STATE v CRAIG

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No. 13034 I N THE SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE OF M N A A OR H OTN 1975 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - R N L LEE CRAIG, O AD Defendant and Appellant. D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Appeal from: Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Floyd A. Brower argued, Roundup, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana William A . Spoja, Jr. County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: Decided : - Filed : $]; $ ; - ,, ? P ( y December 12, 1975 a 1 9 1976 N Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a jury verdict entered in the district court, Fergus County, finding defendant guilty of a felony--sexual intercourse without consent. A complaint was filed in Lewistown justice court on April 3, 1974, charging defendant with a violation of section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, sexual intercourse without consent, a felony. On April 5, 1974, an information was filed in Fergus County district court charging defendant with the offense. On February 13, 1975, defendant moved the district court for a change of venue due to adverse pretrial publicity. The district court denied the motion. On March 10, 1975, defendant moved the district court for production of certain physical evidence. granted the motion. The district court When the State was unable to produce the evidence, defendant moved the district court to dismiss the information due to denial of due process. The district court denied the motion. Trial commenced on March 12, 1975. After the State's first witness had been sworn and testimony given, defendant, in chambers, moved the district court to dismiss the case on the grounds that section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, was an unconstitution- al denial of equal protection of the laws. The district court denied the motion on March 13, 1975. On March 14, 1975, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The district court subsequently sentenced defendant to ten years in the state penitentiary. Defendant appeals the conviction and sentencing. Two issues are presented for consideration by this Court: 1. Whether the district court should have granted the motion to dismiss due to the State's failure to produce certain physical evidence. 2. Whether s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l l y d e p r i v e d him of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o produce c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l and due p r o c e s s of l a w a s r e q u i r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The S t a t e , a l t h o u g h under o r d e r o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , w a s n o t a b l e , due t o n e g l i g e n t l o s s , misplacement o r d e s t r u c t i o n , t o produce t h e f o l l o w i n g p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e : a l l p i e c e s of t h e nightgown owned by t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s , t h e b e d s h e e t and p i l l o w c a s e from t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s ' r e s i d e n c e , t h e p a n t i e s worn by t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s , and t h e s h o r t s and l o n g j o h n s owned and worn by d e f e n d a n t . By n o t b e i n g a b l e t o produce t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e it was c o n t e n d e d , t h e S t a t e i s i n e f f e c t w i t h h o l d i n g o r s u p p r e s s i n g such evidence. Only i n t e n t i o n a l o r d e l i b e r a t e s u p p r e s s i o n o f e v i d e n c e i s a p e r se v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s s u f f i c i e n t t o reverse o r n u l l i f y a conviction. 138 (2nd C i r . ) . United S t a t e s v . Keogh, 391 F.2d Negligent o r passive suppression w i l l overturn a c o n v i c t i o n i f p r e j u d i c e c a n be shown by t h e s u p p r e s s i o n . S t a t e s v. C o n s o l i d a t e d L a u n d r i e s Corp., United 291 F.2d 563 (2nd C i r . ) . G e n e r a l l y , s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must be m a t e r i a l t o e i t h e r g u i l t o r punishment. Brady v . Maryland, 373 U.S. 1194, 1 0 L ed 2d 2 1 5 . 83, 83 S.Ct. I n o r d e r t o amount t o d e n i a l o f due p r o c e s s , n e g l i g e n t l y s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must be v i t a l t o t h e d e f e n s e of t h e accused. United S t a t e s ex r e l . Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 ( 3 r d C i r . ) , 773. cert.den. 350 U.S. 875, 7 6 S.Ct. 1 2 0 , 100 L ed To o b t a i n a new t r i a l , t h e a c c u s e d must show more t h a n s u p p r e s s i o n ; h e must show t h e e v i d e n c e w a s m a t e r i a l and o f some s u b s t a n t i a l u s e t o him. United S t a t e s v . Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2nd C i r . ) , 184. cert.den. 389 U.S. 886, 88 S . C t . 1 5 9 , 1 9 L ed 2d The s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must b e e x c u l p a t o r y , i . e . , would have t e n d e d t o c l e a r t h e a c c u s e d o f g u i l t , t o v i t i a t e a c o n v i c tion. Brady; L o r a i n e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 396 F.2d 335 ( 9 t h C i r . ) , cert.den. 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 292, 21 E ed 2d 270; L e e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 388 F.2d 737 ( 9 t h C i r . ) . Negligent suppression r e q u i r e s a r e v e r s a l of a conviction where t h e r e s u l t would have been d i f f e r e n t had t h e e v i d e n c e been disclosed. Simos v . Gray, 356 F.Supp. 265. In the instant case t h e r e s u l t would n o t have been a f f e c t e d , o n e way o r t h e o t h e r , by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e m i s s i n g p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e . Photo- g r a p h s o f t h e p i l l o w c a s e , p a n t i e s and b e d s h e e t w e r e i n t r o d u c e d , without objection. A p o r t i o n o f t h e nightgown was i n t r o d u c e d . The i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e o f t h e a c t u a l o b j e c t s was n o t v i t a l t o d e f e n d a n t ' s defense, a s they w e r e n o t of an exculpatory nature. The a b s e n c e o f t h e l o n g j o h n s and s h o r t s w e r e n o t p r e j u d i c i a l , s i n c e t h e S t a t e n e v e r c o n t e n d e d t h e y had b l o o d o r semen, and t h e p o l i c e c h i e f e v e n t e s t i f i e d none was f o u n d . The Kansas Supreme C o u r t found a s i m i l a r r e q u e s t f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s h o e s a s " f r i v o l o u s " , where t h e f o o t p r i n t s t o b e matched w e r e n o t e v e n c o n t e n d ed t o b e t h o s e o f t h e a c c u s e d . P.2d 98, 100. S t a t e v . Ingram, 198 Kan. 517, 426 S e e , a l s o , H a l e v . S t a t e , 248 I n d . 630, 230 N.E.2d 432; S t a t e v . Counterman, 8 Ariz.App. 526, 448 P.2d 96. A f a c t u a l question a r o s e regarding t h e pillowcase due t o a c a p t i o n on t h e back o f t h e p h o t o g r a p h o f s a i d p i l l o w c a s e . caption read: "Blood o n p i l l o w i n bedroom". The D e f e n d a n t was s a t - i s f i e d t h a t b l o o d w a s found o n t h e p i l l o w c a s e , t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n was t h e s o u r c e o f t h e b l o o d . The e x a m i n i n g p h y s i c i a n w a s u n a b l e t o answer t h a t q u e s t i o n , a s was t h e c o m p l a i n a n t . The i n t r o d u c - t i o n o f t h e p i l l o w c a s e would n o t have answered t h e q u e s t i o n . i n t r o d u c t i o n was n o t v i t a l n o r m a t e r i a l t o t h e d e f e n s e . Its Defendant c i t e d a number o f c a s e s r e v e r s i n g c o n v i c t i o n s due t o l o s s o r d e s t r u c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e . distinguishable. 529, 439 P.2d These c a s e s a r e a l l I n r e Cameron, 68 Cal.2d 487, 67 C a l . R p t r . 633, and United S t a t e s v . Heath, 147 F.Supp. a f f ' d 260 F.2d 623 ( 9 t h C i r . ) , 877, d e a l t with t h e l o s s of evidence v i t a l t o t h e a c c u s e d ' s d e f e n s e ; w e have found t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was n o t v i t a l t o t h e d e f e n s e . 298 F.Supp. 795,dealt with t h e a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n a l suppression of exculpatory evidence. 1 Cal.Rptr. I m b l e r v. Craven, A p p l i c a t i o n o f Newbern, 175 C.A.2d 862, 80, d e a l t w i t h t h e r e f u s a l o f o f f i c e r s t o a l l o w t h e a c c u s e d a blood t e s t , a t h i s own e x p e n s e , t o p r o v e i n n o c e n c e o f a drunk c h a r g e . zn t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e o f f i c e r s may have been n e g l i g e n t , b u t t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h e y r e f u s e d d e f e n d a n t t h e e x e r c i s e o f any o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n d e n y i n g t h e motion t o d i s m i s s f o r f a i l u r e t o produce t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e . The second i s s u e p e r t a i n s t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 94-5-503 ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, a s worded p r i o r t o 1975. P r i o r t o t h e 1975 r e v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 94-5-503(1) "A m a l e p e r s o n course without s p o u s e commits course without read: who knowingly h a s s e x u a l i n t e r consent with a female n o t h i s t h e offense of sexual i n t e r consent." (Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 94-5-503 (1) p r e s e n t l y r e a d s : "A p e r s o n who knowingly h a s s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t w i t h a p e r s o n n o t h i s spouse commits t h e o f f e n s e o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t consent." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e pre-1975 v e r s i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e i s an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n based s o l e l y upon sex. I t i s a r g u e d t h e former s e c t i o n v i o l a t e s t h e e q u a l pro- t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i s i o n of A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The United States Supreme Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed 369, 377, has set down the following rules to test whether a classification is arbitrary and consequently denies equal protection of the laws: " * * * 1. The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." A State's right to make reasonable classifications was upheld by the Supreme Court in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed 989, 990, wherein Mr. Justice Pitney said: "It is unnecessary to say that the 'equal protection of the laws' required by the 14th Amendment does not prevent the states from resorting to classification for the purposes of legislation. Numerous and familiar decisions of this court establish that they have a wide range of discretion in that regard. But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. * * * " In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L ed 2d 225, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the classification based on sex in the Idaho probate laws granting a preference to males over equally entitled females in administering estates. Applying the Royster Guano language, the Court found no rational relationship between the legislation and the objective sought. See, also, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L ed 2d 583. In applying the Lindsley rules and the language in Royster Guano, we find the language of former section 94-5-503 is not arbitrary, and therefore is not an unconstitutional classification based on sex. Some inequality existed in the law as written prior to the 1975 change. The Legislature recognized this fact and changed the law to prohibit acts by both men and women. The Lindsley rules allow such inequality, so long as there is some reasonable basis for the inequality. Rape is not the only crime prescribed in section 94-5-503. The statute also includes all other forms of sexual relations without consent. well as a man. sexual attacks. women. Such actions could be committed by a woman as The objective of the legislation was to prevent Historically such attacks have been by men upon Even today the vast majority of violations of this type of statute are by males upon females. The Legislature is not able to correct all of the evils of society in one piece of legislation; that the legislation contains some inequality does not make it unconstitutional unless those similarly classified are treated differently or the classifications are arbitrary. Lindsley; State v. Ewald, 63 Wis.2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213. Defendant has not shown prejudice to him by the omission of women from the prohibitions of former section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947. He cannot claim that he is of the class which has been excluded from either protection or prosecution. On the contrary, he seeks to assert the rights of others to avoid punishment under a statute which he asserts is unconstitutional, but which would nevertheless subject him to liability even though extended to all persons. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 27 S.Ct. 243, 51 L.Ed 357; State v. Sluder, 11 Wash.App. 8, 521 P.2d 971. Even under the former section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, a woman committing an act proscribed under that section would still be prosecutable for assault (section 94-5-201, R.C.M. 1947) or aggravated assault (section 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947). If a woman was involved in the illegal action, other than as the victim, she could be prosecuted under section 94-2-107, R.C.M. 1947, as an aider and abetter; she could not escape prosecution and conviction because of her sex, The district court was correct in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. We affirm. / / We concur: L Justices I Chief ~ustice

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