STATE v FITZPATRICK RADI

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No. 13253 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , BERNARD JAMES FITZPATRICK, GARY R A D I , TRAVIS HOLLIDAY, PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . , and EDWIN R . BUSHMAN, D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Nat A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellants: J o h n L. Adams, Jr. a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana R o b e r t L. S t e p h e n s , J r . a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana Reno and Dove, B i l l i n g s , Montana James Reno a r g u e d , ~ i l l i n g s ,Montana C h r i s J. N e l s o n a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana C l a r e n c e T. B e l u e , H a r d i n , Montana C a t e , Lynaugh, F i t z g e r a l d & Huss, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. M i c h a e l G r e e l y a r g u e d , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana James S e y k o r a a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , H a r d i n , Montana James S i n c l a i r a r g u e d , S p e c i a l Deputy C o . A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: Decided: F i l e d : .jf)t- J a n u a r y 28, 1977 $ @= j9;47 ! &ig Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e f i n a l judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Big Horn County, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l . Defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi a p p e a l from judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and r o b b e r y . Defen- d a n t s H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse a p p e a l from judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r robbery. On May 20, 1975, t h e S t a t e o f Montana f i l e d a n Informat i o n c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k , Radi, H o l l i d a y , Bad Horse and Bushman w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 94-5-102 (1) a ) ( b ) , R.C .M. ( 1947; a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i n v i o l a - t i o n o f s e c t i o n s 94-5-303 (1)( b ) ( c ) , 94-5-303 ( 2 ) and 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947; and robbery, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-401 (1) b ) , ( R.C.M. 1947. The a f f i d a v i t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n d i c a t e s t h e s e c h a r g e s s t e m from t h e A p r i l 5, 1975 r o b b e r y o f t h e Safeway s t o r e i n Hardin, Montana and t h e murder o f Monte Dyckman, a Safeway s t o r e employee. Following d e f e n s e m o t i o n s f o r s e v e r a n c e o f t r i a l , change o f venue and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f j u d g e s , t r i a l was h e l d i n B i l l i n g s , Montana i n October 1975. Defendant Bushman t e s t i - f i e d i n b e h a l f o f t h e s t a t e and was g r a n t e d immunity from p r o s e cution. A t t h e conclusion of t h e s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, defendants r e s t e d without o f f e r i n g evidence. all Defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were found g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , and r o b b e r y . Defendants H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse w e r e found g u i l t y o n l y o f r o b b e r y . On October 29, 1975, d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were e a c h s e n t e n c e d t o 100 y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide; 100 y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e of r o b b e r y a s p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 95-2206.5, R.C.M. 1947; and d e a t h by hanging f o r t h e c r i m e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Defendants H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse w e r e e a c h s e n t e n c e d t o 4 0 y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e o f r o b b e r y . Defendants Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k ' s s e n t e n c e s o f d e a t h were s t a y e d by t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t pending a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t . A t t r i a l t h e s t a t e o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h a t de- f e n d a n t s m e t i n B i l l i n g s , Montana on A p r i l 5, 1975 and c o n s p i r e d t o r o b t h e Safeway g r o c e r y s t o r e i n H a r d i n , a s m a l l community 50 miles south of B i l l i n g s . The s t a t e o f f e r e d d i r e c t and circum- s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o p r o v e t h a t on t h e evening o f A p r i l 5 , 1975 d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi d r o v e t o Hardin i n R a d i ' s a u t o m o b i l e , w h i l e ~ o l l j . d a y , ~ aHorse and Bushman t o g e t h e r d r o v e d t o ~ a r d i n n another automobile. i Defendants parked i n f r o n t of t h e Safeway s t o r e and w a i t e d u n t i l c l o s i n g t i m e when E v e r e t t S t o l t z , t h e s t o r e manager, and Monte Dyckman, a s t o r e employee locked t h e s t o r e d o o r s and d r o v e away i n d i f f e r e n t a u t o m o b i l e s . F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi f o l l o w e d t h e s t o r e manager. The r e m a i n i n g d e f e n d a n t s p u r p o r t e d l y f o l l o w e d Monte Dyckman b u t l o s t s i g h t o f him when he s t o p p e d a t t h e p o s t o f f i c e t o d e p o s i t m a i l . When t h e s t o r e manager d r o v e t o h i s home, Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k r e a l i z e d t h e s t o r e r e c e i p t s were c a r r i e d by Dyckman and t h e y proceeded t o t h e bank where t h e d e p o s i t w a s t o be dropped. It i s a l l e g e d F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi a b d u c t e d Monte Dyckman a t t h e bank, p r i o r t o h i s d e p o s i t i n g t h e s t o r e ' s r e c e i p t s , robbed him, and t h e n k i l l e d him i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e Toluca I n t e r c h a n g e , 1 2 m i l e s w e s t o f H a r d i n , w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f Big Horn County. Defendants r a i s e numerous i s s u e s on a p p e a l . W e hold t h e judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e s remanded f o r new t r i a l s . Therefore, we d i s c u s s only t h e following i s s u e s t o i n s u r e t h a t we d o n o t comment on m a t t e r s t o come b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a new t r i a l : I. Whether t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s f o r j u r y s e l e c t i o n a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d and, i f s o , whether t h e j u r y i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance w i t h t h e law? 11. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t s were p r e j u d i c e d by t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s ? 111. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f de- f e n d a n t Bushman's t e s t i m o n y ? IV. Whether t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of d e f e n d a n t s H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t them d i s missed on t h e grounds t h e j u r y was i n a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law and r e t u r n e d i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r d i c t s ? Issue I. Defendants i n i t i a l l y contend t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s should be r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e s remanded on t h e grounds t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n f o r s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d , even i f t h e s t a t u t e i s found t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h a t t h e j u r y p a n e l s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e w e r e s e l e c t e d and drawn i n t o t a l d i s r e g a r d of t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana l a w . 95-1908, R.C.M. Section 1947, sets f o r t h t h e p r o c e d u r e i n c h a l l e n g i n g t h e s e l e c t i o n of a j u r y p a n e l : ( a ) Any o b j e c t i o n "Motion t o d i s c h a r g e j u r y p a n e l . t o t h e manner i n which a j u r y p a n e l h a s been s e l e c t e d o r drawn s h a l l be r a i s e d by a motion t o discharge t h e jury panel. The motion s h a l l be made a t l e a s t f i v e ( 5 ) d a y s p r i o r t o t h e t e r m f o r which t h e j u r y i s drawn. For good c a u s e shown, t h e c o u r t may e n t e r t a i n t h e motion a t any t i m e t h e r e a f t e r . " ( b ) The motion s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g s u p p o r t e d by a f f i d a v i t and s h a l l s t a t e f a c t s which show t h a t t h e j u r y p a n e l was i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn. " ( c ) I f t h e motion s t a t e s f a c t s which show t h a t t h e j u r y p a n e l h a s been i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn, it s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t t o c o n d u c t a h e a r ing. The burden of proof s h a l l be on t h e movant. "(d) I f the court finds t h a t i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn, t h e j u r y p a n e l d i s c h a r g e d and drawing o f a new p a n e l i n t h e law. I' t h e j u r y p a n e l was the court s h a l l order the selection o r manner p r o v i d e d by A t t h e o u t s e t w e n o t e d e f e n d a n t s have f a i l e d t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908. Defendants r a i s e d t h e i s s u e of improper j u r y s e l e c t i o n and d r a w i n g i n a t i m e l y and s p e c i f i c manner, b u t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e submission o f any a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n . Defense c o u n s e l c o n t e n d , on o r a l a r g u m e n t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h a t t h e t i m e l y s u b m i s s i o n o f a s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t , r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-1908, was p r o h i b i t i v e s i n c e c o u n s e l l a c k e d t h e means o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y p a n e l was s e l e c t e d and drawn. Absent s u c h knowledge, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o n c l u d e t h e f i l i n g o f a f f i d a v i t s b e f o r e t h i s Court a t t h e t i m e of appeal i s s u f f i c i e n t . W disagree. e The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h a t a t l e a s t o n e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was c o g n i z a n t o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 951908. The m o t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t Bad H o r s e t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y panel s t a t e s : "COMES NOW t h e D e f e n d a n t , PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . , and moves t h e C o u r t t o D i s c h a r g e t h e J u r y P a n e l h e r e i n p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 . " S a i d m o t i o n w i l l b e s u p p o r t e d by a f f i d a v i t when t h e j u r y p a n e l i s s e l e c t e d and made known t o t h i s defendant. "Dated t h i s 2 9 t h d a y o f A u g u s t , 1 9 7 5 . " The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e i s d e p l e t e o f any a f f i d a v i t supporting t h i s motion t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y panel. Absent such a showing o f good c a u s e t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r m o t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s c a n n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e j u r y p a n e l f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f a i l e d t o s e l e c t and draw j u r y p a n e l s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p p l i c a b l e Montana law. Ledger v . McKenzie, 107 Mont. 335, 85 P.2d 352; S t a t e v . C o r l i s s , 150 Mont. 4 0 , 430 P.2d 632. The means o f e s t a b l i s h i n g good c a u s e , s p e c i f i - c a l l y t h e sworn a f f i d a v i t s o f t h e c h i e f d e p u t y c l e r k o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Y e l l o w s t o n e County and t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e c o u n t y r e g i s t r a r o f v o t e r s , were a s a c c e s s i b l e a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l a s a t t h e t i m e of appeal. Yet, d e f e n d a n t s ' f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908, w i l l n o t f o r e c l o s e our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether t h e j u r y panel was p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d and drawn where t h e fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e a t s t a k e . S t a t e v. P o r t e r , 125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984; S t a t e e x r e l . Henningsen v . ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t , 136 Mont. 354, 348 P.2d 143; S t a t e v . Chapman, 139 Mont. 98, 360 P.2d 703. Thus w e c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e s e l e c t i o n o f j u r o r s and drawing o f j u r y p a n e l s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e i n f r i n g e d on d e f e n d a n t s ' fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s ? T h i s Court h a s l o n g h e l d t h e a c c u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d a t r i a l by a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y s e l e c t e d and drawn i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law. S t a t e ex r e l . Henningson v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925. Any m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e i n p r o c u r i n g a j u r y h a s been h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l o f fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . S t a t e v . P o r t e r , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Groom, 49 Mont. 354, 1 4 1 P. 858; S t a t e v . Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 7 1 P. 3; r e v e r s e d on o t h e r grounds 3 5 M o n t . 512, 90 P. 981. The Revised Codes o f Montana a r e e x p l i c i t l y c l e a r i n d e f i n i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e t o be f o l l o w e d i n s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s and drawing j u r y p a n e l s . S e c t i o n 93-1301, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s t h a t r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s whose names a p p e a r on t h e most r e c e n t l i s t of a l l r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s , a s p r e p a r e d by t h e c o u n t y r e g i s - t r a r , a r e competent t o s e r v e a s j u r o r s . S e c t i o n 93-1401, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s t h a t a l i s t of p e r s o n s t o s e r v e a s j u r o r s must be p r e p a r e d by t h e chairman o f t h e c o u n t y commissioners, o r i n h i s a b s e n c e , any member of t h e board o f c o u n t y commissioners, t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r and t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r o r any two cf such officers. R.C.M. Once t h e j u r y l i s t i s composed, s e c t i o n 93-1402, 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h name on t h e l i s t be a s s i g n e d a number and t h e l i s t of t h e names of t h e p e r s o n s be d e l i v e r e d by those o f f i c e r s t o t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t pursuant t o section 93-1403, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1404, R.C.M. 1947, mandates that the clerk of court place the individual pieces of paper, embossed with the number assigned each juror, in a box and from this box the numbers are to be drawn by the district judge in the presence of the clerk of court pursuant to section 93-1502, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, provides that in the event additional jurors are needed, their numbers must also be drawn by the district judge. Defendants contend section 93-1301, regarding the competency of jurors, is unconstitutional in that voter registration lists fail to provide a true cross-section of the community in violation of equal protection requirements of the state and federal constitutions. It is argued the voter registration system excludes residents who are qualified for jury service, but are not qualified to vote or do not choose to vote. The issue of whether voter registration lists are a proper instrument for selecting jurors was recently discussed in United States v. Ramos Colon, 415 F.Supp. 459, 464: "From a constitutional standpoint it is well settled that voting lists may be used as a basis for jury selection unless it appears that in the comm;nity there is systematic, intentional and deliberate exclusion from those lists of a particular economic, social, religious, racial, geographical or political group. [Citing cases.] From Colon and Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, we glean the prima facie case for establishing a statutory challenge to a jury selection system on the ground of jury composition: 1) Proof that the jury selection system is disadvantageous to a cognizable class, and 2) proof that the disadvantage is occasioned by discrimination in the selection process. Defendants bear the burden of establishing the cognizable class which is discriminated against by the jury selection process. Purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L ed 2d 759; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L ed 84. De- fendants' only allegation of discrimination was that the jury panel was composed of all whites, with the exception of two Indians, and that the convicting jury was exclusively white in composition. Such allegation falls short of establishing a prima facie case challenging the jury selection system on the ground of racial composition. Petition of Boe, 156 Mont. 303, 481 P.2d 45; State v. Johnson, 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728. It is a well accepted proposition of law that the voter registration list, from which the jurors are selected, and the jury panel need not perfectly mirror the racial composition of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 6 9 2 4 2 L ed 2d 690; Foster v. Sparks, supra; State v. Taylor, 168 Mont. 142, 542 P.2d 100, 32 St.Rep. 993. Defendants further contend the jury panels in the instant case were selected and drawn in total disregard of the applicable Montana law. We find merit in defendants' claim that the manner in which jurors were selected and drawn substantially deviated from the procedures mandated in Title 93, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. Specifically, all duties delegated to the jury commission and district court judge were performed by the clerk of court without any apparent overseeing. While we have no cause to question the good faith of the public officers involved, it is obvious the statutory scheme for selecting and drawing a jury was completely circumvented. The rule in Montana is that juries must be selected and drawn in substantial compliance with the law. Where the disregard for legislative mandates amounts to more than technical irregularity substantial compliance has not been achieved. State ex rel. Henningsen v. District Court, supra; State v. Porter, supra. We stated initially that this m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d on a p p e a l , b u t it i s o f s u f f i c i e n t import t o warrant a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n f o r f u t u r e guidance. I s s u e 11. Defendants contend t h a t t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s , a f t e r t i m e l y and s p e c i f i c f i l i n g o f m o t i o n s f o r severance, brought about t h e s e e r r o r s : 1. The j u r y was a l l o w e d t o c o n s i d e r h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e which was i n a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t c e r t a i n d e f e n d a n t s , y e t a d m i s s i b l e against others. 