VINCENT v EDWARDS

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No.14831 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 CHARLOTTE VINCENT, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vsJOHN ROBERT EDWARDS et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: McDonough, Cox and Simonton, Glendive, Montana For Respondents: Douglas Y. Freeman, Hardin, Montana Ronald Lodders, Billings, Montana Charles Cashmore, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: September 12, 1979 flf;T Filed: , : , ir;? -. Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. his is an appeal from the judgment in a personal injury action from the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial ~istrict, Yellowstone County. Plaintiff Charlotte Vincent appeals from the District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Schultz struction Company, Empire Sand & & Meyer Con- Gravel Company, Inc., and Jimmy D. Arndt. Plaintiff brought this cause to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile accident on the night of July 3, 1974. She was a passenger in an automobile which struck a cow lying on Interstate 94 which was then under construction. The cow had been struck by two other automobiles immediately before plaintiff's collision. The original complaint alleges the accident resulting in plaintiff's injuries was caused by the negligence of the operators of the two other automobiles and the construction companies working on Interstate 94. was filed on June 28, 1977. The original complaint At that time, plaintiff posi- tively knew the identity of only two defendants, John Robert Edwards and George Mike Edwards. Consequently, the driver of the second car, Jimmy D. Arndt, and the two construction companies, Schultz Sand & & Meyer Construction Company and ~mpire Gravel Company, Inc., were designated by fictitious names pursuant to section 25-5-103, MCA. Respondent Arndt was designated as "John Doe" and the two construction companies were designated as "A.B.C. Construction company" in the original complaint. Later, plaintiff moved to amend the original complaint upon discovering the true identities of the fictitiously named d e f e n d a n t s . The motion was g r a n t e d on September 25, 1978, and p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a n amended c o m p l a i n t . The t h r e e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s w e r e e a c h s e r v e d w i t h a summons on o r a f t e r September 25, 1978. Prior t o such s e r v i c e , t h e y had no n o t i c e o f e i t h e r t h e a c c i d e n t o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f any p r i o r a c t i o n on b e h a l f o f p l a i n tiff. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e t r u e names of t h e two c o n s t r u c t i o n companies c o u l d have been o b t a i n e d from informat i o n e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e upon mere i n q u i r y . The t h r e e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r summary judgment on t h e grounds t h a t t h e t h r e e - y e a r statute o f l i m i t a t i o n s on p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m had r u n on J u l y 3, 1977, under s e c t i o n 27-2-204(1), MCA. The motion was g r a n t e d , and judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f on A p r i l 3 0 , 1979. P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h i s judgment. This appeal r a i s e s an i s s u e of f i r s t impression i n t h i s jurisdiction: whether o r n o t t h e " r e l a t i o n back" l i m i t a t i o n s o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., a p p l y t o a n amendment o f a com- p l a i n t made t o i d e n t i f y d e f e n d a n t s o r i g i n a l l y named f i c t i t i o u s l y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-5-103, MCA, and made a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s has run. T h i s a p p e a l i n v o l v e s two Montana s t a t u t e s and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and r e l a t i o n s h i p t o e a c h o t h e r . Plaintiff- a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 255-103, MCA, which p r o v i d e s : a f i c t i t i o u s name. When t h e "Suing a p a r t y p l a i n t i E f i s i g n o r a n t of t h e name o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , such d e f e n d a n t may be d e s i g n a t e d i n any p l e a d i n g o r p r o c e e d i n g by any name; and when h i s t r u e name i s d i s c o v e r e d , t h e p l e a d i n g s o r p r o c e e d i n g s may be amended a c c o r d i n g l y . " The second s t a t u t e r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a p p e a l i s Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n back of amendments t o p l e a d i n g s , which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " R e l a t i o n back of amendments. Whenever t h e -c l a i m o r d e f e n s e a s s e r t e d i n t h e amended p l e a d i n g a r o s e o u t of t h e c o n d u c t , t r a n s a c t i o n , o r