MATTER OF L F G

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 14688 IN THE SUPlU3ME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 . IN THE MATTER OF L.F G. , Youth in Need of Care. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Stephens, Jr. and David Kinnard, Billings, Montana David Kinnard argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Robert Waller argued, Deputy County kttorney, Billings, Montana Damon L. Gannett argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: June 15, 1979 ~ecided :AUG 2 0 Filed: i\u C '. i,*g$$ lgtg J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Mr. c his a p p e a l a r i s e s from a c u s t o d i a l h e a r i n g h e l d o n September 29, 1978, i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h S J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , t h e Honorable R o b e r t H. Wilson p r e s i d i n g . The c a s e was t r i e d o n t h e p e t i t i o n o f t h e Department o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana (SRS) t o have L.F.G. d e c l a r e d t o b e a y o u t h i n need o f care and t o have h i s permanent c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l awarded t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana, w i t h a u t h o r i t y t o c o n s e n t t o adoption. The Y e l l o w s t o n e County a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e a p p e a r e d and p a r t i c i p a t e d a s c o u n s e l f o r SRS. The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s w e r e p r e s e n t a t t h e h e a r i n g and w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , and a p r e v i o u s l y appointed g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m f o r t h e youth a p p e a r e d and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e h e a r i n g a s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e child. Upon c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e m a t t e r was t a k e n u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I t entered findings of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w and o r d e r on O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1978, g r a n t i n g t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d by SRS. Judgment was s u b s e - q u e n t l y e n t e r e d i n a c c o r d a n c e t h e r e w i t h on O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1978. The p a r e n t s o f t h e y o u t h a p p e a l . L.F.G. Montana. R.G. was b o r n on September 29, 1977, i n ~ i l l i n g s , The n a t u r a l p a r e n t s of t h e c h i l d a r e J . C . G . and A t t h e t i m e o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and t h e c h i l d r e s i d e d i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County, Montana. The s o c i a l worker i n t h e c a s e , Martha E v e r e t t , had h e r f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e mother on September 1 9 , 1977, when s h e and h e r mother c o n t a c t e d t h e l o c a l SRS o f f i c e t o l e a r n t h e procedures r e l a t i v e t o t h e r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of t h e m o t h e r ' s t h e n unborn c h i l d . The mother i n d i c a t e d t o E v e r e t t d u r i n g t h e i r i n i t i a l c o n t a c t t h a t she d i d n o t f e e l t h a t "she w a s s t r o n g enough t o t a k e c a r e of a baby." The c h i l d was b o r n t e n d a y s a f t e r t h e m o t h e r ' s i n i t i a l C o n t a c t w i t h t h e s o c i a l worker. f o u r pounds and e l e v e n ounces. A t birth, t h e baby weighed He was normal i n a l l re- s p e c t s , except t h a t h i s b i r t h weight w a s l i g h t f o r a f u l l - t e r m infant. On October 3, 1977, t h e mother informed E v e r e t t t h a t s h e had changed h e r mind a b o u t r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e c h i l d , and t h a t s h e no l o n g e r was i n t e r e s t e d i n having t h e c h i l d placed adoptively. The baby was p l a c e d i n a f o s t e r home on October 5, 1977, w i t h t h e knowledge, u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and consent of t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l parents. A t t h e time of placement i n f o s t e r c a r e , t h e mother i n d i c a t e d t h a t " s h e d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t s h e was p h y s i c a l l y r e a d y f o r t a k i n g c a r e of the child." Mrs. D e l o r e s Smith was t h e f o s t e r p a r e n t who p r o v i d e d t h e primary c a r e f o r t h e baby d u r i n g h i s r e s i d e n c e i n h e r f o s t e r home. The baby remained i n t h e Smith f o s t e r home from October 5 , 1977, u n t i l A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. During t h a t six-month p e r i o d , t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s t o t h e f o s t e r home t o v i s i t h e r child. The purpose of t h e m o t h e r ' s v i s i t s w i t h h e r c h i l d i n t h e f o s t e r home was t o a l l o w h e r v i s i t a t i o n , t o o b s e r v e h e r w i t h t h e c h i l d , and t o a t t e m p t t o t e a c h h e r t h e s k i l l s s h e would