STATE v NELSON
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No. 14848 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1979 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , VS . MARK T O A NELSON, H M S D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: F i s h e r and E r i c k s o n , W h i t e f i s h , Montana L e i f B. E r i c k s o n a r g u e d , W h i t e f i s h , Montana H . L. G a r n a a s , M i s s o u l a , Montana Hash, J e l l i s o n , O ' B r i e n and B a r t l e t t , K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Mary B. T r o l a n d a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Ted Lympus, County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana S u b m i t t e d : November 8 , 1979 Filed: ccc Decided: 4 IW. bC 1 4 T 7979 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . ~efendant was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d i n t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f t h e t S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d , w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t . During h i s a r r a i g n m e n t , defendant pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e charge. The p l e a was accepted a t a l a t e r hearing held t o determine t h e f a c t s which w e r e t h e b a s i s of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . Subsequently, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e mandatory minimum two-year s e n t e n c e p r o v i s i o n o f s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, a p p l i e d , and t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e mandatory two-year s e n t e n c e found i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA, had n o t been m e t . A s e n t e n c e o f twenty y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , w i t h a l l b u t t h r e e y e a r s suspended, w a s imposed. Defendant t h e n f i l e d a n a p p e a l from t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e mandatory minimum two-year s e n t e n c e a p p l i e d i n h i s case. Thereafter, defendant f i l e d a motion w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u e s t i n g l e a v e t o w i t h draw h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and e n t e r a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y . s e n t e n c e imposed. T h i s motion was d e n i e d and Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e judgment. On September 1 7 , 1978, t h e d a t e o f t h e a s s a u l t , d e f e n d a n t began d r i n k i n g e a r l y i n t h e day. H e w a s d e p r e s s e d due t o a f i g h t w i t h h i s g i r l f r i e n d and d u r i n g t h e day, he consumed a p p r o x i m a t e l y one p i n t of 100-proof vodka and some p r e s c r i p t i o n s l e e p i n g p i l l s w h i l e o n l y e a t i n g a hamburger. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s combination of a l c o h o l , d r u g s and l a c k o f f o o d , d e f e n d a n t became i n t o x i c a t e d . Sometime d u r i n g t h e morning d e f e n d a n t was informed t h a t a 9mm a u t o m a t i c p i s t o l he had l o a n e d t o a f r i e n d had been r e t u r n e d t o t h e f r i e n d ' s house. H e went t o h i s f r i e n d ' s house t o r e c o v e r t h e p i s t o l and i t s a c c e s s o r i e s , which i n c l u d e d a 1 4 - s h o t c l i p and a s h o u l d e r h o l s t e r . For ease i n c a r r y i n g t h e p i s t o l , h e p u t t h e s h o u l d e r h o l s t e r on and p l a c e d t h e p i s t o l i n it. L a t e r t h a t morning he l o a d e d t h e c l i p and went o u t t o t a k e t a r g e t p r a c t i c e . During t h i s p r a c t i c e he f i r e d t h r e e o r f o u r s h o t s and t h e n p l a c e d t h e Apparently, t h e p i s t o l w a s s t i l l i n weapon i n t h e h o l s t e r . a cocked p o s i t i o n when i t w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e h o l s t e r . A f t e r t h e t a r g e t p r a c t i c e defendant drove t o h i s trailer home l o c a t e d on L a S a l l e Road a c r o s s from a C i r c l e K s t o r e t o t a k e a nap. He s l e p t u n t i l l a t e a f t e r n o o n and upon waking, decided t o call h i s g i r l f r i e n d . Having no phone i n h i s t r a i l e r , he walked a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t t o t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e t o make t h e c a l l . H e w a s still carrying the p i s t o l i n the shoulder h o l s t e r . By t h e t i m e d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e , i t had become d a r k . A s h e w a s r e c r o s s i n g L a S a l l e Road t o r e t u r n t o h i s t r a i l e r , a p i c k u p t r u c k approached t r a v e l i n g s o u t h . At t h i s p o i n t t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r i n g v e r s i o n s o f t h e f a c t s t h a t occurred. The f i r s t v e r s i o n i s t h a t of t h e d r i v e r of t h e p i c k u p t r u c k , Harold K e l l e r . Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s d r i v i n g h i s p i c k u p s o u t h on L a S a l l e Road n e a r t h e C i r c l e K when a man, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s d e f e n d a n t , wandered a c r o s s t h e street i n f r o n t of h i s truck. Keller s t o p p e d h i s t r u c k t o a l l o w t h e man t o c r o s s i n f r o n t of him. K e l l e r maintains d e f e n d a n t w a s s w e a r i n g and waving h i s arms and pounded on t h e hood o f t h e v e h i c l e . K e l l e r proceeded t o d r i v e away when d e f e n d a n t s t a r t e d y e l l i n g and s w e a r i n g . K e l l e r stopped h i s t r u c k and looked t h r o u g h t h e back window a t d e f e n d a n t who w a s j u s t behind t h e t r u c k . K e l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defen- d a n t r e a c h e d i n t o h i s p o c k e t , p u l l e d o u t a gun and f i r e d . A s t h e gun f i r e d , d e f e n d a n t f e l l o v e r backwards and t h e gun s l i d o f f t h e road. police. K e l l e r t h e n sped o f f and c a l l e d t h e Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t d e f e n d a n t was e i t h e r drunk o r o u t o f h i s mind. A t t h e t i m e of t h e shooting, defendant w a s about t e n f e e t away from where K e l l e r was s i t t i n g i n h i s t r u c k . However, t h e s l u g d i d n o t s t r i k e t h e p i c k u p n o r d i d i t i n j u r e anyone, n o r w a s i t found. D e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s o n l y d i f f e r s on a few key p o i n t s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t K e l l e r y e l l e d and swore a t him a s h e went by and t h a t h e f i r s t t h o u g h t t h e r e w e r e two people i n t h e truck. was i n d a n g e r . When t h e p i c k u p s t o p p e d he t h o u g h t he H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he p u l l e d o u t t h e p i s t o l t o show t h e p e o p l e i n t h e t r u c k t h a t he had something w i t h which t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f . I n t h e a c t o f p u l l i n g it o u t , he dropped t h e gun and b e i n g i n a cocked p o s i t i o n , i t f i r e d on h i t t i n g t h e ground. H e t e s t i f i e d h e had n o t i n t e n d e d t o s h o o t t h e gun a t a l l when p u l l i n g it o u t and t h e d i s c h a r g e w a s accidental. On November 27, 1978, d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d i n ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 9 4 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) , R.C.M. 202 (1)( c ) , MCA) , 1947 (now s e c t i o n 45-5- by f i r i n g a p i s t o l a t Harold K e l l e r . d e f e n d a n t w a s a r r a i g n e d on J a n u a r y 22, 1979. h e s t a t e d h e wished t o p l e a d g u i l t y . The A t that time The t r i a l judge, on f i n d i n g t h a t a f a c t u a l b a s i s was n e c e s s a r y p r i o r t o accept i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a , q u e s t i o n e d him a s t o t h e e v e n t s culminating i n t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge. ~efendant r e p l i e d t h a t h i s memory o f e v e n t s w a s u n c l e a r b e c a u s e o f h i s l e v e l of i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e . He did s t a t e , however, t h a t he had been c a r r y i n g a gun on t h e n i g h t i n q u e s t i o n and t h a t t h e weapon had been d i s c h a r g e d . The t r i a l judge a t t h a t p o i n t d e c l i n e d f i n a l a c c e p t a n c e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a u n t i l a more a d e q u a t e f a c t u a l b a s i s c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . a r r a i g n m e n t was c o n t i n u e d . O F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1979, t h e n A t t h a t t i m e Harold K e l l e r t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s version of t h e i n c i d e n t . Defendant d e c l i n e d t o cross-examine K e l l e r and d i d n o t p r e s e n t e v i dence. The t r i a l judge a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a , f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r such action. The judge a l s o made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g u i l t y p l e a w a s e n t e r e d i n accordance w i t h a p l e a bargain a r r a n g e m e n t whereby t h e S t a t e a g r e e d t o d r o p c e r t a i n c h a r g e s i n j u s t i c e c o u r t i n r e t u r n f o r t h e e n t r y of t h e p l e a t o t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge. On May 29, 1979, a h e a r i n g was h e l d f o r e v i d e n c e i n a g g r a v a t i o n and m i t i g a t i o n of s e n t e n c e . During t h i s h e a r i n g defendant, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , revealed h i s version of t h e incident. