MARRIAGE OF OWEN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 14956 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JAY F. OWEN, Petitioner and Respondent, IDALENE OWEN, a/k/a IDALENE L. OWEN, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson,Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana For Respondent : William F. Meisburger, Forsyth, Montana Submitted on briefs: February 27, 1980 Filed: !jT!C L 5 . - - ?.C!:? * P Decided: APR I - f9@ Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e Rosebud County D i s t r i c t C o u r t , S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , d i s p o s i n g of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s . The p a r t i e s h e r e i n w e r e m a r r i e d on November 30, 1948. A t t h e t i m e of t h e m a r r i a g e t h e husband owned a r a n c h n e a r Ashland, Montana. T h i s r a n c h was s o l d a f t e r t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e and t h e p r o c e e d s used t o a c q u i r e t h e p a r t i e s ' c u r r e n t r a n c h p r o p e r t y from t h e w i f e ' s p a r e n t s . The r a n c h was purchased i n t h e j o i n t names of t h e p a r t i e s i n 1949. During t h e m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s worked t o g e t h e r on t h i s r a n c h . In 1952 a n a d d i t i o n a l 172 a c r e s was p u r c h a s e d a s a n a d d i t i o n t o t h e ranch. A house was b u i l t on t h i s p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e s a m e year. I n March 1978 r e s p o n d e n t husband p e t i t i o n e d f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e . The d i s s o l u t i o n w a s g r a n t e d w i t h o u t c o n t e s t , b u t t h e District Court i n i t s decree reserved t h e property division f o r l a t e r adjudication. on t h i s m a t t e r on A p r i l 1 6 , 1979. T r i a l was h e l d A f t e r making f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment on May 25, 1979, e f f e c t i v e l y r e n d e r i n g a 60/40 p e r c e n t s p l i t o f t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y between t h e husband and w i f e . From t h i s judgment t h e w i f e a p p e a l s . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r r e v i e w a r e a s follows : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n i t s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e husband had c o n t r i b u t e d 60 p e r c e n t and t h e w i f e 40 p e r c e n t t o t h e accumulated m a r i t a l a s s e t s ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by n o t g i v i n g s u f f i c i e n t w e i g h t t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of a p p e l l a n t ? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by a b u s i n g i t s d i s c r e - t i o n i n c o n c l u d i n g , a s a m a t t e r o f law, t h e method o f p u r c h a s e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , o r i n f a i l i n g t o a l l o w a p p e l l a n t t h e b e n e f i t of m e e t i n g a good f a i t h p a r t y p u r c h a s e o f f e r ? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r r e s p o n d e n t ' s d i s s i p a t i o n of a s s e t s ? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o award a t - torney f e e s t o appellant? The s u b s t a n c e of t h i s a p p e a l i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l estate. " I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t has f a r reaching d i s c r e t i o n i n resolving p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s and i t s judgment w i l l n o t be a l t e r e d u n l e s s a c l e a r a b u s e o f t h a t d i s c r e The c r i t e r i a f o r r e v i e w i n g t i o n i s shown. t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i s : Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n a c t a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment of c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment, o r exceed t h e bounds of r e a s o n (Citations i n view of a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " Z e l l v. Z e l l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 496, omitted.) 570 P.2d 33, 35. . . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t i t w a s a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o n l y award h e r 4 0 p e r c e n t of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y i n s t e a d of t h e o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t she sought. She c o n t e n d s t h a t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a homemaker, a s w e l l a s r a n c h hand and handy p e r s o n , when c o u p l e d w i t h r e s p o n d e n t ' s d i s s i p a t i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s , e n t i t l e h e r t o a 50 p e r c e n t s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y . "Although t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y d i v i d e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t Section mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and it v e s t s a good d e a l We of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t have s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t e a c h c a s e must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h a n e y e t o i t s u n i q u e circum" ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) I n R e Marstances. r i a g e of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) r Mont. - 598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525. . . ... .. The d u t y of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a and e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e m a r i t a l assets. To