BURKHARTSMEYER BROTHERS v MCCORMIC

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No. 12355 I N THE SUPRME COURT O THE STATE OF MONTANA F 1973 THE STATE O MONTANA, ex r e 1 BURKHARTSF MEYER BROTHERS, e t a l . , R e l a t o r and Respondent, ELIZAEETH McCORMICK , TREASURER O F HILL COUNTY, MONTANA, Respondent and A p p e l l a n t , ------_------------------*------------------ NORA C. NELSON, Intervenor. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Bernard W . Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant : Ronald W. Smith a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , Havre, Montana. F o r Respondent : Weber, Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale and Warner, Havre, Montana. John Warner a r g u e d , Havre, Montana. Hauge, Hauge, Ober, Spangelo and Thompson, Havre, Montana. Theodore K. Thompson a r g u e d , Havre, Montana, Submitted: Decided : Filed : MAY 1 8 1973 A p r i l 24, 1973 MAY'I 8 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I.Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. I n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f H i l l County, Hon. Bernard W. Thomas, d i s t r i c t judge, s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y , r e l a t o r was granted a w r i t o f mandate compelling t h e county t r e a s u r e r t o accept i t s attempted redemption o f delinquent tax sale c e r t i f i c a t e s . The county t r e a s u r e r appeals from t h a t judgment. R e l a t o r i s Burkhartsmeyer Brothers, a ranching c o p a r t n e r s h i p which has occupied t h e l a n d i n q u e s t i o n f o r purposes o f g r a z i n g c a t t l e s i n c e 1952. Appellant i s E l i z a b e t h McCormick, county t r e a s u r e r o f Hi1 1 County, Montana, who i s sued i n her o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y o n l y . I n t e r v e n o r i s Nora C. Nelson, an assignee o f d e l i n q u e n t s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s on t h e s u b j e c t land, who a l s o happens t o be H i l l County a u d i t o r . The s u b j e c t o f t h e d e l i n q u e n t t a x s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s i n v o l v e s a q u a r t e r s e c t i o n o f l a n d i n H i l l County. Hubbard. The owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y i s Ruth R e l a t o r owns t h e l a n d surrounding t h e p r o p e r t y i n d i s p u t e . On October 15, 1958, George H. Campbell purchased from t h e t r e a s u r e r o f H i l l County an assignment o f t a x s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s covering taxes f o r t h e years 1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. On March 20, 1963, t h e same George H. Camp- b e l l purchased from t h e H i l l County t r e a s u r e r an assignment o f t a x s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s c o v e r i n g taxes f o r t h e y e a r 1959 and p a r t o f 1961. Again, on J u l y 6, 1967, he purchased from t h e H i l l County t r e a s u r e r an assignment o f t a x s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s c o v e r i n g taxes f o r t h e years 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966. Sub- sequently, on March 24, 1972, t h e aforementioned c e r t i f i c a t e s were purchased from Campbell by r e l a t o r f o r $1,000. On November 30, 1971 , i n t e r v e n o r purchased t a x s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s c o v e r i n g d e l inquent taxes f o r t h e years 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. on t h e same day, i n t e r v e n o r p a i d 1971 taxes on t h e land. Also, On January 27, 1972, i n t e r v e n o r gave n o t i c e t o t h e r e q u i r e d p a r t i e s t h a t she had made such purchases and p a i d such taxes pursuant t o s e c t i o n 84-4151, R.C.M. 1947. N o t i c e was a l s o g i v e n t h a t unless redemption was made p r i o r t o March 29, 1972, i n t e r v e n o r would a p p l y f o r a t a x deed c o v e r i n g t h e p r o p e r t y . A copy o f s a i d n o t i c e was received by r e l a t o r . The d i s t r i c t court found t h a t on March 27, 1972 r e l a t o r tendered t o the county treasurer a sum of money s u f f i c i e n t t o redeem the taxes represented by the assignment of tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s held by intervenor, together with a l l subsequent taxes, i n t e r e s t , penal t i e s and fees required by law. county treasurer refused t o accept such tender. The Later t h i s same day, r e l a t o r applied t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t of mandate. The writ was granted and served upon the county treasurer on the same day, compelling her t o take a l l steps necessary t o effectuate r e l a t o r ' s attempted redemption or a l t e r n a t i v e l y t o show cause why she had not done so. On t h e following day intervenor tendered her persona1 check t o the county treasurer t o e f f e c t a redemption of r e l a t o r ' s tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s . The check was accepted by the county treasurer. Later the same day the show cause hearing was held. On May 31, 1972, the d i s t r i c t court entered findings of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment ordering