MCGHEE v DIST COURT

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No. 12454 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973 STATE ex re1 R e W. McGHEE, H e L. McGHEE et al., Petitioners, THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al. , Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Petitioners : Lucas, Jardine and Monaghan, Miles City, Montana James P. Lucas argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondents: Gene Huntley argued, Baker, Montana Submitted: March 5, 1973 t M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T, Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court, This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding commenced by R. W. McGhee, H.L. McGhee, and McGhee and McGhee, a p a r t n e r s h i p , h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as petitioners. P e t i t i o n e r s r e q u e s t t h i s Court t o take supervisory c o n t r o l of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Fallon County and v a c a t e an order of t h a t c o u r t denying summary judgment i n favor of a l l t h e p e t i t i o n e r s . The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d a s a matter of law: * "(1)n n o t concluding : J; 9 that l i m i t a t i o n s was a v a l i d defense Defendants, and t h a t i t f u r t h e r i t s PARTIAL SUMNARY JUDGMENT t o t o t h e Defendant H.L. McGhee, 11 t h e s t a t u t e of f o r a l l named e r r e d i n amending l i m i t the r e l i e f The p e t i t i o n i s b a s e d u p o n t h e s e f a c t s : H.L. R. W. McGhee and 14cGhee a r e t h e s o l e p a r t n e r s i n McGhee and McGhee. The purpose of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p i s t o conduct a ranching operation south of Baker, Montana, i n Fallon County. O December 20, 1968, n while employed by t h e p a r t n e r s h i p i n t h e ranching o p e r a t i o n , Alva B.McGhee, f a t h e r of ROW. McGhee, was i n j u r e d and died t h e following day. Sometime a f t e r h i s death, E l l e n Dockter was appointed a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of decedent's e s t a t e . She commenced s u i t i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Fallon County a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r s i n d i v i d u a l l y and a s members of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , a l l e g i n g they had f a i l e d t o provide a s a f e p l a c e t o work and sought damages f o r t h e death of Alva McGhee, Complaint was f i l e d on January 4 , 1972. was had on H.L, Service McGhee t h a t same day and on R.W. McGhee on May 30, 1972, i n Duchesne County, Utah. P e t i t i o n e r s f i r s t moved t o dismiss t h e complaint, s e t t i n g up t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s a complete b a r t o t h e s u i t . motion was overruled. This The respondent c o u r t then on i t s own motion, h e l d an e v i d e n t i a r y hearing on t h e question of t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . It was determined a t t h e h e a r i n g t h a t H. L. McGhee was p r e s e n t i n Montana during t h e running of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t h e s u i t was dismissed a g a i n s t him because he had n o t been served w i t h i n t h e t h r e e year l i m i t a t i o n period, R. W, McGhee was found t o have r e s i d e d i n t h e s t a t e u n t i l May 1971, a t which time he became a r e s i d e n t of Utah. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h a t s u i t could be maintained a g a i n s t him because t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had been t o l l e d by h i s a,bsence from Montana. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f u r t h e r ordered t h a t t h e claim a g a i n s t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p was barred by t h e s t a t u t e ; b u t l a t e r amended t h a t order t o allow s u i t a g a i n s t t h e p a r t n e r s h i p , The s o l e i s s u e h e r e i s whether s u i t a g a i n s t R e W. McGhee and t h e p a r t n e r s h i p was b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Both p a r t i e s agree t h e c o r r e c t s t a t u t e t o apply i s s e c t i o n 932605 (21, R. C .Me 1947, which provides f o r a t h r e e year period i n which t o b r i n g : "An a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r t h e death of one caused by t h e wrongful a c t o r n e g l e c t of another." P e t i t i o n e r s a s s e r t s u i t was not f i l e d u n t i l f o u r t e e n days a f t e r t h e time period f o r f i l i n g such s u i t had expired. Respondent c o u r t agrees with t h i s p o s i t i o n b u t a s s e r t s t h e s t a t u t e was t o l l e d by t h e absence of R. W. McGhee from t h e s t a t e a f t e r May 1971. A s a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s argument respondent c i t e s s e c t i o n 93-2702, R.C.M. 1947, which reads: It I f , when t h e cause of a c t i o n accrues a g a i n s t a person, he i s o u t of t h e s t a t e , t h e a c t i o n may be commenced w i t h i n t h e term h e r e i n l i m i t e d , a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o t h e s t a t e , and i f , a f t e r t h e cause of a c t i o n accrues, he d e p a r t s from t h e s t a t e , t h e time of h i s absence i s not p a r t of t h e time l i m i t e d f o r t h e commencement of t h e a c t i o n . I t The purpose of s e c t i o n 93-2702, R..C.PI. 1947, i s t o prevent a defendant from d e f e a t i n g a p l a i n t i f f ' s claim f o r r e l i e f by leaving t h e s t a t e o r by e s t a b l i s h i n g residence i n another s t a t e , But, t h e r e i s an exception t o t h i s r u l e , I n c a s e s where t h e p l a i n t i f f may e f f e c t s e r v i c e of process by some method, even though t h e defendant may be a nonresident o r absent from t h e s t a t e , t h e s t a t u t e continues t o run during t h e absence o r nonresidency. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma i n Walker v. L.E, Co., Meyers Const. 