MARRIAGE OF WILLIAMS
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No. 14981 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1980 I N RE THE MARRIAGE OF LINDA WILLIAMS, P e t i t i o n e r and R e s p o n d e n t , HARRY L. WILLIAMS, Respondent and A p p e l l a n t . 1 from: The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e c o u n t y o f F l a t h e a d , The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t C. S y k e s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: James D. Moore, K a l i s p e l l , Montana F o r Respondent: Xenneth E. O ' B r i e n , K a l i s p e l l , Montana S u b m i t t e d o n B r i e f s : March 6 , Decided : Filed: &IN 4: .-J@;Q! && 4 . - 1980 - 1980 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l s from an o r d e r d e n y i n g h i s p e t i t i o n t o modify s u p p o r t payments. The o r d e r was e n t e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County. The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n w e r e d i v o r c e d on December 1 3 , 1971. Under t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e , r e s p o n d e n t was g i v e n t h e c u s t o d y of t h e p a r t i e s ' f o u r minor c h i l d r e n . Appellant was o r d e r e d t o pay $60 p e r month p e r c h i l d i n s u p p o r t payments. I n September 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r modifying c h i l d s u p p o r t . Under t h i s o r d e r a p p e l l a n t was r e q u i r e d t o pay $75 p e r month p e r c h i l d u n t i l J u l y 1, 1978, and t h e r e a f t e r $85 p e r month p e r c h i l d c u r r e n t s u p p o r t and $50 p e r month o n a c c r u e d s u p p o r t which t o t a l e d $2,280. S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e e n t r y of t h i s o r d e r , a p p e l l a n t s u s t a i n e d a n i n j u r y which r e s u l t e d i n a one month d i s a b i l i t y . The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d i n w r i t i n g t o r e d u c e a p p e l l a n t ' s October 1977 c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n by o n e - h a l f . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , on? of t h e c h i l d r e n began r e s i d i n g w i t h a p p e l l a n t on a p a r t - t i m e b a s i s w h i l e a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l . A s a r e s u l t of t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the parties further s t i p u l a t e d t o reduce a p p e l l a n t ' s c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n , a s t o t h a t c h i l d , by o n e - h a l f . Approximately a y e a r a f t e r t h e September 1977 o r d e r t h e a p p e l l a n t s u s t a i n e d a s e v e r e , work-related i n j u r y t o h i s f o o t , and a s a r e s u l t , t h e f r o n t h a l f of t h e f o o t was n e a r l y s e v e r e d . H e underwent two o p e r a t i o n s and was s t i l l t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e May 1979 h e a r i n g . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e September 1977 o r d e r , a p p e l l a n t ' s monthly n e t income was $1,074.62. A s a r e s u l t of t h e second i n j u r y and h i s temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , a p p e l l a n t ' s e x p e n d a b l e income was d i m i n i s h e d . H i s c u m u l a t i v e income, a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , comprised of i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s i n t h e s m of $752 a month and d i s a b i l i t y u c r e d i t payments i n t h e sum o f $153.71 p e r month, f o r a t o t a l monthly income of $905.71. T h i s s i t u a t i o n was b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and a l t h o u g h a f o r m a l p e t i t i o n was n o t f i l e d by e i t h e r p a r t y , p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e commenced f o r a f u l l r e v i e w of c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s and f o r such m o d i f i c a t i o n as had become a p p r o p r i a t e under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w and o r d e r o n May 22, 1979. I t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t owed $2,335 i n a c c r u e d s u p p o r t and o r d e r e d him t o r e p a y t h e sum a t t h e r a t e of $50 p e r month. The c o u r t , however, suspended t h e s e payments d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of a p p e l l a n t ' s d i s a b i l i t y . The c o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t t o c o n t i n u e t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s two remaining minor c h i l d r e n a t t h e r a t e of $85 p e r month, suspending $10 p e r c h i l d p e r month d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of d i s a b i l i t y . These suspended payments w e r e t o be added t o t h e amount a p p e l l a n t owed i n a c c r u e d support. The c o u r t a l s o r e q u i r e d t h e p a r t i e s t o s h a r e e q u a l l y a l l m e d i c a l , d e n t a l and o c u l a r e x p e n s e s i n e x c e s s of t h e i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e which a p p e l l a n t i s r e q u i r e d t o maintain. F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t d u r i n g p e r i o d s of v i s i t a t i o n of two weeks o r more, t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments would b e reduced by one-half f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e v i s i t . A p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e on a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law were s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e May 1979 order? More p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e i s s u e s t o be r e s o l v e d are: ( a ) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t a reduction i n c h i l d support? (b) Did the District Court err in its computation of accrued child support? (c) Did the District Court err in reserving the right to order all or a part of accrued