o c c u r r e n c e s e t f o r t h o r a t t e m p t e d t o be s e t f o r t h i n t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g , t h e amendment r e l a t e s back t o t h e d a t e of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g . An amendment changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s back i f t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d by law f o r commencing t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t him, t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t i n by amendment (1) h a s r e c e i v e d s u c h n o t i c e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , and ( 2 ) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n would have been b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him." I n h e r b r i e f a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., and t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e speak t o d i f f e r e n t circumstances. She c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 25-5-103 i s concerned w i t h d e f e n d a n t s whose names o r i d e n t i t i e s a r e o r i g i n a l l y unknown and a r e l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d and no change of p a r t i e s i s involved. Rule 1 5 ( c ) , s h e a r g u e s , i s concerned w i t h a s i t u a t i o n where a p l a i n t i f f h a s e i t h e r misnamed t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t o r h a s m i s t a k e n l y named t h e wrong d e f e n d a n t , and t h e r e f o r e w i s h e s t o make a n amendment "changing t h e p a r t y . " She a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , which admitt e d l y have n o t been s a t i s f i e d h e r e , do n o t a p p l y t o amendments s u b s t i t u t i n g named d e f e n d a n t s f o r f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s h a s e x p i r e d . Thus, a p p e l - l a n t c o n t e n d s , amendments i d e n t i f y i n g and s u b s t i t u t i n g named d e f e n d a n t s r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l comp l a i n t naming f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s , and t h e s t a t u t e of limitations is tolled. The o n l y p u r p o s e of t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i n a s i t u a t i o n s u c h a s t h a t which c o n f r o n t e d a p p e l l a n t i n t h e present case. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s any r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a p l a i n t i f f u t i l i z i n g t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e t o e x e r c i s e reasonable d i l i g e n c e t o determine t h e t r u e name o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , i f t h e r e i s such a r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e , which h a s n o t been done i n t h i s c a s e . Respondents u r g e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n o u t b e f o r e any of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e named a s p a r t i e s d e f e n d a n t , and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d summary judgment. They a r g u e t h a t t h e amended c o m p l a i n t d o e s n o t r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t f o r two r e a s o n s : (1) Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., is a p p l i c a b l e and i t s r e q u i r e m e n t s have n o t been m e t ; and ( 2 ) t h e p l a i n t i f f did n o t exercise reasonable diligence t o d e t e r m i n e t h e t r u e names o f t h e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s . Because we h o l d t h a t a n amendment t o a c o m p l a i n t s u b s t i t u t i n g named d e f e n d a n t s f o r f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s f a l l s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d on a p p e a l . A t t h e o u t s e t i t i s worthy o f n o t e t h a t w h i l e Montana's f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-5-103, MCA, p e r m i t s amendment of t h e p l e a d i n g s upon d i s c o v e r y of t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' t r u e names, t h e s t a t u t e i s s i l e n t a s t o t h e r e l a t i o n back of t h e amendment and t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Both o f t h e s e i s s u e s , t h e r e l a t i o n back o f amendments and t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d i n Rule 1 5 ( c ) , b u t are n o t mentioned i n s e c t i o n 25-5-103, statute. t h e f i c t i t i o u s name Nevertheless, a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t d e s p i t e t h e a b s e n c e of any l a n g u a g e i n s e c t i o n 25-5-103 tolling the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s o r p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e r e l a t i o n back of a n amendment, t h e o n l y p u r p o s e of a f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s and t h e amended com- p l a i n t must t h e r e f o r e r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t , c i t i n g Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 1 3 0 , 134, i n s u p p o r t of h e r p o s i t i o n . s e c t i o n 25-5-103 W e r e f u s e t o r e a d such a r u l e i n t o by i m p l i c a t i o n , s i n c e Rule 1 5 ( c ) e x p r e s s l y d e a l s with the matter. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e more s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., a r e controlling i n the present case. This r u l e provides: ". . . An amendment changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s - -i -t h e back f f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d [same t r a n s within t h e period a c t i o n o r occurrence]and, p r o v i d e d by - - commencing the a c t i o n law for a g a i n s t him, t h e p a r t y t o b e b r o u g h t i n by amendment (1) h a s r e c e i v e d such n o t i c e o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , and ( 2 ) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n would have been b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him." (Emphasis and b r a c k e t e d material supplied. ) A p p e l l a n t a p p a r e n t l y acknowledges t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) have n o t been m e t i n t h i s c a s e i n t h a t n e i t h e r r e s p o n d e n t Jimmy D. A r n d t n o r r e s p o n d e n t s S c h u l t z C o n s t r u c t i o n Company and Empire Sand & & Meyer G r a v e l Company, I n c . , had any n o t i c e o r knowledge o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t them u n t i l a f t e r t h e t h r e e - y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had e x p i r e d . Mont. , L a f o r e s t v. Texaco, I n c . 585 P.2d 1318, 1321, 35 St.Rep. (1978), 1580. Appellant s e e k s t o a v o i d t h e consequences of t h i s f a c t under Rule 1 5 ( c ) by a t t e m p t i n g t o l i m i t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of Rule 1 5 ( c ) t o s i t u a t i o n s where a p l a i n t i f f h a s e i t h e r misnamed t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t o r h a s m i s t a k e n l y named t h e wrong p e r s o n a s a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , and by a t t e m p t i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o v e r e d by t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e , where t h e i d e n t i t i e s of d e f e n d a n t s whose names w e r e o r i g i n a l l y unknown a r e l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d . W e agree with the respondents t h a t t h i s i s a d i s t i n c t i o n without a difference. A s f a r a s r e s p o n d e n t s a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e s e amendments w e r e amendments "changing t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d , " s i n c e t h e f i r s t t i m e r e s p o n d e n t s had any n o t i c e o r knowledge t h a t t h e y w e r e b e i n g sued was when t h e y w e r e s e r v e d w i t h t h e amended c o m p l a i n t s . From t h e i r s t a n d p o i n t , r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y new p a r t i e s b r o u g h t i n t o t h e a c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n . Rule 1 5 ( c ) i s d e s i g n e d t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s , who had no n o t i c e o r knowledge of t h e l a w s u i t u n t i l more t h a n a y e a r a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n . (1978) - Mont. I n L a f o r e s t v . Texaco, I n c . , 585 P.2d 1318, 1321, 35 St.Rep. 1580, t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t e r r o n e o u s l y named t h e wrong p e r s o n s a s d e f e n d a n t s , and t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t , Texaco, had no n o t i c e o r knowledge of t h e l a w s u i t u n t i l i t was s e r v e d w i t h a n amended c o m p l a i n t a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n . Although t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e was n o t involved i n L a f o r e s t , t h i s Court discussed t h e reasoning u n d e r l y i n g Rule 1 5 ( c ) i n t h a t c a s e , q u o t i n g from Munetz v . Eaton Yale & Towne, I n c . (E.D. Pa. 1 9 7 3 ) , 57 F . R . D . 476, " ' I f p l a i n t i f f had i n mind i n i t i a l l y t h e p r o p e r e n t i t y o r p e r s o n and a c t u a l l y had s e r v e d t h a t intended person o r e n t i t y , then it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e amendment would be p e r m i t t e d even though t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n a s t o t h e p e r s o n s o misnamed i n t h e p r o c e s s and c o m p l a i n t , bec a u s e t h e p e r s o n o r e n t i t y would a l r e a d y be i n c o u r t , would have had a d e q u a t e n o t i c e of t h e pendency of t h e a c t i o n , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e would be no p r e j u d i c e t o t h e p e r s o n o r e n t i t y by a l l o w i n g t h e amendment. However, when t h e e f f e c t of t h e amendment i s t o b r i n g b e