2. The a d m i s s i o n o f h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e d e n i e d i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s t h e i r fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o confrontat i o n u n d e r t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3. The j o i n d e r o f d e f e n d a n t s ' t r i a l s d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s t h e i r r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. The o n l y s p e c i f i c example o f t h e a d m i s s i o n o f e x t r a j u d i c i a 1 h e a r s a y c i t e d t o u s i s Bushman's t e s t i m o n y of s t a t e m e n t s a l l e g e d l y made by d e f e n d a n t Radi. Bushman t e s t i f i e d t h e s e s t a t e - ments w e r e made a t R a d i ' s home i n B i l l i n g s on A p r i l 6, 1 9 7 5 , a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2:30 a . m . , of t h e a l l e g e d crimes. s e v e r a l h o u r s a f t e r t h e commission A l l of defendants, w i t h t h e exception o f F i t z p a t r i c k , w e r e p r e s e n t when t h e s t a t e m e n t s w e r e made. Bushman t e s t i f i e d Radi s t a t e d : "A. ' F i t z d i d n ' t have t o s h o o t t h e k i d . ' I ! * * * "A. And h e s a i d , ' F i t z s h o t h i m . ' 'Boom, boom, h e blew h i s head o f f . ' He said, "A. * * * he s a i d , ' F i t z p a t r i c k i s p r e t t y p i s s e d off.' h e s a i d , ' H e i s uptown g e t t i n g d r u n k bec a u s e him h a v i n g t o s h o o t t h e k i d f o r n o t h i n g b e c a u s e tlere w a s no money i n t h e bag."' The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, s t a t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t where o n e d e f e n d a n t testifies about what was said by a second defendant, it is ordinarily not admissible as evidence against any other defendant if that other defendant was not present at the time and place where it was said. "However, what is said is admissible against the defendants that are present when it is said. "In your deliberation, you are not to consider what was said against any defendant who was not present at the time and place where it was said. "You may consider what was said as evidence against those defendants present at the time and place it was said. "The reason for this is that a defendant who is not present when something was said about him, cannot, of course, deny that it was said because it is quite obvious he was not there to know the facts. Therefore, you will not use it as evidence against him." Defendants contend the instruction of the district court was insufficient and failed to erase from the minds of the jurors the crucial and devastating prejudice naturally flowing from the testimony. In support of their argument defendants cite Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L ed 2d 476. In Bruton the codefendants Bruton and Evans were tried jointly and convicted of armed postal robbery. During the trial a postal inspector testified Evans confessed that Bruton and Evans committed the robbery. Evans' conviction was later reversed be- cause the oral admission had been elicited by police officers in disregard of Evans' Miranda rights. Bruton's conviction was upheld on the theory the trial court sufficiently instructed the jurors not to consider Evans' confession as evidence against Bruton. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed Bruton's conviction stating: " * * * because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's r i g h t of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n s e c u r e d by t h e Conf r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e o f t h e S i x t h Amendment." 391 U . S . 126. I n a f o o t n o t e t h e Court s a i d : "We emphasize t h a t t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t i n c u l p a t i n g p e t i t i o n e r was c l e a r l y i n a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t him under t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e * * * t h e problem a r i s i n g o n l y b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e m e n t was * * * a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t t h e d e c l a r a n t Evans. * * * T h e r e i s n o t b e f o r e u s , t h e r e f o r e , any r e c o g n i z e d except i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e i n s o f a r a s p e t i t i o n e r i s concerned and we i n t i m a t e no view whatever t h a t such e x c e p t i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y r a i s e q u e s t i o n s under t h e Confrontation Clause." 391 U . S . 128. The s t a t e a r g u e s Bruton i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s i n c e t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman w e r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e rule. S e c t i o n 93-401-27, coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : " F a c t s which may be proved on t r i a l . I n conformity w i t h t h e p r e c e d i n g p r o v i s i o n s , e v i d e n c e may be g i v e n upon a t r i a l o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : "6. A f t e r proof o f a c o n s p i r a c y , t h e a c t o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f a c o n s p i r a t o r a g a i n s t h i s c o c o n s p i r a t o r , and r e l a t i n g t o t h e conspiracy." The s t a t e f u r t h e r a r g u e s even i f R a d i ' s d e c l a r a t i o n s w e r e n o t a d m i s s i b l e under t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e , t h e y were a d m i s s i b l e under s e c t i o n 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s : " D e c l a r a t i o n s which a r e a p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . Where, a l s o , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r o m i s s i o n forms p a r t o f a t r a n s a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e f a c t i n d i s p u t e , o r e v i d e n c e of t h a t f a c t , such d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r omission i s evidence, a s p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . " The s t a t e c o n t e n d s t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , s i n c e t h e s t a t e prosec u t e d t h e c a s e on t h e t h e o r y t h e r e was a c o n s p i r a c y t o commit robbery. I t i s argued t h a t , even though t h e c r i m e o f c o n s p i r a c y was n o t c h a r g e d a s a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , t h e s t a t e c o u l d p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t o show t h e r e w a s a conspiracy. Defendants u r g e t h e s t a t e i s b a r r e d from u t i l i z i n g t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e s i n c e t h e s t a t e d i d n o t c h a r g e d e f e n d a n t s w i t h t h e c r i m e of c o n s p i r a c y ; t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o prove a c o n s p i r a c y ; and, t h a t t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman were made a f t e r t h e c o n s p i r a c y ended, i f t h e r e was one, and w e r e n o t made i n f u r t h e r a n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y . W e d i s a g r e e with defen- d a n t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e . The s t a t e may p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o n s p i r a c y even though t h e crime of c o n s p i r a c y was n o t c h a r g e d a s a separate offense i n t h e Information. 