The Mississippi Bar v. Greg Pierce
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-BD-00936-SCT
THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
v.
GREG PIERCE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
ADAM B. KILGORE
PRO SE
CIVIL - BAR MATTERS
DISBARMENT- 01/13/2011
EN BANC.
LAMAR, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Greg Pierce pleaded guilty and was convicted of felony possession of a controlled
substance in 2006. The Mississippi Bar has filed a complaint with the Court requesting
disbarment of Pierce based on his conviction. Pierce does not present a defense against
disbarment, but instead, asserts that he resigned from the Bar in June 2006, and argues that
he should not be taxed with the costs of this action. We disagree and find that Pierce must
pay costs under Rule 27 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline (“MRD”).
FACTS
¶2.
Greg Pierce pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for felony possession of a controlled
substance in October 2006. In response to this conviction, the Mississippi Bar has belatedly
submitted a formal complaint against Pierce, requesting disbarment under MRD 6.
¶3.
Pierce does not dispute his conviction. Rather, Pierce contends that he should not be
responsible for costs associated with this litigation, since he resigned in 2006. The Bar
confirms that, upon Pierce’s request, it allowed him voluntarily to resign. It is undisputed
that Pierce has not been an active member of the Mississippi Bar since 2006.
DISCUSSION
¶4.
Jurisdiction in bar disciplinary matters is given exclusively to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.1 The standard of review for bar disciplinary matters is de novo.2 The Mississippi Bar
has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that there was misconduct on the
part of the attorney.3 In this case, Pierce’s felony conviction is undisputed. The Bar
presented the Court with a certified copy of the judgment of conviction accepting Pierce’s
guilty plea. Under Rule 6(a), the certified copy of the judgment of conviction “shall be
conclusive evidence thereof” and “[t]he Court shall then forthwith strike the name of the
attorney and order his immediate suspension from the practice of law.” 4 And under Rule
1
Miss. Bar v. Pels, 708 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Miss. 1998).
2
Miss. Bar v. Shelton, 855 So. 2d 444, 445 (Miss. 2003).
3
Pels, 708 So. 2d at 1373.
4
MRD 6(a).
2
6(d), “[w]hen time for appeal from judgment or conviction . . . expires or all appeals have
been concluded without reversal . . . the Court shall forthwith enter an order of disbarment.” 5
Therefore, the Bar has met its burden to show that Pierce should be disbarred immediately.
¶5.
The only issue is whether Pierce should pay costs associated with this action when he
already has “resigned” from the Bar. Pierce’s resignation, dated May 30, 2006, simply states
that, “Effective Immediately, I request and wish to RESIGN my Mississippi Bar
membership. Please effectuate my resignation immediately upon receipt of this letter. Please
send to the address above correspondence confirming that I am no longer a member of the
Mississippi Bar.”
Notably, this letter was sent prior to his conviction and does not
acknowledge any pending criminal proceedings.
¶6.
The only resignation from the Bar that is addressed by our rules is embodied in Rule
10.5, which allows for an irrevocable resignation during the pendency of disciplinary
actions.6 Absent an irrevocable resignation or an order of disbarment, the Bar is concerned
5
MRD 6(d).
6
MRD 10.5 provides that:
An attorney may tender an irrevocable resignation to either the Court or the
Tribunal. Such a resignation shall acknowledge each and all disciplinary
matters then pending, provide the docket number or numbers, state that the
attorney does not desire to defend, and request permission to resign with
prejudice from the Bar. Upon receipt of such a resignation, and any response
that the Bar may elect to file, the disciplinary proceedings shall terminate and
either the Court or the Tribunal shall enter its order accepting the resignation,
revoking the attorney's license, and barring forever thereafter the attorney's
right to seek reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law in this state. Such
a resignation and order shall be considered disciplinary action, and the
3
that Pierce could resume practicing law by paying past dues and a penalty. We have found
only one case in which this Court has granted an attorney’s petition for reinstatement after
he had “resigned” from the Bar.7 Clearly, that case recognized that reinstatement to the Bar
under circumstances such as this would require this Court’s approval.