support to be paid from proceeds of appellant's industrial accident settlement, if any? Appellant initially contends that the District Court erred in not reducing his child support obligation. He submits that the change in his financial circumstances occurring after his accident was sufficient to require a modification of the support decree. Respondent argues that the plan laid out by the District Court to suspend appellant's payments during the period of disability was a more than adequate modification under the circumstances. Before it was amended in 1979, and for the purposes of this appeal, section 40-4-208(1), MCA, pro-"*ided: "Except as otherwise provided in 40-4-201(6), the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified by a court only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and either: "(a) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable; or " (b) upon written consent of the parties. The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified by a court, except: I' (i) upon written consent of the parties; or "(ii) if the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state." The record here shows that the trial court was cognizant of appellant's financial situation when issuing its order partially suspending support payments. Further, the order was formulated in a manner which would serve the best interests of the children. Therefore, we cannot say that t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n modifying t h e s u p p o r t payments a s i t d i d . W a f f i r m t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e e modification o r d e r p a r t i a l l y suspending a p p e l l a n t ' s f u t u r e c h i l d support. W e must, however, r e v e r s e t h a t p a r t of t h e o r d e r r e - l a t i n g t o t h e s u s p e n s i o n of payments f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of h i s d i s a b i l i t y . T h i s p o r t i o n of t h e o r d e r , i n e f f e c t , m o d i f i e d t h e judgment previously e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o t h e accrued A s such, i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h s e c t i o n c h i l d s u p p o r t payments. 40-4-208(1), (1980), MCA, - Mont. and i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e . , W i l l i a m s v. Budke 606 P.2d 515, 37 St.Rep. 228, 231. ". . . t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e f e r r i n g payments t o o k away [ t h e w i f e ' s ] r i g h t t o l e v y e x e c u t i o n f o r t h e a c c r u e d payments i f p r o p e r t y c o u l d be found i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e husband which c o u l d b e a p p l i e d t o t h e a r r e a r a g e s . Our holding here keeps i n f o r c e t h e r i g h t s t h a t e v e r y h o l d e r of a judgment f o r s u p p o r t i n a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage has: . . . There a r e v a r i o u s means of e n f o r c i n g o r d e r s d i r e c t i n g t h e paymen.t o f s u p p o r t money i n a c t i o n s f o r d i v o r c e . The most common a r e : ( a ) By r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o g i v e s e c u r i t y f o r t h e enforcement o f t h e payments o r d e r e d [ c i t i n g a s t a t u t e and a c a s e ] ; ( b ) by contempt p r o c e e d i n g s [ c i t i n g c a s e s ] ; ( c ) by e x e c u t i o n , a s i n t h e c a s e of o t h e r money judgments [ c i t i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y ] ; and ( d ) by i n v o k i n g t h e p o l i c e power of t h e s t a t e t o p u n i s h t h e p a r e n t f o r w i l f u l l y f a i l i n g , refusing o r neglecting t o support h i s child [citing authority].' S t a t e v. District C o u r t ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 2 Mont. 61, 72, 198 P.2d 761, 767. 11 I "Moreover, o u r h o l d i n g h e r e d o e s n c t nean t h a t a D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t power t o a r r a n g e a d e f e r r e d s c h e d u l e f o r a r r e a r a g e s and The D i s t r i c t C o u r t always s u p p o r t payments. h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n contempt p r o c e e d i n g s f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e n f o r c i n g a s u p p o r t money d e c r e e , t o f i n d t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y i n contempt, and t o s t a y t h e e x e c u t i o n of punishment f o r t h e contempt upon t h e p r o v i s o t h a t t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y p u r g e h i m s e l f by making payments i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a s c h e d u l e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . W e s o s t a t e d i n S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a , 122 Mont. a t 74, 75, 198 P.2d a t 768. .. "However, the deferral schedule adopted by the District Court here, without reference to contempt, constituted a modification of a judgment for accrued payments. This cannot be done." Williams v. Budke, supra, 37 St-Rep. at 232-33. Appellant next contends the District Court erred in computing the amount of delinquent child support owed by him. A review of the record indicates that, although a conflict in the evidence exists, there is substantial evidence to support the District Court's findings and conclusions. Cameron v. Cameron (1978), - Mont. 939, 35 St.Rep. 1723. , 587 P. 2d The District Court's computation of accrued child support is therefore affirmed. Finally, appellant submits the District Court erred in its Finding of Fact No. 15 wherein it reserved the right to order all or a portion of the delinquent child support payments to be paid from any workers' compensation settlement appellant might receive. This is merely a statement of a future action the court might take. It is not a final order and, therefore, does not constitute an appealable issue. Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. / ' We concur: Chief Justice -a Justices
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