Warner Hodges, III v. The Mississippi Bar
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-BR-01200-SCT
IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF
WARNER HODGES, III
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
WARNER HODGES, III (PRO SE)
ADAM B. KILGORE
CIVIL - BAR MATTERS
REINSTATEMENT GRANTED - 04/09/2009
EN BANC.
LAMAR, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Warner Hodges, III, was suspended from the practice of law in Tennessee for one
year, commencing October 1, 2004. Upon complaint from the Mississippi Bar and pursuant
to Rule 13 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline, this Court suspended Hodges’s license to
practice law in Mississippi for one year.1 Miss. Bar v. Hodges, 949 So. 2d 683 (Miss. 2006).
Hodges now petitions this Court for reinstatement in good standing, noting that such good
standing is a requirement to be admitted to the Bar in Georgia, where Hodges has lived for
more than three years.
1
In the suspension order dated July 11, 2005, Tennessee applied its own one-year
suspension retroactively to October 1, 2004. Hodges’s suspension in Mississippi was
retroactive to July 11, 2005, the date that the Tennessee Supreme Court entered its order.
FACTS
¶2.
On April 7, 2003, Hodges entered into a monitoring agreement with the Tennessee
Lawyers Assistance Program (TLAP) because of excessive alcohol abuse. In 2004, Hodges
violated the agreement by consuming alcohol, and as a result, was referred to rehabilitation
centers on two separate occasions. After he relapsed at the first center and then left the
second center before concluding treatment, the Supreme Court of Tennessee temporarily
suspended Hodges on October 1, 2004, due to his noncompliance with the monitoring
agreement.
¶3.
On July 11, 2005, Hodges was suspended by the Supreme Court of Tennessee for one
year, after entering a conditional guilty plea and admitting violations of the Tennessee Rules
of Professional Conduct (TRPC) for engaging in the practice of law while temporarily
suspended. Hodges was found to have violated Rules 5.5(a) and 8.4(a)(c)(d)(g) of the TRPC.
The order of suspension provided that Hodges was to continue in the monitoring agreement
with TLAP for five years, with any reported noncompliance constituting immediate grounds
for summary suspension.
¶4.
Pursuant to Rule 13 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline (MRD), which provides for
reciprocal discipline, and upon complaint from the Mississippi Bar, this Court suspended
Hodges for one year. The decision also gave Hodges explicit directions:
(2)
Hodges shall continue to comply with his monitoring agreement with
TLAP for the period of time remaining on the five year commitment
required by the Tennessee order and shall provide this Court with
confirmation of compliance on an annual basis.
(3)
Hodges shall, within 14 days of the date of this opinion, file an Affidavit
with this court stating either that he has not practiced law in the State
2
of Mississippi since July 11, 2005, and thus no notices are required, or
that he has given [notice of his suspension to clients and all affected
courts and agents required by MRD 11 (c)].
Hodges, 949 So. 2d at 688 (emphasis added). In that opinion, this Court further stated:
Should Hodges seek reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of
Mississippi, he shall be required not only to comply with all the requirements
of MRD Rule 12, but also to present proof to the Mississippi Bar that he has
completed, or is continuing in compliance with, the conditions of his TLAP
monitoring agreement, as required by the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Id at 688.
¶5.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reinstated Hodges on June 6, 2008, with two
conditions: (1) that Hodges maintain compliance with the TLAP agreement through May 17,
2010 2 , and (2) that Hodges maintain involvement with the Georgia Lawyers’ Assistance
Program (GaLAP).
¶6.
On June 11, 2008, Hodges petitioned this Court for reinstatement of active status as
a practitioner of law in Mississippi. Subsequently, the Mississippi Bar Association deposed
Hodges. Following his deposition, Hodges filed a supplemental petition, attaching letters in
support of his reinstatement. Hodges later filed a second supplemental petition, addressing
the allegations of unauthorized practice of law that brought about his suspension in
Tennessee. The Mississippi Bar filed an answer to Hodges’s petition, recommending
reinstatement. Subsequently, this Court directed Hodges to supplement the record with the
results of Hodges’s monthly drug and alcohol screening required by his TLAP monitoring
2
Since filing this petition for reinstatement, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, on
March 9, 2009, modified the terms of Hodges’s monitoring agreement with TLAP by
shortening the period of compliance from five years to four years, so that it will expire May
17, 2009.
