STATE v PATTON
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No. 14482 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 STATE OF YONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsTER-RANCE DWAYNE PATTON, Defendant and Appellant. O R D E R Counsel for the Appellant, having filed a Motion To Strike, and good cause appearing therefrom; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the names of the minor children contained in this Court's opinion of September 11, 1979 be stricken from such opinion. DATED this %j7@. day of Axn,kKy&\ ,1379. No. 14482 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsTERRANCE DWAYNE PATTON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Greg Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana James Masar, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: - i 2 --2 !$Tz $E September 11, 1979 - 3E? 5 1979 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction after a jury verdict for sexual assault in the Third Judicial District, County of Powell. Defendant was charged by information with two counts of sexual assault in violation of section 45-5-502, MCA. each charge, defendant pleaded not guilty. To Trial by jury commenced on February 27, 1978, and resulted in a hung jury on the first count and a finding of guilty on the second. On April 27, 1978, the Honorable Robert J. Boyd sentenced defendant to twenty years' imprisonment in the state prison. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction on the second count of sexual assault. At the time of the incidents giving rise to the charges, defendant was 41 years of age. The complaining witness was 13 years of age and lived next door to defendant and was a frequent visitor at defendant's residence. Count I charged the defendant with sexual contact with the prosecutrix on December 17, 1977, at defendant's residence. Regarding this first incident, the prosecutrix testified that she went to defendant's residence to return a fish net. Defendant was alone at the time, and he invited her to stay and watch television, which she declined to do. The prosecutrix testified that defendant grabbed her by the arm, dragged her into his living room, forced her down on a couch, and assaulted her. She was able to break away from defendant and ran out the door. Defendant denied all of the foregoing, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on this charge. Defendant was convicted on the second charge, which stems from an incident occurring on January 21, 1978, in a g a r a g e s h a r e d by d e f e n d a n t and t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s f a t h e r . The p r o s e c u t r i x t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was i n t h e g a r a g e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9:00 t o 10:OO p.m. l o o k i n g f o r a cookbook when d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d t h e g a r a g e , t u r n e d o f f t h e l i g h t and s h u t t h e door. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t grabbed h e r and pushed h e r a g a i n s t a bench, f o r c e a b l y lowered h e r p a n t s and h i s own and u n s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t e m p t e d t o have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h h e r , t o u c h i n g h e r b r e a s t s and t o u c h i n g between h e r l e g s w i t h h i s hand. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e managed t o g e t away from d e f e n d a n t and p u t h e r p a n t s on and t h a t h e r f a t h e r opened t h e g a r a g e d o o r and t u r n e d on t h e l i g h t as s h e was a b o u t t o go o u t t h e d o o r . The f a t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he opened t h e p a r t i a l l y opened g a r a g e d o o r , t u r n e d on t h e l i g h t s and o b s e r v e d h i s d a u g h t e r walking toward t h e door and d e f e n d a n t s t a n d i n g by t h e bench i n s i d e t h e g a r a g e . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he a s k e d h e r what was g o i n g on s h e d i d n o t r e p l y ; s h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e r e p l i e d " n o t h i n g " b e c a u s e s h e was embarrassed. Defendant's testimony w a s t h a t he e n t e r e d t h e garage t o g e t a g r e a s e gun w i t h o u t t u r n i n g on t h e l i g h t s b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t l i g h t from t h e l i g h t s i n h i s r e s i d e n c e coming t h r o u g h t h e window, t h a t h e saw t h e p r o s e c u t r i x who s a i d h e l l o t o him and t h a t a s he was l e a v i n g t h e g a r a g e , h e r f a t h e r came i n . H e d e n i e d t h a t he e v e r touched o r a s s a u l t e d the prosecutrix. Before t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y f i l e d a motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s any t e s t i m o n y by two proposed p r o s e c u t i o n witnesses regarding an a l l e g e d previous i n c i d e n t of sexual c o n t a c t between t h e d e f e n d a n t and a n o t h e r a p p a r e n t l y underaged female: "COMES NOW the defendant through his attorney and moves in limine that the testimony of prosecution ..a + &+ -M relating to an alwitness G lesed prior criminal act of the Defendant against G M be suppressed on the grounds that such testimony would be wholly irrelevant or that if at all relevant for any purpose the prejudicial effect of such testimony outweighs its probative value in light of the actual need of the prosecution to introduce