TAYLOR v TAYLOR

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No, 12869 I N THE SUPREME C U T OF THE STATE O M N A A OR F OTN 1975 A D D I E F. TAYLOR, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, - -vs JAMES E. TAYLOR, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g , Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana James J , S i n c l a i r argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Amicus Curiae : Honorable Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 1 James F. Walsh, 1 1 argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: J\)b{ lL,j -375 May 9 , 1975 JkiN 1 0 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, t h e Honorable Nat Allen p r e s i d i n g . The judgment modified a d i v o r c e decree e n t e r e d June 23, 1965, by s t r i k i n g t h o s e p o r t i o n s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e payment of alimony. Appellant Addie F. Taylor was granted a d i v o r c e from respondent James E. Taylor. The d i v o r c e d e c r e e provided t h a t a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e decree. The p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was dated June 16, 1965. It r e c i t e d t h a t husband and wife had l i v e d s e p a r a t e and a p a r t f o r many months; t h e w i f e intended t o f i l e f o r d i v o r c e ; and, i t was t h e d e s i r e of both t o s e t t l e and a d j u s t between themselves t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s and a l l claims each may o r might have against t h e other. Then followed n i n e t e e n s e p a r a t e paragraphs, t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s of each a r e : 1) A agreement t o b e f r e e from i n t e r f e r e n c e . n 2) A agreement t o r e l e a s e each o t h e r from a l l c l a i m s , n except a s provided i n t h e agreement. 3) An agreement by t h e husband t o pay a l l c u r r e n t b i l l s . 4) A agreement by t h e husband t o support an a d u l t n daughter a t h e r C a l i f o r n i a r e s i d e n c e . 5) An agreement t o f u r n i s h a l i s t of a l l o b l i g a t i o n s , 6) The p a r t i e s a r e n o t l i m i t e d i n t h e i r remedies a t law o r i n e q u i t y f o r t h e enforcement of e i t h e r t h i s agreement o r t h e decree. 7) The husband can c l a i m t h e minor son a s an income t a x deduction. 8) Personal p r o p e r t y items. 9) T r a n s f e r of one c a r t o each. 10) refunds. Husband t o handle income t a x items and r e c e i v e a l l Husband t o execute a $1,000 n o t e t o be paid o f f a t 11) $25 per month f o r r e l e a s e of w i f e ' s c l a i m on a check f o r $5,500, which was payable j o i n t l y on t h e s a l e of mineral p r o p e r t y i n North Dakota. Husband a g r e e s t o t r a n s f e r t h e home t o t h e w i f e and 12) t o pay t h e l o a n , t a x e s and i n s u r a n c e o b l i g a t i o n s . Husband a g r e e s t o pay support money f o r minor son 13) and t o pay f o r a c o l l e g e education. 14) Small income checks endorsed t o wife. 15) II The husband a g r e e s t o pay t o t h e w i f e t h e sum of Four Hundred and no/100 D o l l a r s ($400.00) p e r month beginning June 1, 1965, a s alimony, and a l i k e sum each and every month thereafter. II 16) Husband w i l l pay balance due on f u r n i t u r e c o n t r a c t . 17) Each w i l l e x e c u t e i n s t r u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t t h i s agreement. 18) 1I This agreement i s made and e n t e r e d i n t o f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y by each of t h e p a r t i e s , and i t s h a l l o p e r a t e a s a complete p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t between them. 19) II "It i s understood t h a t t h i s i s n o t an agreement t o o b t a i n a d i v o r c e , b u t i n t h e event t h a t e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o s h a l l o b t a i n a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e from t h e o t h e r , then t h i s agreement i s t o b e made a p a r t of any Decree headed ( s i c ) by t h e Court. 11 The complaint f o r d i v o r c e by t h e w i f e r e c i t e d t h a t t h e r e were t h r e e c h i l d r e n , two of age, and one, a son, a minor. Custody was g r a n t e d t h e mother w i t h support a s provided i n paragraph 1 3 , f o r t h e minor son. Without f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n o r r e f e r e n c e i n t h e complaint o r d e c r e e , except by r e f e r e n c e , paragraph 4 provided f o r support of a d a u g h t e r , of age, i n C a l i f o r n i a . The decree provided s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r custody and support of t h e minor son. It then provided f o r alimony a t $400 per month, a s agreed i n paragraph 15; b u t l i m i t e d t h e payments u n t i l r e marriage. Then, t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e and t h e w i f e awarded h e r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . The p e t i t i o n by James E. Taylor, defendant i n t h e d i v o r c e c a s e i s simple. It r e c i t e s t h e d e c r e e p r o v i s i o n f o r alimony and t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement, a s note'd.abovee, then a l l e g e s : ( . t h a t t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n i s based on s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. I) 1947; (2) t h a t A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t any person * * *." "* * * The S t a t e * * * s h a l l [ n o t ] * * * on account o f * * * s e x and (3) t h a t s e c t i o n 21-139 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t h a t i t v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n response t o t h e p e t i t i o n , Addie Taylor a l l e g e d : (1) t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n was n o t based upon s e c t i o n 21-139 b u t , r a t h e r , was t h e r e s u l t of an agreement and c o n t r a c t ; (2) i n any e v e n t , even i f s e c t i o n 21-139 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h i s would be an impermissible ex p o s t f a c t o a p p l i c a t i o n ; and, (3) t h e alimony s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e f l e c t s a v a l i d p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Hearing was had and ex-wife Addie t e s t i f i e d t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n i n t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was made a s an accommodation t o t h e husband and was accepted i n l i e u of a d i s t r i b u t i o n of o t h e r p r o p e r t y . Addie t e s t i f i e d : II I was going t o a s k f o r a s e t amount, and J i m s a i d t h a t he could n o t come up w i t h t h a t amount of money, so we decided on alimony payments i n l i e u of a cash s e t t l e m e n t 9~ Yc." * The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, p e r m i t t i n g t h e c o u r t t o award alimony t o a w i f e i n a d i v o r c e proceeding where t h e divorce i s g r a n t e d f o r an o f f e n s e of t h e husband i s i n v i o l a t i o n o f A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The c o u r t then ordered s t r i c k e n t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e d i v o r c e decree. The issues on appeal, as stated, go to the constitutional questions involved. However, in our view, the case can be deter- mined, not on constitutional grounds, but, rather, on contract rights. If the decree is one not subject to modification as alimony, but rather one of contract, no constitutional problems arise. Constitutional issues will not be determined if the case may be determined on nonconstitutional grounds. See: Montana State University v. Ransier, 32 St.Rep. , and Mon t . 