STATE v LOPEZ
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No. 14714 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . DANIEL HERMAN LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: A. Michael Salvagni, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on briefs: Decided : Filed: f c,.. October 4, 1979 .IFt: 2 .- - Mr. ~usticeGene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. his is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Daniel H. Lopez, from a judgment of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, the Honorable W. W. Lessley presiding, rendered upon a jury verdict convicting him of aggravated assault and attempted theft. The defendant was sentenced to the state prison for twenty years on aggravated assault and ten years on attempted theft, the sentences to run concurrently. The District Court designated defendant a dangerous offender. According to both defendant Lopez and the victim, Steven A. Wiscombe, there was an early morning encounter between the two men near the Durston Road, west of Bozeman, Montana, on July 11, 1978. The testimony as to the circum- stances of this encounter is contradictory. Wiscombe testified that he arrived in Bozeman after midnight and decided against staying in a motel. He, there- fore, drove out of town, found an accommodating spot and went to sleep in his sleeping bag. Wiscombe was awakened by defendant shaking him, beating him with a rock, swearing, and demanding Wiscombe's car keys. A struggle ensued in which defendant Lopez lost his glasses but obtained the car keys. Lopez attempted to drive away in the car, but Wiscombe grabbed a door handle and broke a side window, causing Lopez to swerve off the road. The men scuffled over the car keys, and the confrontation ended when Lopez fled. Wiscombe returned to his sleeping spot where he picked up his belongings and Lopez's shaving kit. He then drove to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital where he was treated and hospitalized for three days with head and face lacerations, a small fracture of the skull and possible n e r v e damage. Defendant Lopez was l i n k e d t o t h e i n c i d e n t by t h e f i n d i n g of h i s g l a s s e s and b i k e a t t h e s c e n e and by f i n g e r p r i n t s on a t u b e o f t o o t h p a s t e from h i s s h a v i n g k i t which Wiscombe had p i c k e d up. Lopez, on t h e o t h e r hand, t e s t i f i e d t h a t Wiscombe a t t e m p t e d t o r u n him o f f t h e r o a d and t h a t h e f e l l i n t o a d i t c h and l o s t h i s g l a s s e s . H e s t a t e d t h a t a s he was climb- i n g o u t of t h e d i t c h t o t h e roadway, h e t h r e w a r o c k a t Wiscombe t o s t o p him from advancing on t h e d e f e n d a n t . Lopez c o n t e n d s h e d i d n o t i n t e n d t o h u r t Wiscombe b u t w a s o n l y t r y i n g t o defend himself. I n a n a t t e m p t t o g e t away, Lopez t e s t i f i e d he jumped i n t o t h e c a r and t r i e d t o t a k e o f f . Wiscombe t h e n b r o k e t h e s i d e window and c a u s e d Lopez t o d r i v e i n t o t h e d i t c h . Lopez s t a t e d he c o u l d n o t g e t o u t on t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e b e c a u s e Wiscombe had a r o c k i n h i s hand and had e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s o f k i l l i n g Lopez. Lopez t h e n c r o s s e d t h e c o n s o l e , e x i t e d t h r o u g h t h e p a s s e n g e r d o o r and f l e d a c r o s s a f i e l d . He was a r r e s t e d near t h e scene of t h e i n c i d e n t a t approximately 7:20 a.m. t h e same morning. Lopez a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n s of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and a t t e m p t e d t h e f t c o n t e n d i n g t h a t h e was d e n i e d e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t complains t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was based upon a p r e j u d i c i a l p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and t h e r e f o r e w a s improper. Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s review: 1. Was d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e he d i d n o t r e c e i v e a d e q u a t e and e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l ? 2. proper? Was t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t t I n r e c e n t y e a r s t h i s Court has addressed t h e i s s u e of a d e q u a t e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l o n a number o f o c c a s i o n s . S e e S t a t e v. Maldonado ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 296, 35 St.Rep. Mont . , 420; S t a t e v . Miller ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 568 P.2d 130, 34 St.Rep. 578 P.2d Mont. -, 838; S t a t e v . Brooks ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 45, 554 P.2d 753; S t a t e v. McElveen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 500, 544 P.2d 820. These c a s e s have c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e a c c u s e d ' s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a s r e q u i r e d by t h e S i x t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 24, o f t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l encompasses t h e r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . S t a t e v . McElveen, To d e t e r m i n e t h e adequacy o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l t h i s C o u r t u s e s t h e " f a r c e and sham" t e s t . ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. S t a t e v. N o l l e r 35, 381 P.2d 293, 294. This test s t a t e s : ". . . [To] p r e v a i l on a c l a i m o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a d e f e n d a n t must m e e t t h e burden o f proving h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance was s o w o e f u l l y i n a d e q u a t e a s t o shock t h e cons c i e n c e o f t h e c o u r t and make t h e r e s u l t a n t p r o c e e d i n g a f a r c e and mockery o f j u s t i c e . " State (Citations omitted.) v . M i l l e r , 568 P.2d a t 132. I n applying t h e t e s t t h i s Court ruled: "To d e t e r m i n e t h e adequacy o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w e must l o o k a t t h e s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d by a p p o i n t e d counsel i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e reasoning set f o r t h by J u s t i c e J o h n C. H a r r i s o n i n S t a t e v . F o r s n e s s 159 Mont. 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 , 495 P.2d 1 7 6 , 178: " ' C l a i m e d i n a d e q u a c y o f c o u n s e l must n o t be t e s t e d by a g r e a t e r s o p h i s t i c a t i o n o f a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l , n o r by t h a t c o u n s e l ' s u n r i v a l e d o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t u d y t h e r e c o r d a t l e i s u r e and c i t e d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s of p e r h a p s d o u b t f u l e f f i c a c y . Success i s n o t the test of e f f i c i e n t counsel, frequently n e i t h e r v i g o r , z e a l , n o r s k i l l c a n overcome t h e S t a t e v . McElveen, 544 P.2d a t 822. t r u t h . "' F u r t h e r , i n W i l l i a m s v . B e t o ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 354 F.2d 698, 706, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : . . " . t h e f a c t t h a t some o t h e r lawyer f o l l o w e d a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e i n a n o t h e r c a s e , o r would have done d i f f e r e n t l y had he been a c t i n g a s c o u n s e l , i s no ground f o r b r a n d i n g t h e a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y w i t h t h e opprobrium o f i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , o r i n f i d e l i t y , o r incompetency. The p r a c t i c e of law i s a n a r t a s w e l l a s a s c i e n c e . A s no two men c a n be e x a c t l y a l i k e i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e prof e s s i o n , i t i s b a s i c a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e t o judge a n a t t o r n e y by what a n o t h e r would have done, o r s a y s he would have done, i n t h e b e t t e r l i g h t of hindsight. " (Citations omitted. ) .. With t h e g u i d a n c e o f t h e s e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , w e examine t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f d e f e n d a n t c o n c e r n i n g h i s couns e l ' s ineffectiveness. Defendant c i t e s t h r e e a l l e g e d m i s t a k e s by c o u n s e l and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t r i a l , t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f which he c o n t e n d s d e p r i v e d him of a fair trial. W d i s c u s s t h e s e "mistakes" i n t h e o r d e r defene d a n t r a i s e s them on a p p e a l . The f i r s t " m i s t a k e " w a s t h e f a i l u r e by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o remove d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , L a r r y Moran, on d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e submission o f a n a f f i d a v i t by M r . Moran on t h e morning o f t r i a l . This a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d i n e f f e c t t h a t M r . Moran was g e t t i n g no c o o p e r a t i o n from d e f e n d a n t i n t e r m s of p r e p a r i n g a d e f e n s e and would be a b l e t o do l i t t l e a t t r i a l o t h e r than s i t a t the counsel t a b l e . Despite t h i s a f f i d a v i t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t proceeded t o t r i a l , and M r . Moran c o n t i n u e d t o r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t . Defendant c o n t e n d s i t was e r r o r n o t t o remove M r . Moran on d e f e n d a n t ' s objection. W disagree. e It is true that Mr. Moran, by h i s a f f i d a v i t , s t a t e d he would have d i f f i c u l t y i n r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t . Mr. Moran, however, a l s o s t a t e d f o r t h e r e c o r d t h a t he would ". . . p r o c e e d a s f a r a s I am a b l e . I have n e v e r s h i r k e d m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r duty as a public defender. whatever I c a n on b e h a l f of M r . Lopez." I ' l l give By t h i s s t a t e m e n t , M r . Moran i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e would r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t t o t h e b e s t of h i s a b i l i t y i n s p i t e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f u s a l t o c o o p e r a t e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e . M r . Moran was a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e weeks before the t r i a l . A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s l a c k o f communication e x i s t e d throughout t h i s period. Defendant, however, f a i l e d t o r e q u e s t d i f f e r e n t c o u n s e l u n t i l t h e morning of t r i a l . He c o n t i n u e d t o o b j e c t t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l t o having M r . Moran r e p r e s e n t him. "Although t h e a t t o r n e y c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s o r d i n a r i l y a p r i v a t e matter, a defendant does n o t have t h e u n b r i d l e d r i g h t t o d i s c h a r g e couns e l on t h e e v e o f t r i a l . " S t a t e v. Miller, s u p r a , 568 P.2d a t 132. (Citations omitted.) Furthermore, ". . . while t h i s r i g h t t o counsel includes t h e r i g h t of a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t t o have c o u n s e l a p p o i n t e d f o r h i s b e n e f i t f r e e o f c h a r g e t o him i t n e v e r h a s been h e l d t h a t t h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a l s o comprehends a r i g h t o f a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t t o have c o u n s e l o f h i s c h o i c e a p p o i n t e d f o r him. Rather, it i s t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l f o r t h e i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t , and u n l e s s t h e r e i s good c a u s e shown why t h e a p p o i n t ment of a p a r t i c u l a r a t t o r n e y s h o u l d n o t have been made, t h e d e f e n d a n t must a c c e p t t h e a t t o r n e y s e l e c t e d by t h e c o u r t u n l e s s h e waives t h e r i g h t t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n State o f l a w i s s u p p o r t e d by numerous c a s e s . " v. F o r s n e s s , s u p r a , 495 P.2d a t 179. (Citations omitted ) ... . Counsel h e r e d i d t h e b e s t h e c o u l d under t h e circumstances. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t on two o c c a s i o n s e x p r e s s e d c o n f i d e n c e i n M r . Moran's a b i l i t i e s , and a c a r e f u l r e a d i n g of t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e defense provided w a s a d e q u a t e . A p p a r e n t l y M r . Moran f i l e d h i s a f f i d a v i t s o l e l y because defendant r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s defense. I t i s a g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a p a r t y who p a r t i c i p a t e s i n o r c o n t r i b u t e s t o a n e r r o r c a n n o t complain of it. S t a t e v. M i l l e r , 568 P.2d a t 132. i n defendant' s a l l e g a t i o n . W e f i n d no m e r i t The second " m i s t a k e " a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t was twofold. I t i n v o l v e d t h e i n f e r e n c e on two s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s t h a t d e f e n d a n t may have had a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n on h i s r e c o r d The f i r s t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e v o i r d i r e o f t h e j u r y when ". . . d e f e n s e c o u n s e l Moran s t a t e d : T h e r e may be e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e of a p r i o r conviction of t h i s defendant. If t h a t d o e s , i n f a c t , come i n t o e v i d e n c e , w i l l any o f you assume g u i l t i n t h i s c a s e ? " The second o c c u r r e d when t h e S t a t e was a t t e m p t i n g t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o e v i d e n c e d e f e n d a n t ' s glasses. The f o l l o w i n g c o l l o q u y t o o k p l a c e : "BY MR. -- WHITE: (County A t t o r n e y ) "Q. And, may I have t h e g l a s s e s ? Can I borrow them j u s t f o r a second? And, I hand you what h a s been marked S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 6 . Can you i d e n t i f y t h e s e ? A. Yes, these are the glasses which I found i n t h e d i t c h , t h e n . "Q. And, you t o o k them and p l a c e d them i n t h e bag i n which t h e y w e r e c o n t a i n e d ? A. Yes, I did. "Q. T h a t would b e o n l y i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e t h a t t i m e ? A. I m a i l e d them t o t h e S t a t e I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Bureau i n Helena where P h i l Conover