need t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d on h i s r e t u r n t o h e r phys i c a l custody. Mrs. Smith was p r e s e n t d u r i n g e a c h o f t h e v i s i t s t h a t t h e mother had w i t h h e r c h i l d . During t h i s s i x - month p e r i o d of f o s t e r c a r e , t h e f a t h e r made one v i s i t t o s e e t h e c h i l d i n t h e Smith home. The mother showed some improvement i n h e r a p p a r e n t a b i l i t y t o c a r e f o r t h e c h i l d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of J a n u a r y t o March 1978. Mrs. Smith i n d i c a t e d , however, t h a t s h e n e v e r r e a l l y h e l d t h e baby p r o p e r l y , and t h a t s h e f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e any a f f e c t i o n o r emotion towards t h e c h i l d . The baby seemed t o c r y more t h a n u s u a l when he was around h i s mother, and t h e mother a p p e a r e d t o be c o n f u s e d and u n c e r t a i n a b o u t what t o d o w i t h t h e c h i l d i n g e n e r a l . Mrs. Smith n e v e r o b s e r v e d any p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t o r i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e c h i l d and h i s f a t h e r d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f f o s t e r c a r e i n h e r home. The baby was r e t u r n e d t o h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s on A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. P r i o r t o t h a t r e t u r n , Martha E v e r e t t had made a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of many s u p p o r t s e r v i c e s t o a s s i s t t h e mother i n h e r c a r e of t h e c h i l d . Homemakers from SRS and a p u b l i c h e a l t h n u r s e made r e g u l a r and f r e q u e n t v i s i t s t o t h e c h i l d and his p a r e n t s . D e s p i t e t h e s e e f f o r t s made t o upgrade t h e m o t h e r ' s c h i l d - c a r i n g s k i l l s , s h e f a i l e d t o l e a r n t h e t h i n g s t h a t s h e was t a u g h t c o n c e r n i n g h e r care of t h e c h i l d . T h e r e was a l s o a n a b s e n c e of p h y s i c a l con- t a c t and p l a y between t h e c h i l d and h i s mother. The p u b l i c h e a l t h n u r s e a l s o o b s e r v e d t h e mother l e a v e t h e baby u n a t t e n d e d on two o c c a s i o n s . The mother a l s o d e s c r i b e d t h e f a t h e r a s having thrown t h e c h i l d i n t o t h e baby c r i b . The c h i l d ' s s i t u a t i o n w i t h h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s began t o deteriorate. According t o t h e homemakers and p u b l i c h e a l t h n u r s e s who were i n t h e home, t h e mother became more d i s t a n t and less c o o p e r a t i v e . F i n a l l y , on May 1 8 , 1978, b a s e d upon t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s and t h e recommendat i o n of a p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . Van Dyke, t h e c h i l d was removed from t h e home o f h i s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and r e t u r n e d t o t h e S m i t h f o s t e r home. A t t h e t i m e of t h e c h i l d ' s r e t u r n t o t h e f o s t e r home, h i s head w a s d i r t y , h i s body was d i r t y , and h i s "little penis was filthy." H e was s u b s e q u e n t l y o b s e r v e d a p p a r e n t l y h a v i n g n i g h t m a r e s and waking up c r y i n g and s h a k i n g . Evidence concerning t h e mother's p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n was p r e s e n t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g . i n November 1977 by D r . 1978. Dr. The m o t h e r had been e v a l u a t e d Ned T r a n e l and a g a i n o n March 21, T r a n e l d i a g n o s e d t h e m o t h e r a s h a v i n g two m a j o r The f i r s t i s t e c h n i c a l l y c l a s s i - psychological disorders. f i e d as s c h i z o p h r e n i c r e a c t i o n , c h r o n i c u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d The second d i s o r d e r was d e s c r i b e d by D r . T r a n e l a s type. b e i n g a n o r g a n i c b r a i n syndrome o r c h r o n i c b r a i n syndrome. Dr. T r a n e l o f f e r e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d should n o t be r e t u r n e d t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e mother was t h e p r i m a r y caretaker f o r the child. The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e : 1. Was t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e c u s t o d y h e a r i n g s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e finding of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t was a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e w i t h i n t h e meaning o f L.F.G. s e c t i o n 41-3-102, 2. MCA? Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n t e r m i n a t i n g t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f R.G., t h e f a t h e r , b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e presented? 