MATTER OF SECRET GRAND JURY INQUIRY
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No. 13437 I N THE SUPREME COIRT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN 1976 I N THE MATTER O SECRET GRAND JURY F I N Q U I R Y , J O H N AND J A N E DOES THIRTY THROUGH THIRTY - N I N E ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Howard M. G i l b e r t , S p e c i a l P r o s e c u t o r argued and Thomas Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , Helena, Montana Hon. Gordon R. B e n n e t t , D i s t r i c t J u d g e , a r g u e d , Helena, Montana Dexter T2. Delaney, a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n a r g u e d , M i s s n u l a , Montana For Respondent : R o b e r t Emmons, n e g a t i v e p o s i t i o n , a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Submitted : Filed : Clerk J u l y 7 , 1976 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a petition of Hon. Gordon R. Bennett, presiding district judge in charge of the Lewis and Clark County grand jury, requesting in effect a declaratory judgment from this Court on certain issues raised in the grand jury proceedings of the Workmen's Compensation Division, Department of Labor and Industry, State of Montana. Three issues are presented: 1) What authority does the district court have over grand jury subpoenas? 2) What authority has the district court to examine the proceedings of the grand jury to determine if its instructions, given upon empanelment are being adhered to? 3) What authority has the district court to determine whether agents of the grand jury, such as investigators, are adhering to the law or conducting themselves appropriately as attaches of the court? The petition was set for oral argument before this Court on July 7, 1976, together with several other matters arising out of the grand jury investigation. Several counsel argued for this Court to accept the district court's petition, while others argued this Court had no authority to issue an advisory opinion, and there was nothing before the Court upon which to make a determination, either by appeal or by supervisory control. With the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction, we cannot agree. In the first instance, the petition of Judge Bennett is not one for an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions are those opinions issued by a court in response to a request from some other branch of government,such as the legislative or executive, asking for information concerning matters of law. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 5 150. We are here involved with justiciable issues. ar'ising 6rom En bana ride c6ntroverk.l-es the dbstr'ict.court. We consider Judge Bennett's questions as justiciable controversies contempLaed by Rule 57, Montana Rules Civil Procedure. First, a justiciable controversy requires that parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument invoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the effect final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or lacking these qualities be of such an overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. The decisions of this Court recognize and support this definition, See: The Forty-Second Legislative Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont. 330; Conrad et al. v. Managhan et al., 157 Mont. 335, 485 P.2d 948; State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159 Mont. 190, 496 P.2d 1127; Woodahl v. Montana. Board Natural Resources and Conservation, 163 Mont. 193, 516 P.2d 383; State ex rel. Irvin v. Anderson, 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564. As this Court stated in Lennon, in taking jurisdiction under the Montana Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Title 93, Chap. 89, R.C.M. 1947: "A d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n i s a proper proceeding i n which t o r e a c h and answer t h e l e g a l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s proceeding. A c o u r t of r e c o r d i n Montana i s s p e c i f i c a l l y g r a n t e d t h e power ' t o d e c l a r e r i g h t s , s t a t u s , and o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ' of a p a r t y ( s e c t i o n 93-8901, R.C.M. 1947) which ' a r e a f f e c t e d by a s t a t u t e ' ( s e c t i o n 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947) and i n which a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment ' w i l l t e r m i n a t e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o r remove an u n c e r t a i n t y ' ( s e c t i o n 938905, R.C.M. 1947). This i s p r e s c i s e l y t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t *I1 e x i s t s i n the present case. * F i r s t , we o u t l i n e a b r i e f f a c t u a l s e t t i n g of t h e grand j u r y cases. R.C.M. I n 1974, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e enacted s e c t i o n 79-2315, 1947, which provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e s t a t e , a l l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e s d i s c l o s e d by an a u d i t of a s t a t e agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a u d i t o r . I f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l d e c l i n e such p r o s e c u t i o n o r s h a l l f a i l t o commence a c t i o n on a p u b l i c o f f e n s e w i t h i n a reasonable time t h e county a t t o r n e y of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e county s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e s t a t e such p r o s e c u t i o n .'I Pursuant t o t h e d i r e c t i o n of s e c t i o n 79-2315, t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l began an i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of an a u d i t of t h e Workmen's Compensation D i v i s i o n and r e q u e s t e d t h e two judges of t h e f i r s t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t t o c a l l a grand j u r y . T h i s r e q u e s t was denied and t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a p p l i e d t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , d i r e c t i n g t h e two judges t o empanel a grand jury. I n S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 31, 530 P.2d 780, 32 St.Rep. 11, t h i s Court ordered t h e empanelment of a grand j u r y and s i n c e t h a t time t h e grand j u r y has been funct i o n i n g , r e s d t i n g in a number of lndiccmentsc . Due t o numerous d e l a y s i n g e t t i n g c a s e s t o t r i a l , t h i s Court i s s u e d t h i s o r d e r d a t e d June 1 5 , 1976, e n t i t l e d " I n t h e Matter of t h e Workmen' s Compensation L i t i g a . t i o n l ' , t h i s Court' s No. 13410 : "It appearing in the light of recent events that the rights of the public, the state, the defendants and the judiciary are being subordinated to personal and extraneous ends and purposes, "And it appearing that the Montana Supreme Court should act under its general supervisory powers pursuant to Art.VIS, Sec. 2 of the Montana Constitution, in order to remedy and mitigate the effects of the foregoing situation, "IT IS ORDERED: " (1) That the attorney general of Montana and other public prbosecutors,all defense counsel, and the presiding district judges in all pending criminal cases involving the Workmen's Compensation investigations and prosecutions are directed to appear at a Conference to be held in the Courtroom of this Supreme Court on the 21st day of June, 1976, at 2:00 p.m. "2 ( ) That the Commission on Practice is directed to investigate the conduct of all public prosecutors and defense attorneys in pending Workmen's Compensation litigation, determine whether there are any violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and transmit the Commission recommendations, including disciplinary action, if indicated, to this Court in the usual manner. "3 ( ) That in order to prevent further injury to the rights of the public, the state, the defendants and the judiciary pending the Conference herein provided, all counsel, their staffs, clerks, stenographers and attaches are ordered and directed to refrain directly or indirectly from public comment in any way relating to the litigation heretofore described. . I ( ) Any violation of this order shall subject the ' 4 offender to proceedings for contempt of court. "5 ( ) The Clerk of this Court is directed to cause notice to be given by mailing a true copy hereof forthwith to all public prosecutors, defense counsel, and presiding district judges in all pending Workmen's Compensation cases. District judges shall bring the district court file to the Conference herein provided. "6 ( ) No excuses will be accepted for nonattendance at ' said Conference.I Following the hearing on June 21St, 1976, Judge Bennett petitioned this Court for a declaratory judgment, this Court's No. 13437, as to the heretbfore enumerated three questions. Underlying the questions is a basic question as to the nature of a grand jury proceeding, which must be answered b e f o r e g i v i n g s p e c i f i c answers t o Judge B e n n e t t ' s q u e s t i o n s . The Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s d i s c u s s e d t h e n a t u r e of grand j u r y proceedings i n United S t a t e s v . Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, " T r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e grand j u r y h a s been accorded wide l a t i t u d e t o i n q u i r e i n t o v i o l a t i o n s of c r i m i n a l law. N judge p r e s i d e s t o monitor i t s proceedings. o I t d e l i b e r a t e s i n s e c r e t and may determine a l o n e t h e c o u r s e of i t s i n q u i r y . The grand j u r y may compel t h e production of evidence o r t h e testimony of w i t n e s s e s a s i t c o n s i d e r s a p p r o p r i a t e , and i t s o p e r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y i s u n r e s t r a i n e d by t h e t e c h n i c a l p r o c e d u r a l and e v i d e n t i a r y r u l e s governing t h e conduct of c r i m i n a l t r i a l s . 