f o r e t h e Court f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a completely d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n o r e n t i t y which had n o t p r e v i o u s l y had n o t i c e of t h e s u i t and such amendment, assuming i t would r e l a t e back, o c c u r s a f t e r t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s h a s r u n , t h e n t h e new p e r s o n o r e n t i t y would b e p r e j u d i c e d and t h e amendment i s n o t a l l o w e d ... " ' T h e a d d i t i o n o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f p a r t i e s who had no n o t i c e o f t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n i s n o t a l lowed. S u b s t i t u t i o n o f a c o m p l e t e l y new d e f e n d a n t c r e a t e s a new c a u s e of a c t i o n . Permitting s u c h p r o c e d u r e would undermine t h e p o l i c y upon which t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i s b a s e d . ' (Citations omitted. ) " T h i s same r a t i o n a l e h a s been f o l l o w e d i n c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o n s i d e r i n g b o t h a f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e s i m i l a r o r i d e n t i c a l t o Montana' s - Rule 1 5 ( c ) : and " A s a n i n i t i a l m a t t e r , b e c a u s e from t h e viewp o i n t o f t h e p a r t y s o u g h t t o b e added b e l a t e d l y , i t c a n make no d i f f e r e n c e whether he was o r i g i n a l l y d e s i g n a t e d a s John Doe and n o t s e r v e d , o r o r i g i n a l l y n e i t h e r named n o r s e r v e d b e c a u s e a n o t h e r p e r s o n was e r r o n e o u s l y t h o u g h t t o be t h e c o r r e c t defendant, w e hold t h a t both s i t u a t i o n s are encompassed by S 8 1 A - 1 1 5 ( c ) ' s r e f e r e n c e t o ' c h a n g i n g t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s asserted.'" Sims v . American C a s u a l t y Company ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 3 1 Ga.App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121, 134, a f f ' d . , 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61. See a l s o Gould v. T i b s h r a e n y ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 2 1 Ariz.App. P.2d 104, 106. 146, 517 The p o l i c y behind o u r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s h a s been s t a t e d and g i v e n e f f e c t by t h e Montana C o u r t i n C a s s i d y v. F i n l e y ( 1 9 7 7 ) , - Mont. - 568 P.2d 1 4 2 , 1 4 4 , , " T h i s C o u r t h a s o f t e n s t a t e d one o f t h e o b j e c t s of a t r u e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i s t o p r e v e n t p o t e n t i a l p l a i n t i f f s from s i t t i n g on t h e i r r i g h t s , and t o s u p p r e s s s t a l e c l a i m s a f t e r t h e f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g them have become o b s c u r e d by l a p s e of t i m e , d e f e c t i v e memory, o r d e a t h o r removal of w i t n e s s e s . " Appellant argues t h a t t h e only purpose of a f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e i s t o t o l l t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s s o t h a t t h e amendment s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' t r u e names f o r t h e f i c t i t i o u s d e f e n d a n t s w i l l r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l complaint. T h i s argument i g n o r e s t h e r e q u i r e - ments o f Rule 1 5 ( c ) and t h e p o l i c i e s e x p r e s s e d i n c a s e s construing that rule. Furthermore, other purposes and applications of the fictitious name statute can be readily found in cases involving unknown heirs, in quiet title actions and other actions, and in discovery procedures.. Appellant relies largely on Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 130, and cases cited therein, for the proposition that an amendment substituting the true name of a defendant designated by a fictitious name in the original complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. Two of the cases, while considering a fictitious name statute or a court rule allowing designation of unknown defendants by a fictitious name, were decided before the adoption of Rule 15(c) or its equivalent in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, Maddux v. Gardner (1945), 239 Mo.App. 289, 192 S.W.2d 14, and Wall Funeral Home, Inc. v. Stafford (1969), 3 N.C.App. 578, 165 S.E.2d 532, cannot be considered as authority for appellant's proposition that Rule 15(c) is inapplicable or for the proposition that the amendments relate back to toll the statute of limitations in the present case, since there was no Rule 15(c) or equivalent to consider when those cases were decided. By the same token, Sousa v. Casey (1973), 111 R.I. 623, 306 A.2d 186, and Farrell v. Votator ~ivisionof Chemetron Corp. (1973), 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394, also failed to address the question presented here concerning the effect of Rule 15(c) on fictitiously named defendants. While