STATE v FINLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 13358 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsJOHN LeROY FINLEY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Small, Cummins and Hatch, Helena, Montana Gregory A. Jackson argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley, County Attorney, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided: Clerk May 11, 1977 JUL f 2 1 n ! 3 Chief J u s t i c e P a u l G. H a t f i e l d d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Mr. Defendant John Leroy F i n l e y a p p e a l s from a judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and C l a r k County, o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r d r i v i n g a motor v e h i c l e upon t h e highways w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . On t h e n i g h t of J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1976, d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e l e f t t h e i r f a m i l y home a f t e r a n argument w i t h d e f e n d a n t . Defendant d r o v e h i s a u t o m o b i l e on t h e c i t y s t r e e t s of Helena, Montana, i n an attempt t o l o c a t e h i s wife. When d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e d i s c o v e r e d d e f e n d a n t w a s d r i v i n g t h e f a m i l y c a r , s h e t e l e p h o n e d t h e Helena c i t y p o l i c e and r e p o r t e d d e f e n d a n t was d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d . The p o l i c e responded t o t h e c a l l , s t o p p e d d e f e n d a n t a s h e w a s r e t u r n i n g t o h i s house, concluded he w a s i n d e e d d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d , and p l a c e d him under a r r e s t f o r t h e o f f e n s e o f d r i v i n g a motor v e h i c l e , w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g liquor. The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s , a c c o r d i n g t o u n c o n t r o v e r t e d t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l , t h e n a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t o f h i s Miranda r i g h t s , t o o k him i n t o c u s t o d y , and t r a n s p o r t e d him t o t h e Helena c i t y jail. From t h e t i m e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o t h e t i m e h e w a s p l a c e d i n a j a i l c e l l , h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e r e c o r d e d on a n a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g . Defendant d i d n o t g i v e h i s c o n s e n t t o t h e r e c o r d i n g ; n o r d i d t h e p o l i c e i n f o r m him t h e y were a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g h i s a c t i o n s and speech. Defendant, who had two p r e v i o u s d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e c o n v i c t i o n s , w a s c h a r g e d under s e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 1 4 2 ( d ) , R.C.M. 1947, and a r r a i g n e d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and C l a r k County. Defendant, i n a p r e t r i a l motion, moved t o e x c l u d e t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g from a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l . The d i s - t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion and a t t r i a l a d m i t t e d t h e t a p e i n t o evidence, over defendant's o b j e c t i o n s , t o a i d t h e jury i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y of e y e w i t n e s s e s . A t least s i x p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees o b s e r v e d d e f e n d a n t w h i l e he w a s a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e d , and t h r e e of t h o s e w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d A s i x p e r s o n j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y a s c h a r g e d . a t trial. Defendant w a s t h e r e a f t e r s e n t e n c e d t o one y e a r i n Montana S t a t e Prison. Defendant a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t p o l i c e u s e o f a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t , and adm i s s i o n o f t h e t a p e i n t o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l , v i o l a t e s t h e s e cons t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s : 1. The p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , protected by t h e F i f t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and by A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 25, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2. The r i g h t t o n o t b e d e p r i v e d o f l i b e r t y w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s o f law, r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , and i n A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 1 7 , 1972 Montana Constitution. 