WILLIAMS v WELLMAN-POWER GAS INC
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No. 13536 IN THE SUPRElIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 TERRY N. WILLIAMS, Claimant and Appellant, -vsWELLMAN-POWER GAS, INC., Employer, and HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. hlorkers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Appeal from: Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Greg J. Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: Poore, McKenzie, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, Butte, Montana David J. Wing argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: "UY . t t374f ,+ -. Clerk October 7, 1977 B()v 4 1 n g I M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court : Claimant T e r r y N . Williams appeals from t h e f i n d i n g , conclusions and o r d e r of t h e Workers' Compensation Court d i s missing h i s c l a i m f o r b e n e f i t s on t h e ground t h e c l a i m was n o t timely f i l e d . Claimant, an employee of defendant Wellman-Power Gas, I n c . , was i n j u r e d i n t h e course and scope of h i s employment February 1 5 , 1973, when he f e l l and s t r u c k h i s elbow. He r e p o r t e d t h e a c c i d e n t t o h i s employer and was taken t o s e e D r . John P. Lacey, who took X-rays of t h e elbow. The X-rays were n e g a t i v e , b u t t h e d o c t o r could f e e l broken c a r t i l a g e i n t h e i n j u r e d a r e a . He informed claimant t h e c a r t i l a g e was n o t l i k e l y t o g i v e him t r o u b l e b u t t h e r e was a p o s s i b i l i t y of s e v e r e s w e l l i n g , i n which c a s e s u r g e r y would be necessary. N treatment was recomo mended o r administered and claimant r e t u r n e d t o work w i t h o u t any l o s s of wages. The employer was e n r o l l e d under Plan 11 of t h e workers' Compensation Act w i t h insurance coverage provided by defendant H a r t f o r d Accident & Indemnity Company. A r e p o r t of occupa- t i o n a l i n j u r y and d i s e a s e was f i l e d w i t h t h e Workers' Compensation D i v i s i o n February 20, 1973. The i n s u r e r paid t h e medical ex- penses f o r t h e i n i t i a l examination. On A p r i l 10, 1973, t h e d i v i s i o n n o t i f i e d t h e i n s u r e r t o forward Form 5 4 , Claim f o r Compensation, t o claimant. The Workers' Compensation Court found t h i s form was duly mailed t o c l a i m a n t , along w i t h a cover l e t t e r a d v i s i n g him t o f i l l o u t t h e form and r e t u r n i t f o r t h e i n s u r e r ' s f i l e s . p u t e s t h i s f i n d i n g and d e n i e s r e c e i v i n g t h e form. Claimant d i s - Claimant d i d n o t f i l e a claim and a p p a r e n t l y h a d no more t r o u b l e w i t h t h e elbow u n t i l t h e summer of 1975, when he began t o experience pain while working f o r a d i f f e r e n t employer i n Alaska. He r e t u r n e d t o D r . Lacey i n Gctober 1975, and s u r g e r y was performed by a s p e c i a l i s t . Claimant f i l e d a c l a i m f o r com- p e n s a t i o n w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n December 1 7 , 1975.The d i v i s i o n and t h e Workers' Compensation Court denied t h e claim. Claimant p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e f o r review: 1) Did t h e twelve month s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n under s e c t i o n 92-601,R.C.M. 1947, p r i o r t o amendment i n 1973, commence t o run only a f t e r t h e discovery of a l a t e n t i n j u r y ? 2) Does t h e amendment t o s e c t i o n 92-601, e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1973, apply t o t h i s a c t i o n ? 3) Should t h e employer and i n s u r e r be found t o have waived and be estopped from a s s e r t i n g t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n ? Because of our d i s p o s i t i o n of I s s u e 2), i t i s unnecessary t o d i s c u s s I s s u e s 1 ) and 3 ) . On February 20, 1973, t h e d a t e of t h e a c c i d e n t , s e c t i o n 92-601, provided: "Claims must be presented w i t h i n what time. I n c a s e of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y o r d e a t h , a l l claims s h a l l be f o r e v e r b a r r e d u n l e s s presented i n w r i t i n g under o a t h t o t h e employer, t h e i n s u r e r , o r t h e board, a s t h e c a s e may b e , w i t h i n twelve months from t h e d a t e of t h e happening of t h e a c c i d e n t , e i t h e r by t h e c l a i m a n t o r someone l e g a l l y a u t h