3. Was L.F.G. a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e ? The f u n c t i o n o f a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t i n a case s u c h as t h i s o n e h a s been w e l l d e f i n e d i n p r i o r d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s , Mont. - 570 P.2d 1 1 1 0 , 34 Court. I n R e Gore ( 1 9 7 7 ) , St.Rep. 1 1 7 9 , i n v o l v e d a n a p p e a l from a ~ i s t r i c t o u r t C d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i m i l a r t o o n e i n t h e i n s t a n t case. I n de- c i d i n g t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had n o t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n when i t g r a n t e d SRS's p e t i t i o n f o r permanent c u s t o d y , t h i s Court s t a t e d : ". . . This Court i s mindful t h a t t h e primary d u t y of deciding t h e proper custody of c h i l dren i s t h e task of t h e d i s t r i c t court. A s a r e s u l t , a l l reasonable presumptions a s t o t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i l l b e made. F o s s v . L e a f e r , Mont. 550 P.2d 1309, 33 St.Rep. 528 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . Due t o t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be d i s turbed unless t h e r e i s a mistake of l a w o r a f i n d i n g o f f a c t n o t s u p p o r t e d by c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t would amount t o a c l e a r a b u s e o f discretion 5 7 0 P.2d a t 1112, 34 St.Rep. a t 1181-1182. . . ." The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t b e f o r e t h e r u l i n g o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n b e o v e r t u r n e d , i t must b e shown t h a t t h e District Court c l e a r l y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . F o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o f i n d t h a t L.F.G. was a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e , i t had t o f i n d t h a t he was d e p e n d e n t o r s u f f e r i n g from a b u s e o r n e g l e c t . S e c t i o n 41-3-102(4), MCA. S e c t i o n 4 1 - 3 - 1 0 2 ( 2 ) ( a ) and ( b ) , MCA, d e f i n e a b u s e o r n e g l e c t : " ( 2 ) 'Abuse' o r ' n e g l e c t ' means: " ( a ) t h e commission o r o m i s s i o n o f a n y a c t o r a c t s which m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal phys i c a l o r e m o t i o n a l development o f a y o u t h . Any e x c e s s i v e p h y s i c a l i n j u r y ; s e x u a l a s s a u l t , o r f a i l u r e t o t h r i v e , taking i n t o account t h e age and medical h i s t o r y of t h e youth, s h a l l b e presumed t o b e n o n a c c i d e n t a l and t o m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t t h e normal development o f t h e youth. " ( b ) t h e commission o r o m i s s i o n o f a n y a c t o r a c t s by a n y p e r s o n i n t h e s t a t u s o f p a r e n t , g u a r d i a n , o r c u s t o d i a n who t h e r e b y and by reason of p h y s i c a l o r mental i n c a p a c i t y o r o t h e r c a u s e r e f u s e s o r , w i t h s t a t e and p r i v a t e a i d and a s s i s t a n c e , i s u n a b l e t o d i s c h a r g e t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r p r o p e r and necessary subsistence, education, medical, o r a n y o t h e r c a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e y o u t h ' s phys i c a l , m o r a l , and e m o t i o n a l w e l l - b e i n g . " A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e r e w a s a clear a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e e n t r y of i t s findings. A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e h a s d e c l a r e d t h e p o l i c y of t h i s s t a t e f o r a b u s e d and n e g l e c t e d c h i l d r e n i n s e c t i o n 41-3-101(1), MCA, which p r o v i d e s : " ( 1 ) I t i s h e r e b y d e c l a r e d t o be t h e p o l i c y o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o : " ( a ) i n s u r e t h a t a l l y o u t h a r e a f f o r d e d a n adeq u a t e p h y s i c a l and e m o t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t t o promote normal development; " ( b ) compel i n p r o p e r c a s e s t h e p a r e n t o r g u a r d i a n o f a y o u t h t o p e r f o r m t h e m o r a l and l e g a l d u t y owed t o t h e y o u t h ; " ( c ) achieve t h e s e purposes i n a family environment whenever p o s s i b l e ; and " ( d ) p r e s e r v e t h e u n i t y and w e l f a r e o f t h e f a m i l y whenever p o s s i b l e . " Where a c h i l d h a s a l l e g e d l y been a b u s e d o r n e g l e c t e d by h i s natural parents, the State has a c l e a r duty t o protect t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d by means o f a j u d i c i a l h e a r i n g t o determine whether t h e youth i s i n f a c t abused o r n e g l e c t e d . The i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e n a t u r e and s c o p e o f t h i s j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g h a s p r e v i o u s l y been a d d r e s s e d by t h i s C o u r t i n a r e c e n t case, I n t h e M a t t e r o f G u a r d i a n s h i p o f Doney ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Mont. " T h e r e a r e , however, few i n v a s i o n s by t h e s t a t e i n t o t h e p r i v a c