you are otherwise instructed with regard to a particular presumption, all presumptions are rebuttable; that is, they may be controverted and overcome by other evidence." The trial court then zeros in on the particular offenses charged. Instruction 33, entitled Method -of Proof Applicable to the - - Offense of Deliberate Homicide, sets forth two of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. The first presumption declares that: ". . .the law presumes that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; that is, the law expressly directs you to reason from such unlawful act that the defendant acted with unlawful intent or purpose." Thus, by t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , i f t h e j u r y found t h a t d e f e n d a n t e i t h e r a s s a u l t e d t h e v i c t i m o r i n j u r e d t h e v i c t i m , i t was d i r e c t e d t o f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had an u n l a w f u l i n t e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s was a r e b u t t a b l e presumption. I n s t r u c t i o n 33 t a k e s a n o t h e r s t e p and sets f o r t h a n o t h e r u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l presumption t h a t would f a l l w i t h i n t h e p r o s c r i p t i o n of Sandstrom v. S t a t e o f Montana: ". . . . . . . . . i f you f i n d t h a t t h e defendant, v o l u n t a r i l y and u n l a w f u l l y a s s a u l t e d o r i n j u r e d Lana Harding, and i f you f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e a t h would r e s u l t as t h e o r d i n a r y consequence o f such an a s s a u l t o r i n j u r y , t h e l a w presumes t h a t , and e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o reason therefrom t h a t t h e defendant intended t o c a u s e s a i d d e a t h r e g a r d l e s s of whether o r n o t h e a c t u a l l y had such an i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e . " The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s a l s o i s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption. These f a t a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a g a i n d r i l l e d home t o t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n 38, Methods - Proof A p p l i c a b l e of t o the - - O f f e n s e of Aggravated A s s a u l t . - The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j ury : " S i n c e t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t may be committed e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y , t h e o f f e n s e may be proved by showing t h e a c t was knowi n g l y done, and t h e l e g a presumption t h a t : 'An u n l a w f u l a c t w a s done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and t h e l e g a l p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p e r s o n i s presumed t o i n t e n d t h e o r d i n a r y consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t , ' can b e used t o prove t h e m e n t a l s t a t e o f knowingly. " " T h e r e f o r e , i f you r e a s o n from f a c t s proved i n t h e evidence t h a t t h e defendant unlawfully c a u s e d Lana Harding b o d i l y i n j u r y e i t h e r w i t h o r w i t h o u t a weapon, t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o reason therefrom t h a t he a c t e d w i t h unlawful i n t e n t t h a t i s p u r p o s e l y ; and i f you f u r t h e r r e a s o n from f a c t s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e harm i n f l i c t e d by him was such a s o r d i n a r i l y r e s u l t s from an a c t s u c h a s d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o r e a s o n t h a t he i n t e n d e d t h e consequences o f h i s a c t . " I n s t r u c t i o n 38. ... ... The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e rebuttable. ( I n s t r u c t i o n 38 becomes i m p o r t a n t when c o n s t r u e d a l o n g w i t h I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , which a n a l y s i s w i l l be s e t f o r t h later i n this dissent.) ~ n s t r u c t i o n34 c o n t a i n s t h e methods o f proof f o r t h e n o n s t a t u t o r y o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f torture." The j u r y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o r p u r p o s e s which must be proved under t h i s c h a r g e , c a n n o t be proved by p r e s u m p t i o n s , b u t o n l y i n f e r e n c e s can be used. The t r i a l c o u r t t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c purpose t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " (also a nonstatutory t e r m ) , can be found by t h e u s e of i n f e r e n c e s o n l y . The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o d e f i n e s t h e term " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " ( a g a i n a nonstatutory definition). I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e e s s e n c e of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s the d i r e c t i o n t o t h e jury t h a t defendant i s g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " i f t h e j u r y f i n d s t h a t h e "had p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t e d " Lana Harding and and i n f l i c t e d "--r u e l s u f f e r i n g " - t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had t h e c p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " by h i s a s s a u l t . (Emphasis added. ) These i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e e x c e e d i n g l y c o n f u s i n g , m i s l e a d i n g and i n c o n s i s t e n t . N o n t h e l e s s , I must assume t h a t t h e j u r y under- s t o o d I n s t r u c t i o n s 31, 33, 34, and 3 8 , o r a t l e a s t d i d i t s b e s t t o follow t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The q u e s t i o n t h e n a r i s e s : By which p r o c e s s d i d t h e j u r y r e a c h i t s v e r d i c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide? I t appears t h a t t h e j i n y could have t a k e n s e v e r a l p a t h s , and t h a t o n l y o n e of t h e p a t h s m i g h t n o t have been a f f e c t e d by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstl-om-type presv.mptions. Unless an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n d e t e r x i n e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which p a t h t h e j u r y c h o s ~ ;i t i s i n no p o s i t i o n t o d e c l a r e t h a t a j u r y c h o s e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d the unconstitutional I n s t r u c t i o n s a s t o t h e u s e of j u r y v e r d i c t forms g i v e some c l u e with r e l a t i o n t o t h e s t e p s taken i n reaching t h e verdict,. b u t n o t t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s which t h e j u r y f o l l o w e d . Instruction no. 5 4 , V e r d i c t -Forms and I n s t r u c t i o n s A