¶7.
Nonetheless, we find the Bar’s action in this case to be both necessary and
appropriate. Pierce was a member of the Bar when he committed this felony offense, and he
was subject to the discipline of this Court. Pierce failed to discharge his affirmative duty to
notify the Bar or this Court of the felony charge or conviction.8 Subsequently, upon learning
of Pierce’s conviction, the Bar had an obligation to investigate and submit its findings to this
Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction in Bar discipline matters. Further, there is no
evidence that Pierce complied with Rule 11(c), which requires an attorney to give notice to
clients and our trial courts upon disbarment, suspension, or resignation.9 Therefore, we find
this disciplinary action to be appropriate and necessary and order that Pierce is disbarred
from the practice of law and assessed the costs incurred in the investigation of this matter
under MRD 27(a).10
resignation shall be considered tantamount to the proof of guilt on the matter
charged.
7
In re Reinstatement of Cosnahan, 890 So. 2d 874, 875 (Miss. 2004).
8
See MRD 4(b).
9
MRD 11(c).
10
“A tribunal or the Court may assess costs incurred in the investigation, prosecution
and defense of any disciplinary matter as justice may require. Such costs and expenses shall
4
¶8.
GREG PIERCE IS DISBARRED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AND ASSESSED COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, KITCHENS
AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶9.
In 2006, Greg Pierce notified the Mississippi Bar that he wished to resign. The Bar
responded with a document titled "Resignation Confirmation," informing Pierce that his
membership with the Mississippi Bar "has been changed to resigned on the rolls of the Bar."
His name was removed from the Bar roll and he stopped paying Bar dues.
¶10.
Now, four years later, the Mississippi Bar has filed what the majority refers to as a
"belated" petition to disbar Pierce – the same man who, four years ago, it allowed to resign
– and to make him pay for the disbarment proceedings. The Bar now says – upon reflection
– that once you become a member of the Mississippi Bar, you cannot resign.
¶11.
The majority states: "Pierce does not present a defense against disbarment, but
instead, asserts that he resigned from the Bar in June 2006." From where I sit, that sounds
like a pretty good defense. The majority's response to this non-defense reminds me of a
judge who – upon learning in the middle of a trial that the defendant had died of a heart
attack – nevertheless insisted on proceeding with the death-penalty phase of the trial.11
include the actual and reasonably necessary expenses of the Bar, excluding Complaint
Counsel’s time.” MRD 27(a).
11
One wonders if the Mississippi Bar was the inspiration for these words from the Eagles'
"Hotel California": "You can check out any time you like; but you can never leave!"
5
¶12.
The majority's concern that "Pierce could resume practicing law by paying past dues
and a penalty" is both irrelevant and unfounded. The case cited by the majority 12 clearly
recognizes that reinstatement to the Bar requires this Court's approval. And should Pierce
ever seek such approval, the majority would be within the bounds of its discretion to deny
the request. So now I find myself in the unfortunate position of disagreeing with the majority
– for whom I hold the deepest respect – for two reasons: In addition to finding the majority's
holding illogical (disbarring someone who is not a member of the Bar), I find it decidedly
unnecessary.
¶13.
While I do agree with the majority's excellent point that "jurisdiction in bar
disciplinary matters is given exclusively to the Mississippi Supreme Court," I simply cannot
conclude that this Court's powers stretch so far as to allow us to disbar someone who has not
been a member of the Mississippi Bar for the past four years.
¶14.
A good friend once told me: "You cannot overcome reality." And the reality here is,
Pierce is not a member of the Bar, so we ought not claim we are disbarring him.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
CHANDLER, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
12
In re Petition for Reinstatement of Cosnahan, 890 So. 2d 874, 875 (Miss. 2004).
6
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