3. The r i g h t t o be s e c u r e from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , g u a r a n t e e d by t h e F o u r t h Amendment, U n i t e d S t a t e s Cons t i t u t i o n , and A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Defendant's primary c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n was a b r i d g e d when h i s words and a c t i o n s w e r e r e c o r d e d on a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t o r knowledge, and t h e n s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y a s e v i dence a t t r i a l . Defendant c l a i m s t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e was i n - c r i m i n a t i n g e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d from him by compulsion, and must be s u p r e s s e d under t h e r u l e o f Miranda v . A r i z o n a , 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 436, 1602, 16 L ed 2d 694. Under t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i - t u t i o n , and under t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l l y worded A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 25, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , no p e r s o n may be compelled t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t himself i n a c r i m i n a l proceeding. This Court has held the Montana constitutional guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination affords no broader protection to an accused than does the Fifth Amendment. . Mont , State v. Armstrong, 552 P.2d 616, 33 St.Rep. 688. The opinions of the United States Supreme Court, therefore, delineate the maximum breadth of the privilege against self-incrimination in Montana. The Supreme Court has distinguished between testimonial compulsion and compulsion which does not force the accused to be a witness against himself, but merely requires him to be the source of real or physical evidence. Testimonial compulsion is proscribed by the Fifth Amendment and by Art. 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana constitution. The Court in Miranda stated that, to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination, police must, prior to interrogation of a suspect in custody, inform the accused he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used as evidence against him in court; that he has the right to consult a lawyer and have the lawyer present with him during the interrogation; and, if he is indigent, he may obtain court appointed counsel. Without the Miranda warning or other equally effective measures, the person in custody would not be deemed to have intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and any evidence of a testimonial nature obtained from the accused would be inadmissible at trial. The privilege against testimonial compulsion extends to the defendant's written and oral statements as well as to communicative gestures, such as a nod of the head in response to a question. "It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take * * *." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L ed 2d 908, 916. Real or objective evidence taken from the accused, however, is not protected by Art. 11, Section 25, or by the Fifth Amendment. In Schmerber, results of a test for alcohol in blood taken from defendant despite his refusal to consent to the test, were admissible at trial and did not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in Schmerber followed a long line of Supreme Court decisions when it held: " * * * The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'cornrnunications' or 'testimony', but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." 16 L ed 2d 916. This Court, too, has long and consistently recognized that, while testimonial compulsion is constitutionally prohibited, the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to real or objective evidence. State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 P. 369; State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 975; State ex rel. Sikora v. Dist. Ct., 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897. The crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether the audio-video taping of the speech and actions of defendant in the police station constituted constitutionally prohibited testimonial compulsion or whether his words and actions recorded on the tape were merely real, physical, or objective evidence. We hold that the audio-video taping in this case was objective evidence and, therefore, outside the scope of Art. 11, Section 25 and Fifth Amendment protection. There is no evidence in the record which indicates the recording contained any speech or gesture of defendant which was testimonial in nature. The tape did not contain defendant's responses to interrogation by police. The audio-video tape was introduced into evidence not for the incriminating content of the words uttered by defendant, but as evidence helpful to the jury in understanding the testimony of the police officers and employees who observed defendant's unsteady walk and slurred speech in the police station. While t h i s Court h a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f v i d e o t a p e s we now j o i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have h e l d , p r o v i d e d t h e p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n i s l a i d , t h a t b o t h motion p i c t u r e s and v i d e o t a p e s r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l t o c o n t e s t e d i s s u e s may be a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge. See Annot., 62 ALR2d 686, 701-703 87. This i s a l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g s t h a t sound r e c o r d i n g s , S t a t e v . Warwick, 158 Mont. 531, 494 P.2d 627, and p h o t o g r a p h s , S t a t e v. Harney, 160 Mont. 55, 499 P.2d 802, may be a d m i s s i b l e i n evidence. The d e c i s i o n s o f c o u r t s i n s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s support t h e holding t h a t t h e audio-video t a p e involved i n t h i s c a s e w a s o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e , and as such, d i d n o t i n f r i n g e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n crimination. I n Hendricks v . Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506, 507, wherein t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a n a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s murder c o n f e s s i o n was i n i s s u e , t h e E i g h t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f Appeals stated: " A s t o whether t h e u s e of such t a p e comes d a n g e r o u s l y c l o s e t o r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o incrimi n a t e h i m s e l f , w e t h i n k t h i s no more i n c r i m i n a t e s him t h a t t h e t a k i n g of s t i l l p i c t u r e s o r blood o r u r i n e samples. Such p r o c e d u r e d o e s n o t v i o l a t e W e conclude t h e F i f t h Amendment. [ C i t i n g c a s e s . ] t h a t a video tape incriminates t h e defendant only i f t h e statement i t s e l f i s incriminating. If the p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n h a s been l a i d , t h e r e c e p t i o n i n evidence o f a video t a p e should a i d t h e trier of f a c t . " 456 F.2d 506. The c o u r t s of s e v e r a l s t a t e s have r u l e d on t h e p r e c i s e q u e s t i o n o f t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f motion p i c t u r e s , v i d e o t a p e s , and a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e s o f d e f e n d a n t s who have been a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g motor v e h i c l e s w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g liquor. The c o u r t s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c a s e s h e l d t h a t such t a p e s o r motion p i c t u r e s a r e o b j e c t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e , and a r e a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' p r i v i l e g e S t a t e v . F e l l o w s , 4 7 Ohio App.2d against self-incrimination. 154, 352 N.E.2d 631, 635 ( v i d e o t a p e ) ; C i t y o f P i q u a v . H i n g e r , 1 5 Ohio S t . 2 d 1 1 0 , 238 N.E.2d 89 S.Ct. 766, c e r t . d e n . , 1001, 484, 21 L ed 2d 466 (motion p i c t u r e s ) ; Thompson v . ( v i d e o t a p e ) ; Lanford v. P e o p l e , 1 8 1 Col. 1 9 4 , 510 P.2d 311, P e o p l e , 159 Col. 36, 409 P.2d 829, P e o p l e v. F e n e l o n , 1 4 I l l . A p p . 3 d tape); 393 U.S. (sound motion p i c t u r e s ) ; 622, 303 N.E.2d S t a t e v. S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N . C . 38, (video 253, 1 7 3 S.E.2d 1 2 9 , (sound m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) ; C a r p e n t e r v . S t a t e , 169 Tex. C r i m . App. 333 S.W.2d 391, 283, ( m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) ; Housewright v. S t a t e , 154 Tex. C r i m . App. 1 0 1 , 225 S.W.2d 417 ( m o t i o n p i c t u r e s ) . Only o n e s t a t e h a s r u l e d t h a t m o t i o n p i c t u r e s o f a d e f e n d a n t who w a s a r r e s t e d on a d r i v i n g w h i l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r charge c o n s t i t u t e d t e s t i m o n i a l evidence. The Oklahoma C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals i n S p e n c e r v . S t a t e , Okla. 4 0 4 P.2d 46, C r i m . App. 1 9 6 5 , / r u l e d t h a t Oklahoma's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n was broad enough t o p r o h i b i t u s e , a s e v i d e n c e , o f motion p i c t u r e s t a k e n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h o u t h i s knowledge. The c o u r t r e l i e d on S p e n c e r a s a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s h o l d i n g s i n two s u b s e q u e n t c a s e s . Crim. R i t c h i e v. S t a t e , Okla. App. 1966, 415 P.2d 1 7 6 ; S t e w a r t v. 1967, 435 P.2d 191. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. however, have e x p r e s s l y d e c l i n e d t o f o l l o w t h e r e a s o n i n g o f t h e Oklahoma c o u r t i n S p e n c e r . S t a t e v . S t r i c k l a n d , 276 N.C. 202 Kan. 517, 450 P.2d 2 0 . 253, 173 S.E.2d 129; S t a t e v . F a i d l e y , I n a r e c e n t o p i n i o n , t h e Oklahoma C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals e x p r e s s l y o v e r r u l e d S p e n c e r . Ross v . S t a t e , Okla. C r i m . App. 1976, 556 P.2d 638, 640, c i t i n g S t a t e v . Thomason, Okla. C r i m . App. 1975, 538 P.2d 1080. Because w e h o l d t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e of defendant i n t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n was o b j e c t i v e e v i d e n c e , u n p r o t e c t e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, t h e holding i n Miranda i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . W need e n o t i n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , d i s c u s s whether t h e Miranda warning g i v e n by t h e p o l i c e t o d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f h i s a r r e s t would have s u f f i c e d t o s u s t a i n d e f e n d a n t ' s i n c r i m i n a t i n g t e s t i m o n i a l s t a t e m e n t s made a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n and r e c o r d e d w i t h o u t h i s knowledge. Defendant r a i s e d two o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s which he a p p a r e n t l y abandoned, s i n c e he f a i l e d t o d i s c u s s them i n h i s brief. W e s h a l l , however, d e a l w i t h t h o s e i s s u e s i n t h i s o p i n i o n t o provide guidance i n f u t u r e appeals. Defendant