o r i z e d t o a c t f o r him i n h i s b e h a l f . " On J u l y 1, 1973, a n amendment t o s e c t i o n 92-601 became effective. The amendment d i d n o t change t h e twelve month l i m i t a - t i o n p e r i o d b u t added t h i s paragraph: "The d i v i s i o n may, upon a reasonable showing by t h e c l a i m a n t of l a c k of knowledge of d i s a b i l i t y , waive t h e time requirement, up t o an a d d i t i o n a l twenty-four (24) months . I 1 Claimant p e t i t i o n e d f o r an e x t e n s i o n under t h i s paragraph, b u t t h e c o u r t concluded t h e amendment could n o t be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o g i v e t h e d i v i s i o n d i s c r e t i o n t o allow t h e claim. A t t h e o u t s e t , we n o t e t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation Act has always been l i b e r a l l y construed i n f a v o r of t h e i n j u r e d claimant. S e c t i o n 92-838, R.C.M. 1947; Rumsey v. C a r d i n a l Petroleum, 166 Mont. 1 7 , 530 P. 2d 433 (1975) ; S t a t e ex r e l . Romero v . D i s t r i c t Court, 162 Mont. 358, 513 P.2d 265 (1973); Ness v. Diamond Asphalt Co., 143 Mont. 560, 393 P.2d 43 (1964). W a l s o n o t e t h e 1973 amendment t o s e c t i o n e 92-601 was passed t o a l l e v i a t e a c o n d i t i o n t h a t was d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e s t a t e d purposes and p o l i c i e s of t h e Workers' Compensation Act. P r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973, a c l a i m was r e q u i r e d t o be f i l e d w i t h i n twelve months of t h e d a t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e circumstances. I f an i n j u r y d i d n o t m a n i f e s t i t s e l f u n t i l more than twelve months a f t e r t h e d a t e of t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y had no r e c o u r s e and simply was r e q u i r e d t o b e a r t h e expenses of t h e i n j u r y . C r i t i c i s m of t h i s ' s i t u a t i o n i s w e l l expressed i n 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 578.42(b), p. 15-104: "It i s odd indeed t o f i n d , i n a supposedly b e n e f i c e n t p i e c e of l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e s u r v i v a l of t h i s fragment of i r r a t i o n a l c r u e l t y s u r p a s s i n g t h e most t e c h n i c a l f o r f e i t u r e s of l e g a l s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n . S t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n g e n e r a l l y proceed on t h e theory t h a t a man f o r f e i t s h i s r i g h t s only when he inexcusably d e l a y s a s s e r t i o n of them, and any number of excuses w i l l t o l l t h e running of t h e p e r i o d . But h e r e no amount of v i g i l a n c e i s of any h e l p . The l i m i t a t i o n s period runs a g a i n s t a c l a i m t h a t has n o t y e t matured; and when i t matures, i t i s already barred. * * *" The 1973 amendment o f f e r e d a s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem by g r a n t i n g t h e d i v i s i o n t h e a u t h o r i t y t o extend t h e time p e r i o d on a reasonable showing of l a c k of knowledge of t h e d i s a b i l i t y . I n view of t h e s e circumstances, it i s n o t unreasonable t o c o n s t r u e t h e amendment l i b e r a l l y t o g i v e i t broad a p p l i c a t i o n . .iowever, Jeienciallc . ~ S S isL ~ t h a t t o so c o n s t r u e t h e .smeridnlent t o apply t o t h e i n s t a n t c l a i m would be a r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , c o n t r a r y t o s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1 3 4 7 , which s t a t e s : "No law c o n t a i n e d i n any of t h e codes o r o t h e r s t a t u t e s of Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y 50 d e c l a r e d . " T h i s s t a t u t e should be r e a d i n l i g h t of t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g d e f i r i i t i o n of " r e t r o a c t i v e " , expressed i n B u t t e & S u p e r i o r Mining Co. v . McIntyre, 71 Mont. 254, 263, 229 P. 730 (1924): "* >y T h i s i s b u t a r u l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n . s t a t u t e which t a k e s away o r i m p a i r s v e s t e d a c q u i r e d under e x i s t i n g laws, o r c r e a t e s a 2 b l i g a t i o n , imposes a new duty o r a t t a c h e s riew d i s a b i l i t y , i n r e s p e c t t o t r a n s a c t i o n s p a s t , i s deemed r e t r o a c t i v e . " >? A rights, new a already See a 1 s d : C i t y o f Harlem v . S