checked them f o r f i n g e r p r i n t s , and h e r e t u r n e d them t o m e , and t h e n I m a i l e d them t o t h e S t a t e P r i s o n where t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o i d e n t i f y them, and t h e y r e t u r n e d them t o m e . "MR. WHITE: I would o f f e r i n t o e v i d e n c e S t a t e ' s 6 , y o u r Honor. "MR. MORAN: No o b j e c t i o n , y o u r Honor." Although d e f e n d a n t c o n c e d e s t h a t no a c t u a l e v i d e n c e o f p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s w a s i n t r o d u c e d , h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e above r e f e r ences t o p r i o r convictions w e r e p r e j u d i c i a l . While w e q u e s t i o n t h e p r o p r i e t y o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s v o i r d i r e q u e s t i o n , t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e d o n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d . When t h i s q u e s t i o n was asked, Judge L e s s l e y immediately s t a t e d : " T h e r e w i l l b e no evidence of t h e p r i o r conviction i n t h i s cause." i n d i c a t e s no s u c h e v i d e n c e w a s i n t r o d u c e d . The r e c o r d The jury was instructed that they were to be governed solely by the evidence introduced at trial and the law as stated by the judge. There is nothing here to indicate that the jury disregarded that instruction to defendant's prejudice. Further, there is nothing in the chain of custody colloquy which placed into the record evidence of a prior conviction. The fact that a defendant admittedly has suf- fered a prior felony conviction is not error. These vague references then, if error, are not reversible error; however, we would condemn this kind of tactic in the future. Finally, defendant argues that counsel's failure to object to a self-defense instruction offered by the State deprived him of a fair trial. The instruction stated: "You are instructed that the defense of justifiable use of force or self-defense is an affirmative defense and the defendant has the burden of proving self-defense to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Defendant submits that this instruction is a misstatement of the law and is prejudicial because it appears to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Recently, in State v. Cooper (1979), - Mont. I 589 P.2d 133, 36 St.Rep. 30, this Court reaffirmed the general rule in Montana regarding jury instructions on selfdefense. Quoting State v. Grady (1975), 166 Mont. 168, 531 P.2d 681, we stated: "'The law in Montana is that although the burden of persuasion remains on the State, in order to avail himself of the affirmative defense of selfdefense, the defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence on the issue to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.'" 589 P.2d at 136. In Cooper we tacitly rejected an argument by the Montana County Attorneys Association that a defendant should be r e q u i r e d t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e evidence. Arguments s i m i l a r t o t h e one by d e f e n d a n t h e r e w e r e r e j e c t e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Cooper. Although Cooper d e a l t with a s l i g h t l y milder i n s t r u c t . i o n than t h e one pres e n t e d h e r e , we r e a c h t h e s a m e r e s u l t . A t f i r s t glance defendant appears t o raise a n i s s u e s i m i l a r t o t h a t r a i s e d i n Sandstrom v . Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) , U. , S. 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. This case, however, i s e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Sandstrom w i t h t h e h e l p o f two o t h e r U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c a s e s , P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U . S . L.Ed.2d 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 281, and Leland v . Oregon ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 343 U.S. 790, 72 P a t t e r s o n was concerned w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f b u r d e n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a New York murder t r i a l w i t h p r o v i n g extreme e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r bance a s d e f i n e d by New York law. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court r u l e d t h a t r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s and s t a t e d : ". . . t h e u n i v e r s a l r u l e i n t h i s c o u n t r y was t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n must p r o v e g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e longa c c e p t e d r u l e was t h a t i t was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible t o provide t h a t various affirmative d e f e n s e s w e r e t o be proved by t h e d e f e n d a n t . T h i s d i d n o t l e a d t o s u c h a b u s e s o r t o such wides p r e a d r e d e f i n i t i o n o f c r i m e and r e d u c t i o n of t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s burden t h a t a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Nor d o e s t h e f a c t t h a t a r u l e was r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y o f t h e S t a t e s have now assumed t h e burden o f d i s p r o v i n g a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s - - f o r whate v e r reasons--mean t h a t t h o s e S t a t e s t h a t s t r i k e a d i f f e r e n t b a l a n c e a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Constitution." P a t t e r s o n , 5 3 L.Ed.2d a t 292-93. ... I n Leland t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e o f i n s a n i t y which, by Oregon s t a t e s t a t u t e s , he w a s r e q u i r e d t o prove. One of t h e s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n p r o v i d e d : "'When t h e commission of t h e a c t c h a r g e d a s a c r i m e i s p r o v e n , and t h e d e f e n s e s o u g h t t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h e i n s a n i t y o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e s a m e must be proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt'. . ." 343 U.S. a t 792. The d e f e n d a n t t h e r e a r g u e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i n question, i n e f f e c t , required a defend a n t p l e a d i n g i n s a n i t y t o e s t a b l i s h h i s i n n o c e n c e by d i s p r o v i n g beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t e l e m e n t s of t h e c r i m e n e c e s s a r y t o a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and t h e r e f o r e v i o l a t e d due p r o c e s s of law. To d e t e r m i n e t h e merits of t h i s c h a l l e n g e , t h e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must be viewed i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r r e l e v a n t Oregon l a w and i n i t s p l a c e i n t h e t r i a l of t h e c a s e . On r e v i e w i n g a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e case, t h e C o u r t s t a t e d : ". . . Although a p l e a of i n s a n i t y was made, t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d , i n c l u d i n g , i n t h e c a s e of f i r s t d e g r e e murder, p r e m e d i t a t i o n , d e l i b e r a t i o n , m a l i c e and i n t e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t r e p e a t e d l y emphasized t h i s r e These q u i r e m e n t i n i t s c h a r g e t o t h e jury'. and o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and t h e c h a r g e a s a whole, make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e burden o f proof o f g u i l t , and of a l l t h e n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s o f g u i l t , w a s p l a c e d s q u a r e l y upon t h e S t a t e . A s t h e j u r y was t o l d , t h i s burden d i d n o t s h i f t , b u t r e s t e d upon t h e S t a t e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l , j u s t a s , according t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , a p p e l l a n t was presumed t o be i n n o c e n t u n t i l t h e j u r y w a s convinced beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t he was g u i l t y . The j u r o r s were t o c o n s i d e r s e p a r a t e l y t h e i s s u e of l e g a l s a n i t y p e r se--an i s s u e s e t a p a r t from t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d 343 U.S. a t 794-796. . . . . ." A r e v i e w of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , i n l i g h t of t h e h o l d i n g s i n P a t t e r s o n and Leland, reveals t h a t t h e burden o f proof d i d n o t s h i f t t o d e f e n d a n t . Time and a g a i n t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s presumed t o be i n n o c e n t and t h a t t h e S t a t e must p r o v e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . The c o n t e s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n h e r e , w h i l e worded a l i t t l e s t r o n g e r than t h e self-defense i n s t r u c t i o n t h i s Court favors, d i d n o t have t h e e f f e c t o f s h i f t i n g t h e burden of proof from t h e S t a t e t o t h e defendant. The u s e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t d e p r i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t o f a f a i r t r i a l and f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e representation, While t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t improper i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case, w e r e a f f i r m our holding i n S t a t e v . Cooper, s u p r a , and u r g e t h a t t h e s e l f - d e f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n approved i n t h a t c a s e be used i n a l l c r i m i n a l cases involving an i s s u e of self-defense. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i s whether t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was p r o p e r . Defendant f i r s t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t d o e s n o t comply w i t h a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t o r y law b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r t h e n e e d s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , n o r d o e s i t c o n s i d e r any a s p e c t s o f r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . T h i s c o m p l a i n t i s burdened w i t h t h e s i n s of o m i s s i o n and d o e s n o t d e s e r v e d i s c u s s i o n . Judge L e s s l e y h e l d a d i s - p o s i t i o n a l h e a r i n g and a t t h e o u t s e t t o l d d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e r e would be no r u l e s of e v i d e n c e , e t c . , u n l e s s d e f e n s e o b j e c t e d s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d g e t i n a n y t h i n g t h e y wanted and n o t be hampered by f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . Defendant had c o p i e s o f t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t , p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e p o r t s , and w a s a b l e t o cross-examine t h e a u t h o r of t h e p r e s e n t e n c e report. There were many, many w i t n e s s e s - - l a y , religious--who d o c t o r , and t e s t i f i e d f o r the defendant f o r a t o t a l h e a r i n g of 8 4 pages of t r a n s c r i p t . W e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of any way t h i s h e a r i n g c o u l d have been conducted more f a i r l y . S t a t e v . Metz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , St.Rep. Mont. 1 - P.2d , See 36 (Cause No. 14682, d e c i d e d December 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 ) . Defendant further asserts that he has been convicted of only one violent offense--rape in Missoula in 1969. It is apparent that defendant failed to take into account that he had also been convicted of the present offense--aggravated assault. The District Court's finding was therefore not erroneous. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justice We concur: v4-u?~a, Chief Justice B d Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I would reverse the.judgment and grant a new trial. In doing so, I must state that I would first have to adopt a different standard than the "farce or sham" test which is the rule in this State. A defendant is not simply entitled to counsel, he is entitled to competent counsel. A "farce or sham" test seems to be judged in essence by the mere fact that the defendant had counsel and that his performance did not shock the conscience of the court. The case must be approached from the special circumstances existing here. The prosecuting witness Wiscombe testified that the defendant assaulted him; the defendant testified that he did not assault Wiscornbe, rather, Wiscombe assaulted him, and that was acting in self defense. The remaining physical evidence corroborated neither story. Thus, the jury was presented with a clear question of credibility. Needless to say, the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony, even though the jury did not know what that felony was, could have had a strong impact on the jury. The voir dire question by defense counsel obviously was meant to take the string out of any evidence introduced establishing that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony. And the trial judge's comment in relation to the question by defense counsel served only to emphasize that the defendant did in fact have a previous felony record. The trial court immediately responded to the voir dire question asked by defense counsel: "There will be no evidence of the prior conviction in this cause." (Emphasis added.) Surely the jury knew by this comment of the trial judge that the defendant in fact had a previous conviction. -13- And when t h e w i t n e s s added t h a t t h e g l a s s e s , a l l e g e d t o b e , and e s t a b l i s h e d t o b e t h o s e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , w e r e s e n t t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e j u r y had no d o u b t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had a p r e v i o u s f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n f o r which h e was s e n t t o p r i s o n . They c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h e r e f o r e t h a t i t was most l i k e l y a s e r i o u s o f f e n s e . Under t h e s e circumstances, defense counsel's question, i n conjunction w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s p o n s e and t h e w i t n e s s ' s s t a t e m e n t . ; h a t he had s e n t t h e g l a s s e s t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , c o u l d w e l l have been a n i m p o r t a n t and i n a p p r o p r i a t e f a c t o r i n t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n t o b e l i e v e Wiscombe r a t h e r t h a t t h e defendant. I would, new t r i a l . t h e r e f o r e , r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n and g r a n t a
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