it." The following colloquy took place in chambers: "THE COURT: Let the record show the following motions are held in chambers and outside the presence of the jury panel. Mr. Boggs? "MR. BOGGS: Your Honor, I would like to file the defendant's motion in limine for suppression of certain evidence, copies of which have been previously served on Mr. Masar and I also have for filing on behalf of Mr. Masar a memorandum in opposition to that motion. "THE COURT: Let the record show that the matter was presented by way of oral argument in chambers on Friday of last week at which time the Court considered the testimony and its provative [sic] value and concluded that the motion for suppression should be granted. In granting the motion I intend in no way to restrict the State from any proper rebuttal matters which may arise in the course of the defense of the case. "MR. MASAR: For clarification, your Honor, I would ask -- it is my understanding that the motion in limine restricts any testimony by the two named witnesses, the MI children, as opposed to any testimony with reference to those children? "THE COURT: That is correct. "MR. MASAR: Is that all, Mr. Boggs? "MR. BOGGS: That is all at this time." It is evident from this exchange that defendant's motion was by granted and that this ruling precluded any testimony - the two named prosecution witnesses. It did not preclude all to testimony whatsoever with reference - those witnesses. Defendant's attorney made no objection to the scope of this ruling, or any objection whatsoever at this time. Neither of the two proposed State's witnesses testified at trial. During t h e examination of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , the State b r o u g h t o u t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had o f f e r e d h e r a s w e a t e r - s u i t i n r e t u r n f o r s e x u a l f a v o r s and t o l d h e r t h a t i f s h e d i d n o t " who had a l r e a d y s u b m i t , h e would g i v e i t t o "O p e r f o r m e d s u c h a n a c t w i t h him: "Q. And h e o f f e r e d you t h e s w e a t e r . Did he e v e r make s u g g e s t i o n s you c o u l d n ' t g e t t h e s w e a t e r o r you w o u l d n ' t r e c e i v e t h e s w e a t e r ? A. H e would s a y t h a t h e t r i e d w i t h a n o t h e r , which i s -- I d o n ' t know, and girl, G t h e n -"Q. T h a t was 6c I ? A. Yes. And i f I w o u l d n ' t go up i n t h e camper, h e c o u l d g i v e because G did [it] t h e s u i t t o rJ,' o n c e w i t h him." Defendant's counsel d i d n o t o b j e c t t o any of t h e f o r e going questions o r testimony. presented, t h e s h e r i f f was c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d and a s k e d i f t h e name "G prosecutrix, 29 . A f t e r t h i s t e s t i m o n y was " was mentioned i n a s t a t e m e n t g i v e n by t h e t o which h e r e p l i e d " y e s " and i d e n t i f i e d - - ( ; - D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l made no o b j e c t i o n t o a n y q u e s - t i o n s asked of t h e s h e r i f f . The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o exclude evidence of a l l e g e d p r i o r unlawful a c t s of t h e defendant c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e error. The c h a l l e n g e d e v i d e n c e i s t e s t i m o n y by t h e p r o s e - c u t r i x on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , s e t f o r t h a b o v e , a s t o a s t a t e m e n t made t o h e r by d e f e n d a n t t h a t h e had had s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h "G ," a n o t h e r underaged female. Defen- d a n t contends t h a t t h i s evidence i s i n a d m i s s i b l e under Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) , Mont.R.Evid., a s e v i d e n c e o f a n o t h e r c r i m e , and t h a t h i s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o it a t t r i a l does n o t p r e c l u d e a p p e l l a t e review because h i s motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s p r e s e r v e d t h e o b j e c t i o n and b e c a u s e t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s t e s t i m o n y was " p l a i n e r r o r . " ÿ he first. p r o c e d u r a l a s p e c t of t h i s a p p e a l w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d Defendant made no o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l t o t h e t e s t i m o n y upon which t h i s a p p e a l i s based. There c a n be no d o u b t t h a t a D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l n o t be p u t i n e r r o r where i t was n o t accorded an opportunity t o c o r r e c t i t s e l f . ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 216, 223, 419 P.2d 300. S t a t e v. Walker The a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e t o which no o b j e c t i o n i s made c a n n o t be reviewed on a p p e a l . S t a t e v. Armstrong ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 296, 562 P.2d 1129, 1132; S t a t e v. D i l l o n ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 1 2 5 Mont. 24, 30, 230 P.2d 764. The f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o o r t o move t o s t r i k e t e s t i m o n y p r e c l u d e s o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l . S t a t e v. C r i p p s (1978) , Mont. , 582 P.2d 312, 317, 35 St.Rep. 967. Notwithstanding h i s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t t o t h e testimony a t t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s p r e s e r v e d h i s o b j e