YUNKER v MURRAY

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No. 13486 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 CAREY MATOVICH YUNKER, P l a i n t i f f and P e t i t i o n e r , FRANK MURRAY, S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s Secretary of S t a t e of t h e S t a t e of Montana, e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. O r i g i n a l Proceeding: Counsel o f Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : D a n i e l 3. Shea a r g u e d , Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Robert L.Woodah1, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana William 3. Anderson a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana Submitted: Filed : $El' I. 4 1976 September 7 , 1976 Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . This is an o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t e a c h o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f Montana i s a n " i n c u m b e n t " w i t h i n t h e meaning o f A r t i c l e V I I , s e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. The p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on b e h a l f o f Carey Matovich Yunker, a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r i n p r e c i n c t 5 9 , Y e l l o w s t o n e County, Montana, within t h e Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t . A copy o f t h e c o m p l a i n t f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a t t a c h e d t o t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d h e r e i n . The m a t t e r was s e t f o r a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g and n o t i c e g i v e n t o t h e Hon. F r a n k Murray, S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , and t o t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Notice w a s n o t g i v e n t o t h e c l e r k and r e c o r d e r o f e a c h o f t h e f i v e c o u n t i e s c o m p r i s i n g t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t named a s d e f e n d a n t s . B r i e f s w e r e f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r , t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , and two o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . A t t h e t i m e o f a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g c o u n s e l a p p e a r e d and p r e s e n t e d o r a l argument on b e h a l f o f p e t i t i o n e r and on b e h a l f o f t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . A s w e understand it, t h e s e a t t o r n e y s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t procedurally t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e admitted t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e p e t i t i o n and c o m p l a i n t b u t n o t t h e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a g r e e d on t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d , and r e q u e s t e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e n d e r f o r t h w i t h a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment, i n view of t h e t i m e element involved. This Court took t h e m a t t e r under advisement. W e a c c e p t j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n on t h e b a s i s set f o r t h and u n d e r a u t h o r i t y o f Forty-Second Leg. Assembly v . Lennon, 1 5 6 Mont. 416, 481 P.2d 330. W e d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h e c l e r k s and r e c o r d e r s o f t h e f i v e c o u n t i e s of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t n e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n and o r d e r a l l s t r i c k e n a s d e f e n d a n t s h e r e i n . The s t a t u t o r y d u t y of p r e s c r i b i n g t h e form of b a l l o t i s v e s t e d i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . S e c t i o n 2 3 - 3 5 1 7 ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947. His presence a s a p a r t y herein renders unnecessary t h e joining of county e l e c t i o n o f f i c i a l s . Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e , a bona f i d e j u s t i c i a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment h a s been p r e s e n t e d t o us f o r determination. Here we have a c o m p l a i n t f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment; a s t i p u l a t i o n i n open c o u r t t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d and t h a t p r o c e d u r a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a r e waived by t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ; a n a d m i s s i o n by two o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e i r b r i e f t h a t " t h e f a c t s , i s s u e s , and law a r e now s q u a r e l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t " ; and a n agreement on t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e t o be d e c i d e d under t h e f a c t s . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e w i l l t r e a t t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and a d m i s s i o n s a s r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g s t o t h e c o m p l a i n t and c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e r e a d y f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n . The f a c t u a l background w i l l i l l u m i n a t e t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d for decision. P r i o r t o 1961 d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e s h i p s i n m u l t i - judge j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s were n o t d e s i g n a t e d o r i d e n t i f i e d a s separate offices. Each c a n d i d a t e , whether incumbent o r c h a l l e n g e r , ran against t h e f i e l d r a t h e r than against a p a r t i c u l a r individual f o r a designated judgeship. I n a t h r e e judge d i s t r i c t , f o r example, t h e t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v i n g t h e h i g h e s t number o f v o t e s i n t h e general e l e c t i o n w e r e declared e l e c t e d t o t h e t h r e e judgeships t o be f i l l e d . I n 1961 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e changed t h i s system by amending s e c t i o n s 23-2001 t h r o u g h 23-2003, by s e c t i o n 23-4501, R.C.M. 1947). R.C.M. 1947, ( l a t e r r e p l a c e d The new l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d e d t h a t each d i s t r i c t judgeship i n a multi-judge judicial d i s t r i c t was t o be a s s i g n e d a number and e a c h became a s e p a r a t e j u d i c i a l A t t h a t t i m e t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judgeships