y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a r e more extreme than t h a t of depriving a n a t u r a l p a r e n t o f t h e c u s t o d y o f h i s c h i l d r e n . F o r t h i s reason, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c a r e f u l l y enunciated t h e p r o c e d u r e s t h e s t a t e must f o l l o w and t h e f i n d i n g s which t h e c o u r t must make b e f o r e c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d may l e g a l l y b e t a k e n from h i s n a t u r a l parent. " T h i s c a r e f u l p r o t e c t i o n of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s i s n o t merely a m a t t e r of l e g i s l a t i v e grace, b u t i s constitutionally required. S t a n l e y v. I l l i n o i s , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 3 1 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) ." The p r o v i s i o n s mandated by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e r e l a t i v e t o r e q u i r e d p r o c e d u r e and f i n d i n g s by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n c a s e s of a l l e g e d abuse o r n e g l e c t are set f o r t h i n several pertinent statutes. i n pertinent part: S e c t i o n 41-3-404, MCA, provides " ( 1 ) I n a h e a r i n g on a p e t i t i o n u n d e r 41-3-401, t h e c o u r t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r --- t h i s s a i d you a n a b u s e d , n e g l e c t e d , o r d e p e n d e n t c h i l d , and a s c e r t a i n , a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h e cause thereof. (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) S e c t i o n 41-3-406, MCA, " then c l e a r l y s t a t e s i n p a r t : " ( 1 ) I f a y o u t h i s found t o be a b u s e d , n e g l e c t e d , o r d e p e n d e n t , t h e c o u r t may e n t e r i t s judgment making any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s t o p r o t e c t t h e w e l f a r e of t h e youth: " ( b ) T r a n s f e r l e g a l c u s t o d y t o any o f t h e f o l l o w ing: " ( i )Department o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Services. " A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e s e s t a t u t e s make i t c l e a r t h a t a f i n d i n g o f a b u s e , n e g l e c t , o r dependency i s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o any c o u r t o r d e r e d t r a n s f e r of custody, c i t i n g In t h e Matter of F i s h (1977), Mont . I 569 P.2d 924, 927, 34 S t - R e p . 1080; Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1113, 34 St.Rep. 10. a t 1183; Doney, 570 P.2d 577, 34 St.Rep. a t 1109- A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e i t i s t h e n , and o n l y t h e n , t h a t t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d " standard s o w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s C o u r t h a s i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e q u e s t i o n of custody. 1184; Doney, Gore, 570 P.2d a t 1 1 1 4 , 34 St.Rep. 570 P.2d a t 578, 34 St.Rep. a t 1110. at Thus, b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may c o n s i d e r what t h e " b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d " may i n f a c t b e , t h e c o u r t must have found t h a t t h e c h i l d i n q u e s t i o n was i n f a c t a b u s e d o r n e g l e c t e d p u r s u a n t t o s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n i n s e c t i o n 41-3102(2), MCA. T h i s e l e m e n t c a n n o t be s a t i s f i e d by a m e r e r e c i t a t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t it f i n d s t h e c h i l d i n q u e s t i o n t o be a b u s e d o r n e g l e c t e d ; t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t must c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s u c h a f i n d i n g . With this standard in mind, we have reviewed the evidence presented to the District Court as it fits into the general guidelines established by this Court in recent decisions regarding abused and neglected youths. The child here was placed in the family home for a period of only five weeks. During this time, the family was subject to the daily supervision of welfare department personnel. The public health nurse, the personnel of the welfare department, and a neighbor, all had the opportunity to observe the child in the parents' home, and all agreed that during their observations he appeared to be well-fed, well-clothed, and clean. In addition, during this period there were no signs of physical abuse, and the child appeared to have no learning disabilities or behavior problems in the home, nor was he left alone for extensive periods of time without supervision. On the basis of the above facts, appellants endeavor to distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in several cases involving physical abuse and neglect of a child justifying the termination of parental custody. In addition, appellants endeavor to distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in several cases in which the mental condition of one or both parents was a factor considered by the court together with other environmental factors justifying the termination of parental custody. the Matter of T.E.R. (1979), Mont . 