those jurisdictions had adopted Rule 15(c) or its equivalent at the time the cases were decided, the decisions made no mention of the rule. Thus, although Rule 15(c) was in force, those cases were decided solely on the basis of a fictitious name statute or court rule, and the effect of Rule 15(c) was not considered. Appellant points out that Montana's fictitious name statute, section 25-5-103, MCA, was adopted verbatim from the California statute, and argues that the California cases construing that statute support her contentions. This argument ignores the fact that California has no Rule 15(c) nor any equivalent procedural rule that speaks to the relation back of amendments. See West's Annotated California Code of Civil Procedure, sections 473, 474. Therefore, Mayberry v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1966), 244 Cal.App.2d 350, 53 Cal.Rptr. 317, and other California cases are distinguishable since they did not consider the issue involved in the present case. On the other hand, the federal cases cited by respondents were decided under Rule 15(c) alone, as there is no federal fictitious name statute, and the federal courts have not adopted a court rule allowing the designation of unknown defendants by fictitious names. Craig v. United States (9th Cir. 1969)r 413 F.2d 854; Stephens v. Balkamp, Inc. (E.D. Tenn. 1975), 70 F.R.D. 49. This is true even in a diversity suit where state law provides for a fictitious name statute, on the grounds that such a statute is procedural rather than substantive, and is therefore inapplicable in a federal diversity action under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188. Avis Transport (D. Nev. 1972), 57 F.R.D. See Williams v. 53. The only cases considering both a fictitious name statute and Rule 15(c) have held that an amendment to a complaint substituting named defendants for fictitious defendants will relate back to the filing of the original complaint and toll the statute of limitations only if the requirements of ~ u l e 15 (c) are satisfied. Gould v. Tibshraeny (1973), 21 ~riz.App- 146, 517 P.2d 104, is squarely on point with the present case. In Gould the plaintiff named fictitious defendants pursuant to a fictitious name statute nearly identical to Montana's, then subsequently filed an amended complaint substituting Tibshraeny for one of the "Doe" defendants after the statute of limitations had run. The court rejected the same argument presented here by appellant, holding that the amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint to toll the statute of limitations where the requirements of Rule 15(c) had not been met: "It is fundamental that the purpose of the statute of limitations is to provide a cutoff point in time for stale claims. Rule 15(c) carries out this sound policy by requiring notice of the institution of the action within the time limitations set by the statute of limitations before an amendment adding new parties will relate back to the date of the original pleading." Gould, 517 P.2d at 106. The Arizona Court relied on an earlier Arizona decision which is also on point. See Hartford Insurance Group v. Beck (1970), 12 Ariz.App. 532, 472 P.2d 955. Cases con- sidering both a fictitious name statute and Rule 15(c) have also been decided in Georgia with the same result. In Sims v. American Casualty Company (1974), 131 Ga-App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121, 134-136, aff'd., 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61, the plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute several named defendants for those fictitiously named in her original complaint after the statute of limitations had run. Summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed, against the plaintiff's contentions that the amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint under the fictitious name statute. As in the present case, the requirements of Rule 15(c) had not been satisfied because the defendants did not have notice or knowledge of the action within the period of limitations. S e e a l s o B r e r R a b b i t Mobile Home S a l e s , I n c . v . P e r r y ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 132 Ga.App. Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 1 2 8 , 207 S.E.2d 1 3 0 , 146-148, 578, and S7(a). I n summary a p l a i n t i f f may u t i l i z e t h e f i c t i t i o u s name s t a t u t e and may amend a c o m p l a i n t t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e t r u e name o f t h e d e f e n d a n t when d i s c o v e r e d . I f t h e amendment o c c u r s a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s h a s r u n , however, t h e r e a l o r i n t e n d e d d e f e n d a n t must have e i t h e r been s e r v e d o r o t h e r w i s e r e c e i v e d n o t i c e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n under t h e c o n d i t i o n s provided i n Rule 1 5 ( c ) . Af f i r m e d . W e concur: %'..UE$%&~, Chief J u s t i c e y-ibvL L- , b , h 7 Justices

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