ELLINGSON v CRICK CO

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No. 12824 I N T E SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA H F H F 1975 STEVEN G. ELLINGSON, Claimant and Respondent, - -vs CRICK COMPANY, Employer, and A G N U NORTHWEST INSURANCE COMPANY, ROAT Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant : H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana For Respoddent: H a r r i s o n , Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana Jerome T. Loendorf argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed : fip2 1 l$ib January 15, 1975 APR 1 0 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an a p p e a l from t h e o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Powell County, a f f i r m i n g an award of workmen's compensation b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t , Steven G. E l l i n g s o n . The f a c t s g i v i n g rise t o t h e c l a i m a r e n o t d i s p u t e d . On June 7, 1972, c l a i m a n t was i n j u r e d i n a two v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t on U.S. Highway 1 2 , n e a r Avon, Montana. A t the t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , he was e n r o u t e t o h i s p l a c e of employment i n h i s private vehicle. H i s employer Crick Company was then engaged i n a highway c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t j u s t west of G a r r i s o n , Montana. Claimant was l i v i n g i n Helena and commuted t h e f o r t y - , f i v e miles every day. The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t c l a i m a n t was n o t a union member, b u t was working under t h e terms of t h e 1971-1974 Heavy Highway Construct i o n Agreement between t h e Montana C o n t r a c t o r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . and t h e Laborers' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of North America. Consistent w i t h t h e terms of t h a t agreement, c l a i m a n t was paid f i v e d o l l a r s p e r day a s " t r a v e l allowance". The amount of t h e allowance was determined by a c o n t r a c t u a l schedule computed on t h e b a s i s of mileage between t h e c e n t e r of t h e job s i t e and t h e n e a r e s t county courthouse. The amount t h u s computed w a s paid t o a l l employees, independently of t h e mileage a c t u a l l y t r a v e l e d by any p a r t i c u l a r employee. I t i s c l e a r t h i s allowance was n o t intended t o be compensation f o r t h e time spent i n t r a v e l . Not only was i t computed w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of time and d i s t a n c e a c t u a l l y inolved i n each employee's c a s e , b u t t h e c o n t r a c t c l e a r l y provided: " ~ m ~ l o ~ e h a l l t r a v e l t o and from t h e i r d a i l v ses i n i t i a i r e p o r t i n g p l a c e on t h e i r own time and by means of t h e i r own transportation."(Emphasis supplied). A l l t h e s e f a c t s were b e f o r e t h e h e a r i n g examiner of t h e Workmen's Compensation D i v i s i o n when he e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law f a v o r i n g c l a i m a n t . The d e c i s i o n was appealed t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Powell County on t h e r e c o r d of t h e e a r l i e r h e a r i n g , w i t h o u t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l evidence. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t adopted a l l of t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and concluThat s i o n s o f law e n t e r e d by t h e ~ i v i s i o n ' sh e a r i n g examiner. judgment i s now appealed, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n allowing t h e claim. Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s i n g l e i s s u e r a i s e d , we n o t e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e h e a r i n g examiner and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t were made p r i o r t o our d e c i s i o n i n McMillen v. McKee & Co., , P.2d 32 S t . Rep. 319. Mon t . 2 A s recognized by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e i r arguments b e f o r e t h i s Court, t h e McMillen d e c i s i o n i s pert i n e n t t o t h i s a p p e a l , although t h e q u e s t i o n remains whether i t i s c o n t r o l l i n g under t h e s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n here. I n McMillen and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , c l a i m a n t s were i n j u r e d i n t r a f f i c a c c i d e n t s w h i l e e n r o u t e t o t h e i r jobs. Claimants i n both c a s e s were r e c e i v i n g an allowance f o r t r a v e l under t h e terms of a union c o n t r a c t . I n b o t h c a s e s , we a r e c a l l e d upon t o determine whether t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d a r o s e t h e c l a i m a n t s ' employment. I n McMillen I1 o u t of and i n t h e c o u r s e of1' S e c t i o n 92-614, R.C.M. 1947. t h e Court adopted t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t : ** 'I* a workman i s u s u a l l y e n t i t l e d t o compensation when i n j u r e d d u r i n g t r a v e l t o o r from h i s employment where he r e c e i v e s a s p e c i f i c allowance t o g e t t o and from h i s job. I* Appellant would have u s e i t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h o r o v e r r u l e McMillen here. The argument advanced f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h i s c a s e from McMillen i s t h e acknowledged d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l methods of computing t h e r e s p e c t i v e t r a v e l allowances. I n McMillen, t h e computation was p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e m i l e s a c t u a l l y t r a v e l e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l employee, w h i l e hxe i t i s based on t h e d i s t a n c e from the job site to the nearest county courthouse. The disparity results in McMillen employees receiving Varying amounts of compensation depending on the distance traveled, while the employees here all received a uniform amount. We cannot see where that distinction varies the applicability of the test enunciated in McMillen . The fact that the travel allowance here was based on a distance other than mileage between residence and job site is not important. The union contract singled out transportation as the subject of a specific allowance. When transportation is thus singled out in the employment contract, the travel to and from work is brought within the course of employment. Injuries sustained enroute are therefore compensable. McMillen, supra; 1 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16.30. Although McMillen was expressly limited to the facts therein presented, the facts presented here are so similar as to mandate a similar result. No new arguments were advanced which would require a reconsideration of our position in McMillen, neither as to its facts nor the legal theories there involved. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Justice We Concur: .................................... Justices. M . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles d i s s e n t i n g : r I d i s s e n t a s I did i n McMillen, r e l i e d on here i n the majority opinion. Chief J u s t i c e James 'I1. H a r r i s o n t o o k no p a r t i n t h i s O p i n i o n .

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