HELLICKSON v BARRETT MOBILE HOME T
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No, 12288 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE OF MONTANA OR F 1973 GLEN L. HELLICKSON, 1 1 1 , P l a f n t i f f and Appellant, -VS - BARRETT MOBILE HOME TEUNSPORT, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : John C. H a l l argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. For Respondent: Swanberg, Koby and Swanberg, Great F a l l s , Montana. Raymond F, Koby argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: Decided: Clerk January 22, 1973 WR 12 l n g M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e e i g h t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, Hon, Truman G , Bradford presiding. P l a i n t i f f Glen L, Hellickson 111, brought a c t i o n t o recover money a l l e g e d l y due under a c o n t r a c t with defendant B a r r e t t Mobile Home Transport, Inc. began on October 29, 1971. February 16, 1972. T r i a l without a jury Judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f was e n t e r e d on P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h e judgment, except t h a t p o r t i o n making an award t o p l a i n t i f f , Defendant i s a Minnesota corporation doing business i n Montana and o t h e r s t a t e s , c o n s i s t i n g mainly of t r a n s p o r t i n g mobile homes i n i n t e r s t a t e and i n t r a s t a t e commerce. To c a r r y on i t s business defendant employs persons t o d r i v e t r u c k u n i t s t o tow t h e mobile homes from one l o c a t i o n t o another. I n January 1964, defendant engaged p l a i n t i f f t o tow mobile home u n i t s with lai in tiff's truck, The p a r t i e s entered i n t o a l e a s i n g agreement, on a form provided by t h e s t a t e of North Dakota, whereby p l a i n t i f f leased h i s 1963 Ford t r u c k t o defendant a t t h e r a t e of $50 per month. The agreement was f o r a term of one year from t h e d a t e of execution and on a month t o month b a s i s t h e r e a f t e r , The agreement could be terminated by e i t h e r p a r t y upon t h i r t y days w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e o t h e r party. Although t h e t r u c k was leased t o defendant, p l a i n t i f f was t o use t h e t r u c k t o c a r r y o u t t h e terms of t h e employment agreement. The employment agreement between t h e two p a r t i e s was o r a l , A g r e a t e r p o r t i o n of t h e controversy h e r e concerns t h e terms of t h a t o r a l employment agreement, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h e terms of t h a t agreement were a l t e r e d from time t o time. E s s e n t i a l l y when t h e agreement began, p l a i n t i f f was t o r e c e i v e 85% of t h e revenue derived from the operation of p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u c k i n hauling mobile homes f o r defendant, l e s s c e r t a i n deductions. The t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t on o r about May 1, 1964, defendant changed t h e method of compensating i t s d r i v e r s . The compensation was changed from 85% t o 75% and c e r t a i n deductions were no longer made. Around June 1965, t h e general scheme of compensation was again changed so t h a t , f o r i n t e r s t a t e h a u l s , defendant's d r i v e r s were paid on a mileage s c a l e based on c e n t s per mile. While employed by defendant, p l a i n t i f f operated a terminal f o r defendant's business i n Great F a l l s . The p a r t i e s had an o r a l agreement f o r t h e reimbursement of c e r t a i n c o s t s i n connection with t h e operation of t h e terminal. P l a i n t i f f claimed c e r t a i n amounts were s t i l l owed t o him f o r t h e operation of t h e terminal, along with o t h e r items. Defendant maintained t h a t e i t h e r a l l items had been paid o r were o f f s e t by amounts owed t o defendant by p l a i n t i f f . Other items of disagreement w i l l be considered l a t e r i n t h i s opinion, P l a i n t i f f and defendant mutually terminated t h e i r agreements i n October o r November 1965, complaint i n June 1966. Plaintiff filed his f i r s t A f t e r b r i e f s and proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law were f i l e d , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law awarding p l a i n t i f f judgment i n t h e amount of $415.58, plus c o s t s and i n t e r e s t from November 1, 1965. Because p l a i n t i f f contends t h a t a d d i t i o n a l sums were con- c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d a s s t i l l owing t o p l a i n t i f f , he appeals. P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s some questions concerning modification of a w r i t t e n agreement by o r a l testimony. Basically, hwever, the controlling issue i s p l a i n t i f f ' s third issue: A r e the findings of f a c t supported by t h e evidence? The t r i a l c o u r t issued thorough f i n d i n g s of f a c t on a complicated, complex, and c o n f l i c t i n g f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . Collateral i s s u e s r a i s e d a r e d i r e c t l y dependent upon our duty i n considering those f i n d i n g s , A review of t h e r u l e s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e function of an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n s i t u a t i o n s such a s i s involved h e r e i s appropriate. I n Hornung v. Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 420, 473 P.2d 541, t h i s Court s a i d : It Our duty i n reviewing f i n d i n g s of f a c t i n a c i v i l a c t i o n t r i e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t without a j u r y i s confined t o determining whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support them. S t . Highway Com'n v. West Great F a l l s Flood Cont r o l and Drainage D i s t r i c t , 155 Mont. 157, 468 P.2d 753, 27 St.Rep. 320, and c a s e s t h e r e i n s i t e d . It See a l s o : S t a t e Highway Comm'n v, Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 281, The meaning of " s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidencet' was thoroughly considered r e c e n t l y i n Staggers v . United S t a t e s F i d e l i t y & Guaranty Co,, M nt o . 496 P,2d 1161, 29 S t . Y Rep, 357, 360. The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t s i t t i n g without a j u r y has t h e same e f f e c t a s a v e r d i c t of a jury. 103 Mont. 306, 310, 63 P.2d 123. considering t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t . S t a t e v. Naughton, Certain presumptions a i d us i n The f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e judgment based thereon a r e presumed c o r r e c t . Farmers Union Prop, v. Gen. Guaranty I n s . , Nat, 150 Mont, 297,301, 434 P.2d 708; Christensen v. Hunt, 147 Mont. 484, 490, 414 P.2d 648. I n examining t h e evidence, we must veiw t h e testimony i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , E s t a t e of Hosova, 143 Mont. 74, 78, 387 P.2d 305; Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 541, 385 P. 2d 272. However, while t h e presumptions i s i n p l a i n t i f f ' s f a v o r , he i s a l s o t h e appealing p a r t y and a s such, t h e burden i s upon him t o overcome t h e presumption of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , Nissen v , West Const, Equip,Co., 133 Mont. 143, 146, 320 P.2d 997. Here, t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses i s of prime importance. Since only two people o t h e r than p l a i n t i f f and defendant's p r e s i d e n t t e s t i f i e d , t h e witnesses found t o be most b e l i e v a b l e t o t h e t r i a l judge bear p a r t i c u l a r s i g n f i c a n c e . The c r e d i b i l i t y and weight given t h e w i t n e s s e s , however, i s n o t f o r t h i s Court t o determine. This i s a primary function of a t r i a l judge s i t t i n g without a j u r y ; i t i s of s p e c i a l consequence where t h e evidence i s conflicting. Eliason v , Eliason, 151 Mont. 409, 416, 443 P.2d 884; Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 68, 460 Pe2d 90; Dutton v. Rocky Mtn, Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 7 1 , 438 P.2d 674. I n l i g h t of t h e p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e d above, we consider t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t contested by p l a i n t i f f and determine whether s u b s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t s t o support them. P l a i n t i f f excepted g e n e r a l l y t o a l l b u t t h r e e of t h e f i n d i n g s issued by t h e t r i a l court, P l a i n t i f f argued t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h e f i n d i n g s ex- cepted t o were n o t supported by t h e evidence, W do n o t f i n d i t necessary t o d e l i n e a t e a l l t h e evidence e i n support of each f i n d i n g of f a c t , we a r e concerned h e r e only with t h e major disagreements. Wherever t h e testimony i s d i r e c t l y con- f l i c t i n g , we presume t h e t r i a l judge t o be c o r r e c t . Only he had t h e opportunity t o observe t h e demeanor, candor and spontaneity of t h e witnesses. A l l minor p o i n t s a r e w i t h i n t h e l e g a l maxim c o d i f i e d by s e c t i o n 49-125, R.C.M. trifles. 1947: "The law d i s r e g a r d s II Here, one major disagreement was whether t h e l e a s e agreement r e n t a l of $50 per month was i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e compensation received f o r hauling mobile homes, a s p l a i n t i f f contended; o r whether i t was a p a r t of t h e compensation, a s defendant contended. Although p l a i n t i f f maintained a t t r i a l t h a t t h e $50 per month amounts were due him from t h e inception of t h e employment agreement, p l a i n t i f f acquiesced i n defendant's manner of payment f o r twentytwo months. He made no w r i t t e n demand on defendant f o r t h e a l l e g e d amount due. Richard Ward, p l a i n t i f f ' s witness i n support of h i s contention, e x h i b i t e d such u n c e r t a i n t y i n r e l a t i n g h i s v e r s i o n of t h e same o r a l agreement t h a t t h e t r i a l judge could r e a d i l y have given h i s testimony l i t t l e weight. On t h e o t h e r