3
agreement. Hodges provided the test results to this Court, and the Mississippi Bar filed a
response.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
This Court enjoys “exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to
attorney discipline, reinstatement, and appointment of receivers for suspended and disbarred
attorneys.” In re Morrison, 819 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Miss. 2001). This Court reviews the
evidence in disciplinary matters as the trier of fact, under a de novo standard. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶8.
When an attorney is suspended due to misconduct in another jurisdiction, this Court
views that suspension as “conclusive evidence of the guilt of the offense or unprofessional
conduct on which said sanction was ordered.” MRD 13. The rules, however, do not provide
that reinstatement in another jurisdiction is viewed as conclusive evidence of the
rehabilitation of the attorney. In considering whether to grant reinstatement, “the Court’s
fundamental inquiry is whether [the attorney] has rehabilitated himself in conduct and
character since the suspension was imposed.” In re Steele, 722 So. 2d 662, 664 (Miss. 1998)
(citing In re Mathes, 653 So. 2d 928, 929 (Miss. 1995)).
I. Hodges’s Noncompliance with the Suspension Order.
¶9.
In the suspension order, this Court required that Hodges continue to comply with his
TLAP monitoring agreement for the remainder of the five-year commitment required by
Tennessee.
The order further stated that Hodges was to “provide this Court with
confirmation of compliance on an annual basis.” Hodges, 949 So. 2d at 688.
4
¶10.
While Hodges continued to comply with the TLAP monitoring agreement, he failed
to provide annual confirmation of compliance to this Court. During his deposition testimony,
Hodges admitted that he had failed to provide this Court with annual compliance
confirmation. Hodges’s excuse for disobeying this Court’s order was that he was “so
devastated” when the order was issued, he didn’t even read the annual confirmation
requirement. Hodges further testified that he had no knowledge of the requirement until he
called the Mississippi Bar inquiring about filing a petition for reinstatement.
¶11.
In his petition for reinstatement, Hodges provided an affidavit stating that he was in
full compliance with the monitoring agreement. Additionally, Hodges provided a letter from
Laura Gatrell, TLAP Executive Director, which stated that Hodges’s TLAP file was in
substantial compliance at the time. The letter further stated that TLAP supported Hodges’s
petition for reinstatement in Tennessee and similarly supported his petition for reinstatement
in Mississippi. In response to this Court’s directive to supplement his petition, Hodges has
provided this Court with the results of his monthly drug and alcohol screening tests as
required by the monitoring agreement.
¶12.
This Court’s suspension order also required that Hodges, within fourteen days of the
issuance of the order, file an affidavit stating either that he had not practiced law in
Mississippi since July 11, 2005, or that he had given notice to clients, courts, and agencies
pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Discipline 11.
¶13.
Hodges filed no such affidavit after the suspension order. When questioned about this
failure to comply during his deposition, Hodges stated that he “failed to appreciate the
language” and was so depressed that he didn’t pick up on the requirement. Hodges’s petition
5
for reinstatement provided, as he later testified, that he had no Mississippi clients on or after
July 11, 2005, and rarely practiced in Mississippi prior to that time.
¶14.
Although he failed to satisfy this Court’s clear directives, our principal concern in
considering Hodges’s reinstatement to the practice of law is whether he “has rehabilitated
himself in conduct and character since the suspension was imposed.” Steele, 722 So. 2d at
664. Clearly, Hodges cannot go back and timely file the affidavit and annual confirmations.
Hodges testified that he has had no clients and has not practiced law since July 11, 2005.
Further, Hodges provided a letter from Gatrell, the results of his monthly screening, and his
own testimony as evidence that since his suspension, he has remained in compliance with the
monitoring agreement. Although this Court does not excuse Hodges’s failure to obey this
Court’s order, we will proceed to examine the totality of the record before us and determine
whether Hodges has rehabilitated himself sufficiently to allow reinstatement to the practice
of law in Mississippi.
II. Requirements for Reinstatement
¶15.
Reinstatement of suspended attorneys is governed by Mississippi Rules of Discipline
12. Burgin v. Miss. State Bar, 453 So. 2d 689, 690 (Miss. 1984). In accordance with
Procedure 12.7 of MRD 12, this Court has set forth requirements for all petitions for
reinstatement, which must be satisfied before this Court will reinstate a suspended petitioner.