s t a t e d t h e i n - t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e i n t o e v i d e n c e v i o l a t e d t h e due p r o c e s s and s e a r c h and s e i z u r e c l a u s e s o f t h e Montana and U n i t e d States Constitutions. Art. The p r o t e c t i o n s of A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 17 and 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment due p r o c e s s c l a u s e and t h e F o u r t h Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , respectively. For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d h e r e a f t e r , d e f e n d a n t ' s d u e p r o c e s s and s e a r c h and s e i z u r e c l a i m s a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t . T h i s C o u r t h a s n o t e d t h a t even where e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d from a d e f e n d a n t i s " r e a l " o r " o b j e c t i v e " e v i d e n c e , and t h u s o u t s i d e t h e c o v e r a g e o f t h e F i f t h Amendment, " t h e manner i n which s u c h e v i d e n c e i s o b t a i n e d must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e q u i r e ments o f d u e p r o c e s s . " P.2d 978, 983. Here, S t a t e v . Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 259, 405 t h e p r o c e d u r e o f a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g defend- a n t w a s n o t " b r u t a l " o r "offensive" conduct s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r c i b l e o p e n i n g o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s mouth and t h e f o r c i b l e pumping o f h i s stomach which "shocked t h e c o n s c i e n c e " and v i o l a t e d t h e defenda n t ' s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s i n Rochin v . C a l i f o r n i a , 342 U.S. 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183. 165, The a u d i o - v i d e o t a p i n g of d e f e n d a n t was a l e s s e r p e r s o n a l i n v a s i o n t h a n t h e f o r c e d blood t e s t s u p h e l d by t h e C o u r t i n Schmerber and i n B r e i t h a u p t v . Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L ed 2d 448, 452-53, where t h e C o u r t s t a t e d : " * * * Modern community l i v i n g r e q u i r e s modern s c i e n t i f i c methods of c r i m e d e t e c t i o n l e s t t h e p u b l i c go u n p r o t e c t e d * * * "As a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t o f a n i n d i v i d u a l t h a t h i s p e r s o n be h e l d i n v i o l a b l e * * * must be s e t t h e i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i n t o x i c a t i o n * * *. And t h e more s o s i n c e t h e t e s t l i k e w i s e may e s t a b l i s h i n n o c e n c e , t h u s a f f o r d i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t r e a c h e r y o f judgment based on one o r more o f t h e s e n s e s . " N e i t h e r d o e s d e f e n d a n t ' s F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t t o be s e c u r e from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s p r o t e c t him from h a v i n g h i s words and a c t i o n s a u d i o - v i d e o t a p e d i n a p o l i c e stat i o n , a f t e r he had been a r r e s t e d . Although t h e F o u r t h Amendment may p r o t e c t what a n i n d i v i d u a l s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e a s p r i v a t e , even when he i s i n a p u b l i c what p l a c e , / a p e r s o n " * * * knowingly e x p o s e s t o t h e p u b l i c , even i n h i s own home o r o f f i c e , i s n o t a s u b j e c t o f F o u r t h Amendment protection." Katz v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 389 U.S. 1 9 L ed 2d 576, 582. 347, 88 S . C t . 507, Defendant i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e d i d n o t j u s t i f i a b l y r e l y on h i s p r i v a c y a s d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t i n Katz, whose c o n v e r s a t i o n s were r e c o r d e d when he p l a c e d phone c a l l s i n a g l a s s e n c l o s e d t e l e p h o n e booth. Here d e f e n d a n t was i n a p o l i c e s t a t i o n where h e knew p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and employees were o b s e r v i n g h i s words and a c t i o n s . The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y upheld t h e u s e i n e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d e d c o n v e r s a t i o n s between d e f e n d a n t s and t h e p o l i c e i n f o r m a n t s whom t h e y m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t o be compatriots. I n such c a s e s , d e f e n d a n t s ' m i s p l a c e d c o n f i d e n c e s i n p o l i c e i n f o r m a n t s a r e n o t p r o t e c t e d by t h e F o u r t h Amendment. United S t a t e s v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 453; Hoffa v. United S t a t e s , 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. L ed 2d 374; Lopez v . United S t a t e s , 373 U.S. 10 L ed 2d 462. 1122, 28 L ed 2d 408, 17 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t t a l k and walk in the presence of police informants, but in the presence of police officers, while in the police station. Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy to be protected by Art. 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution or by the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 4 i Chief Justice We concur: .............................. Justices 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
