BAUER v CHAUSSEE

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No. 13467 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1977 J O H N B. BAUER and EDNA BAUER, P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s , WILFRED CHAUSSEE and CHAUSSEE SAPPHIRE MINES, a Montana Corporation, D e f e n d a n t s and Respondents. D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward T. D u s s a u l t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Appeal from: Counsel of Record: For A p p e l l a n t : S k e l t o n and K n i g h t , M i s s o u l a , Montana R o b e r t R. S k e l t o n a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana For Respondents: Radonich, B r o l i n and Reardon, Anaconda, Montana W i l l i a m A. B r o l i n a r g u e d , Anaconda, Montana Submitted: Decided: ! 1 Filed: " - qy, A p r i l 1 8 , 1977 AUG 2 --- IV X M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G . Hatf i e l d d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l from an o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G r a n i t e County, g r a n t i n g a temporary i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s from any media a d v e r t i s i n g of t h e i r t r a d e and o r d e r i n g t h e removal of p l a i n t i f f s ' mobile home from d e f e n d a n t s ' land. The p a r t i e s h e r e t o a r e r e l a t e d . Defendant Wilfred Chaussee i s t h e b r o t h e r of p l a i n t i f f Edna Bauer. e f f e c t e d an agreement i n 1971. i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s s u i t . The p a r t i e s mutually The substance of t h a t agreement Defen.dants a r e purchasing t h e Chaussee Sapphire Mine and a d j o i n i n g land by c o n t r a c t . Plaintiffs c l a i m a p a r c e l of land l o c a t e d a t t h e mine, upon which t h e i r mobile home i s l o c a t e d and base t h e i r c l a i m upon defendants' a l l e g e d o r a l promises which induced p l a i n t i f f s t o move from S e a t t l e , Washington, t o Montana. Defendants deny p l a i n t i f f s ' a l l e g a t i o n s , b u t admit t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f s placed a permanent r e s i d e n c e upon t h e premises, defendants would have a f i r s t o p t i o n t o purchase t h a t r e s i d e n c e . P l a i n t i f f s terminated t h e i r employment w i t h defendants a t t h e end of t h e 1974 t o u r i s t season. Upon t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e working arrangement, defendants r e q u e s t e d , and l a t e r a c q u i r e d a c o u r t o r d e r r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from t h e premises. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e d i s p u t e over t h e p a r c e l o f l a n d , p l a i n t i f f John Bauer became a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a competing s a p p h i r e mine and proceeded t o a d v e r t i s e h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r f a c e t i n g and h i s d i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h defendants' mine. Defendants p e t i t i o n e d the d i s t r i c t court t o enjoin t h i s advertising. A show cause h e a r i n g was h e l d . From t h i s h e a r i n g , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t continued t h e temporary i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s from any media a d v e r t i s i n g o f t h e i r t r a d e and ordered p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants ' p r o p e r t y . P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from t h a t o r d e r . The i s s u e s r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f s a r e : 1. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n r e s t r a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s from a d v e r t i s i n g : t h e i r b u s i n e s s ? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n o r d e r i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants' p r o p e r t y ? The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e s t h e s u b j e c t of commercial speech. Commercial speech h a s long been p r o t e c t e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, even though t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e r e s t i s l a r g e l y economic. Bates v. S t a t e Bar of Arizona, No. 76-316, 45 U.S. Law Week 4895,4899 (June 27, 1977): "* * * Nonetheless, we h e l d t h a t commercial speech of t h a t kind was e n t i t l e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e F i r s t Amendment. *** with the observation "Our a n a l y s i s began t h a t our c a s e s long have p r o t e c t e d speech even though i t i s i n t h e form of a paid advertisement I n s h o r t , such speech s e r v e s i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s i n a s s u r i n g informed and r e l i a b l e d e c i s i o n making. * *. * * *." Montana's C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o t e c t s freedom o f speech. A r t . 