3 - P. 2d 2 cases cited therein. In Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300, this Court considered whether or not, as a matter of law, the alimony provision of a property settlement agreement was integral to the agreement and not severable and as such not subject to modification by the court. On appeal, this Court analyzed the agreement that was incorporated into the decree and held that the 1I alimony" was an integral part of the property settlement agree- ment and was not severable, and the settlement agreement was fully supported by consideration from the wife and could not be changed without the consent of both parties. The Court then went on to state that the payments were not alimony per se and the use of the term alimony was only a label, In Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont, 463, 517 P.2d 884,886,887, 31 St.Rep. 29, this Court considered another property settlement agreementht was incorporated into a decree. The Court stated: "Directing our attention to the first issue, the underlying question is whether the alimony provision of the property settlement is integral and not severable from the rest of the agreement and as such not subject to subsequent modification by the court. This question was recently before this Court in Washington v. Washington, Mont , 512 P.2d 1300, 30 St.Rep. 674. There we held that the alimony provisions of that particular agreement were not in fact alimony payments at all, but instead were an integrated part of a property settlement which could not be severed therefrom without destroying the contract, and accordingly were not subject to subsequent modification by the court. . 11 W r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e s announced t h e r e i n , t h e e a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d i n s u p p o r t , and t h e r a t i o n a l e a p p l i e d t o r e s o l u t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n . Here, however, although t h e agreement b e a r s some s i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h e agreement i n Washington, i t s d i f f e r e n c e s command an o p p o s i t e r e s u l t . I n Washington t h e w i f e d i d n ' t seek alimony o r support i n t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n b u t both p a r t i e s simply sought an e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ; t h e agreement i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e i n Washington provided t h a t t h e payments l a b e l e d a s alimony continued i f t h e w i f e remarried and became a charge a g a i n s t t h e husband's e s t a t e i f he d i e d p r i o r t o payment i n f u l l ; t h e agreement provided t h a t t h e w i f e would assume a p r e - e x i s t i n g l i a b i l i t y of $10,000 a g a i n s t some of t h e property. wa ere, u n l i k e Washington, A l i c e sought an alimony award f o r h e r s u p p o r t and maintenance i n h e r c r o s s c l a i m f o r d i v o r c e , and t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e made such an award pursuant t o t h e agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s . The alimony payments t o A l i c e terminated a b s o l u t e l y i n t h e event of h e r remarriage. The agreement h e r e i s s i l e n t on l i a b i l i t y f o r f u t u r e payments i n t h e event of d e a t h of e i t h e r A l i c e o r Arthur. The alimony p r o v i s i o n s h e r e a r e c l e a r l y alimony and n o t payments i n s e t t l e m e n t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . Here A l i c e assumed no l i a b i l i t y f o r any p r e - e x i s t i n g indebtedness n o r i s t h e r e any evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t she gave up a n y t h i n g i n t h e way of s u p p o r t and maintenance i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of r e c e i v i n g a more f a v o r a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d during t h e i r marriage. "In s h o r t , h e r e t h e r e i s no i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n s and t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n t h a t would d e s t r o y t h e r e s t of t h e c o n t r a c t i f t h e amount o f alimony payments were modified by t h e c o u r t . Absent such mutual interdependency, t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n s of t h e agreement i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e a r e n o t an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e property settlement but a r e i n a l l respects separable therefrom and s u b j e c t t o subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n by t h e c o u r t i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n on a proper showing of changed circumstances. II H e r e t o f o r e , we have s e t f o r t h t h e paragraphs of t h e agreement h e r e and how they were adopted by r e f e r e n c e i n t h e d e c r e e and S i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h e agreements i n b o t h Washington changed i n p a r t . and Movius e x i s t . i n Washington, W hold t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t h e r e i s more l i k e t h a t e The testimony of Addie T a y l o r , n o t d i s p u t e d , makes c l e a r t h a t t h e agreement was an independent b a r g a i n . s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. bearing since the II Thus, whether 1947, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r n o t has no alimony" was p a r t of a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s respective property r i g h t s . O b l i g a t i o n s of a c o n t r a c t executed i n 1965 cannot be i n v a l i d a t e d by subsequent passage of any law. Thus, we hold t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e - agreement ment / a s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e d e c r e e of d i v o r c e , was intended t o a c t a s an i n s e v e r a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n o f t h e agreement and n o t i m p a i r a b l e by a subsequent change i n t h e law, i f indeed there is. Accordingly, we r e v e r s e t h e judgment and remand t h e m a t t e r t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r e n t r y o f judgment f o r a p p e l l a n t . W e do n o t award a t t o r n e y f e e s a s r e q u e s t e d s i n c e no p l e a d i n g f o r such was made; n o r , under our holding h e r e t h a t t h e agreement was contractual have h e r c o s t s . Justice W Concur: e ,/? / Justices. - could any a t t o r n e y f e e be awarded. > / Appellant s h a l l

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