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e testimony of defendant, of d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r w i t n e s s e s , and of t h e v i c t i m , t h e t r i a l judge a l s o had b e f o r e him, a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and a n e v a l u a t i o n r e p o r t from t h e s t a t e p r i s o n where d e f e n d a n t had been g i v e n a 45-day e v a l u a t i o n . Based on t h i s e v i d e n c e , t h e t r i a l judge s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o twenty y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , a l l b u t t h r e e s u s pended. I n d o i n g s o , t h e judge s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s s u b j e c t t o t h e mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e o f t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e . On J u l y 11, 1979, a h e a r i n g w a s h e l d on d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f not guilty. The motion w a s based on t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e p l e a was i n v a l i d b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t had n o t a d m i t t e d t h e f a c t s of t h e crime a s a s s e r t e d by t h e v i c t i m . The t r i a l judge d e n i e d t h e motion r u l i n g t h e r e was a n a d e q u a t e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e p l e a based on d e f e n d a n t ' s and t h e v i c t i m ' s testimony a t t h e arraignment. Defendant ap- p e a l s b o t h h i s s e n t e n c e and t h e d e n i a l o f h i s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r review: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n a c c e p t i n g t h e g u i l t y p l e a e n t e r e d by d e f e n d a n t ? Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e mandatory two-year sentence provision f o r aggravated a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, a p p l i e d under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s case? The f i r s t i s s u e t o be r e s o l v e d i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea. General p r i n c i p l e s governing t h e withdrawal of a g u i l t y p l e a are w e l l s e t t l e d . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n s 2 4 and 26, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t o f a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t t o a t r i a l by j u r y . S e c t i o n 46-12-204, MCA, states i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " (1) The d e f e n d a n t s h a l l e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y t o t h e indictment, information o r complaint. I f t h e defendant r e f u s e s t o p l e a d t o t h e i n d i c t m e n t , i n f o r m a t i o n , o r comp l a i n t , a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y must be e n t e r e d . " ( 2 ) The c o u r t may r e f u s e t o a c c e p t a p l e a of g u i l t y and s h a l l n o t a c c e p t t h e p l e a o f g u i l t y without f i r s t determining t h a t t h e p l e a is voluntary with an understanding of t h e charge." Further, section 46-16-105(2), MCA, provides: "At any time before or after judgment the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." There is no precise rule which can be relied upon in any given case to withdraw a guilty plea. , State v. Lewis (1978) Mont. 582 P.2d 346, 352, 35 St.Rep. 1089, 1096. Each case must be examined on its own record. State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 21, 535 P.2d 498, 503. We must rely on the discretion of the trial court. ". . . That discretion is subject to review only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. Lewis, supra, "'A plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary where it appears that the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists he may have plead guilty to a crime of which he is innocent.' ... "If, however, there is any doubt that a plea is not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in the defendant's favor. On application to change a plea, all doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits." State v. Huttinger (1979) Mont. , 595 P.2d 363, 367, 36 St-Rep. 945. (Citations omitted.) In Huttinger this Court held that there are three important considerations involved in a criminal defendant's attempt to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty: ". . . (1) the adequacy of the interrogation by the District Court of the defendant at the entry of the guilty plea as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea, (2) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea, and (3) the fact that the defendant's plea was apparently the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dis595 P.2d at missal of another charge. 