MARRIAGE OF BERTHIAUME

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No. 13554 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O F MONTANA O R F 1977 I N RE: THE MARRIAGE O F SIFROY J. BERTHIAUME, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, -vsPAULINE H . BERTHIAUME , Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Appeal from: Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : /;1 ;j& C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingr9,ham Montana K e i t h McCurdy a r g u e d , & Wold, - &, For Respondent: G a r r i t y and Keegan, Helena, Montana Donald A. G a r r i t y a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: Decided : . Filed: . May 2 4 , 1977 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court : , This i s an appeal by t h e wife from t h e provisions of a divorce decree granted J u l y 14, 1976, i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and Clark County, concerning property settlement and support of minor c h i l d r e n . N i s s u e i s taken t o t h e g r a n t i n g o of t h e divorce. Appellant p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review: I s s u e 1. Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n mhking t h e property d i v i s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n a s s e t f o r t h i n i t s decree? I s s u e 2. Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n b.fai1in.g t o provide f o r t h e support of t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s i n i t s decree? Issue 3. Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t kbused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by denying a p p e l l a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l and overruling h e r o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law? S i f r o y and Pauline Berthiaume were married i n June 1970. Both were employed and continued t o be so u n t i l Pauline q u i t h e r job i n August 1974 t o take c a r e of t h e i r two c h i l d r e n . While employed, Pauline earned $6,100 and S i f r o y $8,100 per year. Their earningswere put i n t o a j o i n t account and used f o r family purposes. Following P a u l i n e ' s termination of employment, she drew unemployment compensation f o r 14 months a t t h e r a t e of $68 p e r week, which was deposited t o t h e j o i n t account. The p a r t i e s used t h e i r t o t a l earnings f o r t h e family with t h e exception of $100 per montb paid by S i f r o y f o r support of a c h i l d of a previous marriage. A t t h e time of t h e marriage t h e p a r t i e s bought a home i n Helena. S i f r o y p a i d $5,500 a s a down payment by c a s h i n g c e r t i - f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t . I n August 1973 t h e p a r t i e s purchased a n o t h e r home w i t h 2 112 a c r e s a t E l l i s t o n , Montana. They borrowed $6,000 from P a u l i n e ' s p a r e n t s t o ,make t h e down payment, paying i t back when t h e Helena home was s o l d . I n a d d i t i o n , from t h e proceeds of t h e Helena s a l e they purchased some c a t t l e . The purchase p r i c e . of t h e E l l i s t o n p r o p e r t y was $25,000 and a t t h e d a t e of h e a r i n g approximately $16,000 remained t o be p a i d on t h e mortgage. The e s t i m a t e d v a l u e of t h e home and p r o p e r t y was between $30,000 and $35,000. During t h e p e r i o d t h e y l i v e d a t E l l i s t o n , t h e y r a i s e d a few cattle. The maximum number was 27 head. 7 head were g i v e n t o P a u l i n e by h e r p a r e n t s . Both p a r t i e s t e s t i f i e d t o t h e ownership of v a r i o u s items of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y and t h e d e s i r e d d i s t r i b u t i o n . A t t h e time of t r i a l t h e minor c h i l d r e n were aged 5 and 3 and were i n P a u l i n e ' s custody. A t t h a t time S i f r o y was e a r n i n g $821 p e r month and P a u l i n e , who was working f o r h o u r l y wages a s a w a i t r e s s and j a n i t r e s s , was making approximately $400 p e r month. I s s u e 1. S e c t i o n 48-321(1), R.C.M. 1947, c o n t r o l s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n and d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l property. This s t a t u t e provides: " D i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y . (1) I n a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of a m a r r i a g e , l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , o r d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y f o l l o w i n g a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n by a c o u r t which lacked p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e a b s e n t spouse o r lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d i s p o s e of t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e . c o u r t , w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o m a r i t a l misconduct, s h a l l , and i n a proceeding f o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n may, f i n a l l y e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s t h e p r o p e r t y and a s s e t s belonging t o e i t h e r o r b o t h however and whenever acquired, and whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n t h e name of t h e husband o r wife o r both. I n making apportionment t h e c o u r t s h a l l consider t h e duration of t h e marriage, and p r i o r marriage of e i t h e r p a r t y , a n t e n u p t i a l agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e age, h e a l t h , s t a t i o n , occupation, amount and sources of