1117, 36 St.Rep. 276; In the Matter of J.J.S. , Mont. Mont. , In 590 P. 2d (1978), 577 P.2d 378, 35 St.Rep. 394; In re Moyer (1977), , 567 P.2d 47, 34 St.Rep. 682; In re Matter of Bessette (1976), 170 Mont. 122, 551 P.2d 653; In re Henderson (1975), 168 Mont. 329, 542 P.2d 1204. Appellants contend that a review of the evidence presented at the hearing presents the contrary view, i.e., that the child suffered no adverse effects from his mother's mental condition, and that he was in fact well cared for. his, they claim, is the distinguishing factor from the other Montana cases previously cited. The mental condition of the mother standing alone, according to appellants, was apparently found by the District Court to be the sole basis for termination of parental rights, without a finding of the relationship between the mental condition and any alleged detriment to the child. A review of Montana case law reveals no decisions in which the mental condition of one or both parents was the sole factor considered by the court. Other jurisdictions, however, have considered this factor and some have arrived at a different conclusion than that reached by the District Court herein. Appellants cite a minority view of Mr. Justice Murphy in a 1972 termination of parental rights case from New York. While we do not wish to disagree with our Irish brother in New York, we find that relying on a minority view in making our decision as to what the law is to be in this State, while enlightening, is not persuasive. The majority found that under the New York Family Court Act, Section 1012(f), that the record amply supported a finding of neglect in that the child is "in eminent danger of becoming impaired." The court noted that a child living with a chronic paranoid and severely psychotic schizophrenic mother is in eminent danger of becoming physically and emotionally impaired. That is the situation the trial judge faced here, and we do not find fault with his judgment. Appellants go on to discuss several cases from other jurisdictions to substantiate their position on mental conditions as the sole factor in a case involving parental rights. , See, In Interest of E. v. J.T. (1978), Utah2d 578 P. 2d 831; In the Matter of Anderson (1978), 35 0r.App. 561, 582 P.2d 3 2 ; In the Matter of Wyatt (1978), 34 0r.App. 793, 579 P.2d 889; In the Matter of Fisher (1976), 169 Mont. 254, 545 P.2d 654; In the Matter of J.J.S., supra. As these cases discuss, one of the controlling criteria to be considered is, what are the possibilities of damage to the child? What we have before us here is a case not of possibilities, but of high probabilities, and in such a case, the child's future must be paramount. In the Matter of J.J.S., As we noted in 577 P.2d at 381, 35 St.Rep. at 397: .. ". What is, or what is not, the best interests of the child depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The responsibility of deciding custody is a delicate one that is lodged in the District Court. The judge hearing oral testimony in such a controversy has a superior advantage in determining the same, and his decision ought not to be disturbed except under a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.]" Dr. Tranel testified that because of the mother's combination of a schizophrenic mental illness and organic brain damage, there existed a condition of material deprivation known as "mask deprivation." This condition exists where there is no emotional responsiveness to the child, but this failure to "mother" the child is masked by the fact that the parent is physically present. He further testified that the mother would not be able to respond to the most basic emotional needs of the child because of her mental condition. Dr. Tranel stated that while it was possible that the mother's condition could be stabilized at its present level, it was unrealistic to expect any improvement. Dr. T r a n e l concluded t h a t i f t h e c h i l d was r e t u r n e d t o t h e mother, he would n o t r e c e i v e even m i n i m a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y m a t e r n a l c a r e and would be exposed t o " e x t r e m e l y h i g h " c h a n c e s of d e v e l o p i n g a m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e mother. W e f i n d t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o sup- p o r t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t t h e c h i l d was a y o u t h i n need o f c a r e . of d i s c r e t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e h a s been no a b u s e I n removing t h e c h i l d permanently from t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s a c t i n g i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d as i t was bound t o do. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s c a s e had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o view t h e t e s t i m o n y o f J . C . G . , and was j u s t i f i e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c h i l d w a s a y o u t h i n need of c a r e . I t is i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t h a t he n o t be r e t u r n e d t o t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s b u t placed f o r adoption. The a t t o r n e y f o r t h e y o u t h s u p p o r t s t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and t h e S t a t e on t h i s i s s u e . A p p e l l a n t s n e x t c o n t e n d t h a t i n t h e t r i a l of t h i s m a t t e r R.G., t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , played an i n s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e evidence presented t o t h e c o u r t regarding t h e c a p a c i t y and c a p a b i l i t i e s of R.G. and J . C . G . a s parents. T h i s p r o c e e d i n g f o c u s e d p r i m a r i l y on a l l e g a t i o n s o f m e n t a l i n c a p a b i l i t i e s on t h e p a r t of t h e mother. ~ u r i n gt h e p r o - c e e d i n g s , t h e f a t h e r w a s mentioned o n l y i n p a s s i n g on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , and a t no t i m e d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s was t h e r e any s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t made t o i n q u i r e i n t o h i s capab i l i t i e s as a parent. A p p e l l a n t s c o n t e n d t h a t t h i s l a c k of d i s c u s s i o n r e q u i r e s a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e termination proceedings i n l i g h t of a r e c e n t d e c i s i o n made a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f judgment i n t h e c a s e h e r e . In the Matter o f T.E.R. (1979), supra. I n t h a t c a s e , t h e Court d i r e c t e d i t s e l f t o e x a c t l y t h i s i s s u e f o r what was a p p a r e n t l y t h e f i r s t t i m e , and found an i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s of t h e o t h e r p a r e n t : "However, a c a r e f u l r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e v e a l t h a t t h e y o u t h c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y cons i d e r e d t h e r i g h t s o f T . E . R . ' s motion i n awardt o SRS w i t h i n g permanent c u s t o d y o f T.E.R. a u t h o r i t y t o consent t o her adoption. I n addit i o n t o t h e r i g h t s a s a c o u p l e , p a r e n t s may have i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r children. The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e rev e a l s t h a t t h e mother's r i g h t s w e r e afforded no more t h a n s u p e r f i c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Theref o r e , t h e o r d e r o f t h e youth c o u r t i s v a c a t e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o T.E.R. ' s mother, and t h e c a s e i s remanded t o t h e y o u t h c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r proceedings t o determine t h e f u t u r e s t a t u s of t h e mother's p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . " 590 P.2d a t 1 1 2 1 , 36 I n t h e Matter of T.E.R., St.Rep. a t 281. A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t i n l i g h t o f t h i s d e c i s i o n and t h e i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s a s a p a r e n t h e r e i n , t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and remanded, i f f o r no o t h e r r e a s o n t h a n t h i s i n a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n p r i o r t o p a r e n t a l termination. The S t a t e and t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e y o u t h c o n t e n d t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e f a t h e r were c o n s i d e r e d . They a r g u e t h a t t h e f a t h e r was s e r v e d w i t h n o t i c e of t h e h e a r i n g , was p r e s e n t a t t h e h e a r i n g , and had a c o u r t a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y t o r e p r e sent his interests. Dr. Tranel t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e f a t h e r would n o t be a b l e t o p r o v i d e enough i n f l u e n c e t o o f f s e t t h e marked d e p r i v a t i o n d e s c r i b e d above, n o r i n f a c t , would anyone be a b l e t o do s o . In addition, t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t t h e f a t h e r made no e f f o r t t o a s s i s t t h e mother i n l e a r n i n g t o become a good p a r e n t . He v i s i t e d t h e f o s t e r home o n l y o n c e w h i l e t h e mother made 38 v i s i t s . The homemaker who t e s t i f i e d r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r n e v e r a s s i s t e d t h e mother i n l e a r n i n g p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s and was, i n fact, a distraction. hearing. The f a t h e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e The mother r e p o r t e d t o t h e homemaker t h a t t h e f a t h e r had a b u s e d t h e baby by t h r o w i n g him i n t o t h e c r i b . W e b e l i e v e t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s r i g h t s w e r e a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d p r i o r t o t e r m i n a t i o n and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e them i s s u p p o r t e d by c r e d i b l e evidence. The f i n d i n g s o f f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur: %44?w* Chief J u s t i c e

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.