STATE v SAWYER

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No. 13731 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1977 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , W D TURNER SAWYER, AE D e f e n d a n t and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e Gordon R. B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana R o b e r t Yunck a r g u e d , C u t Bank, Montana F o r Respondent : Hooks and S h e r l o c k , Townsend, Montana J e f f r e y M. S h e r l o c k a r g u e d , Townsend, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: September 30, 1977 9C-T l c 15 '- M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court: The s t a t e appeals from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Broadwater County, suppressing evidence obtained i n an invent o r y search of defendant's automobile. Defendant was apprehended August 14, 1976, a f t e r Unders h e r i f f Michael Walrod observed him making an i l l e g a l t u r n on t h e s t r e e t s of Townsend, Montana. O f f i c e r Walrod recognized defendant and proceeded with Ted I n g e r s o l l , a f o r e s t s e r v i c e d i r e c t o r who was accompanying the o f f i c e r , t o look f o r defendant. They found defendant's c a r a t a bar parking l o t and n o t i c e d t h e c a r had a ten-day r e g i s t r a t i o n s t i c k e r which had expired. The o f f i c e r found defendant i n t h e b a r and informed him he was charged with r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g and improper v e h i c l e r e g i s t r a t i o n , and t h a t he would be t i c k e t e d a t the s h e r i f f ' s office. O f f i c e r Walrod rode t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e with de- fendant, i n defendant's c a r . A t t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e O f f i c e r Walrod informed defendant bond would be $125; $100 f o r r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g and $25 f o r i m proper v e h i c l e r e g i s t r a t i o n . Defendant was unable t o meet t h e bond, s o he was booked and placed i n t h e county j a i l . A t that time o f f i c e r s impounded defendant's automobile and made a complete inventory of i t s c o n t e n t s , discovering p i l l s they believed t o be amphetamines under the d r i v e r ' s s e a t . As a r e s u l t , defendant was charged w i t h c r i m i n a l possession of dangerous drugs. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t suppressed the evidence obtained i n t h e inventory, based on these conclusions of law: "1. That t h e a c t i o n of t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r , i n s e t t i n g bond without reference t o any schedule e s t a b l i s h e d by a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r , was a v i o l a t i o n of Section 95-1103, R.C.M. 1947, and r e s u l t e d i n t h e i l l e g a l d e t e n t i o n of t h e defendant. "2. That t h e inventory search of defendantt s v e h i c l e was unreasonable i n l i g h t of t h e Fourth Amendment t o t h e U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n . 11 F i r s t , we consider t h e s t a e ' s contention the d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i t s f i n d i n g t h a t b a i l was improperly s e t by a law enforcement o f f i c e r . Although it i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y requirement t h a t b a i l be s e t by a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r , s e c t i o n 95-1103, R.C.M. 1947, allows a peace o f f i c e r t o accept b a i l i n l i m i t e d circumstances: " S e t t i n g and accepting b a i l i n minor offenses. A j u s t i c e of t h e peace o r p o l i c e judge may i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n e s t a b l i s h and post a schedule of cash b a i l f o r offenses n o t amounting t o a felony. A peace o f f i c e r may accept b a i l i n behalf of t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace o r p o l i c e judge i n accordance with t h e schedule. * * *" The s t a t e argues t h e r e i s no evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e conclusion of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t bond was n o t accepted " i n accordance with t h e schedule" a s required by s e c t i o n 95-1103. While t h e o f f i c e r admitted he did n o t p h y s i c a l l y r e f e r t o t h e bond schedule s e t by t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace, he explained: "A. On t h e Reckless Driving charge 1 used what I assumed was c o r r e c t , t h e c o r r e c t bond, what t h e Highway P a t r o l had been using and what t h e Judge had been using i n t h e p a s t . I t W d e c l i n e t o hold t h a t a peace o f f i c e r may not r e l y on h i s e everyday experience and memory i n accepting bond i n behalf of a magistrate. There was no evidence t h e bond accepted by t h e o f f i c e r i n t h e i n s t a n t case was any d i f f e r e n t from t h a t l i s t e d i n t h e bond schedule. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i n d i n g of a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 95-1103 i s not supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. Second, i s the question of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e inventory search of defendant' s v e h i c l e . The s t a t e f r e e l y admits t h e o f f i c e r s had no probable cause o r even any suspicion t h a t contraband might be found i n t h e v e h i c l e . warrant was ever obtained. N search o The inventory was conducted, according t o t h e o f f i c e r s who t e s t i f i e d , s o l e l y a s a matter of standard p o l i c e procedure f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of any valuable items which t h e owner may have l e f t i n t h e automobile. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of such a search i s a question of f i r s t i m pression i n Montana. I t i s axiomatic t h a t a search must comport with s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. The reasonableness of an inventory search under the Fourth Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s Constit u t i o n was discussed i n t h e recent United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 49 L ed 2d 1000 (1976). 3092, The Court i n Opperman upheld, by a 5-4 m a j o r i t y , an inventory search of an abandoned automobile impounded f o r multiple overtime parking v i o l a t i o n s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t case f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d Opperman and found a v i o l a t i o n of the Fourth Amendment. W e need n o t consider t h e Fourth Amendment i s s u e because we view t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n t o a f f o r d an i n d i v i d u a l g r e a t e r protect i o n i n t h i s instance than i s found under t h e Fourth Amendment i n Opperman. The 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t . 11, Sections 10 and 11, provide: "Section 10. Right of privacy. The r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l privacy i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e well-being of a f r e e s o c i e t y and s h a l l not be i n f r i n g e d without t h e showing of a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t . "Section 11. Searches and s e i z u r e s . The people s h a l l be secure i n t h e i r persons, papers, homes and e f f e c t s from unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s . N o warrant t o search any place, o r s e i z e any person o r t h i n g s h a l l i s s u e without d e s c r i b i n g t h e place t o be searched o r t h e person o r t h i n g t o be s e i z e d , o r without probable cause, supported by oath o r affirmat i o n reduced t o w r i t i n g . " The importance of t h e r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l privacy t o t h e framers of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n i s obvious from these provisions. This Court has previously noted t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e e x p l i c i t guarantee of t h e r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l privacy contained i n Section 10, a s no comparable provision e x i s t s i n t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . S t a t e v. Coburn, 165 Mont. It i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t an inventory search such a s t h e one considered here i s a s i g n i f i c a n t invasion of i n d i v i d u a l privacy. One of t h e o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e standard i n - ventory search i s no d i f f e r e n t i n scope than a warranted search of an autoraobfle, As'was noted i n Mozzetti v. Superior Court, "It seems undeniable t h a t a r o u t i n e p o l i c e inventory of t h e contents of an automobile i n volves a s u b s t a n t i a l invasion i n t o t h e privacy of t h e v e h i c l e owner. Regardless of professed benevolent purposes and euphemistic e x p l i c a t i o n , an inventory search involves a thorough explorat i o n by t h e p o l i c e i n t o t h e p r i v a t e property of an i n d i v i d u a l . I n t h a t process s u i t c a s e s , b r i e f c a s e s , sealed packages, purses--anything l e f t open o r closed within t h e v e h i c l e - - i s subjected without *'I l i m i t a t i o n t o t h e prying eyes of a u t h o r i t i e s . ** While we have recognized t h e d i f f e r e n c e , f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l purpoees, between an automobile and a home o r o f f i c e , S t a t e v. Spielmann, 163 Mont. 199, 203, 516 P.2d 617 (19731, t h i s Court has a l s o approved t h i s statement i n S t a t e v. Amor, 164 Mont. 182, 185, 520 P.2d 773 (1974), quoting Coolidge v. N w Hampshire, e 403 U.S. 443, 461, 91 S e c t . 