'It is a grand i n q u e s t , a body w i t h powers o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n and i n q u i s i t i o n , t h e scope of whose i n q u i r i e s i s n o t t o be l i m i t e d narrowly by q u e s t i o n s of p r o p r i e t y o r f o r e c a s t s of t h e p r o b a b l e r e s u l t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o r by doubts whether any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be found p r o p e r l y s u b j e c t t o an a c c u s a t i o n of c r i m e . ' B l a i r v . United S t a t e s , 250 US 273, 282, 63 L Ed 979, 39 S.Ct. 468 (1919). "The scope of t h e grand j u r y ' s powers r e f l e c t s i t s s p e c i a l r o l e i n i n s u r i n g f a i r and e f f e c t i v e law e n f o r c e ment. A grand j u r y proceeding i s n o t an a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g i n which g u i l t o r innocence of t h e accused i s a d j u d i c a t e d . R a t h e r , i t i s an e x p a r t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o determine whether a crime h a s been committed and whether c r i m i n a l proceedings should be i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t any person. The grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i v e power must be broad i f i t s 9; *I' p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a d e q u a t e l y t o be d i s c h a r g e d . * There i s a grave p u b l i c need f o r a grand j u r y which may conduct an u n f e t t e r e d and u n i n t e r r u p t e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The grand i u r y h a s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e p u b l i c t o thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t e 2 the matters before it. The p u b l i c must know t h a t no l e a d went unin- v e s t i g a t e d , t h a t t h e p u b l i c may have c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e f u l l and f a i r adrriinistration of j u s t i c e . Measuring t h e p u b l i c need f o r a f u l l , broad grand j u r y i n v e s c i g a t i o n a g a i n s t any p o t e n t i a l harm t o a w i t n e s s who h a s been subpoenaed, i t i s c l e a r t h e need f o r an u n f e t t e r e d grand j u r y is much g r e a t e r . What, i f a n y t h i n g , i s l o s t by anyone i f t h e grand jury hears evidence from a witness a second time, even if that evidence was conceded to be irrelevant to the grand jury's basic investigation. The grand jury conducts its investigation in secret, and its investigation is not adversarial. The grand jury does not determine guilt or innocence, it only determines if criminal proceedings should be begun. Most of the witnesses that appear before the grand jury will never be indicted, but the grand jury needs their testimony simply to continue its investigation. The witnesses lose nothing by testifying. The grand jury has a right to every man's evidence, even if it would be embarrassing to him personally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L ed 2d 626. If a witness should be later indicted, he would be accorded the full range of rights granted to him as a defendant in a criminal case. If, at that time, evidence is offered that is irrelevant an objection would lie, and the legal question can be determined in a court of law. The constant interruption of the grand jury by witnesses who wish to litigate the validity of the subpoenas which call them before the grand jury, could easily result in the investigation coming to a grinding halt. The logic of the United States Supreme Court in Calandra explaining why the exclusionary rule should not apply to grand jury proceedings applies with equal force to the questions now before this Court: "* * Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on the merits and would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the orderly progress of an,investigationand might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's primary objective. The probable result would be 'protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings, t * 9~ * effectively transforming them into preliminary trials on the merits. In some cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury proceedings: "'Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, I 17, 35 L Ed 2d 67, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973) .' The questions posed by Judge Bennett must be answered against the backdrop of this strong policy against saddling the grand jury investigation with delays for preliminary hearings that would frustrate the public need for an unfettered grand jury investigation. This Court will not tolerate "litigious interference with grand jury proceedings". We now consider Judge Bennett's concern as to the authority of a district judge over grand jury subpoenas in the instant case. The statutory section in the Code of Criminal Procedure which applies to grand jury subpoena power is section 95-1407, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness before the grand jury may be signed and issued by the county attorney, by the grand jury or by the judge of the district court, for witnesses in the state, in support of the prosecution, for those witnesses whose testimony, in his opinion is material