FOSS v LEIFER
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No. 13193 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 CHERYL LEIFER FOSS , A p p e l l a n t and P e t i t i o n e r , -vs - JAMES T. LEIFER, Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: J a r d i n e , Stephenson, B l e w e t t and Weaver, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana K. Dale Schwanke a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana F o r Respondent : Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and M a t t e u c c i , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana B r e t t C. A s s e l s t i n e a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Submitted: Decided : A p r i l 19, 1976 &Fib! 1 4 'i976. Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns a petition seeking to modify child custody provisions contained in a decree of divorce granted to appellant on August 10, 1972. The judgment appealed from is that of the district court, Jefferson County, entered December 17, 1975. Appellant Cheryl Leifer Foss and respondent James T. Leifer were married in the city of Butte, Montana, in November 1968. Their son Christopher Lance Leifer was born the following year. The divorce decree provided,inter alia,that appellant should have the care, custody and control of the child, subject to the right of reasonable visitation by respondent. The court ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of $100 per month. Respondent has never defaulted-in paying the child support payments . Respondent made no attempt to contest the provisions of the divorce decree at the time. Shortly after the divorce respondent moved to the state of Michigan and later to Pullman, Washington, where he spent approximately eighteen months completing requirements necessary to obtain a Master's degree. Following his graduation respondent became employed in Yakima, Washington. At the time of the hearing on the petition for modification, respondent was contemplating the prospect of a transfer on his employer's behalf to Hermiston, Oregon. It is our understanding that he has now made that move. Following her divorce, appellant was employed at several local financial institutions in the city of Butte. She was transferred by her employer to Great Falls in May 1974. She gave birth to a second child in September 1973, and at the time this matter was heard, the child was living with appellant and her son Lance. In early January 1975, appellant began to date Richard Foss. He moved i n t o a p p e l l a n t ' s home s e v e r a l weeks l a t e r . They were subsequently married. S e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e marriage, a p p e l l a n t was a b l e t o t e r m i n a t e h e r employment t o devote more time t o t h e c a r e of h e r two c h i l d r e n . Respondent commenced t h e a c t i o n t o p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e s h o r t l y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a l e t t e r from h i s ex-wife informing him t h a t she and Foss had begun l i v i n g t o g e t h e r . I n h i s p e t i t i o n respondent a l l e g e d t h a t circumstances b e a r i n g a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of h i s c h i l d had m a t e r i a l l y changed s i n c e t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e i n t h a t : *** t h e s p i r i t u a l and moral atmosphere i n "a. t h e home has d e t e r i o r a t e d t o a s t a t e wherein t h e i s s u e of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , Christopher Lance L e i f e r , w i l l be m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d and a l t e r e d . ** "b.Jc t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e above captioned m a t t e r i s r e s i d i n g w i t h a male who i s n o t t h e spouse of t h e above named p l a i n t i f f and t h e presence of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l has aided and contributed. t o t h e moral d e c l i n e and decay of t h e atmosphere i n which t h e minor p a r t y of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o must r e s i d e . I I The p a r t i e s agreed by s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e m a t t e r be heard i n t h e e i g h t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, and a two-day h e a r i n g commenced on October 16, 1975. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found respondent was 11 b e s t s u i t e d and motivated morally and emotionally t o meet t h e needs of Lance L e i f e r and i s t h e p a r e n t most l i k e l y t o s e e t h e needs of Lance L e i f e r a r e met." and granted respondent's p e t i t i o n . I n Montana i t has been f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n m a t t e r s of custody i s of a c o n t i n u i n g n a t u r e . Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 3 1 7 , , 3 3 0 P.2d 1093; 154 Mont. 222, 462 P.2d 178. Libra v. L i b r a , This concept a l s o c o n t r o l s under t h e r e c e n t l y enacted Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, s e c t i o n 48339, R.C.M. 1947, which c l e a r l y provides d i s t r i c t c o u r t s may n o t e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n a r y power t o modify a p r i o r custody d e c r e e unl e s s two b a s i c elements a r e shown t o e x i s t : 1 ) new f a c t s o r f a c t s unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e time t h e i n i t i a l d e c r e e was e n t e r e d demonstrate that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or those of his custodian; and 2) this change is sufficient to warrant a modification in order to promote the particular child's best interests. This basic standard was applied in this jurisdiction long before the enactment of the new law, and a determination of which law would be applicable under the facts presented would have no bearing on the result. Jewett v. Jewett, 73 Mont. 591, 237 P.702; Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225; Simon v. Simon, 154 Mont. 193, 461 P.2d 851. Here, the issue to be decided is whether the district court, in granting the petition for modification, abused its discretion. Although no specific finding to this effect appears in the order, such judicial action must inherently be predicated on the conclusion that a change in circumstances had occurred sufficient to endanger the welfare of the child to support the modification order. In reviewing orders which affect the custody of a child, this Court is mindful that the primary duty of deciding the proper custody of children is the task of the district court. Thus, all reasonable presumptions as to the correctness of that determination will be made. No ruling will be disturbed absent a clear showing the district court's discretion was abused. In re Corneliusen et al., 159 Mont.6, 494 P.2d 908; State ex rel. Veach v. Veach, 122 Mont. 47, 195 P.2d 697; Ex parte Bourguin, 88 Mont. 118, 290 P. 250; In re Thompson, 77 Mont. 466, 251 P. 163. It is elemental that the phrase "change in circumstances" is a term of art which must not be considered in a vacuum. No change in circumstances, regardless of its substantiality, is legally sufficient to support a modification order altering custody unless the best interests and general welfare of the child will be promoted. Altmaier v. Altmaier, 135 Mont. 404, 340 P.2d 829; Haynes v. F i l l n e r , 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802. In a l l c a s e s , t h e l o d e s t a r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n i s t h e w e l f a r e and b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d , and n o t t h e parent. 32 St.Rep. Grant v. Grant, 166 Mont. 229, 531 P.2d 1007, 191; I n r e Adoption of B i e r y , 164 Mont, 353, 522 P. 2d 1377; Turk v. Turk, 164 Mont. 35, 518 P.2d 804. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e p l e a d i n g s and testimony o f f e r e d a t h e a r i n g suggest t h e i s s u e t o be decided should b e c o n s i d e r a b l y narrowed. The r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e w i t h evidence t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n a r e w e l l - q u a l i f i e d t o be f i t and proper p a r e n t s t o Christopher Lance L e i f e r . Respondent i s a well-educated i n d i v i d u a l w i t h promising and s t e a d y employment, The r e c o r d amply demonstrates t h e a f f e c t i o n respondent has f o r h i s son and h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o do a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y t o provide him w i t h an environment conducive t o a happy childhood and t h e development of a w e l l - a d j u s t e d adulthood. I n v e s t i g a t i o n s made by t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s e s t a b l i s h t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s a capable and e n t h u s i a s t i c mother t o h e r two c h i l d r e n , and t h a t h e r p r e s e n t husband i s q u a l i f i e d t o adopt t h e c h i l d r e n . Neither p a r t y seriously challenges t h e general f i t n e s s of t h e other regarding parenthood. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t made no f i n d i n g t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t was an u n f i t p a r e n t . Reports concerning b o t h p a r t i e s were r e q u e s t e d and f u r n i s h e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by a c l i n i c a l psychologist. These r e p o r t s show a conspicuous absence of t h e t y p e s of a d v e r s e psychological f a c t o r s which, i f possessed by e i t h e r p a r t y , might tend t o a f f e c t unfavorably t h e well-being of t h e child. The r e c o r d does show t h a t t h e c h i l d has been some- what slow t o develop due t o a r a t h e r l o o s e l y d e f i n e d " l e a r n i n g disability". The prognosis concerning t h i s problem was d e s c r i b e d i n t h e r e c o r d a s good, and t h e r e c o r d f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y connect t h e problem t o t h e home environment. The c l i n i c a l psychofogist t e s t i f i e d : * * "A. 9: I t h i n k t h i s youngster has a n a t u r a l d i f f i c u l t y coping w i t h change, coping w i t h a g r e a t many p i e c e s of information which might be given t o him a t one time * * *. Would t h e f a c t t h a t your r e p o r t s a i d M r s . "Q. Foss, formerly Mrs. L e i f e r had some g u i l t f e e l i n g s about h e r p a s t and about h e r family affect a It could. But i n t h i s c a s e 1 do n o t c h i l d ? A. t h i n k i t does t o any marked degree." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ] ** The f a c t t h a t a p a r e n t allows h e r paramour t o l i v e w i t h h e r f o r a s h o r t time b e f o r e t h e i r marriage does n o t , by i t s e l f , constitute a ?1 change i n circurnstances" s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e g r a n t i n g of a c u s t o d i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n o r d e r . s p e c i f i c a l l y decided t h i s p r e c i s e i s s u e . This Court has never But a number of r e c e n t c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have examined t h e m a t t e r . They a r e almost unanimous i n holding t h a t such conduct may be t h e b a s i s f o r a change i n custody o n l y upon a showing t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n have i n some way been a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d . 3 1 Ill.App.3d Ill.App.3d Christensen v. C h r i s t e n s e n , 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581; Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 19 647, 312 N.E.2d 395; C h r i s t i a n v. Randall, 33 Colo.App. 129, 516 P.2d 132; Howland v. Howland, (1nd.App. 555. 1975), 337 N.E.2d Of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e i s t h e language o f t h e Washington S t a t e Supreme Court speaking through J u s t i c e F a r r i s i n Wildermuth v. Wildermuth, 14 Wash.App. 442, 542 P.2d 463, 466: "We f i n d t h a t t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s more than a showing o f i l l i c i t conduct by t h e p a r e n t who has custody. There must be a showing of t h e e f f e c t of t h a t conduct upon t h e minor c h i l d o r c h i l d r e n . Unless t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s evidence from which t h e t r i e r of f a c t can reasonably conclude t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s environment i s d e t r i m e n t a l t o h i s o r h e r p h y s i c a l , mental, o r emotional h e a l t h and, f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e harm l i k e l y t o b e caused by a change of environment i s outweighed by t h e advantage of a change t o t h e c h i l d , t h e c o u r t e r r s i n e n t e r i n g an o r d e r changing custody." *** Here, t h e r e c o r d i s devoid o f evidence t o reasonably e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e conduct of t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t caused a "moral d e c l i n e " i n t h e home which h a s e i t h e r m a t e r i a l l y o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e well-being of t h e minor c h i l d . Further, the record e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t p r o g r e s s concerning t h e c h i l d ' s aforementioned l e a r n i n g d i s a b i l i t y might be i n t e r r u p t e d by a geographical change of r e s i d e n c e , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t change must be c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d t o promote the child's best interests. Returning t o t h e i s s u e of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n modifying t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e , we c o n s i d e r f i r s t whether any change of circumstances has occurred which a f f e c t s t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s and g e n e r a l w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d . N change of substance appears from t h e r e c o r d . o The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found no l a c k of f i t n e s s of t h e mother. There simply appears no evidence upon which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t could /fund such a l a c k of f i t n e s s i n c l u d i n g l o v e , a f f e c t i o n and c a r e . Thus, t h i s amounts t o an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n t o change custody without a f i n d i n g of changed circumstances. The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t modifying and awarding custody t o respondent i s s e t a s i d e . W Concur: e Justices -- - Hon. Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d i s s e n t i n g : I f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence i n t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e custody award of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . In m y view, t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e h a s simply s u b s t i t u t e d i t s judgment on custody f o r t h a t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o n t r a r y t o law. 22e&.&SAm Justice. M r . Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n , d i s s e n t i n g : I a g r e e w i t h t h e foregoing d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell. / Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison.
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