a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , i t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e a g e , o c c u p a t i o n , amount and s o u r c e s o f income, v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , e m p l o y a b i l i t y , e s t a t e , and t h e l i a b i l i t i e s and needs o f e a c h p a r t y . I n R e M a r r i a g e of Aanenson, s u p r a , 598 P.2d a t 1123. W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e r e properly followed t h e d i c t a t e s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The f i n d i n g s of a t r i a l judge w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l where t h e y a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l though c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r p r e p o n d e r a n c e of e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t such findings. - Mont. Cameron v . Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , P.2d 939, 35 S t - R e p . 1723. , 587 Here, t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and t h e e v i dence d o e s n o t p r e p o n d e r a t e a g a i n s t them. The D i s t r i c t Court, t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n apportioning the marital estate. Appellant's next contention e s s e n t i a l l y questions t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n and method of p u r c h a s e of t h e m a r i t a l property. A p p e l l a n t s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e and m a i n t a i n t h e f a m i l y r a n c h and s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s approved t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f a l l o w i n g h e r t o do s o , most r e c e n t l y i n I n R e M a r r i a g e of Jacobson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1183, 36 s t . ~ e p . 1773. , - Mont. - 600 P.2d She a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y and v a l u a t i o n t h e r e o f p r e v e n t h e r from p u r c h a s i n g t h e r a n c h . A c o u r t i n d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e m a r r i a g e i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of a l l p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d during t h e marriage. Kruse v . Kruse ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 586 P.2d 294, 298, 35 St.Rep. 1502. - Mont. The ~ i s t r i c c o u r t d i d t I p r e c i s e l y t h a t here. I t accepted testimony, a l b e i t c o n f l i c t - i n g , a s t o t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y b e f o r e concludWe find that this i n g t h e p r o p e r t y was w o r t h $566,200. procedure w a s not unreasonable. A p p e l l a n t i s c o r r e c t t h a t Montana cases have a c c e p t e d t h e p r e m i s e t h a t a r a n c h o r farm s h o u l d be k e p t i n t a c t and operated a s a u n i t . This policy i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e follow- i n g d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of farming and ranchi n g property: I n R e M a r r i a g e of J a c o b s o n , s u p r a ; I n Re Mar- r i a g e of Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep. 1733; B i e g a l k e v. B i e g a l k e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987; Hunnewell v . Hunnewell ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 125, 500 P.2d " I t must be remembered t h a t t h e p r i m a r y r i g h t t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n d i s p o s i n g of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y i s t h e r i g h t of e a c h p a r t y t o a n e q u i t a b l e apport i o n m e n t o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . While i t i s t h e p o l i c y o f t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e t o a v o i d s p l i t t i n g up a r a n c h o r f o r c i n g i t s s a l e where t h e r e i s any r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t p o l i c y , however commendable, c a n n o t be used t o o v e r r i d e [a p a r t y ' s ] r i g h t t o an e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l property." I n R e M a r r i a g e of J a c o b s o n , s u p r a , 600 P.2d a t 1187-88. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e b o t h p a r t i e s were g i v e n t h e o p t i o n t o buy t h e o t h e r ' s r e s p e c t i v e s h a r e of t h e r a n c h p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e r i g h t be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n s i x months of t h e judgment. O t h e r t h a n t h i s c o n d i t i o n , i t was l e f t up t o t h e p a r t i e s t o r e a c h t h e i r own t e r m s on a p u r c h a s e . W e c a n f i n d no a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s methods. The f i n a l c o n t e n t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o award h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s . S e c t i o n 40-4-110, MCA, provides: "The c o u r t from t i m e t o t i m e , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s of b o t h p a r t i e s , may o r d e r a p a r t y t o pay a r e a s o n a b l e amount f o r t h e c o s t t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y of m a i n t a i n i n g o r defending any proceeding under Chapters 1 and 4 of this title and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceed. ing or after entry of judgment . ." Here the District Court, after considering the financial resources of both parties, determined that each should bear their own legal costs. It was not an abuse of discretion to do so. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justice We concur: Chief ~usti%e w Q 0. & Justices db y -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