s - T h e i r U s e , s t a t e d - to i n the introduction: -91- , "In order to return a verdict, all twelve jurors must agree to the decision, including the additional findings - - asked - you are to make on the Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form and on the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping verdict form." (Emphasis added. ) This can be interpreted as requiring that the jury first determine whether or not defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide and then to determine if the homicide was committed "by means of torture." Instruction 54, Part 11, Verdict Forms--Deliberate Homicide provides additional support for this two-step process. Instruction 54, Part 11, provides in relevant part: ". . . as only one death is alleged, only one Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form is required. "If you adopt the Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form you are asked to find on that form whether the Deliberate Homicide was or was not by Means of Torture as this is the most serious of the remaining charges of Deliberate Homicide made against the defendant.'' Again, a two step process is clearly indicated by this instruction. When combining the two step process set forth in the verdict form with these instructions, a reasonable conclusion is that the jury first reached its decision that defendant was guilty of deliberate homicide and then found in the second step that the deliberate homicide was committed "by means of torture." It remains a mystery, of course, which path or paths the jury took in finding defendant guilty of deliberate homicide. are, however, several more obvious possibilities. There If one assumes that the jury followed this two step process in reaching its verdict, the probabilities are clearly in favor of the conclusion that the jury's verdict was tainted by use of the Sandstrom-type instructions. Count 1 charged defendant with "knowingly or purposely" causing the victim's death. Instruction 31 told the jury that a voluntary act could be proved by the use of Sandstrom-type presumptions. Instruction 33, Part 11, specifically told the jury that the mental state required for proof of deliberate homicide could be proved by use of Sandstrom-type presumptions. Thus, if the jury did find defendant guilty of Count 1, an appellate court must assume that the jury reached this verdict by use of the unconstitutional presumptions contained within Instructions 31 and 33. Several possibilities arise if the jury found defendant guilty of any of the alternative charges contained in Count 2. One of the alternative allegations in Count 1 is that defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide by reason of the application of the felony-murder rule. The State alleged that defendant had attempted, had committed, or was withdrawing from the commission of sexual intercourse without consent, a felony, or aggravated assault, a felony. If the jury followed a strict application of the felony-murder rule and thus found defendant guilty of deliberate homicide, it is possible that its verdict was not tainted by the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions. The felony-murder rule is set forth in Instruction 22, part (b) (a verbatim recitation of the statute), and in ~nstruction 33, Part 111. Under Instruction 33, Part 111, "knowingly or purposely) is not an element of the offense. Technically, the jury was therefore not required to consult or use either Instruction 31 or 33 in reaching a verdict that defendant is guilty under the felony-murder rule. But an appellate court cannot determine whether the jury took this path to its verdict. Surely no appellate court could declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury took only the felony-murder route just described as its only path to its verdict. Furthermore, if the jury took the felony-murder rule path to its verdict (thereby avoiding the use of the unconstitutional presumptions contained in Instruction 33) there is still a -93- strong chance that it used the unconstitutional instructions contained in Instructions 37 and 38. Assuming the jury deter- mined that defendant was guilty of deliberate homicide by committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing from the commission of the felony of sexual intercouse without consent, the jury would have been required to use Instruction 37, Methods of to - Proof Applicable - Sexual Intercourse Without Consent. Instruction 37, part 11, specifically declares that proof that ---the act was "knowingly" committed "can be made by presumption." The Sandstrom-type presumption was set forth as the applicable presumption. Thus a felony-murder verdict in relation to sexual intercourse without consent would still not assure that the verdict was untainted by the unconstitutional presumptions. The same analysis can be made in relation to a felonymurder conviction under the theory that defendant killed the victim while committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing from the commission of aggravated assault. Instruction 38, to the Part 11, Methods of Proof Applicable - - Offense of-Aggravated Assault, specifically declares that proof that an assault was committed "knowingly or purposely" can be made by the presumptions either that "an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent", or "the legal presumption that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." Accordingly, a felony murder verdict in relation to aggravated assault would be tainted by the reasonable possibility that the jury used the unconstitutional presumptions contained in Instruction 38. Another possibility is that the jury reached its verdict through the path cut in relation to the charge of deliberate homicide "by means of torture." Aside from the fact that such offense does not exist in this state, the State did charge that this offense was committed (Count 2, last paragraph), and the trial court defined the offense for the jury (Instruction 23) -94- and set forth the method of proof required for this offense (Instruction 34, supra). Whether the jury took this path, is, of course, another mystery. Assuming that it did however, it could have followed an unconstitutional path or a constitutional path. Instruction 34 permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of the offense of deliberate homicide "by means of torture" if it found the following elements: (1) That defendant had "purposely assaulted Lana Harding and inflicted cruel suffering" and - (2) that defendant had one of the particular purposes to inflict "cruel suffering." The phrase "purposely assaulted" is important in relation to how the jury may have reached its decision. If the jury first found that defendant "purposely assaulted" Lana Harding, and then found that the particular purpose of the assault was to inflict "cruel suffering" it followed