366. . ." Here, w e a r e o n l y concerned w i t h t h e f i r s t f a c t o r a s d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a w a s t i m e l y and t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement when presented t o the court. While t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n h e r e w a s more complete t h a n i n H u t t i n g e r , d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t admit t h a t he had comrni t t e d a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , n o r d i d he d e c l a r e t h e f a c t s upon which h i s p l e a of g u i l t y w a s based. Here, t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e judge c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n c i d e n t went a s f o l l o w s : "THE COURT: You a r e aware o f t h e n a t u r e of t h i s c h a r g e a g a i n s t you and t h a t i t c o u l d be up t o 2 0 y e a r s a t hard l a b o r i n t h e S t a t e Prison? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: A r e you s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d by your a t t o r n e y , M r . B a r t l e t t ? "THE DEF,ENnANT: Y e s j . sir. "THE COURT: M r . B a r t l e t t , a r e you s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e Defendant i s e n t e r i n g t h i s p l e a voluntarily? "MR. BARTLETT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: Now, even though you have t h e r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , a s I s t a t e d , I w o n ' t a c c e p t a p l e a of g u i l t unless t h e r e i s a f a c t u a l b a s i s j u s t i f y i n g s u c h p l e a , s o I ' m g o i n g t o a s k you, d i d you, on September 1 7 , 1978, d i s c h a r g e a Smith & Wessons Model 59 p i s t o l a t a Harold Keller? "THE DEFENDANT: I w a s h i g h l y i n t o x i c a t e d a t t h e t i m e , your Honor, and I ' m n o t s u r e - - I d o n ' t rec a l l t h e a c t u a l e v e n t s t h a t happened. "THE COURT: Did you have a p i s t o l w i t h you? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: Yes, sir. And was i t d i s c h a r g e d ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, s i r . "THE COURT: Now, p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e , I assume t h a t your a t t o r n e y knew of--had access t o t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s f i l e a s t o t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i gation? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: time? What had you been drinking at the "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: And how long? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: recall? Vodka and orange juice. About 12, 14 hours. Now, who else was there, do you "THE DEFENDANT: No, just myself. "THE COURT: Do you know where the gun was discharged from? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: And where was it? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: know? I have no idea, sir. Harold Keller? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: No, sir. Who is Allen Baker? "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: On LaSalle Road. And why was it discharged, do you "THE DEFENDANT: "THE COURT: Yes, sir. I don't know him either. You have never met him before? THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: But this was the person involved with the discharge of the gun? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: Well, under these circumstances, at the time of the hearing, I think that Mr. Keller should be here in order that the circumstances be more fully known to the Court. . ." The court at this time properly refused to accept defendant's guilty plea. It did, however, accept it without further interrogation of defendant after hearing the testimony of the victim on March 8, 1979. While this case involves an aggravated assault, it has the same problems and defects that were pointed out in State v. Azure (1977), - Mont. , 573 P.2d 179, 34 St.Rep. 1569, and reiterated in Huttinger. Here, defendant was not made aware of the differing elements of assault as set forth in sections 45-5-201 and 45-5-202, MCA. The District Court had before it evidence indicating the defendant was under the influence of a combination of drugs and alcohol and was possibly suffering from mental distress or instability. These mitigating circumstances may have prevented the defendant from being able to commit an aggravated assault as defined by statute. " ' * * * Real notice and understanding by a defendant of the true nature of the charge against him is the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process * * * understanding of the nature of the charge is indispensable to a valid plea of guilty * * * ' " State v. Azure, supra, 573 P.2d at 183. The transcripts indicate defendant actually remembered the facts surrounding the alleged assault. From statements made by his original counsel, it appears defendant testified contrary to these facts because of his mistaken interpretation of counsel's advice that he was to advise the court he was too intoxicated to remember the details surrounding the alleged assault. It appears that defendant, who was a newcomer to the criminal justice system, clearly misunderstood not only the advice of counsel, but the ramifications of failing to tell the truth. The attorney, however, should