175 Okl. 548, 53 P.2d 547, 548, e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s t e s t t o be applied i n such c a s e s : "The t e s t a s t o whether t h e s t a t u t e i s t o l l e d o r n o t seems t o be whether i t i s p o s s i b l e a t a l l times t o o b t a i n s e r v i c e of t h e process upon a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n , upon which a personal judgment could be rendered, even though t h e f o r eign corporation i s absent from t h e s t a t e + *." : * While t h e language of t h e Oklahoma c o u r t i s i n terms of out of s t a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s , i t can be a p p l i e d here. Respondent c o u r t has determined t h e f a c t s t o be: That R e W. McGhee was present i n t h e s t a t e on t h e day t h e a c c i d e n t took place; t h a t he continued t o r e s i d e i n t h e s t a t e u n t i l May 1971, and a f t e r t h a t d a t e h e r e s i d e d i n Utah. Based on those f a c t s , i t was p o s s i b l e t o obtain s e r v i c e on R. W. McGhee during t h e e n t i r e t h r e e years. For t h e period up t o May 1971, he could have been served under Rule 4D(2) ( a ) , M.R,Civ,P. A f t e r May 1971, s e r v i c e could have been accomplished by what i s commonly r e f e r r e d II t o as the long arm s t a t u t e " , Rule 4D(3), M.R.Civ.P. A s a matter of f a c t , s e r v i c e was made on R. W. McGhee i n Utah by v i r t u e of t h i s rule. The a l l e g e d t o r t was committed by R . W. McGhee while he r e s i d e d i n Montana and under Rule 4 B ( l ) , M,R,Civ.P., him t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Montana c o u r t s . t h i s subjects B being s u b j e c t y t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of respondent c o u r t and capable of being served during t h e e n t i r e t i m e , t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s was not tolled. This conclusion i s supported by t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e ex r e l . Johnson v. D i s t . Court, 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109. While t h e f a c t s i n Johnson a r e n o t t h e same, t h e e f f e c t of t h e d e c i s i o n t h e r e was t o s u b j e c t a doctor l i v i n g i n C a l i f o r n i a t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Montana c o u r t s f o r a t o r t he committed while l i v i n g i n Montana. I n t h a t c a s e , s e r v i c e was obtained by t h e "long arm s t a t u t e " , Rule 4D(3), M e R,Civ, P. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached t h e same conclusion i n construing a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r i n i n t e n t t o ~ o n t a n a ' ss e c t i o n 93-2702, R.C.M, 1947, i n S t . Louis and S.F.R.Co. 67 Okl, 37, 168 P. 788. v. T a l i a f e r r o , There i t was s a i d : "The theory of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i s t h a t i t operates t o b a r a l l a c t i o n s , except a s a g a i n s t persons and corporations upon whom n o t i c e of t h e a c t i o n cannot be served because of t h e i r being out of t h e s t a t e . I f such n o t i c e can b e served during t h e whole of t h e prescribed period, and a personal judgment can be enforced i n t h e mode provided by law, then such person o r corporation i s n o t ' o u t of t h e s t a t e , ik ?C ik", ' This same conclusion was reached by t h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court i n Klein v. Lionel Corporation, 130 F.Supp, 725, 727, i n deciding whether t h e Delaware s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s The c o u r t h e l d : had been t o l l e d i n an a n t i t r u s t s u i t . he v a s t majority of t h e cases hold t h a t a s t a t u t o r y provision t o l l i n g t h e S t a t u t e of Limitations during t h e time defendant i s not a r e s i d e n t o r i s absent from a s t a t e has a d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n a b i l i t y of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o secure s e r v i c e of personal process on such defendant. Thus, most c o u r t s hold t h a t such s t a t u t e s regarding t h e t o l l i n g t h e S t a t u t e of Limitations do n o t have t h e e f f e c t of t o l l i n g t h e s t a t u t e , i f notwithstanding such absence, personal s e r v i c e of process can be had. I n such c a s e t h e S t a t u t e of Limitations continues t o run during t h e defendant's absence. I I Therefore, because R. W, McGhee was s u b j e c t t o personal s e r v i c e t h e t h e e n t i r e running of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e s t a t u t e a s t o him was n o t t o l l e d . I n t h i s c a s e , i t was n o t necessary t o serve R, W e McGhee personally t o secure j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . The a l l e g e d t o r t took p l a c e while decedent was i n t h e employ of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p of R. W. McGhee and H.L. McGhee. Under Montana law of p a r t n e r s h i p , they could be sued under t h e p a r t n e r s h i p name and they were, a s t h e c o u r t found, 93-2827, R.C,M. This i s provided i n s e c t i o n 1947, which a l s o provides t h a t summons i n such an a c t i o n may be served one one of t h e p a r t n e r s and such s e r v i c e s h a l l be binding on a l l p a r t n e r s . See: Rule 4D(2) (e) , M. R. Civ. P. Here, a s determined by t h e respondent c o u r t , H.L. McGhee was present i n Montana d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e t h r e e y e a r p e r i o d and could have been served a s a member of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . T h i s i s a proper c a s e f o r t h i s Court t o e x e r c i s e i t s power of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l under A r t i c l e V I I I , Sec, 2 , o f t h e 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , and s e c t i o n 93-1106, R.C.M. 1947. Therefore a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l i s ordered t o i s s u e d i r e c t i n g respondent c o u r t t o amend i t s summary judgment i n i t s Cause Y,, 4306, t o g r a n t summary ssociate defendants,

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