an unconstitutional path. A "purposeful assault" is defined by Instruction 38, Method - of Proof Applicable To - Offense of - The Aggravated Assault. Part I1 of Instruction 38 specifically directs that the mental element of "purposely or knowingly" is established by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. The trial court specifically told the jury that: "Since the offense of aggravated assault may be committed either knowingly or purposely, the offense may be proved by showing the act was knowingly done, and the legal presumptions that: 'An unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent, and the legal presumption that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act,' can be used to prove the mental state of knowingly. "Therefore, if you reason from facts proved in the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . unlawfully caused Lana Harding bodily injury the law either with or without a weapon, - - expressly directs you- reason therefrom - -he acted with - to that that unlawful intent - -is purposely; and if you further reason from facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the harm inflicted by him was such as ordinarily results from acts such as defendant's, - the law expressly directs you- reason that he intended the - to consequences of - - his act." (Emphasis added.) -- The instruction further provided that these are rebuttable presumptions. It is clear therefore, that Instruction 38 permits the element of "purposely or knowingly" to be proved by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. Thus, if the jury used either one of these presumptions in determining the first step that defendant committed a "purposeful assault", the verdict cannot stand. Any finding that defendant had the particular purpose to inflict "cruel suffering" would be tainted by the initial determination that defendant had committed a "purposeful assault" by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. It is possible, on the other hand, to construe the special jury finding that the deliberate homicide was committed "by means of torture", as embracing the general purpose of the defendant to assault the victim. If the jury followed this path, it need not have used the unconstitutional presumptions contained in Instruction 38, supra. It is, however, quite unlikely that the jury followed this path to its verdict. Initially, it must be emphasized again that it remains a mystery as to the path or paths chosen by the jury in reaching its verdict. But neither do the instructions telling the jury how to proceed, or the verdict form itself, support a conclusion that the jury found defendant guilty of deliberate homicide "by means of torture" in one fell swoop. Rather, Instruction 54, Part 11, tells the jury to first determine if defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide and if it is so to then determine if the deliberate homicide was committed "by means of torture." The two step process in the verdict form itself indicates, moreover, that the jury followed this process directed by the instruction. There are, of course, many additional possibilities that the jury found defendant guilty of more than one count or that it found him guilty of having committed the deliberate homicide -96- in several alternative ways. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that this was permissible. 6, supra; Instruction 54, part 11, supra. Instruction Unfortunately, the trial court did not see fit to provide the appropriate verdict forms for the jury's use. Because of the deficient record, only the jury knows which path or paths it followed in reaching the guilty verdict. An appellate court can only speculate as to what the jury did or did not do. It is impossible to determine therefore, that the Sandstrom-type presumptions which were sprinkled so liberally throughout the instructions used in this case, did not have an impact on the decision making process of the jury. Certainly no self-respecting appellate court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sandstrom-type instructions had no impact on the decision of the jury. As a matter of fact, because of the prevalence of these unconstitutional instructions, the probabilities are clearly in favor of a determination that the jury did use these presumptions as part of its decision making process. I cannot in good conscience declare that beyond a reasonable doubt the Sandstrom-type presumptions had no effect on the jury's verdict. Indeed, the probabilities are that they did. But I must emphasize again, that separate basis exists to reverse the deliberate homicide conviction aside from the Sandstrom issue. There is a reasonable chance that the jury convicted defendant of the so-called offense of deliberate homicide "by means of torture." Such statutory offense does not exist in this state. If the jury did in fact convict him of this nonoffense it is a a frightening prospect indeed thatldefendant has been sentenced to death for a crime which does not exist. Due process of law requires for this reason alone that this conviction be reversed. THE KIDNAPPING STATUTES AND CHARGES FILED I N THIS CASE --- The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e t o o k e f f e c t on J a n u a r y 1, 1976. on J a n u a r y 21, 1974. i n s e c t i o n s 94-5-201 The c r i m e s w e r e a l l e g e d l y committed The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s a r e c o n t a i n e d t h r o u g h 94-5-305, R.C.M. of t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case: 1947. Three s e c t i o n 94-5-302, c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f k i d n a p p i n g ; s e c t i o n 94-5-303, c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ; and s e c t i o n 94-5-304, which p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h a l l be imposed i f t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s a r e s u l t of a n a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , and p r o v i d e d t h e r e a r e no m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h two c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t i n g k i d n a p p i n g (Counts 3 and 4 ) . S e c t i o n 94-5-303, reads a s follows: " ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a q g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i f h e knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y - a n d without lawful a u t h o r i t y r e s t r a i n s another person by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g him i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e p h y s i c a l f o r c e , w i t h any of t h e f o l l o w i n g p u r p o s e s : " ( a ) t o h o l d f o r ransom o r reward, o r a s a s h i e l d o r hostage; o r " ( b ) t o f a c i l i t a t e commission o f - f e l o n y o r - any flishtthereafter; or on o r t o " ( c ) t o i n f l i c t bodily i n j u r y - - - t e r r o r i z e of t h e victim - another; o r " ( d ) t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e performance of any governmental o r p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n ; o r " ( e ) t o h o l d a n o t h e r i n a c o n d i t i o n of i n v o l u n t a r y servitude." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) The p e n a l t y i s p r o v i d e d f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) , which p r o v i d e s : " ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d o f t h e o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h a s p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 94-5-304, o r be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one hundred (100) y e a r s u n l e s s he has v o l u n t a r i l y r e l e a s e d t h e v i c t i m , a l i v e , i n a s a f e p l a c e , and n o t s u f f e r i n g from s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y , i n which e v e n t h e s h a l l be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed t e n (10) years." S e c t i o n 94-5-304, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-303(2) above, s e t s f o r t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may be imposed: "A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i f it that the i s dead - - f i n d s -- v i c t i m - - as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e c r i m i n a l conduct u n l e s s t h e r e a r e m i t i q a t i n q circumstances." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) Count 3 of t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a , 0 i n v o k e s s e c t i o n 94-5-303(b) n and a l l e g e s s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e ways by which t h e o f f e n s e was committed. the State First, a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit o r f l e e from t h e commission of t h e f e l o n y o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent. Second, t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit o r f l e e from t h e commission of t h e felony of aggravated a s s a u l t . The a l l e g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o aggravated a s s a u l t a r e f u r t h e r divided i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose. By Count 3 , 2 ( a ) , s u p r a , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s committed f o r t h e purpose of causing " s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y " t o t h e victim. "? (See s e c t i o n 94-5-202A a ) , R.C.M. 1947.) By Count 3 , 2 ( b ) , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g was committed f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c a u s i n g " b o d i l y i n j u r y " ( a s opposed t o s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y , above) " w i t h a weapon". (See s e c t i o n 94-5-202(b), R.C.M. 1947.) F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e " w i t h a weapon" a l l e g a t i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e weapon used w a s " a r o p e " o r " a heavy weapon. " Count 3 a d d s , i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e k i d n a p p i n g . The v i c t i m ' s d e a t h , however, i s n o t a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Count 4 o f t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a , i n v o k e s >!C s e c t i o n 94-5-30$(c), and a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t , i n k i d n a p p i n g t h e v i c t i m , had " t h e p u r p o s e o f i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y " on t h e victim, o r "threatening o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e victim. Count 4 a l s o adds, i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e victim d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e kidnapping. Again, however, t h e v i c t i m f s deatl! i s n o t an e l e m e n t of t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . The S t a t e a l l e g e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e k i d n a p p i n g b e c a u s e i t wanted t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y t o be imposed s h o u l d t h e d e f e n d a n t be c o n v i c t e d . 94-5-304, But u n d e r s e c t i o n supra, it i s t h e function of t h e c o u r t , n o t t h e jury, t o make t h a t f i n d i n g i n t h e e v e n t of a c o n v i c t i o n . AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS O THE F I t would o f c o u r s e be p r o p e r t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t n o t i c e t h a t t h e S t a t e would s e e k t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i n t h e e v e n t o f a c o n v i c t i o n , b u t t h e i s s u e s h o u l d n e v e r have been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e jury. The p l a i n meaning of s e c t i o n 94-5-305, is t h a t t h e c o u r t must make t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s a r e s u l t o f t h e k i d n a p p i n g . The j u r y had t h e c h o i c e of a t l e a s t e i g h t s e p a r a t e p a t h s it c o u l d have t a k e n t o t h e v e r d i c t , a s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s eight c h a r g e d i n a t l e a s y a l t e r n a t i v e ways. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s a l s o p e r m i t t e d t h e j u r y t o t a k e two o r more p a t h s t o its verdict. An a n a l y s i s of Count 3 r e v e a l s t h a t t h e j u r y had s i x s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s ; an a n a l y s i s o f Count 4 r e v e a l s t h a t t h e j u r y had two s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s . However, t h e a p p l i c a b l e i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o v i d e no c l u e s a s t o t h e c h o i c e o r c h o i c e s t h e j u r y may have chosen. And t h e v e r d i c t form upon which t h e jury returned i t s v e r d i c t , reveals absolutely nothing a s t o which p a t h o r p a t h s it c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t . The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d c o n v i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t on o n e o r a l l of t h e s e p a r a t e c h a r g e s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 6 , S t a t e m e n t o f -e Case, s u p r a ) . - th - But even i f t h e j u r y c h o s e more t h a n one p a t h i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t o r e t u r n o n l y one v e r d i c t form ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t 111, V e r d i c t Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping, s u p r a ) . And t h e v e r d i c t i t s e l f i s a simple d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e jury f i n d s t h e defendant g u i l t y of aggravated kidnapping: -100- "A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as Charged. "B. We further find that Lana Harding (did) (did A&) die as a result of said Aggravated Kidnapping) . "(Strike out bracketed word or words that do not apply. ) " Assuming that the jury chose only one path by which it reached its verdict, because of the multiple charges and alternative ways alleged, it had at least eight choices. Furthermore, if the jury chose more than one path to reach its verdict, and the instructions of the trial court explicitly allowed this approach, the possible combination of choices is multiplied many times over. Needless to say, it is impossible to determine which path or paths the jury chose. Before an appellate court can affirm the conviction here, it must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt which path or paths the jury chose and that the path or paths chosen were not impacted by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type jury instructions. An appellate court cannot in good conscience, make that declaration, and therefore the only choice is to reverse the conviction. It should be sufficient to stop the analysis at this point and simply declare that the multiple choices available to the jury without any indication of what its choice or choices were, makes review impossible. Nonetheless, I will set forth some of the more obvious paths the jury could have taken, assuming, of course, that the jury followed or attempted to follow the applicable instructions. The charges of aggravated kidnapping are set forth in Counts 3 and 4 of the Information, supra. There are quite a number of jury instructions which have a bearing on these charges. -101- I n s t r u c t i o n 25 d e f i n e s b o t h t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g and t h e crime of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e a c t i n v o l v e d by done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t or lawful authority. . ." This d e f i n i t i o n i s a verbatim r e c i t a - t i o n o f s e c t i o n 54-5-302(1). I n defining t h e c r i m e of aggravated kidnapping t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury t h a t t h e or a c t must b e done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y , and f u r t h e r , t h a t i t be done t o a c c o m p l i s h one of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s c h a r g e d , namely : "(a) or t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission of a f e l o n y , " (b) or t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e v i c t i m , "(c) t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim." T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s , f o r t h e most p a r t , a v e r b a t i m r e c i : k a t i o n o f the /aggravated k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 94-5-302(2), R.C.M. I n s t r u c t i o n 29, e n t i t l e d Requirement o f - V o l u n t a r y Act -a With a Mental S t a t e , i s a t h r e e page i n s t r u c t i o n s e t t i n g f o r t h -t h e v a r i o u s m e n t a l s t a t e s which must be proved f o r e a c h o f t h e charges f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant. In relation t o the o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g , P a r t I V of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e jury t h a t : ". . . the voluntary - ( t h e s e c r e t i n g o r holding act of a v i c t i m i n a p l a c e of i s o l a t i o n w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e h o l d i n g o f s a i d p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) be done e i t h e r knowingly or - purposely." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated kidnapping, P a r t V of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t : ". . . the voluntary a c t (the secreting o r holding the victim without lawful authority i n a place of i s o l a t i o n , o r t h e holding of s a i d p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) , - done e i t h e r p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly - and i n be a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t i t be done f o r one of t h e following p a r t i c u l a r purposes: either "(a) to facilitate the commission of any felony (in this case sexual intercourse without consent of the victim, or an aggravated assault upon the victim), or " (b) to inflict bodily injury on the victim, or "(c) to terrorize the victim." (Emphasis added.) Instruction 29, Part VI, provides that for the offense of sexual intercourse without consent, "that the voluntary act - (sexual intercourse without consent) be done knowingly." (Emphasis added.) Instruction 29, Part VII, provides that for the offense of aggravated assault: ". . . the voluntary act (the infliction of serious bodily injury either with or without a weapon, or the infliction of bodily injury with a weapon) be done either knowingly or purposely." (~mphasisadded. With these statements as to mental state out of the way, the trial court then gave a long series of instructions as to the methods of proof which can be used to prove the mental element involved for each crime. The unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate this series of instructions. Instruction 31, entitled Mental State--Methods - Proof, of set the stage by explaining the kinds of evidence: Direct Evidence; Indirect Evidence; Presumptions; and Inferences. Part I1 of Instruction 31, entitled Proof by Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence, subheading (2), is entitled Proof by Presumption of Law. There, the trial court sets forth the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions. In essence the trial court told the jury that it is presumed that the defendant intended the consequences of his "voluntary act", and that it is presumed that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent. (Note: I have previously set out these presumptions in the discussion relating to the deliberate homicide conviction, supra.) In each of the instructions containing the unconstitutional presumptions the jury was told that the presumptions were rebuttable. But the jury was not told that it could accept or reject the presumptions as it saw fit. The clear meaning of the instructions taken together is that the jury must use these presumptions to find the mental element and that it was within the power of the defendant alone to rebut these presumptions. Instruction 31 stated: "2. Proof bv Presum~tionof law. (Deductions a to be made which the l ; expres;ly directs - - from particular facts): . . in addition thereto the law Dresumes, that is, - - expressly directs - - - to the law the jury reason: That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intend and also that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." (Emphasis added.) 