i n t h e office. T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t w e r e a s s i g n e d numbers a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e n i o r i t y of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s . Thus t h e j u d g e s h i p h e l d by J u d g e Derry became Department #1; t h a t of J u d g e F e n t o n became Department # 2 ; and t h a t o f J u d g e Sande became Department #3. T h i s s i t u a t i o n continued u n t i l t h e r e t i r e m e n t of Judge A t t h a t t i m e by c o u r t r u l e i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h Derry i n 1967. J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , J u d g e F e n t o n became t h e s e n i o r d i s t r i c t judge i n p o i n t o f s e r v i c e and succeeded t o Department #1; J u d g e Sande t o Department # 2 ; and J u d g e Luedke, a p p o i n t e d t o s u c c e e d J u d g e D e r r y , t o Department # 3 . The s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , however, r e t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l d e p a r t m e n t d e s i g n a t i o n and s o f a r a s h i s e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s w e r e c o n c e r n e d J u d g e F e n t o n remained i n Department # 2 , J u d g e Sande i n Department # 3 , and J u d g e Luedke succeeded t o Department # l . I n 1969 J u d g e F e n t o n d i e d and J u d g e Wilson was a p p o i n t e d t o s u c c e e d him. The l o c a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e r e s u l t e d i n a n o r d e r b e i n g e n t e r e d a s s i g n i n g J u d g e Sande t o Department #1, J u d g e Luedke t o Department # 2 , and J u d g e Wilson t o Department # 3 . The s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s r e t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l d e s i g n a t i o n s and showed J u d g e Luedke i n Department #1, J u d g e Wilson i n Department # 2 , and J u d g e Sande i n Department #3. I n t h e 1972 e l e c t i o n t h e r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e ' s o f f i c e and i n t h e c o u r t r e c o r d s o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t indicated t h i s situation: S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t i n Billings Dept. #1 J u d g e Luedke J u d g e Sande Dept. # 2 J u d g e Wilson J u d g e Luedke Dept. # 3 J u d g e Sande Judge Wilson Confusion r e s u l t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h f i l i n g s by c h a l l e n g e r s . One c h a l l e n g e r f i l e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e T h i r t e e n J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t d e p a r t m e n t numbers, r a t h e r t h a n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t numbers i n t h e e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s office. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n h i s f i l i n g a g a i n s t t h e wrong judge. The e r r o r was d i s c o v e r e d b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g d e a d l i n e and t h e f i l i n g was amended a c c o r d i n g l y . This e l e c t i o n y e a r , according t o t h e B i l l i n g s judges, they d e c i d e d t o f i l e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t o v e r which e a c h p r e sided a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e c o u r t records of t h e Thirteenth Judic i a l D i s t r i c t i n B i l l i n g s , t o avoid t h e confusion t h a t e x i s t e d i n 1972. The r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e ' s o f f i c e w e r e conformed t o t h o s e d e p a r t m e n t numbers used i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h Judicial District. A c c o r d i n g l y , Judge Sande f i l e d f o r Department #1, Judge Luedke f o r Department #2 and Judge Wilson f o r Department #3. However, p r i o r t o t h e e l e c t i o n t h i s y e a r , t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n had been a d o p t e d and t h e e l e c t i o n laws p e r t a i n i n g t o d i s t r i c t judges changed. The 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e d a l l unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges t o r u n on a " r e t a i n o r reject" basis. A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u - t i o n ; K e l l e r v . Smith, 33 St.Rep. 828, Mont . P.2d - -1 A form of b a l l o t w a s p r o v i d e d t o implement t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n by t h e 1973 l e g i s l a t u r e . S e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947; K e l l e r v . Smith, s u p r a . The s i t u a t i o n , i n a n u t s h e l l , i s t h a t e a c h o f t h e t h r e e judges i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t was e l e c t e d i n 1972 t o a f o u r y e a r term i n a d i f f e r e n t d e p a r t m e n t o r j u d g e s h i p t h a n t h a t f o r which t h e y a r e r u n n i n g unopposed i n 1976. The q u e s t i o n f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s whether e a c h i s a n "incumbent" w i t h i n t h e meaning of A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , and must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, 1947. R.C.M. A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n provides : " (2) I f , a t the f i r s t election a f t e r senate c o n f i r m a t i o n , and a t t h e e l e c t i o n b e f o r e e a c h s u c c e e d i n g t e r m o f o f f i c e , any c a n d i d a t e o t h e r t h a n t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e b a l l o t . I f t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l n e v e r t h e l e s s be p l a c e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o a l l o w v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r r e j e c t him. I f a n incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , a n o t h e r s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made." S e c t i o n 2 3 - 4 5 0 1 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s : "Each j u d i c i a l o f f i c e i n a d i s t r i c t which h a s more t h a n one (1) d i s t r i c t judge i s a s e p a r a t e and i n d e pendent o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes." From t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n and s t a t u t e it i s a r g u e d t h a t none o f t h e t h r e e unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i s a n "incumbent" b e c a u s e e a c h h a s f i l e d f o r a d i f f e r e n t o f f i c e o r j u d g e s h i p t h a n t h a t t o which h e was e l e c t