in an investigation before the grand jury, and for such other witnesses as the grand jury upon investigation pending before them may direct." (Emphasis added.) The statute allows the court, the jury to issue subpoenas. county: attorney, or the grand It allows any one of the three to subpoena witnesses whose testimony is, in the caller's opinion, material. However, i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e j u d g e ' s charge i s Che l i m i t i n g f e a t u r e t o t h e scope of t h e grand j u r y . The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a grand j u r y i s e n t i t l e d t o o b t a i n testimony o r subpoena a l l evidence n e c e s s a r y f o r i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . However, i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e a r e made. For example, t h e r e i s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r conformity w i t h t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s requirements of t h e Fourth and F i f t h Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The c o u r t may quash a subpoena duces tecum which i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y overbroad. 50 L ed 652. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. C t . 370, The c o u r t may quash a subpoena duces tecum which v i o l a t e s t h e F i f t h Amendment's r i g h t a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . ,3,g!!/ Boyd v. United S t a t e s , 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct.-$&3f 29 L ed 746; Losavio v. D i s t r i c t Court I n & For Tenth J u d . D i s t . , 533 P.2d 32. (Colo. 1975), A grand j u r y may subpoena a w i t n e s s even though i t i s powerless t o f o r c e him t o t e s t i f y over a v a l i d c l a i m of s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n a b s e n t a g r a n t of immunity. United S t a t e s v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204. Quashing a subpoena because t h e r e i s no showing of t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e testimony sought i s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court, 238 F.2d 713. United T h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may never quash a grand j u r y subpoena no m a t t e r how f a r a f i e l d t h e grand j u r y may go from t h e a r e a o f i t s o r i g i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o n l y t h a t t h i s power i s l i m i t e d t o t h e most extreme c a s e s where t h e c o u r t , by n o t quashing t h e subpoena, would be p e r m i t t i n g a g r o s s abuse of p r o c e s s . I n United S t a t e s v . United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 238 F. 2d 713, 722, t h e Court s a i d : * * While IT* t h e judge has t h e s u p e r v i s o r y duty t o s e e t h a t i t s p r o c e s s i s n o t abused o r used f o r purposes of *** oppression o r i n j u s t i c e t h e r e should be no c u r t a i l m e n t of i t s i n q u i s i t o r i a l power except i n t h e c l e a r e s t c a s e s of abuse ." Applying t h a t t e s t , t h e c l e a r e s t c a s e of abuse r e q u i r e s something more than r e c a l l i n g w i t n e s s e s whose testimony i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e original inquiry. Oppression i s something s u b s t a n t i a l l y more than t e l l i n g a w i t n e s s t h a t i f h e l i e s b e f o r e t h e grand j u r y he w i l l be charged w i t h p e r j u r y . was Only i n a much s t r o n g e r c a s e , where t h e r e g r o s s misconduct a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e use of p r o c e s s , would t h e c o u r t be j u s t i f i e d i n i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n by quashing t h e grand j u r y ' s subpoena. From t h e foregoing d i s c u s s i o n i t i s apparent and we h o l d , t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e grand j u r y ' s subpoena power except ( a ) where t h e subpoena duces tecum i s overbroad; (b) where t h e subpoena r e q u i r e s s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n ; ( c ) i n t h e c l e a r e s t c a s e of g r o s s l y abusive conduct; (d) where t h e grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n goes beyond t h e scope s e t f o r t h above; o r ( e ) where, i f t h e c o u r t d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e , t h e r e s u l t would be an abuse of process. Judge B e n n e t t ' s second i s s u e r e v o l v e s around t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings t o determine i f t h e l i m i t s of t h e charge a r e being v i o l a t e d . It i s c l e a r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings only t o s e e t h a t i t s t a y s w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 79-2315, R.C.M. 1947. The Code of Criminal Procedure d i r e c t s t h e grand j u r y t o r e t i r e t o a " p r i v a t e roomf' and look i n t o t h e o f f e n s e s cognizable by i t , s e c t i o n 95-1404(b), R.C.M. 1947. S e c t i o n 95-1406, R.C.M. 1947, allows t h e grand j u r y t o ask a d v i c e of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, b u t i t r e q u i r e s , absent a r e q u e s t f o r such a d v i c e , t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge n o t be p r e s e n t during t h e s e s s i o n s of t h e grand jury. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s n o t t o monitor t h e grand j u r y proceedings. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Calandra a t 38 L ed 2d 561, 568, s a i d : N judge p r e s i d e s t o monitor i t s proceedings. o II I t d e l i b e r a t e s i n s e c r e t and may determine a-lone t h e c o u r s e of i t s i n q u i r y . " I n r e K i t t l e , 180 F. 946, 947, where F e l i x F r a n k f u r t e r was t h e A s s i s t a n t United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Judge Learned Hand r e f u s e d t o r e l i e v e a w i t n e s s from examination by a grand j u r y , s t a t i n g : "* * They a r e t h e v o i c e of t h e community a c c u s i n g i t s members, and t h e o n l y p r o t e c t i o n from such a c c u s a t i o n i s i n t h e conscience of t h a t t r i b u n a l . T h e r e f o r e , e x c e p t i n s p o r a d i c and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d i n s t a n c e s , t h e c o u r t s have never t a k e n s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r what evidence s h a l l come b e f o r e them * * *." To summarize t h e second m a t t e r of concern t o Judge B e n n e t t , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s a u t h o r i t y t o l i m i t t h e a r e a of a grand j u r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n by i t s charge given a t empanelment and t h e d i s t r i c t c a u r t may i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings t o a s c e r t a i n i f any i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n a r e n o t being followed. However, such a u t h o r i t y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e l i m i t s p r e v i o u s l y r e f e r r e d t o i n t h i s o p i n i o n a s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 79-2315, R.C.M. Judge B e n n e t t ' s t h i r d m a t t e r of concern i s t h e e x t e n t of t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t over t h e a g e n t s of t h e grand j u r y t o a s c e r t a i n i f t h e s e a g e n t s a r e obeying t h e law o r conducting themselves appropriately w h i l e t h e grand j u r y i s conducting i t s i n v e s t i gation. W noted i n t h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r s e t t i n g a h e a r i n g on t h i s e m a t t e r , t h a t one of t h e m a t t e r s of concern i s a p e t i t i o n f i l e d b y counsel f o r John Boyer, William F . P e l l e g r i n i , John C. Drescher and Wade J. Dahood to have certain subpoenas quashed. To summarize the affidavits and their allegations, we note that the fact an indictment came down, partially from their testimony on their first appearance before the grand jury, does not close off further inquiry. Each of the first three named witnesses later signed affidavits which reflect upon the accuracy, veracity and completeness of their prior grand jury testimony. Since an indictment against Dahood was partially based on their testimony, it would appear to this Court that it is not only relevant but absolutely necessary for the grand jury to ascertain whether or not the allegations are correct. The very integrity of the entire investigation leading to the Dahood indictment may depend upon the veracity and accuracy of the testimony given by the three witnesses, The petition of Wade J. Dahood, filed earlier, related to testimony of another witness, Henry T. Laughlin. The filing of that affidavit resulted in an unusual closed hearing before Judge Bennett at which Laughlin's testimony was taken, a transcript of which was submitted and considered by this Court in State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 33 St.Rep. 537, (June 1976). Mont . , P.2d 9 That transcript has possible dis- crepancies between Dahood's affidavit and Laughlin's subsequent testimony respecting the events described in the affidavit. To not have called Laughlin back to the grand jury for more testimony, as was done, would have interfered with the grand jury's full investigation of the Dahood case. The Dahood petition contains only speculation and its conclusions, that the witnesses are being recalled for harassment and intimidation, are without grounds either in law or fact. A legitimate and lawful purpose for the subpoenas exists; they should issue. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed t o C e r t a i n Executive O f f i c e r s of t h e M.G. A l l e n & A s s o c i a t e s , I n c . , 391 Fed. Supp. 991 (1975). I n B l a i r v. United S t a t e s , 250 U. S. 273, 39 S. C t . 