MISKOVICH v CITY OF HELENA

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 13210 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF MONTANA F GEORGE D. MISKOVICH, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, CITY OF HELENA, MONTANA, a Municipal C o r p o r a t i o n , JACK WILLIAMS, Chief o f P o l i c e o f s a i d C i t y of Helena; THE POLICE COMMISSION o f s a i d C i t y of Helena and t h e members t h e r e o f i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y a s P o l i c e Commissioners, e t al., Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Na t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : C. W. L e a p h a r t , Jr. a r g u e d , Helena, Montana F o r Respondent : L o b l e , P i c o t t e and P a u l y , Helena, Montana Gene A . P i c o t t e a r g u e d , Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided : A p r i l 21, 1976 A I R 2 ,1 :976 Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. The City of Helena appeals from a judgment of the district court, Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Nat Allen presiding, reversing the Helena Police Commission's findings and adjudication and restoring policeman George D. Miskovich to the rank of sergeant with retroactive pay. On April 25, 1974, Sergeant Miskovich an eight year veteran of the Helena Police Department, with a spotless record and an early appointment to the rank of sergeant, was charged by the Chief of Police with three specific episodes, each alleged to constitute "misconduct in office", "conduct unbecoming an officer1' and conduct "such as to bring reproach upon the police force". The charges were in writing: 1. Cameron arrest, February 3, 1974 (a) Striking arrestee Cameron in the face while transporting him to police station, breaking Cameron's nose. (b) Grabbing Cameron by the hair in the police station and pounding his head upon the booking desk on two or more occasions. (c) Throwing Cameron to the floor and beating him with fists after Cameron requested permission to take a breathylizer test. 2. Coldwell arrest, March 4, 1973. Putting a "full Nelson" upon an arrestee named Coldwell, then releasing Coldwell, grabbing him with one hand and hitting him in the face. 3. St.Marks arrest, June 23, 1973. Arresting a woman named Mrs. St. Marks for public drunken- n e s s , and when t h i s woman i n d i c a e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t d e s i r e t o go i n t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , grabbing h e r , p u l l i n g h e r forward and " h i t t i n g h e r i n t h e f a c e w i t h h e r purse", a t t h e same time s h o u t i n g a c c u s a t i o n s a t h e r and holding h e r by t h e h a i r . A l l t h r e e charges were contained i n one w r i t t e n document. The f i r s t occurred about t h r e e months p r i o r t o c h a r g e s , t h e remaining two approximately a year b e f o r e . It s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c i t e d t h a t a l l charges were brought under s e c t i o n 11-1806(1), R.C.M. 1947, n o t i f y i n g Miskovich t h a t he would be t r i e d b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e commission i n accordance w i t h t h e s t a t u t e . I n t h e same paragraph Miskovich, on t h o s e i d e n t i c a l c h a r g e s , was suspended without pay and without h e a r i n g , e f f e c t i v e immediately. T h i s suspen- s i o n w i t h o u t n o t i c e o r h e a r i n g was e x p r e s s l y done by t h e Chief of P o l i c e i n accordance w i t h s e c t i o n 11-1806(10), R.C .M. 1947. Miskovich f i l e d a mandamus proceeding i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k County, s u c c e s s f u l l y o b t a i n i n g a w r i t of mandate t o f o r b i d t h e summary suspension beyond t h e l a s t day of A p r i l 1974, because t h e s t a t u t e provided a maximum suspension under s u b s e c t i o n (10) of t e n days i n any one c a l e n d a r month, and he was suspended on A p r i l 25. Miskovich appealed t h i s summary f i v e day suspension t o t h e $ ' o l i c e commission, a s provided i n t h e s t a t u t e . That a p p e a l was heard on t h e same evidence as were t h e charges under s u b s e c t i o n (I). The p o l i c e Commission h e l d a g a i n s t Miskovich on t h e suspension a p p e a l , and because t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t provide f o r a f u r t h e r a p p e a l , t h e summary d i s c i p l i n e under s u b s e c t i o n (10) became f i n a l . The Helena P o l i c e Commission, a t h r e e man body, was o f f i c i a l l y c h a i r e d by Commissioner P f e i f f e r , who became ill and l e f t t h e h e a r i n g . A t h i s d e p a r t u r e i t was a p p a r e n t l y s t i p u l a t e d by a l l p a r t i e s t h a t P f e i f f e r would be excused and would n o t p a r t i c i p a t e f u r t h e r i n the case. The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h e r e was a s t i p u l a t i o n b u t t h e s p e c i f i c terms a r e i n doubt. P f e i f f e r missed t h e testimony of s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s , p l u s most of t h e d i r e c t examination of M i s kovich. He r e t u r n e d t o t h e h e a r i n g i n t h e c o u r s e of Miskovich's d i r e c t examination, and proceeded t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e