'I. From these general instructions as to methods of proof the trial court then provided a long series of instructions describing for the jury the use of the presumptions in relation to each of the offenses charged. In this respect the words or phrases "voluntary act", "unlawful act", and "purposely or knowingly", or "intent", take on a real importance because the trial court told the jury to find the requisite mental element by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions. These presumptions were hammered home to the jury again and again. The State charged in one of the deliberate homicide counts and in the aggravated kidnapping counts that the defendant had a particular purpose in mind by committing the act. With respect to this particular purpose, the trial court in Instruction 32, told the jury that such particular purpose could never be presumed: "in offenses which require proof of a particular purpose the particular purpose required may never be proved by means of - legal presumptions, -but must of be proved by means - inferences only. In this - c a s e t h e o f f e n s e s o f : D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e , and Aggravated Kidnapping a l l r e q u i r e proof t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t committed t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t charged f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , i n a d d i t i o n ---- a t he committed t o proof t h said ac or --t e i t h e r knowingly - p u r p o s e l y . " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) I n s t r u c t i o n 36, e n t i t l e d Method of Proof--Aggravated Kidnapping, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : "The o f f e n s e of Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n t o - proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e - o f f e n s e o f the - the k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s that t h e k i d n a p p i n g wascomm i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. " I n t h i s c a s e Count 4 r e q u i r e s p r o o f t h a t t h e kidnapping w a s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose e i t h e r t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on Lana Harding, o r t o t e r r o r i z e h e r and Count 3 r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d napping have been f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o f f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission o f a f e l o n y : e i t h e r sexual intercourse without her consent, o r t o commit a n Aggravated A s s a u l t on h e r . " T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt i f you f d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding, t h a t the defendant,. -b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f a a a r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n s a s charqed i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , must reasonable doubt t h a t -- f u r t h e r - f i n d beyond he a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g - l e a s t o n e- - e p a r t i c u l a r at - of t h purposes charged. . . a " S i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r purpose may n e v e r be presumed i n l a w , t h e m e n t a l s t a t e of e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e must be proved by i n f e r e n c e o n l y w i t h o u t t h e u s e o f any presumptions. " T h i s means t h a t i f you f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding, you are p e r m i t t e d t o deduce o r r e a s o n from any and a l l f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s proved i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h t h a t h e d i d s o w i t h one o r more of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s charged i n Counts 3 and 4 , and t o f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t h e committed t h e o f f e n s e as charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) Although it may b e o t h e r w i s e d e f i c i e n t , I n s t r u c t i o n 36, standing alone, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . type presumptions. I t c o n t a i n s no Sandstrom- I f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e t e r m i n e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e j u r y used I n s t r u c t i o n 36 as i t s s o l e g u i d e i n f i n d i n g t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e , i t would t h e n have t o t a k e a l o n g , h a r d l o o k a s t o w h e t h e r t h e r e m a i n i n g Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s would o r would n o t have t a i n t e d the jury v e r d i c t . I f i t knew t h e p a t h chosen by t h e jury, an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e c l a r e t h a t t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , i n o r d e r t o c o n v i c t d e f e n d a n t of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , embraced by n e c e s s i t y t h e g e n e r a l i n t e n t o r general purpose t o kidnap. The conscious o b j e c t t o restrain t h e v i c t i m (required f o r t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g ) c o u l d a r i s e by n e c e s s i t y from a f i n d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o e i t h e r commit a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y o r t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim. See s e c t i o n 94-5-303, supra. T h i s would be a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h , f o r t h e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e j u r y found t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o n l y by t h e u s e o f p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e s a s d i r e c t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 36. The most o b v i o u s d e f e c t i n t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t no s e l f r e s p e c t i n g a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d e v e r d e c l a r e beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e jury took t h i s path t o i t s v e r d i c t . There a r e , moreover, s t r o n g r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s had an e f f e c t on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y . No one knows o f c o u r s e , which one o r more p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s t h e j u r y may have found under t h e c h a r g e s . For example, under Count 3 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e " p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e e i t h e r t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on Lana Harding, o r t o t e r r o r i z e h e r ? " purposes? O r d i d it f i n d b o t h s u c h Under Count 4 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e " t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission o f a felony: e i t h e r