STATE EX REL BRICENO v DIST COUR
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No. 13832 I N THE SUFREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 THE STATE O F ElONTANA ex r e l . SOL BRICENO and J E S S I E BRICENO, Relators, THE D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE THIRTEENTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA, I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of Y e l l o w s t o n e , and t h e H o n . C. B. Sande, Respondents. Original Proceeding: C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For R e l a t o r s : M o s e s , T o l l i v e r & Wright, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a R a l p h A l l a n B e c k argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : H a r o l d F. H a n s e r , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n q s , M o n t a n a C h a r l e s B r a d l e y argued, D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , IvlOntana Submitted: F i l e d : - =w<q ,~~ clerk June 2 2 , 1 9 7 7 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding. Relators Sol Briceno and J e s s i e Briceno, defendants i n a criminal a c t i o n , seek a w r i t of supervisory control o r other appropriate w r i t from t h i s Court t o require the presiding judge of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, annul and s e t a s i d e the denial of r e l a t o r s ' motion t o dismiss f o r lack of a speedy t r i a l . Defendants Sol and J e s s i e Briceno, f a t h e r and son respectively, were a r r e s t e d i n B i l l i n g s on November 20, 1975, and charged with the crime of aggravated a s s a u l t , a felony. t o have occurred on J u l y 7 , 1975. The offense was alleged Defendants appeared i n j u s t i c e court on November 20, 1975, and were released upon posting bond the next day. On April 28, 1976, the Yellowstone County attorney and de- fendants, accompanied by counsel, appeared i n d i s t r i c t court. The county attorney moved f o r and was granted leave t o f i l e an I n f o r m t i o n formally charging defendants with aggravated a s s a u l t . De- fendants were arraigned during t h e proceedings and pled "NOT GUILTY" t o t h e charge. M y 26, 1976. a Two weeks t h e r e a f t e r the t r i a l d a t e was s e t f o r O May 18, 1976, counsel f o r defendants moved f o r n a continuance and, i n addition t o other matters, f o r a dismissal of t h e charges f o r lack of a speedy t r i a l . The motion s t a t e d i n part : "The defendants agree t h a t they w i l l waive any r i g h t they have by law t o complain a s t o a speedy t r i a l by reason of any delay i n t h e i r t r i a l date caused by t h i s mot ion ." The t r i a l was r e s e t f o r September 1976. Defendants, on September 2 , 1976, renewed t h e i r motion t o dismiss. Various pre- t r i a l proceedings were had between September 1976 and March 1977. O April 12, 1977, following a hearing, the d i s t r i c t court n o r a l l y denied defendants' motion t o dismiss f o r lack of a speedy t r i a l . Thereupon defendants f i l e d the i n s t a n t applica- t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory control with t h i s Court, seeking t h a t the d i s t r i c t court order of April 12, 1977, denying the motion t o dismiss be s e t a s i d e and annulled. The s o l e issue on appeal i s whether the Information should be dismissed because defendants have been denied t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Defendants argue t h a t , under the f a c t s of t h i s case, a delay of 4 1/2 months between the d a t e of t h e alleged offense and t h e i r a r r e s t and of over 6 months between t h e a r r e s t and t h e f i l i n g of t h e Information i s s u f f i c i e n t l y long t o s h i f t t o the s t a t e the burden of explaining t h e delay and showing the absence of prejudice t o defendants. Their argument i s grounded i n t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s outlined by the United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n . . Lj t Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 99&, 18 L ed 2d Fs 4 and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101; a s f u r t h e r developed by t h i s c o u r t ' s decisions i n S t a t e ex r e l . Thomas v. D i s t r i c t Court, 151 Mont, 1, 438 P.2d 554; F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t , 165 Mont, 382, 528 P.2d 1322; S t a t e v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178; and S t a t e v. Keller, 1013, 33 S t . Rep. 795. Mont . , 553 P.2d These cases involve a s e n s i t i v e balancing of four f a c t o r s , i n which t h e conduct of the prosecution and t h e defendant a r e weighed i n determining whether t h e r e has been a denial of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . evaluated and balanced a r e : . The f o u r - f a c t o r s t o be (1) Length of delay; (2) Reason f o r delay; (3) Assertion of t h e r i g h t by defendant; and (4) Prejudice t o the defendant. Defendants a s e e r t t h e f a c t s of the i n s t a n t case, when considered and balanced i n the context of the above four f a c t o r s , c l e a r l y demonstrate they have been denied t h e r i g h t t o