income, v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , employability, e s t a t e , l i a b i l i t i e s , and need of each of t h e p a r t i e s , c u s t o d i a l p r o v i s i o n s , whether t h e apportionment i s i n l i e u of o r i n a d d i t i o n t o maintenance, and t h e opportunity of each f o r f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n of c a p i t a l a s s e t s and income. The c o u r t s h a l l a l s o consider t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n , o r d i s s i p a t i o n of value of t h e r e s p e c t i v e e s t a t e s , and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of a spouse a s a homemaker o r t o t h e family u n i t . I n disposing of property acquired p r i o r t o t h e marriage; property acquired by g i f t , bequest, devise o r descent; property acquired i n exchange f o r property acquired before t h e marriage o r i n exchange f o r property acquired by g i f t , bequest, d e v i s e , o r descent; t h e increased value of property acquired p r i o r t o marriage; and property acquired by a spouse a f t e r a decree of l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , t h e c o u r t s h a l l consider those c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e o t h e r spouse t o t h e marriage, including t h e nonmonetary c o n t r i b u t i o n of a homemaker; t h e e x t e n t t o which such c o n t r i b u t i o n s have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e maintenance of t h i s property and whether o r n o t t h e property d i s p o s i t i o n serves a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance arrangements. I t Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t No. V I I I , found : "That t h e p a r t i e s accumulated r e a l and personal property which i s held mostly i n j o i n t tenancy. "The p r o p e r t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s should be divided a s e q u a l l y a s possible." Then, t h e court went on, and awarded S i f r o y Che family home without making a n i f 6 f f s e t t i n g provision f o r Pauline. Under t h e evidence, t h e t o t a l market value of t h e property awarded Pauline amounts t o l e s s than $1,000 while t h a t awarded S i f r o y amounts t o over $17,000. I n percentages, S i f r o y apparently r e - ceived w e l l over 90 percent of t h e combined r e a l and personal property --andsuch award - 5 s d i r e c f l y - contraryJ- the ; d f ' s t r i & t- c o u r t 1 to? s f i n d i n g of f a c t No. V I I I , t h a t t h e property should be divided a s equally a s possible. Accordingly, i t amounts t o a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and must be reconsidered. I n P o r t e r v.! P o r t e r , 155 Mont. 451, 457, 473 P.2d 538, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h e scope of review by t h e Supreme Court on appeal i n cases involving a claim t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t ion : "* * *a reviewing c o u r t i s never j u s t i f i e d i n s u b s t i t u t i n g i t s d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I n determining whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t h e question i s . - n o t whether t h e reviewing c o u r t agrees with t h e t r i a l c o u r t , but, rather, did the t r i a l court i n the exercise of .its dis&retio~i'a~t~arbitsariity',wfthout ; : ,the: employment of conscientious judgment o r exceed t h e bounds of reason, i n view of a l l t h e circums t a n c e s , ignoring recognized p r i n c i p l e s r e s u l t i n g i n substantial injustice." 155 Mont. 457. c 3 I s s u e 2 i s d i r e c t e d a t t h e f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make provisions i n i t s judgment decree f o r t h e support and maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t did make i t s f i n d i n g of f a c t No. V I and i t s conclusion of law No. 3, providing : I . That t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s an able-bodied person who i s capable of c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e support and maintenance of t h e s a i d minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s hereto. That t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s a t t h e p r e s e n t time employed by t h e S t a t e Motor Pool, S t a t e of Montana, and holding a p o s i t i o n with t h a t department which pays approximately $800 a month. That $50 a month per c h i l d i s a reasonable sum t o be contributed by t h e p e t i t i o n e r f o r t h e support of s a i d minor c h i l d r e n . That support payments should continue f o r each of s a i d c h i l d r e n u n t i l s a i d c h i l d reaches t h e age of 18, o r i s emancipated, whichever should occur f i r s t . " "3. That p e t i t i o n e r s h a l l pay t o respondent t h e reasonable sum of $50 per month p e r c h i l d f o r t h e support of s a i d minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o ; t h a t s a i d support payments s h a l l continue f o r each of s a i d c h i l d r e n u n t i l s a i d c h i l d reaches t h e age of 18, o r i s emancipated, whichever should occur f i r s t ; t h a t t h e petitioner s h a l l maintain i n f o r c e and e f f e c t an insurance policy providing f o r medical and h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n coverage f o r t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o ; t h a t both p e t i t i o n e r and respondent a r e ablebodied persons capable of providing f o r t h e reasonable medical, d e n t a l and o p t i c a l expenses incurred f o r t h e proper c a r e and maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o over and above those amounts covered by t h e insurance p o l i c y p r e s e n t l y i n e f f e c t on s a i d c h i l d r e n ; t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , a l l medical, d e n t a l and o p t i c a l expenses incurred f o r t h e proper c a r e and maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , over and above those amounts covered by t h e insurance p o l i c y p r e s e n t l y i n e f f e c t on s a i d c h i l d r e n , s h a l l be divided equally between p e t i t i o n e r and respondent." The f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l court t o make provision i n t h e decree f o r t h e support of t h e minor c h i l d r e n was an obvious oversight and must be corrected. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i n t h i s r e s p e c t i s s e c t i o n 48-323, R.C.M. 1947: "In a proceeding f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage, l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , maintenance, o r c h i l d support, t h e c o u r t may order e i t h e r o r both p a r e n t s owing a duty of support t o a c h i l d t o pay an amount reasonable o r necessary f o r h i s support, without regard t o m a r i t a l misconduct, a f t e r considering a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s including: "(1) t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of t h e c h i l d ; "(2) parent ; t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of t h e c u s t o d i a l "(3) t h e standard of l i v i n g t h e c h i l d would have enjoyed had t h e marriage n o t been dissolved; "(4) t h e p h y s i c a l and emotional condition of t h e c h i l d , and h i s educational needs; and " (5) t h e f i n a n c i a l resources and needs of t h e noncustodial parent. " On remand, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s d i r e c t e d t o make an award of support money i n i t s decree i n conformity with s e c t i o n 48-323. I s s u e t h r e e concerns d e n i a l by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of appell a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l and t h e o v e r r u l i n g of h e r o b j e c t i o n s t o i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law. Section 93-5602, R:C.M. 1947, provides: "New t r i a l i n e q u i t y cases. N new t r i a l s h a l l be o granted i n e q u i t y c a s e s , o r i n cases t r i e d by t h e c o u r t without a j u r y , except on t h e grounds mentioned i n t h e f i r s t , t h i r d , and f o u r t h subdivision of s e c t i o n 93-5603 ." Section 93-5603, R.C.M.1947, provides i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : "When a new t r i a l may be granted. The former v e r d i c t o r o t h e r decision may be vacated and a new t r i a l granted, on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p a r t y aggrieved, f o r any of t h e following causes, m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of such p a r t y : "1. I r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e proceedings of t h e c o u r t , j u r y , o r adverse p a r t y , o r any o r d e r of t h e c o u r t , o r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , by w h i c h ' e i t h e r p a r t y was prevented from having a f a i r t r i a l ; "-3. Accident o r s u r p r i s e , which ordinary prudence could n o t have guarded a g a i n s t ; 4 . Newly discovered evidence, m a t e r i a l f o r t h e p a r t y making t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , which he could n o t , with reasonable d i l i g e n c e , have discovered and produced a t *.Ir the t r i a l ** This Court i n Downs v. Downs, 1025, 1026, 1027, 33 St.Rep. , Mont . , 551 P.2d 576, 578, 579, remanded t h e cause t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t with d i r e c t i o n s t o hold a new t r i a l s t a t i n g : "In view of t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e record a s t o t h e t r u e n e t worth of defendant a t t h e time of t h e marriage and a t t h e time of t h e divorce, t h e judgment i s s e t aside." Further i n Downs i n support of i t s conclusion, t h i s Court s t a t e d : * * This f a i l u r e t o f u l l y p u t before t h e t r i a l c o u r t proper v a l u a t i o n of a l l the property caused t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make an i n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e property -;insofar?: a s p l a i n t i f f ' s needs a r e concerned .I' 'I* Paulinet s motions t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclus i o n s of law and t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment should have been granted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e reasons hereinbefore r e c i t e d . A s an a l t e r n a t i v e , Pauline asked f o r a new t r i a l . a l s o denied. This motion was This d e n i a l c o n s t i t u t e d an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have required testimony on t h e value of t h e r e a l and personal property, thus enabling i t t o make an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s and provide f o r t h e support of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s decree i s s e t a s i d e and t h e cause i s remanded f o r new t r i a l on t h e i s s u e s of e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of r e a l and personal property of t h e p a r t i e s and f o r determination and i n c l u s i o n i n t h e decree of a provision f o r the support of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . W Concur: e c h i e m u s t ice' /\.

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