468, 6 3 L ed 979, 982, i t was n o t e d : " ' I t i s c l e a r l y recognized t h a t t h e g i v i n g of testimony and t h e a t t e n d a n c e upon c o u r t o r grand j u r y i n o r d e r t o t e s t i f y a r e p u b l i c d u t i e s which e v e r y person w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e government i s bound t o perform upon being p r o p e r l y summoned The p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e involved i s a p a r t of t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e w e l f a r e of t h e p u b l i c . The d u t y , s o onerous a t t i m e s , y e t s o n e c e s s a r y t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e according t o t h e forms and modes e s t a b l i s h e d i n our i s subject t o mitigation system of government i n exceptional circumstances; t h e r e i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l exemption from being compelled i n any c r i m i n a l c a s e t o be a w i t n e s s a g a i n s t o n e s e l f , e n t i t l i n g t h e w i t n e s s t o be excused from answering anything t h a t w i l l tend t o i n c r i m i n a t e him some c o n f i d e n t i a l m a t t e r s a r e s h i e l d e d , from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p o l i c y , and p e r haps i n o t h e r c a s e s f o r s p e c i a l r e a s o n s a w i t n e s s may be excused from t e l l i n g a l l t h a t he knows. *** *** *** But, a s i d e from e x c e p t i o n s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s - and none such i s a s s e r t e d i n t h e p r e s e n t case--t h e w i t n e s s i s bound n o t only t o a t t e n d , b u t t o t e l l what he knows i n answer t o q u e s t i o n s framed f o r t h e purpose of b r i n g i n g o u t t h e t r u t h of t h e m a t t e r under i n q u i r y . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) 11 1 The d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge h a s l i m i t e d power over a grand j u r y . Once i t i s c a l l e d , t h e grand j u r y i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c o n t r o l e x c e p t a s h e r e t o f o r e s e t o u t and d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n . I n United S t a t e s v . Doe ( E l l s b e r g ) , 455 F.2d 1270, 1274, t h e Court s a i d : *** W recognize e t h a t grand j u r y proceedings cannot be p o l i c e d i n any d e t a i l . I t i s a p r i c e we pay f o r grand j u r y independence *.I1 11 ** I n t h a t same c a s e , i n a memorandum a t t a c h e d a t t h e end of t h e o p i n i o n , a p p e a r s a s t a t e m e n t which we t h i n k a p p l i e s i n t h e i n s t a n t case: * *defendants seek t o break up t h e p l a y b e f o r e i t h a s s t a r t e d , and t h e n c l a i m t h e government was o f f s i d e . " If* T h i s Opinion s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e d a\ e c l a r a t o r y judgment. @ Chief Justiceu .................................. Justices M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g I dissent. Judge B e n n e t t r e c e i v e d a p e t i t i o n i n h i s c o u r t J u n e 22, 1976 r e q u e s t i n g a n o r d e r t o show c a u s e t o suspend o r c a n c e l subpoenas d i r e c t e d t o o n e P e l l e g r i n i , Boyer and D r e s c h e r , p e r s o n s who had p r e v i o u s l y t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e t h e g r a n d j u r y . The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e s c e r t a i n a c t s o f h a r a s s m e n t , i n t i m i d a t i o n and improper c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f t h e o f f i c e r s i n c h a r g e of t h e g r a n d j u r y function. The p l e a d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e s t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n i s one and t h e same t h a t was p r e v i o u s l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and b r o u g h t t o t h e Supreme C o u r t on s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l . T h i s C o u r t h e a r d t h e matter on J u n e 7 , 1976, and on J u n e 1 8 , 1976, and o r d e r e d t h e o r d e r t o show c a u s e and s t a y s e t a s i d e a s t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s b e c a u s e no sworn s t a t e m e n t s by a p p l i c a n t s accompanied t h e p e t i t i o n t h a t would a l l o w t h e C o u r t t o p r o c e e d . The sworn s u p p o r t now h a s been f i l e d w i t h t h e p r e s e n t p e t i t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h memorandum of a u t h o r i t y . Judge B e n n e t t a t t a c h e d a copy o f t h i s p e t i t i o n and s u p p o r t i n g documents t o a communication a d d r e s s e d t o t h e Chief J u s t i c e of t h i s C o u r t a l l e g i n g t h a t it a p p e a r s t o be t h e same p e t i t i o n p r e v i o u s l y p r e s e n t e d t o h i s c o u r t and t h e s u b j e c t o f o u r o r d e r o f J u n e 1 8 , 1976, s u p r a , and a l l e g i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r document a t i o n h e l d l a c k i n g b e f o r e h a s now been added. Judge B e n n e t t a d v i s e s t h a t h e h a s n o t a c t e d on t h e p e t i t i o n and forwarded same t o t h e Supreme C o u r t b e c a u s e t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s s