s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h Lana ~ a r d i n g i t h o u t w h e r c o n s e n t , o r t o commit Aggravated A s s a u l t upon h e r ? " d i d it f i n d both? Or O r d i d t h e j u r y f i n d one o r more o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and one o r more of t h e p u r p o s e s under Count 4? O r d i d it f i n d a l l of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and Count 4? No a p p e l l a t e c o u r t would be s o i r r e s p o n s i b l e t o d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s t h e j u r y used i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t . -106- I t a p p e a r s from I n s t r u c t i o n 36, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h a t t h e j u r y was t o l d t o make a two s t e p a n a l y s i s i n d e t e r mining whether d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . First, t h e j u r y was t o d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t committed t h e o f f e n s e o f k i d n a p p i n g ( a s opposed t o a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) . Second, i f t h e j u r y found h e d i d commit t h e o f f e n s e o f k i d napping, i t was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e i f i t c o n s t i t u t e d a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping. Thus t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n 36, supra: "The o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h e o f f e n s e o f k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s comm i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. " T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i f you f t h a t the defendant,. --d k i d n a p Lana Harding, di b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f aggravated kidnapping a s charged i n t h e Information, you must f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t -t h a t h e a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g a t l e a s t one of t h e p a r t i c u l a r purposes charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) . . T h i s two s t e p p r o c e s s f o r t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s i s f u r t h e r s u g g e s t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t V , and by I n s t r u c t i o n 32, s u p r a , which r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e be proved "in a d d i t i o n - proof t h a t he committed s a i d a c t e i t h e r knowto i n g l y o r purposely." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) I n s t r u c t i o n s 25, 29 ( P a r t I V , and 35, a r e p e r t i n e n t t o t h e o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g (as opposed t o t h e o f f e n s e o f aggravated kidnapping). I n s t r u c t i o n 25 sets f o r t h t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f k i d n a p p i n g ( s e c t i o n 94-5-302, supra) and s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e m e n t a l a c t r e q u i r e d f o r i t s commission i s " p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly." IV, I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t provides t h a t : ". . . t h e voluntary - ( t h e secreting o r holding act of t h e v i c t i m i n a place of i s o l a t i o n without lawful a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e holding of s a i d person by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) - be done (Emphasis a d d e d . ) e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y . " - Instruction 35, Part 11, - - by Presumption sets out Proof the Sandstrom-type presumptions: ". . . . if you find that the defendant,. . without lawful authority, restrained Lana Harding, either by secreting her in a place of isolation, or by usinq physical force to hold - - her, the law presumes - -he acted therein with that an unlawful intent, purpose or knowledge, a n d expressly directs - - - reason." (~mphasis you to so added. ) If the jury took a two step process to its verdict, and it appears that it was directed to do so, there can be no question that the jury may well have used the unconstitutional presumptions contained within Instruction 35 in reaching its decision that defendant committed the offense of kidnapping. Thus, the finding of intent (herein classified as "purposely or knowingly") to kidnap could well have been affected by the unconstitutional presumption. Certainly no court could declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's finding as to "purposely or knowingly" was not affected by the unconstitutional presumption whereby the jury was specifically directed to "presume that he acted therein with an unlawful intent, purpose, or knowledge. . ." Thus, if the jury first found the offense of kidnapping before proceeding to the next question of whether defendant had committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping, its finding of a particular purpose for aggravated kidnapping would be tainted by its reliance on the unconstitutional presumption in its first finding. Clearly, the verdict would then be built in part upon the use of an unconstitutional presumption. It is perhaps more reasonable to view the instructions in a fashion that permits the general purpose to commit kidnapping to be embraced by the more specific particular purpose finding which is necessary for a conviction of aggravated kidnapping. If the question were not a con- stitutional one perhaps an appellate court could reach this conclusion. But our duty here is confined to a determination -108- beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s t o whether o r n o t t h e j u r y c h o s e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l paths t o reach i t s v e r d i c t . There i s abundant r e a s o n a b l e doubt i n t h i s c a s e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n h e r i n g i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , was n o t h a r m l e s s . I t i s , moreover, n o t l i k e l y t h a t t h e j u r y , i n reaching i t s d e c i s i o n a s t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , would n o t have r u n i n t o t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s . I f one assumes t h a t t h e j u r y found t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e a s a l l e g e d under Count 4 , t o e i t h e r commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , o r b o t h , a s p a r t of i t s d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s t h e j u r y c o u l d w e l l have used t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n s 37 ( s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ) and 38 ( a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) . By I n s t r u c t i o n 37, t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e v o l u n t a r y a c t o f "knowingly" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e