11, S e c t i o n .,7, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n : ** Every person s h a l l be f r e e t o speak o r p u b l i s h whatever he w i l l on any s u b j e c t , being 9~ r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . I1>k * *" The t r i a l record e s t a b l i s h e s p l a i n t i f f s made no agreement prohibiting advertising. I n addition, a contract t o r e s t r a i n t r a d e o r b u s i n e s s i s void except f o r two exceptions. 13-807, R.C.M. 1947. Section C o n t r a c t u a l r e s t r a i n t o f t r a d e i s allowed when: ( I ) Good w i l l of a b u s i n e s s i s s o l d , s e c t i o n 13-808, R.C.M. 1947; o r (2) a p a r t n e r s h i p d i s s o l u t i o n agreement so p r o v i d e s , s e c t i o n 13-809, R.C.M. 1947. These two e x c e p t i o n s r e q u i r e s t r i c t compliance b e f o r e a r e s t r i c t i o n becomes v a l i d . Montana C l i n i c v. Jacobson, 33 St.Rep. 37 (1976). Mont . , Western 544 P.2d 807, 811, N showing was made by defendants t h a t an o agreement r e s t r i c t i n g a d v e r t i s i n g e x i s t e d , nor t h a t p l a i n t i f f s f e l l w i t h i n e i t h e r exception. Under t h e f a c t s t h e e f f e c t of t h e above s t a t e d a u t h o r i t y i s t o g u a r a n t e e t h e r i g h t of p l a i n t i f f s t o a d v e r t i s e t h e a v a i l - a b i l i t y , n a t u r e and. p r i c e s of t h e i r products and s e r v i c e s . The temporary i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s from e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r r i g h t of commercial speech was e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s ' second i s s u e c h a l l e n g e s t h e o r d e r r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . Following t h e show cause h e a r i n g , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t a t e d : " I t i s t h e opinion of t h e Court t h a t a t t h i s heari-ng t h e testimony of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r i l y t o t h e testimony of t h e Respondents, t h a t they have n o t shown cause s u f f i c i e n t t o convince t h e Court t h a t they should continue t o occupy t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n w i t h t h e i r t r a i l e r and improvements, which a r e a d d i t i o n s which have been made ." I n Luppold v. Lewis, Mont . , 563 P.2d 538, 34 St.Rep. 227, 229 (1977), t h e Court s t a t e d : "When reviewing f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law of a d i s t r i c t c o u r t , s i t t i n g without a j u r y , t h i s Court h a s r e p e a t e d l y h e l d such f i n d i n g s and cbnclusions w i l l n o t be- d i s t u r b e d i f supported b3 s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and , 557 P.2d 292, by t h e law. Compton v. Alcorn, Mont 33 St.Rep. 1186 (1976); Brady v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 163 Mont. 416, 517 P.2d 738; Timmerman v. G a b r i e l , 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; Wash. Water Power Co. v. Morgan E l e c t r i c Co., 152 Mont 126, 448 P. 2d 683. When reviewing evidence i t w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s and t h e weight assigned t o t h e i r testimony i s f o r t h e determination of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a nonjury , 560 P.2d 1331, t r i a l . Johnson v. Johnson, Mont 34 St.Rep. 101; H e l l i c k s o n v. B a r r e t t Mobile Home Transp. 161 Mont. 455, 507 P.2d 523; Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 460 P.2d 90; E l i a s o n v. E l i a s o n , 151 M0nt.409~443 P.2d 884." . . . This Court f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o remove t h e i r mobile home from defendants' p r o p e r t y . Further, the d i s t r i c t court order a p p l i e d only t o p l a i n t i f f s ' mobile home and was made without p r e j u d i c e f o r any claim which p l a i n t i f f s may l a t e r pursue. This cause i s a f f i r m e d i n p a r t and r e v e r s e d i n p a r t . It i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o amend i n accord w i t h t h i s decision. --- (L&T/&~ * \ Chief J u s t i c e

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