Reinstatement of Kelly, 2007-BR-00937-SCT (Miss. 2008). In his petition for reinstatement,
the petitioner must: (1) state the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment; (2) give the
names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered
pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct; (3) make full amends and restitution; (4) show
6
that he has the necessary moral character for the practice of law; and (5) demonstrate the
requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law.
Id. (citing In re
Benson, 890 So. 2d 888, 890 (Miss. 2004)). Although not dispositive, this Court “considers
the Bar’s position as to reinstatement as a factor in determining whether to reinstate a
suspended attorney.” Reinstatement of Kelly, 2007-BR-00937-SCT at ¶15 (citing In re
Holleman, 826 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Miss. 2002)).
A. State the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment.
¶16.
In Hodges’s petition, he outlined the cause of his suspension. Hodges stated that
because of excessive alcohol abuse, he entered into a monitoring agreement with TLAP.
After noncompliance with the monitoring agreement on several occasions, Hodges was
suspended from practicing in Tennessee for one year. Upon gaining knowledge of the
suspension, this Court suspended Hodges from practicing in Mississippi for one year.
¶17.
In his initial petition, Hodges failed to address the specific cause for his suspension
in Tennessee, i.e., the conditional guilty plea to allegations of engaging in the practice of law
while temporarily suspended. In his second supplemental petition, Hodges acknowledged
the allegations and provided “an explanation of the references to the unauthorized practice
of law in the State of Tennessee.” The first allegation involved Hodges assisting a family
friend in a personal-injury suit, including making contact with insurance adjusters and using
his own phone number and address on her pro-se petition. Hodges also assisted in finding
an attorney to represent her and answering discovery. The second allegation involved a
worker’s compensation case in which Hodges had begun to represent the client before the
temporary suspension. Hodges stated that after informing the client that Hodges could not
7
represent him, the client’s physical condition worsened and he became suicidal. Because of
the deteriorating physical and mental condition of the client, Hodges agreed to assist in
drafting a response to a motion for summary judgment. Hodges stated that this work was
done pro bono and was done only “to prevent a tragedy.”
B. Give the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms or legal entities
who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct.
¶18.
In his supplemental petition, Hodges stated that he “owes no duty of restitution to any
person in the State of Mississippi, or in any other state.” Hodges stated in his deposition and
petition that he did not practice law in Mississippi after July 11, 2005, and had no Mississippi
clients at the time of suspension. During his deposition, Hodges testified that no pecuniary
loss had resulted from his suspension.
C. Make full amends and restitution.
¶19.
Hodges’s supplemental petition addressed this requirement, stating that no duty of
restitution is owed, as noted supra. Hodges’s deposition testimony is consistent with this
assertion.
As no pecuniary loss was suffered, Hodges has adequately satisfied this
requirement.
D. Show the necessary moral character for the practice of law.
¶20.
Hodges has acknowledged that he has an alcohol problem. He entered into a
monitoring agreement with TLAP and initially failed to comply with that agreement, with
four trips to rehabilitation facilities and repeated alcohol abuse, leading to the eventual
suspension of his license in Tennessee and Mississippi.
8
¶21.
In 2006, after the suspension, Hodges moved to Georgia and began working as a
commercial and land realtor with Keller Williams Realty Co. He is in the fourth year of his
monitoring agreement with TLAP and undergoes random monthly drug and alcohol screens.
He regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, is monitored by a Georgia
attorney, and attends a separate lawyers’ recovery group in Atlanta.
¶22.
Hodges acknowledges that he had a brief relapse in January of 2006, as a result of the
death of one of his best friends. Hodges drank for three days, which resulted in two failed
alcohol screens. After these failed screens, Hodges began his involvement with GaLAP and
clinical director Steven Brown, and has remained on the road to recovery since. The monthly
drug and alcohol screening reports filed with this Court are consistent with Hodges’s
testimony and confirm that there have been no positive screens since January 2006.
¶23.