o f sexual intercourse without consent. By I n s t r u c t i o n 38, t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e v o l u n t a r y a c t of "knowingly o r purposely" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t . Thus, t h e j u r y c o u l d have used t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , o r aggravated a s s a u l t , o r both. With t h i s d e c i s i o n made it would n o t be a t a l l d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t kidnapped t h e v i c t i m f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e of a c c o m p l i s h i n g these offenses. A t l e a s t , one c a n n o t i n good c o n s c i e n c e d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e s e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s had no i n f l u e n c e w h a t e v e r on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s e s of t h e j u r y . SUMMARY AND POSTSCRIPT I concluded in my dissent in McKenzie - that we had I1 denied defendant's constitutional rights at both ends of the procedural spectrum. First, we did not begin to fairly consider defendant's assertions that his rights had been violated under the Fourth Amendment and under Art. 11, S11 of the Montana Constitution. Second, this Court did not fairly apply and fairly analyze the existing laws in relation to the death penalty. more resolute. My views on these two questions are even Now we can add to this our failure to fairly consider whether the barrage of unconstitutional Sandstromtype instructions was prejudicial error. Our analysis and conclusion that the instructions were harmless can never be accepted by the United States Supreme Court as an appropriate standard. And now we can add to this the strong and frighten- ing possibility that defendant may have been convicted of an offense and sentenced to death for a crime that does not exist in the laws of this state--deliberate homicide by means of torture. Never have I seen a case more replete with con- stitutional error. I end this dissent with a postscript. In McKenzie - and I McKenzie - we held that defendant's procedural rights in 11, relation to the death penalty are adequately protected by his right to take his case before the Sentence Review Board after we had reviewed his case on direct appeal. I dissented to this view because the sentence review statutes (sections 95-2501 through 95-2504, R.C.M. 1947; 581 P.2d 1235 through 1266), clearly show on their face that they do not apply to review of a death penalty. Moreover, assuming that they do, they are defective because the defendant does not have a right to appeal to this Court from any decision made by the Sentence Review Board, a panel of district judges. -110- Indeed, after d e f e n d a n t took h i s c a s e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board, he p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n , and w e declined. I d i s s e n t e d b e c a u s e any s y s t e m o f meaningful r e v i e w must p r o v i d e t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s h i g h e s t c o u r t w i l l review the f i n a l death penalty decision. See o r d e r e n t e r e d i n S t a t e v. McKenzie, Cause No. 13011, d a t e d February 20, 1979. The m a j o r i t y view i n McKenzie - and McKenzie - and i n I 11, Cause no. 13011, s u p r a , rests, o f c o u r s e , on an assumption t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e s i n d e e d do a p p l y t o r e v i e w a death sentence. But l o and b e h o l d , s t r a n g e a s it may seem, i t i s now t h e view o f t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t t h a t s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board c a n n o t r e v i e w a d e a t h sentence. T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , a 180 d e g r e e s h i f t from McKenzie I 11, - and McKenzie - and from S t a t e v . McKenzie, Cause No. 13011. T h i s d e c i s i o n was r e c e n t l y made i n t h e Coleman o r d e r : State of Montana e x r e l . Dewey Eugene Coleman v. S e n t e n c e Review D i v i s i o n of t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Montana, No. 80-89, dated March 2 1 , 1980. I n t h e Coleman c a s e , t h i s C o u r t d e n i e d an a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n o t h e r d e a t h p e n a l t y d e f e n d a n t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , and p r o p e r l y s o . Defendant i s under s e n t e n c e of d e a t h b u t a l s o h e h a s been s e n t e n c e d t o imprisonment by conDefendant p e t i t i o n e d t h i s v i c t i o n on a s e p a r a t e c o u n t . Court t o s t a y proceedings i n D i s t r i c t Court f o r an execution d a t e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t f i r s t had t h e r i g h t t o go ' t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o have it r e v i e w a nonideakh penalty sentence. W e declined, holding t h a t should h i s death p e n a l t y s e n t e n c e be o v e r t u r n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t s y s t e m , he c o u l d t h e n a p p l y t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o r e v i e w h i s na-death penalty sentence. What i s i m p o r t a n t however, i s what w e s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e s t o a death sentence: -111- "The review application by relator was denied by the Sentence Review Division on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that of is only review - sentences - available - -to persons sentenced - -a term of - - - - - - in the to one year or more state prison, section 46-18-903, MCA, and that it had-no jurisdiction to review death sentences. It also pointed to section 46-18-307, MCA, which provides for automatic review of death sentences by the Montana Supreme Court. "We hold that the denial of review by the Sentence Review Division was correct. With respect to the death sentence, the only statutory agency with power to review is this Court. We have fulfilled not only our duties in that connection. It would -- extra-statutory - - anomalywere we to hold but an ---be that the of this review of -- conclusions - - Court on review bv death sentences were subiect to later the Sentence Review ~ivisionof - this Court." (Emphasis added) . Needless to say, a judicial system having fundamental fairness as one of its underpinnings, cannot long tolerate this kind of inconsistency--particularly where death itself is the underlying issue. I leave it for others more perceptive and scholarly than myself to determine the status of constitutional law in this 11, state in the wake of McKenzie - and McKenzie - and now I McKenzie 111. Perhaps, however, an appropriate title for an article or book on the subject would be: The McKenzie Rules: Not - General Application--Apply Sparingly. - For

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