t a t e Highway Commission, 149 Mont. To apply t h e amendment t o claims n o t a l r e a d y b a r r e d a t +he tirne t h e amendment took e f f e c t would n o t r e q u i r e r e t r o a c ~ i v e p p l i c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h i s amendment. a vested r i g h t s a r e taken away o r impaired. J i s a b i l i t i e s a r e imposed. N o N new d u t i e s o r o The amendment simply g r a n t s t h e J i v i s i o n t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o extend t h e time p e r i o d i n l i m i t e d circumstances. The C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court i n Mudd v . McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 463, 183 P.2d 1 0 , 13 (1947), c o n s i d e r e d an amendment which extended a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . The c o u r t ' s r e a s o n i n g " I t i s t h e s e t t l e d law of t h i s s t a t e t h a t a n anlesldment which e n l a r g e s a p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n s p p l i e s t o pending m a t t e r s where n o t o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y excepted. Such l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t s t h e cemedy and i s a p p l i c a b l e t o m a t t e r s n o t a l r e a d y ' m r r e d , w i t h o u t r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . Because t h e speration i s prospective r a t h e r than r e t r o s p e c t i v e , t h e r e i s no impairment of v e s t e d r i g h t s . Moreover a p a r t y h a s no v e s t e d r i g h t i n t h e running of a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n p r i o r t o i t s e x p i r a t i o n . He i s deemed t o s u f f e r no i n j u r y i f , a t t h e time of a n amendment extending t h e period of l i m i t a t i o n f o r recovery, he i s under o b l i g a t i o n t o pay. Thus t r u e r e t r o a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n o f a l i m i t a t i o n s t a t u t e i s such a s would r e v i v e m a t t e r s t h a t had a l r e a d y been b a r r e d by t h e l a p s e of time." *** T h i s c a s e i s t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Penrod v. Hoskinson, M.D., Mont . , 552 P.2d 325, 33 St.Rep. 705 (1976), r e l i e d upon by defendants. T h i s Court i n Penrod r e j e c t e d a n a t t e m p t t o r e t r o a c t i v e l y apply a new s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o medical m a l p r a c t i c e which would have limited p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o sue under t h e "discovery d o c t r i n e " . There was no q u e s t i o n i n Penrod t h a t defendant was a s k i n g f o r r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e new s t a t u t e , and we found no m a n i f e s t a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t i t be s o a p p l i e d . The i n s t a n t c a s e does n o t involve t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e amendment b u t r a t h e r t h e e x e r c i s e by t h e d i v i s i o n of d i s c r e t i o n which i t had t h e power t o e x e r c i s e while c l a i m a n t was s t i l l e n t i t l e d t o f i l e h i s claim. W hold t h e amendment a p p l i e s t o a 1 1 claims e x i s t i n g e J u l y 1, 1973, without r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . Claimant's a c t i o n had n o t been b a r r e d by J u l y 1, 1973, and t h e r e f o r e t h e d i v i s i o n had t h e power t o c o n s i d e r h i s p e t i t i o n f o r ' a n e x t e n s i o n of time. The workers' Compensation Court e r r e d i n h o l d i n g otherwise. While defendants argue t h e m a t t e r i s s t i l l d i s c r e t i o n a r y w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n and t h e d i v i s i o n may r e f u s e t o e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s argument has no m e r i t h e r e . The d i v i s i o n was obviously under t h e f a l s e impression i t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a t t e r , and r e f u s e d t o e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h a t reason. The judgment i s reversed and t h e cause i s remanded t o t h e Workers' Compensation Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. W Concur: e > 1 ' ' -- -7 / GI,(, /& / - chief J u s t i c e -- I Justices. ........................... M r . J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell, s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t i n t h e foregoing Opinion. Justice
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