t h a t a peremptory writ of mandate be issued compelling r e l a t o r ' s attempted redemption and f u r t h e r ordered t h a t t h e county treasurer pay r e l a t o r the s m of $250 f o r i t s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e . u The county treasurer appeals from t h i s judgment. Two issues a r e presented upon t h i s appeal : (1 ) Whether r e l a t o r ' s demand f o r a writ o f mandate must f a i l because i t has a p l a i n , adequate and speedy remedy a t law, and ( 2 ) whether r e l a t o r , as the holder of prior tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s has the r i g h t t o redeem subsequent tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s held by intervenor. As a general r u l e , a writ of mandate i s t o be issued only when there i s no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 93-9103, R.C.M. 1947; Sullivan v . Treasurer of S i l v e r B w o County, 140 Mont. 609, 370 P.2d 762. Appellant and intervenor contend t h a t i f r e l a t o r had acted i m mediately a f t e r i t received notice of intervenor's appl ication f o r tax deed the following a l t e r n a t i v e remedies were available: (1) a quiet t i t l e action, (2) declaratory judgment, or (3) an injunction pursuant t o sections 93-4201 and 93-4202(3), R.C.M. 1947. Although appellant has l i s t e d several a l t e r n a t i v e remedies i t must be noted t h a t the mere existence of another remedy will n o t bar the issuance of a w r i t of mandate; the a l t e r n a t i v e remedy must be one t h a t i t s e l f enforces the performance of the p a r t i c u l a r duty ,and not merely a remedy which i n t h e end saves the party t o whom the duty i s owed unharmed by i t s nonper- S t a t e v . McCracken, 91 Mont. 157, 6 P.2d 869. formance. In l i g h t of the f a c t s in this case only a writ of mandate can give complete r e l i e f . I t was essential t h a t r e l a t o r be granted immediate r e l i e f which would compel the appel lant-treasurer t o accept i t s money t o redeem If t h i s was n o t done immediately intervenor intervenor's tax c e r t i f i c a t e s . could turn t h e tables on r e l a t o r by redemption of r e l a t o r ' s tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s , which in f a c t was done t h e very next day; o r i f the delay was extended f o r two days intervenor would apply f o r a tax deed c u t t i n g off r e l a t o r ' s r i g h t of redemption. Any remedy other than by writ of mandate would be uncertain, and neither plain, adequate o r speedy. Mandamus i s a proper remedy here t o compel the appellant, Hill County t r e a s u r e r , t o compute the tax owed and accept r e l a t o r ' s tender of money t o redeem tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e s owned by intervenor. S t a t e ex r e l . Federal Land Bk. v . Hays, 86 Mont. 58, 282 P. 32. Appellant a l s o r a i s e s the issue of laches. Relator's delay of 58 days a f t e r receipt of notice, a1 though two days before the s t a t u t o r y period would have expired (section 84-41 51 , R.C .M. 1947), was not unreasonably 1ong. Furthermore, the delay caused no detriment t o t h e opposing p a r t i e s . Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o the second issue f o r review we note t h a t as the holder of a tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e , r e l a t o r claims a l i e n under section 84-4130, R.C.M. 1947; and as a .lienholder i t claims the r i g h t t o redeem under section 84-4132, R.C.M. 1947. Section 84-4132, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "A redemption of the property sold may be made by the owner, or any party having any i n t e r G t i n or l i e n upon such property, w i t h i n t h i r t y - s i x (36) months from the date of purchase, o r a t any time p r i o r t o the giving of the notice and the application f o r a deed as provided i n this a c t . " (Emphasis supplied . ) Appellant and intervenor, on the other hand, claim t h a t r e l a t o r i s not e n t i t l e d t o redeem. They contend t h a t section 84-4151, R.C.M. 1947, only permits the "owner of the property, or the mortgagee, or the assignee of said mortgagee *** the r i g h t of redemption i n d e f i n i t e l y until such notice has been given and the deed applied f o r * * *." (Emphasis suppl ied. ) In determining who has the r i g h t of redemption i t i s n o t necessary t o look t o section 84-4151, R.C.M. 1947. That section of the Code i s p r i - mari l y a "notice" s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o procedural requirements r e q u i s i t e t o obtaining a tax deed. Relator's r i g h t t o redemption flows from t h e f a c t and t h a t i t i s the occupier of the land/ the assignee of a tax s a l e c e r t i f i c a t e . As the holder of such c e r t i f i c a t e i t has a l i e n in accord with section 844130, R.C.M. 1947, and as a party having a l i e n upon such property i t can certificate redeem a subsequent tax s a l e / 3 t any time before application i s made f o r the tax deed. Section 84-4132, R.C.M. 1947. For these reasons the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. Associate J u s t i c e Associate J u s t i c e s /

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