have taken steps to protect his client from a situation of this kind, if not immediately, at least before the second hearing. Matters were further complicated, however, when defendant's original attorney became ill and one of his associates, who was unfamiliar with the facts, assumed the case shortly before the second hearing. At the second hearing, no e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e v i c t i m , a l t h o u g h d e f e n d a n t c l e a r l y had a d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n of t h e i n c i d e n t . The judge a c c e p t e d t h e p l e a without ever hearing defendant's version. T h i s i s an u n f o r t u n a t e c h a i n o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s which s h o u l d n o t happen i n o u r c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system. I f the m a t t e r was p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d by t h e judge i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e judge would n o t have a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a , t h e r e b e i n g r e a l q u e s t i o n s conc e r n i n g whether o r n o t a n a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t was a c t u a l l y committed. The second i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e mandatory twoy e a r s e n t e n c e p r o v i s i o n f o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, must a p p l y h e r e . S e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, states: "A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s h a l l be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m o f n o t less t h a n 2 y e a r s o r more t h a n 20 y e a r s , e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n 46-18-222." S e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " A l l mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s p r e s c r i b e d by do n o t apply i f : t h e laws o f t h i s s t a t e . . . " ( 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s mental c a p a c i t y , a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which h e i s t o be s e n t e n c e d , was s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p a i r e d , a l t h o u g h n o t s o i m p a i r e d a s t o c o n s t i t u t e a defense t o the prosecution; " ( 5 ) where a p p l i c a b l e , no s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y w a s i n f l i c t e d on t h e v i c t i m . " Both p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d and t h a t t h e exemptions enumerated above a p p l y . The t r a n s c r i p t s are r e p l e t e w i t h t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s v e r y drunk on t h e n i g h t o f t h e i n c i d e n t . This t e s t i m o n y , however, may be viewed d i f f e r e n t l y by r e a s o n a b l e men a s i t c o n c e r n s i n t e n t . Y e t , whether d e f e n d a n t c o u l d o r c o u l d n o t form t h e n e c e s s a r y i n t e n t i s of no consequence h e r e , a s t h e e x c e p t i o n i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 5 ) above enumerated i s applicable. Although a l o a d e d weapon was i n v o l v e d and a l t h o u g h s e c t i o n 46-18-221(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s f o r a minimum s e n t e n c e f o r c r i m e s committed w i t h a f i r e a r m , t h i s s e c t i o n i s a l s o s u b j e c t t o t h e e x c e p t i o n s o f s e c t i o n 46-18-222. I n t h e l a s t l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n , s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5) was amended s o t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n i n v o l v i n g a b s e n c e of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i s i n a p p l i c a b l e i f a weapon i s used i n t h e c r i m e , even i f no s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d . C h a p t e r 396, S e c t i o n 1, Laws of Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) . T h i s amend- ment, however, d i d n o t become e f f e c t i v e u n t i l J u l y 1, 1979, and t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t be r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l i e d t o p e r s o n s committing c r i m e s p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e . S t a t e v . Azure, s u p r a , 587 P.2d a t 1297. T h e r e f o r e , on t h e f a c t s and t i m e frame o f t h i s c a s e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5) inapplicable. The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e s e n t e n c e imposed on t h a t judgment v a c a t e d and s e t a s i d e . The c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o p e r m i t d e f e n d a n t t o withdraw h i s p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d p l e a o f g u i l t y and e n t e r h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y t o t h e crime c h a r g e d . We concur: ';t Chief Justice
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