hand, defendant's w i t n e s s , E a r l Wallace, who was present when t h e employment agreement between p l a i n t i f f and defendant was i n i t i a l l y discussed, substant i a t e d defendant's r e c o l l e c t i o n . P l a i n t i f f knew from h i s very f i r s t pay r e p o r t t h a t t h e $50 per month r e n t a l was a p a r t o f , n o t i n a d d i t i o n t o , t h e r e g u l a r compensation. Yet, he d i d l i t t l e , i f anything, t o gain what h e claimed a t t r i a l was due, The t r i a l c o u r t had s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o f i n d : "That during t h e e n t i r e period from January, 1964 through October, 1965 t h e o r a l arrangement e x t a n t between p l a i n t i f f and defendant contemplated t h a t t h e commissions paid by t h e l a t t e r t o t h e former would include and not be i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e n t a l f: 9: *". Another element of controversy concerned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for repairs. P l a i n t i f f contended a t t r i a l t h a t defendant was o b l i g a t e d f o r r e p a i r s on t h e truck. True, t h e l e a s e agreement form d i d indeed impose t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r r e p a i r s on defendant, However, a t no time u n t i l t h e commencement of t h i s a c t i o n i n June 1966, d i d p l a i n t i f f ever present any claim f o r r e p a i r expenses t o defendant, I n about A p r i l 1965, p l a i n t i f f s o l d h i s 1963 Ford t r u c k and t h e l e a s e agreement on t h a t v e h i c l e terminated; no new agreement was ever executed. The e v i d e n c e = inconclusive a s t o whether t h e r e p a i r expenses claimed due were f o r t h e t r u c k i n t h e o r i g i n a l agreement. Further, i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r whether any r e p a i r expenses were a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e operation of p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u c k while i n defendant's s e r v i c e o r during p l a i n t i f f ' s own personal use. The t r i a l c o u r t found p l a i n t i f f acquiesced t o t h e o r a l modification t h a t defendant was n o t o b l i g a t e d f o r r e p a i r expenses t o e i t h e r of p l a i n t i f f ' s trucks. It concluded t h a t p l a i n - t i f f was now estopped from recovering those claims. W agree. e The f i n a l major disagreement concerns t h e a c t u a l compensat i o n received f o r hauling mobile homes. P l a i n t i f f conceded t h e agreement could indeed be changed from an 85% compensation r a t e t o 75%, and then t o a mileage b a s i s , However, p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h e s e changes could not be made u n i l a t e r a l l y ; consent t o t h e changes must be mutual and must be communicated t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y , While p l a i n t i f f claimed he was n o t n o t i f i e d of t h e change, t h e r e was evidence from which t h e t r i a l judge could have found t h a t t h e n o t i c e of t h e change had been communicated t o a l l terminal o f f i c e s . It was e s t a b l i s h e d by defendant's witness, Wallace, t h a t a t t h e time t h e employment agreement was f i r s t discussed defendant's p r e s i d e n t informed p l a i n t i f f t h e compensation might f l u c t u a t e during t h e course of employment. I n any event, a l e t t e r from p l a i n t i f f t o defendant i n d i c a t e d p l a i n t i f f was aware of t h e change by May 13, 1964, Y e t , p l a i n t i f f continued t o work f o r defendant; t h i s employment even continued through a subsequent r a t e change. This course of conduct was s u f f i c i e n t , we b e l i e v e , t o preclude recovery f o r t h e compensation claim. The r u l e s t a t e d i n 53 Am J u r 2d, Master and Servant, $ 73, p. 148, i s applicable : "Where, however, t h e r e i s no d e f i n i t e term of employment f i x e d by c o n t r a c t , [ a s i n t h i s c a s e ] a n o t i c e by t h e master t h a t f o r t h e f u t u r e he w i l l pay l e s s wages t o t h e servant and t h e continued s e r v i c e t h e r e a f t e r of t h e servant without o b j e c t i o n , c r e a t e s a new c o n t r a c t based upon s u f f i c i e n t considera t i o n , I t W f i n d no f a u l t i n t h e conclusions of law rendered by e the t r i a l court. P l a i n t i f f ' s appeal does n o t concern i t s e l f with l e g a l i s s u e s , b u t b a s i c a l l y i s on f a c t u a l grounds. f a c t u a l determinations made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . W cannot r e t r y e W are further e persuaded t h a t t h e monetary award was c o r r e c t by t h e f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o remit c e r t a i n revenues c o l l e c t e d by him f o r defendant and due defendant, There i s ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e record f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision. The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s affirmed, I
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