tommission's f i n d i n g s and d e c i s i o n , s i g n i n g a s Chairman of t h e p o l i c e Commission. The p o l i c e commission found t h e charges a r i s i n g o u t of t h e Coldwell a r r e s t of March 1973 were n o t proven. Those a r i s i n g out of t h e St.Marks a r r e s t of June 1973, were found proven i n t h e i r entirety. Those a r i s i n g from t h e Cameron i n c i d e n t of February 1974 were found proven i n p a r t , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e u s e of e x c e s s i v e f o r c e i n backhanding Cameron and slamming h i s f a c e i n t o t h e booking counter. I n accordance w i t h t h e s e f i n d i n g s , t h e commission suspended Miskovich an a d d i t i o n a l t h i r t y days and permanently reduced h i s rank from s e r g e a n t t o patrolman. These p e n a l t i e s were approved by t h e c i t y manager. The s t a t u t o r y a c t i o n f o r review i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by Miskovich ensued. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t reviewed t h e r e c o r d i n t h e manner d i r e c t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court i n a p r i o r proceeding by t h e C i t y of Helena i n s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , ( C i t y of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 5 2 . ) , r e v e r s e d t h e p o l i c e commission d e c i s i o n and r e s t o r e d Miskovich r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o h i s pay, emoluments and rank. This a p p e a l by t h e C i t y of Helena followed. The C i t y p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s f o r review: (1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t exceeded i t s scope of review i n r e v e r s i n g t h e p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s on t h e weight of t h e evidence. (2) Whether a policeman subject to charges under section 11-1806 (I), R.C.M. 1947, can also be suspended on the same charges under section 11-1806 ( o , R.C.M. 1947. l) (3) Whether the district court erred in concluding the police commission findings were nul'lified by the absence of Commissioner Pfeiffer. ( ) Whether certain evidentiary rulings of the p'olice 4 oommission materially prejudiced Sergeant Miskovich. The City contends the district court exceeded its scope of review of the police comtrkion proceedings. In support of its position the City relies on the Montana Administrative Procedure 7, Act, specifically section 82-4216 ( ) R.C .M. 1947, which states in pertinent part: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. * * *I1 First, the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, Title 82, Chapter 42, is not applicable to the administrative functions of metropolitan police commissions. The full title of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 2, Laws of Montana 1971, Extraordinary Session, reads in pertinent part: "An act prescribing .uniform procedures for state administrative agencies * * *' .I (Emphasis supplied.) The Montana Administrative Procedure Act defines "agency" at section I, 82-4202 ( ) R.C.M. 1947, as: "* * * any board, bureau, commission, department, authority or officer of the state government authorized by law to make rules and to determine (Emphasis supplied.) contested cases * * *.I1 Though city police commissions are creations of state statute, they are obviously entities of municipal government. It is the mayor or city manager who appoints the police commissioners The c i t y w i t h t h e consent of t h e c i t y c o u n c i l o r commission. c o u n c i l o r c i t y commission determines t h e compensation of p o l i c e commissioners, s e c t i o n 11-1804, R.C.M. 1947. I t i s t h e d u t y of t h e p o l i c e commission t o o v e r s e e t h e h i r i n g and d i s c i p l i n e of p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s being municipal employees, s e c t i o n s 11-1805, 11-1806, R.C.M. District, Mont . Y 1947. See S t a t e of Montana v . P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 464. S i n c e t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o l i c e commission i s n o t a s t a t e administ r a t i v e agency a s d e f i n e d i n t h e Montana A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedure A c t , t h e a c t i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e scope of d i s t r i c t c o u r t review of p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s . The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law, T i t l e 11, Chapter 18. S e c t i o n 11-1806 ( 7 ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "When a charge a g a i n s t a member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e i s found proven by t h e board, and i s n o t vetoed by t h e mayor, t h e mayor must make an o r d e r e n f o r c i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e b o a r d , o r i f modified by t h e mayor, t h e n such d e c i s i o n a s modified, and such d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o review by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e p r o p e r county on a l l q u e s t i o n s of f a c t and a l l q u e s t i o n s of law." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) This Court i n d i s p o s i t i o n of a p r e v i o u s a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e C i t y of Helena f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l d i r e c t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ( C i t y of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 5 2 , 5 4 ) , i n t e r p r e t e d d i s t r i c t c o u r t review of p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s i n t h i s manner: "* * *However, t o review t h e law i s t o a s c e r t a i n whether t h e r u l i n g s t h e r e o n were c o r r e c t , t o review t h e f a c t s i s t o determine whether t h e evidence s u p p o r t s t h e p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s . T h i s would be s i m i l a r t o t h e review of law and f a c t s a s i n an e q u i t y c a s e . See s e c t i o n 93216, R.C.M. 1947." I t has long been h e l d by t h i s Court t h a t review of f a c t s i n an e q u i t y c a s e i s based on t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t e s t . White v. Nollmeyer, 151 Mont. 387, 443 P.2d 873; Bender v. Bender, 144 Mont. 470, 397 P.2d 957; Kyser v. Hiebert, 142 Mont. 466, 385 P.2d 90. Thus t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s power t o make i t s own d e t e r - mination a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence r e s u l t i n g from t h e p o l i c e commission hearings i s analogous t o t h i s Court's power t o do t h e same i n e q u i t y cases. Here, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e t e r - mined t h e r e was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o warrant t h e p o l i c e commission f i n d i n g s . Upon review of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e p o l i c e commission hearing, we agree w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s determination a s t o t h e weight of t h e evidence bearing i n mind t h e two b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s espoused by t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . Wentworth v. Baker, 101 Mont. 226, 53 P.2d 440. mayor suspended a policeman. I n t h a t c a s e , t h e c i t y council and A f t e r i s s u i n g a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i and holding a hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s e t a s i d e t h e suspension and ordered t h e policeman r e i n s t a t e d . I n reviewing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s a c t i o n , t h i s Court f i r s t s a i d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judgment i s presumed t o be c o r r e c t and t h e r e f o r e t h e burden i s on t h e p a r t y challenging it. Second, i n determining whether t h e challenging p a r t y has met i t s burden, t h i s Court has t h e duty of determining whether o r n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t s i n t h e record t o support t h e charge. A s a f i n a l statement on t h i s C o u r t ' s r o l e i n reviewing a proceeding such a s t h i s and by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n t o discussion of t h e evidence i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we n o t e t h e p o l i c e d i s c i p l i n e case Bailey v. Examining & T r i a l Board, 42 Mont. 216,218, 112 P. 69, where t h e Court s a i d : "The e f f e c t of t h i s provision i s t h a t a d e c i s i o n of t h e examining and t r i a l board on questions of f a c t i s f i n a l and conclusive on a l l c o u r t s i f t h e r e i s any s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support i t . Whether t h e r e i s o r not i s a question i n the f i r s t instance f o r a d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d e c i d e . A charge w i t h o u t s u b s t a n c e i s no c h a r g e , and a f i n d i n g w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence a s i t s b a s i s i s no f i n d i n g . One of t h e e s s e n t i a l requirements of law i s t h a t a charge s h a l l be brought a g a i n s t t h e o f f i c e r and t h a t such c h a r g e s h a l l embody f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a c a u s e of a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e Act. Another i s t h a t , b e f o r e t h e charge can be s u s t a i n e d , some s u b s t a n t i a l evidence must be g i v e n i n s u p p o r t of i t . 9 : * *" Turning t o t h e testimony p r e s e n t e d a t t h e p o l i c e commission h e a r i n g , w e n o t e t h i s testimony i n s u p p o r t of t h e h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e p o l i c e commission findings : (1) A s t o t h e charges stemming from t h e Cameron i n c i d e n t , Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t e n r o u t e t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n Miskovich engaged i n an unprovoked a t t a c k a g a i n s t him a t a time when he was handcuffed. Cameron claimed Miskovich's a t t a c k broke h i s nose. However o t h e r testimony r e v e a l s t h e i n c i d e n t may n o t have been q u i t e a s Cameron p i c t u r e d i t . Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had s p e n t t h r e e t o f o u r hours i n a l o c a l b a r p r i o r t o h i s a r r e s t . Officer Sebens, p r e s e n t a t t h e time of Cameron's a r r e s t , t e s t i f i e d Cameron r e s i s t e d a r r e s t b u t t h a t Miskovich engaged i n no p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y a t t h a t time. O f f i c e r Crawford, a l s o p r e s e n t a t t h e time of Cameron's a r r e s t , v e r i f i e d O f f i c e r Sebens' testimony. Miskovich t e s t i f i e d Cameron was a b u s i v e , u n r u l y , and r e s i s t e d a r r e s t and d u r i n g t h e d r i v e t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , Cameron kicked him i n t h e c h e s t , momentarily s t u n n i n g him, s o t h a t he f e l t compelled t o backhand Cameron i n t h e f a c e t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f . Upon h i s a r r i v a l a t t h e s t a t i o n , Cameron t e s t i f i e d t h a t Miskovich continued t o abuse him, a t one p o i n t grabbing him by t h e h a i r and slamming h i s f a c e i n t o t h e booking c o u n t e r . Officers Valiton and S t r a d l e y confirmed Cameron's s t o r y on t h i s p o i n t . However, once again o t h e r testimony would tend t o c a s t s u b s t a n t i a l doubt on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r version of t h e i n c i d e n t . Bonnie Goltz, working a s a d i s p a t c h e r near t h e booking counter a t t h e time of t h e a l l e g e d face slamming i n c i d e n t , d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e testimony of t h e s e two o f f i c e r s , s t a t i n g Cameron was s o unruly t h a t Miskovich held h i s head t o t h e booking counter t o calm him down. She e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t a t no time d i d Miskovich slam Cameron's head a g a i n s t t h e counter. I n a d d i t i o n , one of t h e o f f i c e r s who t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e C i t y , O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y , was under i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n connection with an a l l e g e d felony i n Broadwater County. The v i c t i m of t h a t felony t e s t i f i e d t h a t no p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n was t o be taken a g a i n s t O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y u n t i l c a s e was taken c a r e of ** *'I. 'I* * * a f t e r t h e Miskovich The v i c t i m t e s t i f i e d f u r t h e r t h a t t h i s was t h e r e a c t i o n , even though he informed t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of a signed confession by O f f i c e r S t r a d l e y on t h e matter. O f f i c e r Eielena S t r a d l e y has s i n c e been removed from t h e l p o l i c e department. F i n a l l y , :in view of t h e a l l e g e d charge of excessive violence i n f l i c t e d on Cameron by Miskovich, evidence a s t o Cameron's a c t u a l physical condition subsequent t o t h e a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t i s of t h e utmost importance. O f f i c e r Grant ~ o h n s o n ,a witness f o r t h e c i t y and t h e o f f i c e r i n charge of t h e s h i f t on t h e day of t h e a r r e s t , s t a t e d on cross-examination t h a t he t o l d Miskovich on t h e day of t h e a r r e s t t h a t Cameron d i d n o t appear t o be i n j u r e d . A close examination of t h e photo of Cameron taken t h e day of h i s a r r e s t and marked Miskovich Exhibit 2 , shows no marks on t h e p r i s o n e r compatible with t h e a l l e g e d violence purportedly i n f l i c t e d on Cameron's head and face. In view of the foregoing evidence, we hold the findings of the police commission as to charges against Miskovich stemming from the Cameron arrest are not supported by substantial evidence, (2) The police commission findings as to the St. Marks arrest of June 1973. Officer Bryson who assisted Miskovich in arresting the St. Marks woman testified that upon arriving at the police station, Miskovich proceeded to grab the woman by the hair and pull her down an entrance ramp, at the same time striking her in the face with her purse. Miskovich testified he felt com- pelled to strike her once with her purse because she was kicking and biting and had taken his thumb in her mouth and refused to let go. Further scrutiny of Officer Bryson's testimony reveals (1) he admitted the woman had been drinking, (2) it was necessary for both officers to exert force to accomplish the arrest and place her in the patrol car, and (3) the woman attempted to jump out of the patrol car on the way to the station. Mrs. St. Marks plead guilty to a charge of resisting arrest, paid a $50 fine, and was given a suspended jail sentence. She also plead guilty to a charge of drunkenness and paid a fine of $25. Further, she failed to appear at the commission hearing. On the basis of this evidence the police commission findings as to the St. Marks incident were not supported by substantial evidence. This type of case should properly be decided on the merits if a t all possible. This we have done and consequently an in depth discussion of the procedural due process issues raised is not necessary to the disposition of this matter--but we will comment briefly for clarification of these issues. Appellant City's second issue seeks a clarification of 1) section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947 as to subsections (1) and ( 0 . Miskovich was suspended pursuant to subsection (10) of section 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. Utilizing the same charges used to justify his suspension, he was then subjected to a police commission hearing pursuant to subsection (1) of section 11-1806. The City contends subsection (10) is a proper means of suspending a policeman pending charges brought under subsection (I), it argues that the power of suspension is incident to the power of removal. Miskovich, on the other hand, contends the applicable subsections are mutually exclusive, and thereforeace charges were brought under subsection (lo), those same charges could not be used to 1. institute proceedings under subsection ( ) The City contends that suspension pending hearing on the charges is a perfectly legitimate administrative exercise. We agree. However, that principle is not dispositive of the issue. The question here is the mode of such suspension, considering the applicable statute. While subsections (1) through (9) and subsection (lo), of section 11-1806, all deal with matters of police discipline, it is apparent the procedure and remedies available under subsections (1) through (9) are more detailed in their due process protections than those under subsection ( 0 . 1) In particular, contrary to sub- 9, sections (1) through ( ) subsection (10) does not provide for written notice of charges or a hearing prior to suspension, rather the only action required is a notice of suspension given by the mayor or the chief of police, with the approval of the mayor. In addition, suspension under subsection (10) can only be for ten days in any one month, with the only appeal of that suspension being to the police commission since subsection (10) does not provide for judicial review. In construing a statutory situation such as exists here, this Court in Adair v. Schnack, 117 Mont. 377, 386, 161 P.2d 641, quoted with approval from the California case People v. Campbell, 110 Cal.App. 783, 291 P. 161, 162: "'It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the legislature intended a different meaning and effect. "I In State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 20, 195 P. 2d 989, the Court said: "A fundamental rule of construction is that, if possible, effect shall be given to all parts of a statute. * * * And each part of a statute must be given a reasonable construction which will enable it to be harmonized with other provisions * * * and give it vitality and make operative all of its provisions. * * * Statutes I should be so construed as to give a sensible and intelligent meaning to every part and avoid absurd and unjust consequences. Section 516, Lewis' Sutherland Stat.Const. (2d ~d.)' * * * . I ' (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, in view of provisions in section 11-1806, subsections (1) through (9) and subsection (lp), R.C.M. 1947, we hold they are mutually exclusive with subsection (10) intended to deal with minor disciplinary matters capable of being handled within the police department and subsections (1) through (9) intended for charges of a more serious nature, charges which could, if proven, lead to discharge from the police force. Therefore, a policeman charged under section 11-1806, subsection (lo), cannot also be subject to identical charges under section 11-1806, subsection ( ) 1. To construe this statute otherwise would be to hold the legislature intended to subject the policeman, on one set of charges, to two proceedings before the police commission, one with v a r i o u s procedural safeguards and t h e r i g h t t o j u d i c i a l review, and t h e o t h e r of a more summary n a t u r e w i t h no r i g h t of j u d i c i a l review. It i s such "absurd and u n j u s t consequences" a l l u d e d t o i n S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. Cole, s u p r a , t h a t t h i s Court s t r i v e s t o avoid. However, we emphasize t h i s holding does n o t mean a p o l i c e o f f i c e r cannot be suspended pending a h e a r i n g on charges b u t only t h a t t h e same charges may n o t be used t o e f f e c t both suspension under s u b s e c t i o n ( l o ) , and t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e formal h e a r i n g process under s u b s e c t i o n (1). W a g r e e w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t a member of an a d m i n i s t r a e t i v e t r i b u n a l who was a b s e n t from a p o r t i o n of t h e a d j u d i c a t i v e proceedings b e f o r e t h a t t r i b u n a l should n o t be allowed t o p a r t i cipate i n i t s f i n a l decision. This would be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m - p o r t a n t as i t p e r t a i n s t o a p o l i c e commission. Here, t h e r e was a t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d of t h e proceedings b e f o r e t h e commission b u t t h i s may n o t always be t r u e as t h e s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a r e c o r d be k e p t . C i t y of Helena v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 74, 530 P.2d 464, 32 St.Rep. 52. Finding no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n and s u f f i c i e n t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , we a f f i r m t h e judgment t o r e i n s t a t e respondent p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o s e r g e a n t ' s rank w i t h retroact i v e and o t h e r . We concur: Justices dlu! f,JA JI.' / ' i fi611." Robert Nelson, District g for chief Justice Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: n I dissent. 1

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.