a speedy trial. They s t r e s s (1) the Iefigth of the delay was unreasonable; (2) t h e delay was aggravated by the f a c t the i n v e s t i g a t i o n which formed the b a s i s f o r the Information was completed during August 1975, more than 8 months p r i o r t o the f i l i n g of the Information, aad the e n t i r e period of delay can be characterized a s one of t o t a l inaction on t h e p a r t of the prosecution, chargeable a s such t o t h e prosecution; (3) the d e n i a l of the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l was a s s e r t e d through counsel s h o r t l y following the f i l i n g of t h e Information and arraignment i n d i s t r i c t court; and (4) severe a c t u a l prejudice has r e s u l t e d through t h e l o s s of an e s s e n t i a l defense witness, The s t a t e concedes the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the four f a c t o r balancing process of Barker,,as accepted i n the various Montana decisions, It contends t h e i n a b i l i t y t o resolve one of the four f a c t o r s i n favor of the accused i s s u f f i c i e n t gmetwd a lack of speedy t r i a l argument. for rejecting The s t a t e argues t h e delay i n t h e i n s t a n t case was n e i t h e r purposeful nor oppressive; t h a t the anxiety and concern of t h e defendants were minimized by reason of no p r e t r i a l incarceration, and no a c t u a l prejudice r e s u l t e d from the l o s s of the defense witness. Court's decision i n S t a t e v. Carden, The s t a t e r e l i e s on t h i s - . Mont -9 P.2d 34 St.Rep. 420, wherein the Court indicated t h a t not every delay , i n a criminal a c t i o n i s properly chargeable t o the s t a t e . It i s maintained the delays i n the i n s t a n t case f a l l 'under t h e r u l e of Carden and, a s such, a r e not chargeable t o the No attempt i s made t o d i s t i n g u i s h F i t z p a t r i c k , Steward o r state. Keller . The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s expressly guaranteed by t h e United S t a t e s and Montana Constitutions. The Sixth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution provides: "In a l l criminal prosecutions t h e accused s h a l l enjoy the r i g h t t o a speedy and public t r i a l * * *." A r t . 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution s t a t e s : "In a l l criminal prosecutions the accused s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o a speedy public t r i a l * * *." *** The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l has been c l a s s i f i e d a s a fundamental r i g h t , applicable t o the s t a t e s by v i r t u e of the Fourteenth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra. The touchstone i n any a n a l y s i s of the speedy t r i a l i s s u e i s Barker v. Wingo, supra. Both p a r t i e s , a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , recognize the primary a u t h o r i t y of Barker. W f i n d no need t o e r e i t e r a t e the t h e o r e t i c a l foundations of t h e four f a c t o r balancing approach of Barker a s adopted by numerous Montana decisions. It i s suf f i e i e n t t o say the balancing t e s t involves a weighing of these four f a c t o r s with consideration given t o the conduct of the accused and prosecution, respectively: (1) Length of delay; (2) Reason f o r delay; (3) ~ e f e n d a n t ' sa s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t ; and (4) Prejudice t o the defendant. F i r s t , the length of delay i n t h i s case. There were two b a s i c delays involved (a) 4 1/2 months between the alleged offense and t h e a c t u a l a r r e s t , and (b) 6 months between t h e a r r e s t and the f i l i n g of the Information. A-similar delay was considered by t h i s Court i n F i t z p a t r i c k : "Length of delay: Seven months. W emphasize t h i s e delay i s not considered a per se v i o l a t i o n of p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o a speedy trix, but under the c i r cumstances here it i s thought long enough t o s h i f t t o t h e s t a t e the burden of explaining the reason f o r t h e delay and showing absence of prejudice t o p e t i t i o n e r . " 165 Mont. 382, 388. Here, a s i n F i t z p a t r i c k , w e find the burden t o have s h i f t e d t o the s t a t e by reason of the delays. Unlike t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Carden, the e n t i r e 10 1/2 month delay i n t h i s case c o n s i s t s primarily of "dead t i m e " . The prosecution simply was not pursued with reasonable diligence u n t i l the time the Information was filed. Indeed, the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the case which furnished t h e information necessary t o charge these defendants was completed a t l e a s t 8 months p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of the Information. Second, t h e reason f o r the delay. The s t a t e argues i t was not made aware of t h e f a c t defendants were a r r e s t e d and brought before t h e j u s t i c e court on November 20, 1975, u n t i l s h o r t l y p r i o r t o the time the Information was f i l e d . This i s not *a case involving delays occasioned i n any manner, whether thcough time