e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g e l e c t i o n i n 1972. W e observe t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i s d i r e c t e d t o incumbent d i s t r i c t judges (and Supreme C o u r t j u s t i c e s ) . W e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prov i s i o n a p p l i e s t o a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i r r e s p e c t i v e o f how t h e y o r i g i n a l l y a t t a i n e d t h e i r j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s and i n t h a t c o n t e x t a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r reject" b a l l o t i n the general election. K e l l e r v . Smith, s u p r a . The e x p l a n a t o r y n o t e s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention f o l l o w i n g A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8, f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e word "incumbent" a p p e a r i n g t h e r e i n a p p l i e s t o any judge i n o f f i c e . "Convention Notes " R e v i s e s 1889 c o n s t i t u t i o n * * * C o n t e s t e d e l e c t i o n o f judges i s n o t changed, however i f a judqe i n o f f i c e d o e s n o t have a n opponent i n a n e l e c t i o n h i s name w i l l be p u t on t h e b a l l o t anyway and t h e p e o p l e asked approve o r r e j e c t him. * * * I t (Emphasis a d d e d . ) to T h i s e x p r e s s e s t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention and t h e meaning t h e y a t t a c h e d t o t h e word "incumbent" i n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h e y framed and a d o p t e d . It c l e a r l y shows t h e a p p r o v a l o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t was i n t e n d e d t o Keller v. Smith, s u p r a . a p p l y t o any unopposed judge i n o f f i c e . The s t a t u t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, was e n a c t e d l o n g b e f o r e t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . O r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d i n 1961 when t h e system of e l e c t i n g judges was changed a s h e r e t o f o r e d e s c r i b e d , vcol t h e s t a t u t e was s u b s e q u e n t l y c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2 3 - M ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, i n 1969. I t c r e a t e d a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes f o r each judgeship i n a multi-judge d i s t r i c t i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h head-on c o n t e s t s between two c a n d i d a t e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l j u d g e s h i p s i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n c o n t i n u e t h e p r i o r system whereby a l l c a n d i d a t e s r a n i n a f i e l d f o r t h e t o t a l number o f j u d g e s h i p s t o be f i l l e d i n t h e e l e c t i o n . Thus t h e purpose and o b j e c t i v e o f t h e s t a t u t e , on t h e o n e hand, and t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , on t h e o t h e r , a r e q u i t e different. It follows t h a t t h e r e i s nothing inconsistent i n using t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t o mean any judge i n o f f i c e and a t t h e same t i m e p r e s e r v i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y mandate t h a t e a c h j u d g e s h i p i s a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes. The two a r e n o t r e p u g n a n t o r i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , b u t c a n be c o n s t r u e d and i n t e r p r e t e d as p a r t s o f a homogene0.u~wh01.e~ g i v i n g e f f e c t t o each. W e find f u r t h e r support f o r our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e p r i n c i p l e of reasonable construction. This p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n and h a s been d e f i n e d and e x p l a i n e d i n t h i s language: " I t h a s been c a l l e d a g o l d e n r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t unreasonableness of t h e r e s u l t produced by one among a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a s t a t u t e i s r e a s o n f o r r e j e c t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n f a v o r of a n o t h e r which would produce a r e a s o n a b l e r e s u l t . It is said to be a 'well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible construction.'" Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, Sec. 45.12, p. 37, and cases cited therein. Montana has adopted this principle by statute. Section 49-134, R.C.M. 1947. Applying this principle to the case before us, is it reasonable to construe the intent of the framers of the constitution to permit nullification of the "retain or reject" ballot simply by filing for a different district judgeship in the same judicial district? To ask the question is to answer it. This could be repeated in each succeeding election ad infinitum. We decline to indulge in the assumption the framers of the constitution intended to impose the requirement of a "retain or reject" ballot for unopposed judges with their right hand, and at the same time effectively nullify it with their left. Additionally, public policy supports our construction. In Keller we quoted a recognized authority: "Statutes regulating the rights of citizens to vote are of great public interest, and therefore, are interpreted with a view to securing for citizens their right to vote and to insure the election of those officers who are the people's choice." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 71.15, p . 366. and cases . therein cited. A We applied this principle to Article VII, Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana Constitution, in the context of the issue before us in Keller. We apply it here for the same reasons and with the same result. We have considered the subsidiary arguments advanced in opposition to our interpretation and find them not persuasive. This opinion constitutes a declaratory judgment that each of the three judges in the Thirteenth Judicial District of Montana is an unopposed "incumbent" within the meaning of Article VII, Section 8(2), 1972 Montana Constitution, and must run on a "retain or reject" ballot in the general election in 1976 pursuant to section 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. The secretary of state, pur- suant to section 23-3517(3), R.C.M. 1947, should prescribe the form of ballot accordingly. 7%d - g - M ------------ - Justice * * * * * Justice Wesley Castles dissents but is not available to express his views at this time.

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