STATE v STUIT
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No. 13556 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1978 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , D A E STUIT, U N D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t J. Boyd, J u d g e p r e s i d i n a . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: Greg J . S k a k l e s a r g u e d , Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: H o n o r a b l e Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Denny Moreen a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana James J. Masar, County A t t o r n e y , Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted: January 30, ~ e c i d e CAR d 2 2 1978 Clerk 1978 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court: Duane S t u i t a n inmate o f Montana s t a t e p r i s o n was conv i c t e d by j u r y v e r d i c t f o r t h e crime of escape, a f e l o n y i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-7-306, R.C.M. 1947. The D i s t r i c L Court, Powell County, ordered defendant be punished by c o n f i n e ment i n Montana s t a t e p r i s o n f o r 10 y e a r s . Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n . On February 13, 1976, defendant, w h i l e i n t h e l a w f u l custody of Montana s t a t e p r i s o n , f l e d t h e c o n f i n e s of t h e p r i s o n and made h i s way t o Colorado S p r i n g s , Colorado, where he surrendered himself t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s f i v e days a f t e r h i s escape. On March 18, 1976, t h e county a t t o r n e y f o r Powell County f i l e d an Information charging defendant w i t h t h e crime of escape. Defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y and r e l i e d on t h e defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r escape due t o n e c e s s i t y , d u r e s s o r f e a r of g r e a t b o d i l y harm, a s s e t out i n s e c t i o n 94-3-110, R.C.M. 1947. The c r u x of S t u i t ' s defense l i e s i n t h e c o n t e n t i o n h i s escape from Montana s t a t e p r i s o n was n e c e s s i t a t e d by h i s f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n adequate medical a t t e n t i o n . Defendant's r i g h t eye had been removed a s a r e s u l t of a childhood i n j u r y . a p r o s t h e s i s o r g l a s s eye was i n s t a l l e d . I n i t s place While a n inmate a t Montana s t a t e p r i s o n defendant c o n t r a c t e d a s t a p h i n f e c t i o n i n h i s r i g h t eye. P r i s o n medical s t a f f d o c t o r s and s p e c i a l i s t s were provided f o r t r e a t m e n t of t h e i n f e c t i o n . A t r e a t i n g physician recommended arrangements be made t o s e c u r e a new p r o s t h e s i s f o r defendant. The p r i s o n warden t e s t i f i e d t h a t a new p r o s t h e s i s could only be obtained i n Spokane, Weshington a t t h a t time, b u t t h e necessary equipment would soon be a v a i l a b l e i n Montana. Defendant contends the fear of infection spreading from the right eye to the left eye and the potential for loss of sight in his left eye necessitated his escape in order to obtain necessary medical care. Defendant raises two issues on appeal: 1 Whether the District Court erred in restricting defendant's ) voir dire by precluding defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors on their attitute toward the defense of justification? 2 Whether the District Court erred in its instructions ) to the jury? Defendant contends the District Court's limitation on the scope of voir dire questioning of prospective jurors denied defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The specific instances of purported error involved the state's objections to defense counsel's voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. The state objected on the grounds the questions propounded were irrelevant, misstated the law and counsel was arguing the case to the jury. The District Court sustained the state's objections. Upon reviewing the transcript of jury voir dire, we conclude the District Court did not err in sustaining the state's objection. The court's ruling merely precluded defense counsel from arguing the case to the jury during voir dire. Defense counsel was not restrained from questioning jurors on the defense of justification. The purpose of voir dire is to enable counsel to determine the existence of bias and prejudice on the part of prospective jurors and to enable counsel to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. Court, (1976), - . Mont State ex rel. Stephens v. District , 550 P.2d 385, 33 St.Rep. 469. This purpose was not undermined in the present case. I n h i s second i s s u e defendant c h a l l e n g e s t h e D i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s instructions t o t h e jury. Defendant contends I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 15 and 1 6 , i n essence, d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and Instruc- placed upon defendant t h e burden of proving h i s defense. t i o n No. 15 s t a t e d : "A person s u b j e c t t o o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of ESCAPE i f he knowingly o r purposely removes himself from o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n . " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 16 s t a t e d : "To s u s t a i n t h e charge of ESCAPE, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t each element of t h e o f f e n s e was done purposely o r knowingly." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 merely d e f i n e s t h e crime of escape i n t h e language of s e c t i o n 94-7-306(2), R.C.M. 1947. In- s t r u c t i o n No. 16 e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s t a t e ' s burden of proof which i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e mental s t a t e f o r each element of t h e crime of escape, a s provided i n s e c t i o n 94-2-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. W e f a i l t o conclude t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s amount t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of g u i l t o r impose upon t h e defendant t h e burden of proving h i s defense. Other i n s t r u c t i o n s given t o t h e j u r y s e t f o r t h t h e defense of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12 s p e c i f i c a l l y provided: "The Defendant has presented evidence showing t h a t he a c t e d o u t of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The Defendant does n o t have a burden of proof t o s u s t a i n t h i s defense. I f h i s evidence r a i s e s a reasonable doubt a s t o h i s g u i l t , he i s e n t i t l e d t o a c q u i t t a l . He i s n o t o b l i g e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s defense beyond a reasonable doubt, o r even by a preponderance of t h e evidence. The p r o s e c u t i o n must prove h i s g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant contends given I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A, ( 1 ) e r r o n eously placed an a f f i r m a t i v e burden on defendant t o prove h i s defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and (2) erroneously r e q u i r e d t h a t defendant be faced w i t h a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of d e a t h o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y i n t h e immediate f u t u r e t o be j u s t i f i e d i n h i s escape, thus imposing an o b j e c t i v e standard r a t h e r than a subj e c t i v e standard. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A s t a t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e defense of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e only i f t h e following conditions e x i s t e d a t t h e time of t h e escape: "(1) The Defendant was faced with a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of death, o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y i n t h e immediate f u t u r e . "(2) There i s no time f o r a complaint t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o r t h e r e e x i s t s a h i s t o r y of f u t i l e complaints which make any r e s u l t from such complaint illusory. ( 3 ) There i s n o t time o r opportunity t o r e s o r t t o t h e Courts. "(4) The p r i s o n e r immediately r e p o r t s t o t h e proper a u t h o r i t i e s when he has a t t a i n e d a p o s i t i o n of s a f e t y from t h e immediate t h r e a t . " I f you f i n d from your c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e evidence t h a t a l l t h e s e conditions d i d n o t e x i s t a t t h e time of t h e escape, then you should f i n d t h a t t h e defense of n e c e s s i t y o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s not a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Defendant." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A i s derived from a C a l i f o r n i a Court of Appeals d e c i s i o n , People v. Lovercamp, (1974), 43 Cal.App.3d 118 Cal.Rptr. 823, 110, which a r t i c u l a t e d t h e elements of t h e l i m i t e d defense of n e c e s s i t y a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e crime of escape. Lovercamp has been r e c e n t l y construed i n another C a l i f o r n i a Court of Appeals d e c i s i o n , People v. Condley, (1977), 69 Cal. App.3d 999, 138 Cal.Rptr. 515. I n Condley t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n - s t r u c t e d t h e jury: "The defendant has t h e burden of proving by t h e preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t n e c e s s i t y forced him t o escape. Preponderance of t h e evidence means such evidence a s , when weighed with t h a t opposed t o i t , has more convincing f o r c e and t h e g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of t r u t h . " 138 Cal.Rptr. 519. The defendant in Condley contended such an instruction constituted reversible error because the defense of necessity as justification for the crime of escape is of the type of 'It *** defenses asserted by an accused which raise factual issues collateral to the question of the accused's guilt or innocence and do not bear directly on any link in the chain of proof of any element of the crime. Among such defenses are those which raise no challenge to the sufficiency of the prosecution's proof of any element of the crime charged, but for reasons of public policy insulate the accused notwithstanding the question of his guilt. 1 (People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 142-143, 544 P.2d 1335, 1342-1343.)" 138 Cal.Rptr. 520. The California Court then went on to conclude in Condley: "* * * . the Lovercamp defense is founded upon public policy and provides a justification distinct from the elements required to prove escape. Therefore, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendants had the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence." 138 Cal.Rptr. 522. We hold that under Montana law the defense of justification is an affirmative defense which must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. In the present case, Instruction No. 12 provides that defendant, in asserting the defense of necessity or justification, is entitled to acquittal if the evidence he presents merely raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Instruction No. 12 goes on to specifically provide defendant "is not obligated to establish this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence." The burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to guilt is far less than the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the standard approved by California. We fail to find defendant's argument in this area persuasive. Defendant a l s o contends I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12A erroneously required t h a t defendant be faced with a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of death o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y i n t h e immediate f u t u r e i n order t o be j u s t i f i e d i n h i s escape, thus imposing an o b j e c t i v e standard r a t h e r than a s u b j e c t i v e standard. This same i s s u e was addressed by t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court of Appeals i n Lovercamp and Condley: "Under t h e l i m i t e d circumstances described i n Lovercamp, when t h e defendant's d e c i s i o n t o escape i s o b j e c t i v e l y t h e 'only v i a b l e and reasonable choice a v a i l a b l e ' we excuse t h e offense a s being j u s t i f i e d under t h e circumstances. It would be ludicrous t o apply a s u b j e c t i v e standard t o d e t e r mine whether t h e defendant's escape i s j u s t i f i e d a s being t h e only v i a b l e and reasonable choice. These terms thernselbes connote an o b j e c t i v e standard. A s noted i n Lovercamp, ' I t i s hardly e a r t h s h a t t e r i n g t o observe t h a t prisons a r e n o t Brownie Camps and t h a t w i t h i n t h e inmate population a r e those who, i f given t h e opportunity, w i l l d e p a r t without due a t p. 826, 118 Cal.Rptr., process of law.' a t p. 111) Were we t o adopt a s u b j e c t i v e standard t o e s t a b l i s h t h e elements of t h e Lovercamp defense, i t would take l i t t l e imagination on t h e p a r t of any inmate t o claim t h a t t h e p r i s o n milieu i t s e l f c r e a t e s , s u b j e c t i v e l y , t h e r e q u i s i t e elements of t h e overc cam^ defense." People v. Condley, 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1011, 138 Cal.Rptr. 515, 521. (s., W a r e i n agreement with t h e o b j e c t i v e standard imposed by e t h e "Lovercam2 i n s t r u c t i o n " i n determining whether a defendant' s escape i s j u s t i f i e d . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. / Justice. W Concur: e Chief JUS tic:
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