159, 2 1 P.2d 63. S t a t e v. Dennison, 94 Mont. Whether o r n o t a c o n s p i r a c y was proved f o r t h e purpose o f p e r m i t t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n was a t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e j q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The e x i s t e n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y can be shown by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i dence. To e s t a b l i s h a c o n s p i r a c y it i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e by d i r e c t e v i d e n c e a n agreement t o commit a c r i m e . S t a t e v. A l t o n , 139 Mont. 479, 365 P.2d 527; S t a t e v. C o l l i n s , 88 Mont. 514, 294 P. 957; S t a t e v . Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106. A e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t n c o u r t made a f i n d i n g , w i t h o u t a d i s c l o s u r e of i t s g r o u n d s , conc e r n i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s made by a d e f e n d a n t a g a i n s t a n o n p r e s e n t c o d e f e n d a n t , by a n o t h e r codefendant. The c o u r t a d m i t t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e n admonished t h e j u r y by i t s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 ( h e r e t o f o r e c i t e d i n f u l l ) t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t c o u l d n o t be used a g a i n s t a c o d e f e n d a n t n o t p r e s e n t when t h e s t a t e m e n t was made. T h i s p r o c e d u r e was approved by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n P a o l i v . United S t a t e s , 352 U.S. 232, 77 S . C t . 294, 1 L ed 2d 278. I n Paoli a confession o f o n e d e f e n d a n t was a d m i t t e d i n c u l p a t i n g t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s . A five-four Court approved t h e g i v i n g o f a c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n , i f s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , and r e a s o n e d t h a t it c o u l d be assumed t h e j u r y would f o l l o w t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n . Yet, t h i s s t a r t e d a series of c a s e s based on t h e S i x t h Amendment command t h a t a l l d e f e n d a n t s i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s h a l l e n j o y t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t them. In 1 9 6 8 , Bruton p r e s e n t e d a f a c t s i t u a t i o n where Bruton was j o i n t l y t r i e d w i t h a c o d e f e n d a n t named Evans and c o n v i c t e d of r o b b e r y . A p o s t a l i n s p e c t o r t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t Evans had o r a l l y c o n f e s s e d t o him and a l s o i m p l i c a t e d Bruton. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h i s added s u b s t a n t i a l w e i g h t t o t h e c a s e i n a form n o t s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , take t h e stand. s i n c e Evans d i d n o t The Court of Appeals, E i g h t h C i r c u i t , 375 F.2d 355, s e t a s i d e t h e Evans c o n v i c t i o n f o r a "Miranda" v i o l a t i o n b u t a f f i r m e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e n o n c o n f e s s o r Bruton. The c o u r t r e l i e d on P a o l i b e c a u s e t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d n o t t o cons i d e r Evans1 c o n f e s s i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g B r u t o n 1 s i n n o c e n c e o r guilt. The Supreme Court i n Bruton s p e c i f i c a l l y o v e r r u l e d P a o l i and c h a l l e n g e d t h e n a i v e assumption t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of s u c h t e s t i m o n y c o u l d be overcome by j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . The C o u r t h e l d t h a t s i n c e s u b s t a n t i a l w e i g h t was added t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s c a s e by t h e t e s t i m o n y i n a form n o t s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , B r u t o n ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him was v i o l a t e d , and t h e v i o l a t i o n was n o t c u r e d by t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n t o d i s r e g a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p o s t a l i n s p e c t o r c o n c e r n i n g Evans1 c o n f e s s i o n i n c u l p a t i n g Bruton. For a c a s e by c a s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e "Bruton r u l e " see H a r r i n g t o n v . C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U . S . 2 3 L ed 2d 2 8 4 . 250, 89 S.Ct. 1 7 2 6 , I n H a r r i n g t o n t h e r e a r e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of con- s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e "Bruton r u l e " , i n Bruton t y p e s i t u a t i o n s where it i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W do n o t f i n d e these exceptions present i n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case. - 13 - The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right of the defendant to confront his witnesses at the time of trial. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L ed 409, 411, the Court said: "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. * * *" The United States Court of Appeals in United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 683, cert. den. 404 U.S. 943, found the relevant factual inquiry in determining whether the Confrontation Clause is violated to be: " * * * whether under the circumstances, the unavailability of the declarant for cross-examination deprived the jury of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the extrajudicial declaration." The criteria to be considered in making this factual inquiry are: (1) the declarant's knowledge of the identities and roles of the other coconspirators; (2) the possibility that declarant was relying on faulty recollection; (3) the circumstances under which the statements were made, indicating declarant might be lying about the codefendant's involvement in the crime; (4) the possibility defendants could have shown by cross-examination the declarant's statements were unreliable; and (5) whether the testimony is so "crucial" to the prosecution or "devastating" to the defense as to require reversal of the conviction. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730; United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, cert. den. 416 U.S. 940. Whether a defendant was denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be resolved case-by-case, based on an examination of all the circumstances and e v i d e n c e . A r i a s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 388 F.Supp. 736. T h e r e i s l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t d e c l a r a n t Radi c l e a r l y knew F i t z p a t r i c k ' s r o l e i n t h e a l l e g e d crime and t h e i d e n t i t i e s and r o l e s of t h e o t h e r conspirators. mind. The e v e n t s w e r e f r e s h i n h i s Y e t , w i t h o u t d i s c u s s i n g t h e t r u t h and v e r a c i t y o f t h e d e c l a r a n t , w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t Radi had good r e a s o n t o l i e a b o u t who s h o t t h e v i c t i m . W i t h o u t F i t z p a t r i c k p r e s e n t , Radi m i g h t e a s i l y persuade h i s coconspirators t h a t a l l f a t a l s h o t s w e r e f i r e d by F i t z p a t r i c k and t h u s a v o i d some c o n c e i v e d c r i m i n a l culpability. I n any e v e n t , w e recognize t h e d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t t h i s t e s t i m o n y would have upon a j u r y and h o l d , a t l e a s t a s t o F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e r e was a d e n i a l o f t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e d e c l a r a n t on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n b e f o r e t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n admonishing t h e j u r y was i n s u f f i c i e n t a s f a r a s o f f s e t t i n g a n y p r e j u d i c e which r e s u l t e d from t h e admission of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements. S t a t e s , s u p r a ; R o b e r t s v . R u s s e l l , 392 U.S. Bruton v. United 293, 88 S . C t . 1921, W e acknowledge t h e i n h e r e n t d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n determining whether d e f e n d a n t s j o i n t l y charged w i t h p u b l i c o f f e n s e s a r e t o be provided s e p a r a t e t r i a l s o r t r i e d jointly. However, w e r e c o g n i z e a need f o r j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s i n t h e i n s t a n c e where t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t e n d s t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o evidence t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of one defendant t h a t imp l i c a t e s a codefendant. T h i s i s s u e was d i s c u s s e d i n P e o p l e v . Aranda, 63 C.2d 518, 47 C a l . R p t r . 353, 4 0 7 P.2d 265, 272: "When t h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r o p o s e s t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o evidence an e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of one defendant t h a t i m p l i c a t e s a codefendant, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must a d o p t o n e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g procedures: (1) I t c a n p e r m i t a j o i n t t r i a l i f a l l p a r t s of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements imp l i c a t i n g a n y c o d e f e n d a n t s c a n b e and a r e e f f e c t i v e l y deleted without prejudice t o t h e d e c l a r a n t . By e f f e c t i v e d e l e t i o n s , w e mean n o t o n l y d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s o f c o d e f e n d a n t s b u t any s t a t e m e n t s t h a t c o u l d be employed a g a i n s t n o n d e c l a r a n t c o d e f e n d a n t s once t h e i r i d e n t i t y i s o t h e r w i s e e s t a b l i s h e d . ( 2 ) I t c a n g r a n t a s e v e r a n c e of t r i a l s i f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n s i s t s t h a t it must u s e t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s and it a p p e a r s t h a t e f f e c t i v e d e l e t i o n s c a n n o t be made. (3) I f the p r o s e c u t i o n h a s s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d a motion f o r s e v e r a n c e and t h e r e a f t e r o f f e r s a n e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement implicating a codefendant, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must e x c l u d e i t i f e f f e c t i v e deletions a r e not possible. Similar rules c o n c e r n i n g j o i n t t r i a l have been a d o p t e d i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s and have been found workable. [ C i t i n g c a s e s . ] " 407 P.2d 272. W a r e i n agreement w i t h t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s . e Our f i n a l i n q u i r y i n t h i s a r e a of j o i n d e r c o n c e r n s def e n d a n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s d e n i e d them t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . Defendants c l a i m : (1) The number o f d e f e n d a n t s and i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l m81.de it i m p o s s i b l e t o employ e f f e c t i v e t r i a l t a c t i c s ; ( 2 ) one d e f e n d a n t o r a n o t h e r d i s q u a l i f i e d a d i s t r i c t judge o r c h a l l e n g e d a j u r o r t h a t a n o t h e r d e f e n d a n t would have a l l o w e d t o remain i n t h e c a s e ; (3) certain t h a t m e r e l y re- c o u n s e l d e l v e d i n t o a r e a s on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n p e a t e d t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r d e f e n d a n t s ; and ( 4 ) a l l d e f e n d a n t s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of Radi, e l e c t e d t o rest t h e i r cases f o l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , Radi t o r e s t . t h u s compelling W n o t e t h a t most of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a r e o f a e g e n e r a l n a t u r e and c o u l d be r a i s e d i n a l m o s t any m u l t i p l e defendant-counsel proceeding. I t would be most u n u s u a l , i n our opinion, i f four defense counsel representing individual c l i e n t s d i d a g r e e on e v e r y q u e s t i o n of t r i a l t a c t i c s . F u r t h e r , a de- f e n d a n t h a s no r i g h t t o have h i s c a s e t r i e d by a s p e c i f i c judge o r have a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s i t on h i s j u r y . S t a t e v . Moran, 1 4 2 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. I n c o n c l u d i n g d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i s s u e of j o i n d e r , w e r e i t e r a t e our position. Defendants i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u - d i c e t h r o u g h t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s b e c a u s e of a f a i l u r e to protect individual defendant's right to confrontation. We fully realize the benefits of joint trials, specifically, the conservation of state funds, diminished inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and the avoidance of delay in bringing those accused of crime to trial. Yet, where we obtain speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the cost of fundamental constitutional rights, that price is too high. Trial courts must examine joinder of defendants' trials more closely, particularly where separate counsel is required because of potential conflicts of interest between the defendants. Issue 111. This issue attacks the sufficiency of evi- dence which the state presented to corroborate Bushman's testimony. Section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Testimony of person legally accountable. A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of