c t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s of a p p e a l , c i t i n g c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I t i s not necessary f o r t h i s C o u r t t o d e c i d e whether o r n o t t h i s r u l e a p p l i e s i n Montana, b e c a u s e i t h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e f a c t s i n t h e present case. Although d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was a p p r i s e d o f , and r u l e d a g a i n s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n a t t h e t i m e i t c o n s i d e r e d t h e motion i n l i m i n e t o s u p p r e s s , s o a s t o make any o b j e c t i o n a t t h e time o f t r i a l f u t i l e , t h i s c o n t e n t i o n i s n o t b o r n e o u t by t h e r e c o r d . Defendant's motion r e q u e s t e d o n l y t h a t t h e c o u r t s u p p r e s s any t e s t i m o n y by t h e two proposed p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s . T h i s motion w a s g r a n t e d , and t h e two w i t n e s s e s d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t r i a l . In t h e exchange which t o o k p l a c e i n chambers a t t h e t i m e o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e motion, s e t f o r t h above, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made i t c l e a r t h a t i t s o r d e r d i d n o t p r e c l u d e -- a l l t e s t i m o n y whatsoever w i t h r e f e r e n c e - t h e two proposed to prosecution witnesses, only testimony - those witnesses. by Defendant's attorney did not object or give any indication that he opposed the scope of this ruling. Defendant's second argument is that the alleged error committed by the District Court is reviewable under the "plain error" doctrine which is contained in the following statute: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall (Emphasis added.) The sheriff was asked on direct examination if he had " was, whereupon he replied been able to determine who "G "yes" and provided her last name. object to this testimony. The defendant did not He now asserts that it could only be based on secondhand knowledge, i.e., the statements of the victim, and that it was hearsay evidence which precluded cross-examination and deprived defendant of his constitutional right to confrontation. Therefore, defendant con- tends, it should be reviewable under the plain error doctrine as enacted by statute, despite defendant's failure to object at trial. These contentions are without merit. The sheriff's testimony was not hearsay as defined in Rule 801(c), Mont.R.Evid., and defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right of confrontation. There was no plain error which would justify this Court's review of the matter. Although evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., there is an exception which makes such evidence admissible for the purpose of proving intent. , Rule 404 (b), Mont. R. ~ v i d . provides: "Evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, o r a c t s i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o prove t h e c h a r a c t e r of a p e r son i n o r d e r t o show t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y I t m a y , however, be a d m i s s i b l e f o r therewith. o t h e r p u r p o s e s , such a s p r o o f o f m o t i v e , opport u n i t y , i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , knowledge, i d e n t i t y , o r absence of mistake o r accident." ( ~ m ~ h a s added. ) is T h i s r u l e of e v i d e n c e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r Montana c a s e law: "The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t e v i d e n c e o f c r i m e s o t h e r t h a n t h e o n e f o r which a d e f e n d a n t i s on t r i a l i s not admissible, but t o t h i s general r u l e t h e r e a r e e x c e p t i o n s , and one i s where e v i d e n c e i s m a t e r i a l a s t e n d i n g t o show t h e i n t e n t o r m o t i v e of t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e comm i s s i o n of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he i s on t r i a l , t h e f a c t t h a t it a n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g -------l s o t e n d s t o p r o v e t h e commission - - - a n o t h e r o f f e n s e . " by him of S t a t e v. H o l l o w e l l ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 343, 349, 256 P. 380, 382. (Emphasis a d d e d . ) The o f f e n s e of s e x u a l a s s a u l t w i t h which t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c h a r g e d r e q u i r e d proof t h a t he knowingly made s e x u a l c o n t a c t f o r t h e purpose o f arousing o r g r a t i f y i n g t h e sexual d e s i r e of e i t h e r p a r t y . "A p e r s o n who knowingly s u b j e c t s a n o t h e r n o t h i s spouse t o any s e x u a l c o n t a c t w i t h o u t cons e n t commits t h e o f f e n s e of s e x u a l a s s a u l t . " S e c t i o n 45-5-502, MCA. " ' S e x u a l c o n t a c t ' means any t o u c h i n g of t h e sexual o r o t h e r i n t i m a t e p a r t s of t h e person of a n o t h e r f o r t h e purpose of a r o u s i n g o r g r a t i f y i n g t h e s e x u a l d e s i r e s of e i t h e r p a r t y . ' Sect i o n 45-2-101 ( 5 4 ) , MCA. Due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e S t a t e must p r o v e e v e r y e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e a s t h a t o f f e n s e i s d e f i n e d by s t a t e law. P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 I n re Winship U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. Cooper ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 30, 32. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d Mont. , 368; S t a t e v . 589 P.2d 133, 135, 36 St.Rep. T h e r e f o r e , t h e e l e m e n t of i n t e n t was i n i s s u e a s a m a t t e r of l a w . T h i s was n o t changed by t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n - d a n t c o m p l e t e l y d e n i e d committing t h e a c t s , r a t h e r t h a n admitting the acts but denying that he had the requisite intent as in State v. Jensen (1969), 153 Mont. 233, 238, 455 P.2d 631, where a chiropractor was convicted of a similar sexual offense after defending on the grounds that his acts with the prosecutrix were for the purpose of treatment. The question then becomes one of whether or not the testimony of the prosecutrix is relevant to the issue of intent, and whether or not its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rationale underlying Rule 404(b) and prior case law is that the evidence of other crimes generally should be excluded because it is irrelevant to the offense charged and highly prejudicial, and because the defendant may not be prepared to meet the extraneous charges. State v. Tiedemann (1961), 139 Mont. 237, 242, 362 P.2d 529; State v. Merritt (1960), 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683, 684; State v. Jensen, supra. In the present case, the challenged testimony was relevant because defendant's statements to the prosecutrix regarding the sweater and his sexual relations with "Glenda" were evidence of his sexual desire for the prosecutrix and his intention to gratify it. This testimony was not offered to establish that defendant had committed other crimes; it was offered to prove that before he forceably assaulted her, defendant had verbally attempted to seduce the complaining witness. This being so, it was not crucial that the State demonstrate "similarity of crimes or acts, nearness in time, and tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or system," to establish the relevance of the evidence of defendant's other crimes. Jensen, 153 Mont. at 239, 455 P.2d at 633. State v. Tiedemann (1961), 139 Mont. 237, 362 P.2d 529, relied on by defendant, is clearly distinguishable. In Tiedemann t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h a t t e m p t e d r a p e o f a 16 year o l d g i r l . During c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , the prosecutor was a l l o w e d t o q u e s t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n c e r n i n g a p r i o r s t a t e m e n t i n which h e a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had been warned a b o u t g o i n g o u t w i t h g i r l s u n d e r t h e a g e o f 1 8 and t h a t h e c o u l d have been c h a r g e d w i t h s t a t u t o r y r a p e i n a n o t h e r i n c i d e n t . This w a s c l e a r l y an attempt t o introduce evidence of o t h e r l i k e crimes h a v i n g n o r e l e v a n c e t o t h e c a s e b e i n g t r i e d and was p r o p e r l y condemned by t h i s C o u r t . Defendant's f i n a l contention i s t h a t t h e testimony, e v e n i f i t was r e l e v a n t , s h o u l d n o t b e r e c e i v e d b e c a u s e i t s p r e j u d i c i a l n a t u r e f a r outweighed a n y p r o b a t i v e v a l u e . 403, Mont.R.Evid., provides: Rule "Although r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may b e e x c l u d e d i f i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y o u t w e i g h e d by t h e d a n g e r o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e . . ." r u l e h a s a p p l i c a t i o n t o e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r crimes: This "The D i s t r i c t Court a s w e l l a s t h i s Court, i s o b l i g a t e d t o look v e r y c a r e f u l l y a t t h e r e l a t i v e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e of t h e e v i dence of o t h e r o f f e n s e s . . . and weigh t h i s a g a i n s t t h e p r e j u d i c e i n h e r e n t i n t h i s t y p e of evidence i n l i g h t of t h e a c t u a l need t o i n t r o d u c e s u c h e v i d e n c e by t h e S t a t e . " State v . S k i n n e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. The 58, 64, 515 P.2d 81, 84. testimony i n t h i s c a s e , while having t o do w i t h a n o t h e r c l a i m e d v i c t i m o f d e f e n d a n t , was a c o n v e r s a t i o n c r e d i t e d t o defendant while i n t h e a c t of seduction of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x h e r e and was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t u i t i o n i n the matter. T h i s C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d a d i s t i n c t i o n between t e s t i mony t h a t t e n d s t o p r o v e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t committed a n u n r e l a t e d crime and t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d h e committed s u c h a n o f f e n s e . S t a t e v . C o l l i n s (19781, , Mont. 582 P.2d 1179, 35 S t - R e p . 993, 998. The l a t t e r may b e a d m i s s i b l e a s " r e l e v a n t a s a p a r t o f t h e whole f a c t u a l situation." C o l l i n s , 35 St.Rep. a t 998. Such was t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e present case. The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . /. 'i ; w z / Justice W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e
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