consuming investigations o r good f a i t h motions, by the conduct of the defendants. It i s t r u e the s t a t e , i n a given case, i s not automatically chargeable with a l l delays not a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the defendant. supra. S t a t e v. Carden, The delays here appear t o be unintentional r a t h e r than d e l i b e r a t e , nevertheless they a r e s u b s t a n t i a l delays r e s u l t i n g d i r e c t l y from a breakdown i n t h e chain of prosecution, f o r which t h e s t a t e w i l l be held responsible. The reason f o r t h e delay advanced by t h e s t a t e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y the lengthy delay. Third, w find defendants' a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t t o a e speedy t r i a l was timely. A s s t a t e d i n Steward: "The 'appropriate motion' i s a motion t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l . The proper time t o a s s e r t the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s p r i o r t o the a c t u a l commencement of the t r i a l , usually a t t h e t i m e t h e t r i a l d a t e i s s e t , o r t h e time 168 Mont. 385, 390. the case i s c a l l e d t o t r i a l . " Here, defendants moved t o dismiss f o r lack of a speecy t r i a l two weeks following arraignment i n d i s t r i c t court and l e s s than a week a f t e r the f i r s t t r i a l date was s e t . Under these circumstances we f i n d t h e a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t was properly and timely made. Defendants' waiver of the r i g h t regarding any delay occasioned by t h e i r motion t o dismiss has no e f f e c t on the propriety of the a s s e r t i o n . Fourth, prejudice, both presumptive and a c t u a l , t o defendants. The primary i n t e r e s t s which l i e a t t h e h e a r t of thPs f a c t o r a r e s e t f o r t h i n Barker: "* * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed i n t h e l i g h t of the i n t e r e s t of defendants which the speedy t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o protect. This Court has i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e such i n t e r e s t s : ( i ) t o prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l incarceration; ( i i ) t o minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and ( i i i ) t o l i m i t the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired. Of these, t h e most important i s the l a s t , because the i n a b i l i t y of a defendant adequately t o prepare h i s case skews t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e e n t i r e system. I f witnesses d i e o r disappear during a delay, the prejudice i s obvious. There i s a l s o prejudice i f defense witnesses a r e unable t o r e c a l l accurately events of t h e d i s t a n t p a s t . Loss of memory, however, i s n o t always r e f l e c t e d i n t h e record because what has been forgotten can r a r e l y 407 U.S. 514, 532. be shown." Defendants acknowledge they were not prejudiced with regard t o oppressive p r e t r i a l confinement. p r e t r i a l con£iaement There was no . The second i n t e r e s t t o be protected by a speedy t r i a l , minimization of an accused's anxiety and concern, i s d i f f i c u l t t o show a s such i s not r e a d i l y subject t o proof by o b j e c t i v e evidence. S t a t e v. Steward, supra. Here, while the record contains no f a c t s conclusively showing anxiety and concern have been caused t o defendants, various statements appearing i n defendants' b r i e f support the conclusion defendants have l i k e l y been subject t o s u b s t a n t i a l anxiety and emotional abuse because of the delays. W f i n d , under the f a c t s , some prejudice e i n the nature of anxiety and concern can be presumed t o have occurred. It i s the t h i r d and most important outlined above which concerns us here. OF t h e i n t e r e s t s The defense was s e r i o u s l y impaired by t h e death of an e s s e n t i a l witness and it has r e s u l t e d i n a c t u a l prejudice t o defendants. I t s d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t on the a b i l i t y of defendants t o prepare an adequate defense i s more than obvious. It i s no argument t o say t h e testimony of the deceased witness might have been controverted by testimony of s t a t e ' s witnesses. W cannot allow any defendant's r i g h t e to an adequately prepared case t o be dismissed i n t h i s manner. After considering the circumstances i n t h e l i g h t of the f a c t o r s established by Barker, we hold there has been an excessive delay; t h a t no v i a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e delay has been demonstrated; t h a t defendants' a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l was proper and timely; and t h a t some preaudice, both a c t u a l and presumptive, r e s u l t e d d i r e c t l y from the delay. Accordingly, i t i s ordered the d i s t r i c t court annul and s e t aside i t s oral order o f April 12, 1977, denying defendants' motion t o dismiss and substitute therefor an order o f dismissal. Justice W e Concur: n f Cbief Justice
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