u g g e s t e d " t h a t t h e p i t h and moment o f t h e s e workmen's compensation p r o c e e d i n g s j u s t i f y s p e c i a l p r o c e d u r e s . This Court [Judge B e n n e t t ' s ] h a s l e a r n e d by e x p e r i e n c e t h a t any a c t i o n t a k e n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e grand jury, o t h e r than approving of expense v o u c h e r s and o r d e r i n g t h e f i l i n g of i n d i c t m e n t s , w i l l be m e t by a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t o f s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , which w i l l be h e a r d by t h e Supreme C o u r t . I t i s t h e n , t h e i n t e n t o f t h i s pe- t i t i o n [ B e n n e t t ' s ] t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x p e n s e s and d e l a y o c c a s i o n e d by s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s . " Judge Bennett f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s : " * * * t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t i s s u e i t s o ~ i n i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e a i o r e s a i d p e t i t i o n " [The p e t i t i o n f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t J u d g e B e n n e t t l i s t s t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s s e t o u t above i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n and c o n c l u d e s : "You a r e r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t e d t o r e v i e w t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n and t o t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e action o r advise t h i s court thereon." (~mphasis supplied.) W e have h e r e a p e t i t i o n p r o p e r l y f i l e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h sworn a l l e g a t i o n s t o move t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g r a n t a f a c t hearing t o determine i f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a r e entitled to relief. I n s t e a d it i s h e r e on a r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s C o u r t s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o s a v e e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x p e n s e and d e l a y and t o " a c t " o n t h e p e t i t i o n o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e " a d v i s e " the d i s t r i c t court. F i r s t t h e m a j o r i t y t h r o u g h some k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g , n o t a t a l l c l e a r t o m e , determines t h a t t h e r e q u e s t of Judge Bennett i s n o t one f o r " a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n " o r "advice" a s set f o r t h above b u t t h i s becomes, a s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment action. They c i t e R u l e 5 7 , M.R.Civ.P., and v a r i o u s p a s t d e c l a r a - t o r y judgment c a s e s h e a r d by t h i s C o u r t , none o f which a r e i n point i n t h i s matter. R u l e 57 r e q u i r e s t h a t s e c t i o n 93-89011947, must b e o b s e r v e d . 93-8916, R.C.M. The f i r s t o b v i o u s problem i s how do w e s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t on t h i s p e t i t i o n a n d ' d e c i d e i s s u e s o f f a c t without an evidentiary hearing? The f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n a r e n o t a g r e e d f a c t s by any means. S e c t i o n 93-8911, 1947, seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i f f a c t s a r e t o b e r e s o l v e d a l l R.C.M. p a r t i e s must b e h e a r d o r e l s e t h e y would n o t b e bound. Some of t h e f a c t s t h e m a j o r i t y has decided w i t h o u t a e v i d e n t i a r y hearing a r e t h a t t h e oppression pleaded i n t h e p e t i t i o n i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant r e l i e f ; t h a t c e r t a i n indictments f i l e d w e r e b a s e d on t h e t e s t i m o n y o f p e t i t i o n e r s ; t h a t f u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y o f p e t i t i o n e r s i s r e l e v a n t and n e c e s s a r y ; t h a t t h e Dahood p e t i t i o n c o n t a i n s o n l y s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n c l u s i o n s ; t h a t t h e r e a r e no g r o u n d s i n l a w o r f a c t t o s u p p o r t h a r a s s m e n t ; t h e s u b p o e n a s a r e grounded on l e g i t i m a t e a n d l a w f u l p u r p o s e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s " s e e k t o b r e a k up t h e p l a y b e f o r e it h a s s t a r t e d , and t h e n c l a i m t h e government was o f f s i d e " ; t h a t , "Most w i t n e s s e s t h a t a p p e a r b e f o r e a g r a n d j u r y w i l l n e v e r b e indicted* * * T.he w i t n e s s e s l o s e n o t h i n g by t e s t i f y i n g * * *. I f a w i t n e s s s h o u l d l a t e r b e i n d i c t e d , h e would b e a c c o r d e d t h e f u l l r a n g e o f r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o him a s a d e f e n d a n t i n a c r i m i n a l I f , a t t h a t t i m e , evidence i s o f f e r e d