Hodges has presented this Court with evidence of the steps he has taken to turn his life
around, in the form of letters regarding his involvement in support groups and other civic,
religious, and charitable organizations. A letter from Brown reports that Hodges has been
actively involved with the GaLAP since September 13, 2005, receiving support and peer
monitoring. Brown’s letter also reports that Hodges has an ongoing involvement with a local
AA group and was a charter member of a GaLAP Lawyers’ Recovery Group in Atlanta
formed in 2007, noting that Hodges has taken a leadership role in the group. A letter from
James Haley, Georgia attorney and Hodges’s peer monitor, states that he has met with
Hodges on a monthly basis since August 2006, during which time Hodges has maintained
his sobriety and followed the principles of recovery from alcoholism. The letter from Laura
Gatrell, TLAP executive director, states that Hodges is diligent in providing updates and has
9
tested negative on alcohol and drug screens. Hodges provided letters from Georgia attorneys
Theodore Smith and Frederick Bauerlein, who attend the weekly AA meetings with Hodges,
stating that Hodges is living a sober, spiritual life and takes the AA program very seriously.
Hodges presented letters from three Keller Williams coworkers, which state that he is an
excellent employee and mention his involvement with Habitat for Humanity and support for
an abused women’s shelter. In addition, Hodges presented letters from both Brett Berto,
chairman of the Cumming-Forsyth County Chamber of Commerce, and James McCoy,
president and CEO of the same. These two letters commend the work of Hodges with the
organization and other civic activities, noting that Hodges has been accepted into the
Leadership Forsyth class of 2008-2009.
¶24.
We find that Hodges has adequately shown that he has taken steps to correct the
problems he encountered as a result of his substance abuse and that he has the necessary
moral character for the practice of law.
E. Demonstrate the requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of
practicing law.
¶25.
Hodges stated that he “is current in his CLE hours through July 2008.” Hodges
testified that he yearly attended a seminar in Tennessee, where he received either twelve or
fifteen hours of general CLE credit and three hours of ethics CLE credit. In addition, the
Mississippi Bar provided a letter from the Mississippi Commission on Continuing Legal
Education, confirming that Hodges is “in compliance with the Rules and Regulations for
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for the State of Mississippi, including the ethics
requirement through July 31, 2008.”
10
F. The recommendation of the Mississippi Bar.
¶26.
The Mississippi Bar, in its answer to Hodges’s petition and following its own
investigation of the case, recommended that Hodges be reinstated to the practice of law,
based on his reinstatement by the Tennessee Supreme Court, his ongoing compliance with
his TLAP agreement, and his participation with the GaLAP.
CONCLUSION
¶27.
“The suspended attorney seeking reinstatement has the burden of proving to this Court
that he has the requisite moral character for reinstatement to the practice of law.” In re:
Reinstatement of License to Practice Law, Robert D. Underwood, 649 So. 2d 825, 828
(Miss. 1995) (citing Haimes v. Miss. State Bar, 551 So. 2d 910, 912 (Miss. 1989)). “The
showing to be made for reinstatement seems inextricably bound to the nature of the original
offense.” Id. In considering reinstatement, this Court has stated that a suspension does not
require “a long period to discipline and effect a rehabilitation of character.” Id. (quoting
Williams v. Miss. State Bar Ass’n, 492 So. 2d 578, 580 (Miss. 1986)). “A firm resolve to
live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to convince a reasonable
mind clearly that the person has reformed is only required.” Id. at 828-829 (quoting
Williams, 492 So. 2d at 580).
¶28.
Based on the evidence presented to this Court, we find that Hodges has met the burden
of proving to this Court that he has rehabilitated himself and now possesses the moral
character necessary for reinstatement to the practice of law. We note that Hodges initially
was suspended for a period of one year and, at present, has been suspended for more than
three years and seven months.
11
¶29.
This Court hereby grants Hodges’s petition for reinstatement on the condition that
Hodges file monthly reports with the Mississippi Bar of the results of any drug and alcohol
screens, through the expiration of his TLAP monitoring agreement. Failure to furnish the
monthly reports as directed will constitute grounds for immediate summary suspension of
Hodges’s license to practice law in Mississippi, upon proper petition of the Mississippi Bar.
¶30. PETITION OF WARNER HODGES, III, FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IS GRANTED.
REINSTATEMENT GRANTED ON CONDITION PETITIONER PROVIDE
MONTHLY REPORTS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION TO THE
MISSISSIPPI BAR.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH,
KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.
12
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