one responsible or legally accountable £0; the same offense, as defined in section 94-2-106, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof." In State v. Orsborn, Mont . , 555 P.2d 509, 514, 33 St.Rep. 935, 940, this Court said: "State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P.2d 265, has been cited many times as to the general guidelines for determining the sufficiency of evidence corroborating the testimony of one legally accountable. Though Cobb was decided under section 11988, R.C.M. 1921, since repealed, the language of the old statute is nearly identical to that of section 953012, R.C.M. 1947, in pertinent part. * * *" State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P. 265, set out these general rules: "(a) The corroborating evidence may be supplied by the defendant or his witnesses. "(b) It need not be direct evidence--it may be circumstantial. "(c) It need not extend to every fact to which t h e accomplice t e s t i f i e s . " ( d ) I t need p o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a conv i c t i o n o r t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e o f guilt. " ( e ) I t need n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e c r i m e ; i t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f it t e n d s t o do s o . " ( f ) Whether t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e t e n d s t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission o f t h e o f f e n s e i s a q u e s t i o n of l a w , b u t t h e weight o f t h e evidence--its e f f i c a c y t o f o r t i f y t h e testimony o f t h e accomplice and r e n d e r h i s s t o r y t r u s t worthy--is a m a t t e r f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e j u r y . '' A t t r i a l t h e s t a t e p r e s e n t e d two minor g i r l s who t e s t i - f i e d t h e y were w i t h a l l f i v e d e f e n d a n t s on t h e day of t h e r o b b e r y and murder. The g i r l s t e s t i f i e d a l l f i v e d e f e n d a n t s planned t o go t o Hardin and t h e g i r l s t h e m s e l v e s accompanied Bushman, Bad Horse and H o l l i d a y on t h e t r i p t o Hardin and t h e r e t u r n t r i p t o B i l l i n g s , a t a b o u t m i d n i g h t on A p r i l 5 , 1975; t h a t F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were i n R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e a t a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n i n B i l l i n g s j u s t b e f o r e Bushman, H o l l i d a y , Bad Horse and t h e two g i r l s l e f t f o r Hardin; t h a t R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e p a s s e d them on t h e highway t o Hardin; and t h a t two men, who t h e g i r l s presumed t o be Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k , g o t o u t o f R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e i n Hardin. Both g i r l s t e s t i f i e d t h e y o b s e r v e d a h o l e i n t h e w i n d s h i e l d o f R a d i ' s a u t o m o b i l e on t h e morning f o l l o w i n g t h e crimes. C a r o l Broach t e s t i f i e d Bushman, Bad Horse and H o l l i d a y were i n Hardin from a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10:45 p.m. t o m i d n i g h t on A p r i l 5 , 1975; t h a t s h e r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s w i t h t h e s e t h r e e d e f e n d a n t s and t h e two minor g i r l s ; a n d , t h a t t h i s g r o u p a r r i v e d a t R a d i ' s house a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2:00 a . m . on ~ p r i l , 1975. 6 R a l e i g h K r a f t , Jr. t e s t i f i e d he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h Bushman and Bad Horse t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r o b b i n g t h e Safeway store. - 18 - Ronald Potts and Lyle Doane testified they were customers at the Safeway store on the evening of April 5, 1975, and observed an automobile, blue or green in color,parked in front of the Safeway store, with two male occupants approximately the same ages as Radi and Fitzpatrick. Radi's automo- bile was metallic blue in color. Agent Dieckman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified Fitzpatrick was arrested in Spokane, Washington on June 3, 1975, and Fitzpatrick told him he had been drinking with Radi in Billings on the evening of April 5. The witness established that Fitzpatrick used a fictitious name while in Spokane and possessed a newspaper clipping stating Fitzpatrick was wanted by the police for the crimes committed in Hardin on April 5, 1975. Robert Balko, employed by Nyquist Financial Services in Billings, testified Radi indicated in a conversation with him that someone had shot a hole through his windshield. The testimony of Mary Jenkins and Helen Jones established that Radi had changed his Montana automobile license plates for Nevada license plates shortly after the crimes. Roger Asbury of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified the bullet found in Radi's automobile was fired from the same gun as the slug found in the victim's automobile and the slug which killed the victim. This evidence sufficiently corroborates Bushman's testimony. Issue IV. The final issue we will consider is whether the convictions of defendants Holliday and Bad Horse should be reversed on the ground the jury was inadequately instructed on the applicable law and returned inconsistent verdicts. Holliday and Bad Horse contend that since the state prosecuted its case on the theory of conspiracy it is logically inconsistent to find them guilty of robbery, but not guilty of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping. In support of this contention de- fendants direct our attention to the court's Instruction No. 28, an instruction on the felony-murder doctrine, which provided: "You are instructed that when two or more persons agree to commit a crime under such circumstances as may * * * result in the taking of human life, either in the furtherance of, or the resistance to their unlawful agreement, then each party * * * will be held responsible for the consequences which might reasonably be expected to flow * * * from carrying into effect their unlawful agreement * * *. "The law is that, if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and death happens in the furtherance of the common object, all are alike guilty of the homicide. The act of one of them done in the furtherance of the original design, in the contemplation of the law, is the act of all. And if such an agreement is to do or perform an unlawful act constituting a felony, and in the prosecution of such unlawful act constituting a felony, an individual is killed, such killing is deliberate homicide." A general principle of law is that consistency in criminal verdicts is unnecessary. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L ed 356. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. Where two or more defendants are tried together in a criminal case the verdicts need not demonstrate rational consistency. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, cert. den. 420 U.S. 991. The United States Supreme Court explained the rationale for the Dunn holding when it said: "That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." 284 U.S. 394. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse distinguish Dunn from the instant case. They contend the jury in Dunn correctly followed the instructions of law given to it in reaching that verdict, but the jury here when finding Holliday and Bad Horse not guilty on two counts and guilty on the other count, completely disregarded Instruction No. 28 and relied on Instruction No. 36 which provided the jury might "find any one of the following verdicts" as to each defendant: "1. Guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide; "2. Not guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide; "3. Guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping; "4. Not guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping; "5. Guilty of Count Three, robbery; "6. Not guilty of Count Three, robbery." The jury verdicts returned in this case can be distinguished from the inconsistent verdicts which were the subject of the general rule announced in Dunn. These verdicts are not merely inconsistent, they are legally unsupportable. his case was prosecuted on a conspiracy to commit robbery theory and each defendant prosecuted under the felony murder rule or doctrine which contemplates, as set forth in the trial court's Instruction No. 28, that each defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide or must be acquitted. This jury was improperly and inadequately instructed on that point of law and could not reach a proper verdict. State v. Bean, 135 Mont. 135, 337 P.2d 930; State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309. The inconsistency between the court's Instruction No. 28 and Instruction No. 36 is apparent and the resulting confusion in the minds of the jury is evidenced by its request for clarification of Instruction No. 28: "Question on Instruction #28 "If we find one defendant guilty of robbery does Inst. No. 28 require guilty verdict on two remaining counts." The district court responded: "Instruction number 36 answers this question." No further clarification was provided, the jury completed d e l i b e r a t i o n and r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t . T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e need f o r g i v i n g a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury i s a m a t t e r of d i s t r i c t court discretion. 1377. S t a t e v . Hawkins, 165 Mont. 4 5 6 , 529 P.2d However, h e r e t h e j u r y was d i r e c t e d t o examine I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 36, which i s a n improper i n s t r u c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o t h e l a w of t h e case. The c o u r t s h o u l d have f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n a manner t h a t would s u f f i c i e n t l y and c l e a r l y p r e s e n t t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. Such f a i l u r e i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . The judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n o f a l l d e f e n d a n t s a r e r e v e r s e d . The c a u s e s a r e remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r new t r i a l s . Justice ( Chief J u s t i c e Justices 0 A M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g in part: I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y ' s o p i n i o n a s t o a l l d e f e n d a n t s except Radi whose c o n v i c t i o n I would a f f i r m . By h i s own s t a t e - ments he was one of two men who kidnapped a young man (who u n l i k e any of t h e d e f e n d a n t s worked f o r a l i v i n g ) , took him o u t s i d e h i s hometown robbed and r u t h l e s s l y murdered him. I n ~ a d i ' s a s e it c makes l i t t l e o r no d i f f e r e n c e who f i r e d t h e s h o t s , f o r h i s v e r y a c t s i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e kidnapping and robbery make him a p r i n c i p a l t o t h e murder. A s t o Fitzpatri'ck, who was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e time of R a d i ' s s t a t e m e n t on who f i r e d t h e s h o t s , t h i s Court i s compelled t o f o l l o w t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Bruton v . United S t a t e s , s u p r a , and i t s progeny. To do o t h e r w i s e would be t o d e l a y t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n on r e t r i a l . Bruton i s based upon t h e r i g h t of defendant F i t z p a t r i c k , guaranteed by t h e S i x t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments, t o cross-examine w i t n e s s e s . Bruton t h u s h e l d t h a t , i n a j o i n t t r i a l where one defendant d i d n o t t a k e t h e s t a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of h i s e x t r a j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n which i n c r i m i n a t e d t h e second d e f e n d a n t , v i o l a t e d t h e second d e f e n d a n t ' s Sdxth and F o u r t e e n t h Amendment r i g h t s even though t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h e c o n f e s s i o n was n o t t o be c o n s i d e r e d a g a i n s t him. Subsequent c a s e s i l l u s t r a t e Bruton does n o t i n v a l i d a t e use of codefendant s t a t e m e n t s i n a l l j o i n t t r i a l s i t u a t i o n s . When, f o r example, t h e d e c l a r a n t codefender t a k e s t h e s t a n d and s u b j e c t s himself t o cross-examination, t h e r e i s no i n f r i n g e m e n t of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o cross-examine. 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L ed 2d 222. Nelson v . O'Meil, The Bruton r u l e cannot be invoked b y a defendant who i n s i s t s u p o i ~a join^ trial, knowing t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t e n d s t o use codefendants' i n c u l p a t o r y scatements. + d 2 U.S. United S t a t e s v. S u l l i v a n , 435 F.2d 650, c e r t . denied 912, 9 1 S.Ct. 1392, 28 L ed 2d 654. See a l s o Anno. 29 I f t h e inculpatory codefendant's confession i s admissible u n d e ~an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e , a s f o r example an admis- s i o n of a c o c o n s p i r a t o r , t h e Bruton r u l e w i l l n o t be invoked. : ~ n i t e d t a t e s v . K e l l e y , 526 F.2d 615,620. S Also where e x t r a - j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s of both d e f e n d a n t s i n t e r l o c k , and do n o t c o n f l i c t on v i t a l p o i n t s , c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t no r e v e r s a l i s required. United S t a t e s e x r e l . S t a n b r i d g e v . Z e l k e r , 514 F.2d 45. For t h e above reasons I would confirm a s t o defendant Radi.

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