t h a t i s i r r e l e v a n t case. a n o b j e c t i o n would l i e , and t h e l e g a l q u e s t i o n c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d constant by a c o u r t o f law * * * T h e / i n t e r r u p t i o n o f t h e grand. j u r y by * * * w i t n e s s e s who w i s h t o l i t i g a t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e subpoenas c o u l d e a s i l y r e s u l t i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n coming t o a g r i n d i n g halt.", and s o on. Even i f t h i s p r o c e d u r e c o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n it h a s gone f a r beyond t h e o r i g i n a l scope of i n q u i r y . S e e N a t i o n a l S u r e t y Corp. v . K r u s e , 1 2 1 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317, 319. It i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t t h i s C o u r t i n 1962 seemed t o h o l d t h a t " P e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e D e c l a r a t o r y Judgment S t a t u t e s which a r e c i v i l and n o t c r i m i n a l r e m e d i e s " . H a r o l d Goff v . S t a t e o f Montana and Ed E l l s w o r t h , J r . , 1 4 1 Mont. 605, 374 P.2d 862. See a l s o I n t h e Matter o f Charges Against Robert D e W a r , P o l i c e O f f i c e r , Mont . , 548 P.2d 1 4 9 , 33 St.Rep. F o r s y t h e v . Coate, (1976) Mont . , . - 16 - 353 (1976) and S t a t e e x r e l . 546 P.2d 1 0 6 0 , 33 St.Rep. 310, I t i s my p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n s by J u d g e B e n n e t t have a l r e a d y been g e n e r a l l y d e c i d e d by t h i s C o u r t . T h e r e i s no l a w t h a t p e r m i t s t h i s C o u r t t o d e c i d e f a c t s i n a vacuum which w i l l o p e r a t e d i r e c t l y on i n d i v i d u a l p e t i t i o n e r s i n a d i s t r i c t c o u r t cause. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d f i r s t d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s and make i t s r u l i n g and u n t i l a n o r d e r i s e n t e r e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e r e i s no p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t o n which t h e m a j o r i t y c a n r e n d e r i t s o p i n i o n . T h e r e a r e no c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d t h a t would i n law p e r m i t t h i s C o u r t t o e n t e r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment which would be b i n d i n g o n t h e petitioners i n the d i s t r i c t court. The r e q u e s t by J u d g e B e n n e t t s h o u l d b e d i s m i s s e d and t h e matter returned t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o t h a t t h e foundation p e t i t i o n p r e c e d i n g a l l of t h i s o r d e r l y j u d i c i a l proceeding. Justice Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g : I dissent. I n m view, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y y judgment, b i n d s no o n e , and it f u r n i s h e s no p r e c e d e n t i n f u t u r e cases. There a r e no p l e a d i n g s a s r e q u i r e d by Montana's Uniform D e c l a r a t o r y Judgments Act. S e c t i o n 93-8901 e t s e q . ; S u r e t y Corp. v . Kruse, 1 2 1 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317. National A l l persons who have o r c l a i m a n i n t e r e s t which would be a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c l a r a t i o n have n o t been made p a r t i e s a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 93-8911, R.C.M. 1947. The i s s u e s i n t h i s m a t t e r have n o t been framed i n a f a c t u a l s e t t i n g p e r m i t t i n g e n t r y of a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. N a t i o n a l S u r e t y Corp. v . Kruse, s u p r a . I n s t e a d of a bona f i d e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o v e r s y between i d e n t i f i a b l e p a r t i e s seeking s p e c i f i c r e l i e f through a decree of conclusive c h a r a c t e r as required t o v e s t t h i s Court with j u r i s d i c t i o n (Chovanak v . Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 188 P.2d 582), we s i m p l y have a r e q u e s t f o r answers t o t h r e e b r o a d , t h e o r e t i c a l and a b s t r a c t q u e s t i o n s . I n s h o r t , t h e m a j o r i t y has rendered an advisory opinion without l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o do so. The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment b u t s i m p l y a g r a t u i t o u s o p i n i o n , f u r n i s h i n g n e i t h e r g u i d a n c e n o r p r e c e d e n t , and b i n d i n g no o n e , n o t even i t s a u t h o r . I f o r e s e e s u b s t a n t i a l mischief i n t h e b r o a d , sweeping l a n g u a g e employed. I would remand t h i s m a t t e r t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n t o b r i n g it w i t h i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Uniform D e c l a r a t o r y Judgments A c t b e f o r e a c c e p t i n g j u r i s diction. Justice
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