STATE v FARNES
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No. 13107 I N THE SUPKEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - EVELYN FARNES , Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John Id. Adams, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, : B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted w i t h o u t o r a l argument Submitted: October 2 2 , 1976 Dee i d ed : G'IL 2. Filed : I- , y/j: ., , j i6 ! Hon. L.C. Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of Chief J u s t i c e James T , H a r r i s o n , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Mr. Defendant Evelyn F a r n e s a p p e a l s from a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e c r i m e of t h e f t , t r i e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone. On F e b r u a r y 8 , 1975, one B i l l Stumpf a r r i v e d a t t h e P u b l i c Auction Market i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, w i t h a number of o t h e r p e o p l e , i n a cream-colored towing a h o r s e t r a i l e r . Oldsmobile, An unbranded s o r r e l mare w a s unloaded from t h e t r a i l e r , and was d e l i v e r e d by Stumpf t o a n employee of t h e Market a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12:30 a.m., t e l l i n g t h e employee t o r u n t h e h o r s e t h r o u g h " l o o s e " a t t h e s a l e t h a t day. Horses which a r e r u n t h r o u g h " l o o s e " a r e n o r m a l l y s o l d a s c a n n i n g h o r s e s , whereas h o r s e s which a r e ridden through t h e s a l e s r i n g a r e normally s o l d a s p l e a s u r e o r working h o r s e s . Stumpf d i d n o t c l a i m any ownership o f t h e a n i m a l , b u t c o n s i g n e d t h e mare i n t h e name o f one Ray Tanner. A f t e r t h e s a l e , a t a b o u t 5:15 p . m . , February 8 , 1975, a p u r p o r t e d b i l l of s a l e t o t h e a n i m a l s i g n e d by one E a r l West t o Ray Tanner was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e A u c t i o n Market by t h e d e f e n d a n t Evelyn F a r n e s . The employee receiving t h e b i l l of s a l e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant i n t r o d u c e d h e r s e l f a s Ray T a n n e r ' s w i f e , and when t o l d t h a t payment would be d e l a y e d u n t i l t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday waote t h e name of K a r l a R e i c h e r t on t h e back of t h e b i l l of s a l e and t o l d t h e employee t o make payment t o h e r f r i e n d Reichert. The employee r e c e i v i n g t h e b i l l of s a l e from t h e d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d o v e r o b j e c t i o n t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 m i n u t e s e a r l i e r he had r e c e i v e d a phone c a l l from a person i n q u i r i n g what he needed f o r t h e h o r s e , and t h e employee answered t h a t a b i l l o f s a l e would be r e q u i r e d , and t h e c a l l e r responded t h a t a b i l l of sale would be d e l i v e r e d f o r t h e h o r s e . The l o c a l brand i n s p e c t o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he photographed t h e mare on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1975, b e c a u s e he knew t h e mare w a s on h e r way t o a dog food f a c t o r y i n S o u t h Dakota and t h a t p r i o r t o t h e s a l e he p u t a s t o p on t h e check f o r t h e s a l e of t h e h o r s e , and t h a t a t t h e s a l e he s a w t h e d e f e n d a n t , i n t h e company of B i l l Stumpf, Buzz F e e l e y , and K a r l a R e i c h e r t , The l o c a l i n s p e c t o r / d e t e c t i v e t e s t i f i e d t h a t on F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 197 5 , he commenced a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e s a l e of t h e h o r s e , l e a r n i n g t h a t Karla R e i c h e r t w a s t h e d a u g h t e r of t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e g i r l f r i e n d of B i l l Stumpf. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s u n a b l e t o l o c a t e anyone by t h e name of Ray Tanner o r E a r l West, t h e p e r s o n s named on t h e b i l l of s a l e d e l i v e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . On a p p r o x i m a t e l y F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1975, D r . Thomas Morledge r e p o r t e d a s o r r e l mare a s m i s s i n g from h i s w i n t e r p a s t u r e , and from photographs he had t a k e n and t h e p h o t o g r a p h t a k e n on February 8 a t t h e Auction Market, t h e h o r s e w a s i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e one d e l i v e r e d by B i l l Sturnpf. The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : t h a t on F e b r u a r y 7 , 1975, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 11:30 p.m. s h e and "Buzz" F e e l e y w e r e d r i n k i n g i n a B i l l i n g s b a r when a man a s k e d F e e l e y t o h e l p him h a u l a h o r s e t o t h e A u c t i o n Market. F e e l e y a g r e e d , and t h e d e f e n d a n t d r o v e h e r v e h i c l e , a c c 0 m p a n i e d . b ~ e e l e y and B i l l y Stumpf, t o F t h e North Yard where t h e y p i c k e d up F e e l e y ' s h o r s e trailer. They t h e n f o l l o w e d a d a r k p i c k u p truck to a p a s t u r e n e a r A l k a l i Creek where b o t h v e h i c l e s s t o p p e d and t h e man i n t h e p i c k u p g o t o u t , c r a w l e d t h r o u g h a f e n c e , and walked up t o a h o r s e , p u t t i n g a h a l t e r on t h e h o r s e , t h e n l e a d i n g it t h r o u g h a g a t e , and p u t i t i n t h e horse t r a i l e r . She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e "Buzz" and B i l l y Stumpf were o u t s i d e of h e r c a r , t h e s t r a n g e r came by t h e d r i v e r ' s window of t h e c a r and handed h e r t h e b i l l of s a l e , s a y i n g , "You w i l l need t h i s t o s e l l t h e horse." The d e f e n d a n t t h e n d r o v e h e r v e h i c l e , p u l l i n g t h e l o a d e d h o r s e t r a i l e r , back t o t h e a u c t i o n y a r d s where B i l l y Stumpf unloaded t h e h o r s e and t o o k it i n t o t h e Market. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e n e v e r saw t h e s t r a n g e r a g a i n , t h a t s h e d i d n o t c a l l t h e Auction Market o r have a c a l l p l a c e d f o r h e r , b u t o n l y d e l i v e r e d . t h e b i l l of s a l e on t h e a f t e r n o o n of F e b r u a r y 8 t o t h e Market b e c a u s e s h e assumed t h a t t h e y would need i t , t h a t s h e d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e h e r s e l f a s Ray T a n n e r ' s w i f e , t h a t s h e w r o t e h e r d a u g h t e r ' s name on t h e back of t h e b i l l of s a l e s o s h e c o u l d h o l d t h e check u n t i l t h e s t r a n g e r p a i d them $15.00 which s h e c l a i m e d he had promised i n exchange f o r h a u l i n g t h e h o r s e t o m a r k e t . Karla Reichert, t h e defendant's daughter, t e s t i f i e d s h e knew n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o r t h e b i l l of s a l e , and t h a t h e r mother had n e v e r a s k e d h e r t o p i c k up t h e check a t t h e Market. B i l l y S t u m p f l s t e s t i m o n y was c o r r o b o r a t i v e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e x c e p t he s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s n o t o u t of t h e c a r a t A l k a l i Creek, w h i l e M r s . F a r n e s s t a t e d t h a t he w a s when t h e s t r a n g e r handed h e r t h e b i l l of s a l e . The a p p e a l p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1. Ws t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support a t h e conviction? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o give defendant's offered i n s t r u c t i o n s number 7 and 8? M r s . F a r n e s w a s c h a r g e d and c o n v i c t e d o f t h e o f f e n s e of t h e f t a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1) which reads a s follows: " ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f t h e f t when he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly o b t a i n s o r e x e r t s unauthorized c o n t r o l over property of t h e owner, and: ( a ) h a s t h e p u r p o s e of d e p r i v i n g t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y ; o r ( b ) p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly u s e s , c o n c e a l s , o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y i n s u c h manner a s t o d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y ; o r ( c ) u s e s , c o n c e a l s , o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y knowing such u s e , concealment o r abandonment p r o b a b l y w i l l d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e property. " The t e r m "knowingly" i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n "A p e r s o n a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o n d u c t o r t o a c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when h e i s aware of h i s c o n d u c t o r t h a t t h e circums t a n c e e x i s t s . When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e - of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s a n -e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , such knowledqe i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a Derson i s aware o f a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e . E q u i v a l e n t t e r m s such a s 'knowinq' o r ' w i t h knowledge ' have t h e same meaning. " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . L - - ~ ~ " P u r p o s e l y " i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101 ( 5 3 ) which r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "A person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in the conduct or to cause that result. * * * " The testimony presented at trial constituted direct evidence of every element of the crime of theft except intent. As in State v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99 (1971) the element of intent may be, and generally is, demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Citing State v. Madden, 128 Mont. 408, 276 P,2d 974 (1954) the Court stated: "The element of felonious intent in every contested criminal case must necessarily be determined from facts and circumstances of the particular case--this for the reason that criminal intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct or positive proof and therefore must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence * * * "The question of intent is a question for the jury." The rules that govern the weight and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence are set out in the leading Montana case of State v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86 (1964) at page 326: "Circumstantial evidence is not always inferior in quality nor is it necessarily relegated to a 'second class status' in the consideration to be given to it. The very fact that it is circumstantial is not a sufficient allegation to justify a reversal of the judgment for such evidence may be, and frequently is, most convincing and satisfactory. In any criminal case. evidence that is material, relevant and' competent will be admitted, 'nothing more and nothing less'. The test is whether the facts and circumstances are of such a quality and quantity as to legally justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If such be the case, then the court should not, indeed cannot, s e t a s i d e t h e solemn f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i e r of f a c t s . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) I t is a well-established p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h e main f a c t of g u i l t o r any e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t looking t h e r e t o i s a matter peculiarly within t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s c o u r t h a s stated that: "The j u r y b e i n g t h e s o l e judge of t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d n o t t e l l them what p a r t i c u l a r weight t o g i v e t o any p o r t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y . " S t a t e v . G l e i m , 17 Mont. 1 7 , 29, 4 1 P. 998 (1895). The r u l e i s t h a t i f s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s found t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t , t h e n it w i l l s t a n d . S t a t e v . White, 146 Mont. 226, 229, 405 P.2d 761 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . The c o u r t i n S t a t e v. S t o d d a r d , 147 Mont, 402, 408, 412 P.2d 827 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , s t a t e d : F i r s t w e should note t h a t t h i s c o u r t i s n o t a t r i e r of f a c t * * * I n view o f t h e presumption o f innocence a t t h e t r i a l , t h e j u r y must have been i n s t r u c t e d t o t h a t e f f e c t , b u t on a p p e a l a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n t h e r u l e changes. Then, i f t h e r e c o r d shows any s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e judgment, t h e presumption i s i n f a v o r of s u c h judgment." p. 408. I n S t a t e v . Medicine B u l l , J r . , 152 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e j u r y i s f r e e t o c o n s i d e r a l l t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d and t o p i c k and choose which o f t h e w i t n e s s e s t h e y w i s h t o b e l i e v e . That i f s u f f i c i e n t testimony w a s introduced t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g , t h e n t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n would n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s t h e r e w a s a c l e a r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e j u r y o r a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n made t o t h e j u r y . The a p p e l l a n t i s g u i l t y of t h e crime of t h e f t . i n t h i s c a s e i f s h e was aware t h a t t h e h o r s e was s t o l e n o r i f s h e was aware o f a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e h o r s e was s t o l e n . Under t h e weakest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d by t h e s t a t e , t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e from which t h e j u r y c o u l d f i n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e horse w a s stolen. W e f i n d t h a t t h e evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e conviction. D e f e n d a n t ' s second a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r would be grounds f o r r e v e r s a l of t h e c o n v i c t i o n i f t h e e x c l u s i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s 7 and 8 w a s e r r o n e o u s and d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d by such exclusion. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 7 reads as follows: "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may n o t be c o n v i c t e d on c o n j e c t u r e s , however shrewd, on s u s p i c i o n s , however j u s t i f i e d , on p r o b a b i l i t i e s , however s t r o n g , b u t o n l y upon e v i d e n c e which e s t a b l i s h e s g u i l t beyond r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; t h a t i s upon proof such a s t o l o g i c a l l y compel t h e conviction t h a t t h e charge i s t r u e . " D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 8 r e a d s as follows: "You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t p r o o f o f i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o prove t h e c r i m e of t h e f t . By i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n i s meant t h e i l l e g a l t a k i n g o f t h e a n i m a l . T h e r e f o r e i f you f i n d t h a t t h e r e i s no proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t knowingly p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n of t h e a n i m a l o r proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t s h e knew t h e animal had been s t o l e n when s h e p r e s e n t e d t h e b i l l of s a l e t o t h e s t o c k y a r d s , s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o an a c q u i t t a l . " I t i s a n e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of law i n Montana t h a t when examining j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on a p p e a l t o 'determine if prejudice has occurred by erroneous admission or erroneous exclusion of a jury instruction, all instructions must be read as a whole. 125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477. State v. Bosch, Where jury instructions as a whole correctly state the law prejudice is not created because of a refusal of a proposed instruction. State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 423 P.2d 49. Here the jury was instructed as to each of the elements of the crime of theft, as to circumstantial evidence, and as to the standard of proof necessary to convict. Defendant's proposed instruction number 7 is often given but here the same subject matter was covered in given instructions. Objection to defendant's proposed instruction number 8 was made on the grounds that it was an incomplete statement of law. Here proof of asportation was not essential to conviction and the jury was instructed as to the element of "control" necessary to convict. Upon examining all instructions given we find that the jury was properly instructed and defendant was not prejudiced through the court's failure to give defendant's proposed instructions number 7 and number 8. The appellant further interjected the issue of the admissibility of the telephone call made to the Market approximately one-half hour before the defendant arrived with the bill of sale. The caller was told that a bill of sale would be required before the proceeds of the .sale could be paid. Evidence of the contents of the call did constitute hearsay, but was admissible as an exception to the rule, the call being made as an integral part of an overall criminal transaction. ~taee v. McCracken, 93 Mont. 269, 18 P.2d 302 (1933). The judgment of conviction i District We concur: Justices J
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