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, 580 (1971): ""Phe word "automobile" i s n o t a talisman i n whose presence t h e Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears, 111 A s a s u b s t a n t i a l infringement upon i n d i v i d u a l privacy, t h e inventory search must meet t h e "reasonableness" and "compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t 1 ' s t a n d a r d s of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . There a r e two b a s i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r an inventory search t h a t could p o s s i b l y have any a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e i n s t a n t case: (1) p r o t e c t i o n of t h e contents of t h e v e h i c l e f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e owner; and (2) p r o t e c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e from claims f o r l o s t property f o r which t h e p o l i c e a r e responsible. While t h e f i r s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n has merit i n t h e case of an abandoned v e h i c l e , i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t h e l p f u l where, a s h e r e , t h e owner of t h e v e h i c l e i s present and can be questioned about valuable items and p o s s i b l e arrangements f o r t h e i r disposition. I t would be anomalous t o j u s t i f y a search of an automobile t o be f o r t h e owner's b e n e f i t , when t h e owner i s a v a i l a b l e b u t does n o t consent t o t h e search. Surely t h e pro- p e r t y owner i s an adequate judge of t h e treatment of t h e prop e r t y t h a t would most b e n e f i t him. The inventory, then, must be based upon t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e o f f i c e r s from claims f o r l o s t property. While t h i s i s a reasonable concern, i t bears l i t t l e weight i n Montana. A s the custodian of an impounded v e h i c l e , a p o l i c e o r s h e r i f f ' s department i s a " g r a t u i t o u s depositary" w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 20-211, R.C.M. 1947. A s such, t h e depositary owes a duty of " s l i g h t Wre'' f o r t h e preservation of t h e property, and i s l i a b l e t o the owner only f o r l o s s e s occasioned by "gross negligence. II Boyd v. Harrison S t a t e Bank, 102 Mont. 94, 56 P.2d 724 (1936). C e r t a i n l y t h i s duty would be s a t i s f i e d by simply securing and taking an inventory of any valuable items i n p l a i n view from o u t s i d e t h e v e h i c l e , r o l l i n g up t h e windows, locking t h e doors, and r e t u r n i n g t h e keys t o t h e owner. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra. Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t , these j u s t i f i c a t i o n s simply do n o t bear up under t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g force of t h e r i g h t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches i n Montana. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, on t h e remand of S t a t e v. Opperman, (So.Dak.1976), 247 N.W.2d 673,675, a s s e r t e d a s a matter of s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law: "* *' * noninvestigative p o l i c e inventory searches of automobiles without a warrant must be r e s t r i c t e d t o safeguarding those a r t i c l e s which a r e w i t h i n t h e p l a i n view of t h e o f f i c e r ' s v i s i o n . * * *" This standard reasonably balances t h e needs of t h e p o l i c e a s custodians of a lawfully impounded v e h i c l e with t h e r i g h t s of privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s h e l d by i n d i v i d u a l s i n Montana. Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. W adopt i t a s a p p l i c a b l e t o e I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e contra- band was found under a s e a t and admittedly was never i n p l a i n view. I t was s e i z e d i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e 1972 Montana Constitu- t i o n and was properly suppressed. To avoid misunderstanding, we wish t o n o t e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of our p r e s e n t hozding. W i n no way l i m i t t h e r i g h t of an e o f f i c e r t o s e i z e items i n p l a i n view where t h e o f f i c e r ' s presence is j u s t i f i a b l e . 33 St.Rep. S t a t e v. Emerson, 169 Mont. 285, 546 P.2d 509, 261 (1976); S t a t e v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509 P.2d 852 (1973). This i s n o t a case where t h e r e was any probable cause t o search o r where t h e search was i n any manner r e l a t e d t o the a r r e s t . See: S t a t e v. Turner, 164 Mont. 371, 523 P.2d 1386 (1974); S t a t e v. Armstrong, 149 Mont. 470, 428 P.2d 611 (1967); S t a t e v. Houchin, 149 Mont. 503, 428 P.2d 971 (1967). W hold only t h a t where t h e s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an e inventory search i s t h e f a c t i t i s i n c i d e n t t o t h e lawful custody of an impounded v e h i c l e and pursuant t o standard p o l i c e procedure, such search must be l i m i t e d i n scope t o a r t i c l e s i n p l a i n view from o u t s i d e t h e vehicle. The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t suppressing evidence i s a f f inned.

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