Jeffery A. Stallworth v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-00100-SCT
JEFFERY A. STALLWORTH
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
11/17/2006
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT L. GIBBS
HAROLD EDWARD PIZZETTA, III
R. STEVEN COLEMAN
CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
AFFIRMED - 05/22/2008
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶1.
In early 2002, Jeffery A. Stallworth (“Stallworth”), a resident of Mississippi, was
indicted on five separate sex offenses in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The indictment
charged Stallworth with one count of second-degree rape, one count of second-degree sex
offense, one count of second-degree assault, and two counts of fourth-degree sex offense.
The victim was an adult resident of Maryland.
¶2.
On March 4, 2002, Stallworth appeared before the Maryland circuit court and pleaded
guilty to one count of fourth-degree sex offense. The other counts on which Stallworth was
indicted were nolle prossed. The offense to which Stallworth pleaded guilty is codified in
Maryland Code Annotated, Criminal Law Section 3-308(b)(1). Under section 3-308(b)(1),
a person is guilty of sexual offense in the fourth degree if that person engages in “sexual
contact with another without the consent of the other.” “Sexual contact” is defined in
Maryland Criminal Code Annotated Section 3-301(f) as follows:
(1) “Sexual contact,” as used in §§ 3-307 and 3-308 of this subtitle, means an
intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s genital, anal, or other intimate
area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party.
(2) “Sexual contact” includes an act:
(i) in which a part of an individual’s body, except the penis,
mouth, or tongue, penetrates, however slightly, into another
individual’s genital opening or anus; and
(ii) that can reasonably be construed to be for sexual arousal or
gratification, or for the abuse of either party.
(3) “Sexual contact” does not include:
(i) a common expression of familial or friendly affection; or
(ii) an act for an accepted medical purpose.
¶3.
Under Maryland law, a fourth-degree sex offense is a misdemeanor and does not
require registration as a sex offender.
¶4.
On May 3, 2002, Stallworth again appeared before the Maryland circuit court and was
sentenced by the trial judge to serve one year in prison, but that sentence of incarceration was
suspended and Stallworth was placed on supervised probation for two years. It was further
2
authorized by the Maryland court that Stallworth’s probation could be transferred to
Mississippi.
¶5.
After being sentenced by the Maryland court, Stallworth returned to Mississippi,
whereupon the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (“MDPS”) required him to register
as a sex offender pursuant to the Mississippi Sex Offender Registration Laws beginning with
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-21 (Rev. 2004). Stallworth registered with MDPS
on November 18, 2002, and as required by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-31,
Stallworth was required to re-register every ninety days. There is no claim that Stallworth
failed to re-register per Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-31.
¶6.
On October 19, 2005, Stallworth filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the
Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. In his complaint, Stallworth
averred MDPS had “illegally required him to register.” Stallworth stated a fourth-degree
sexual offense in Maryland is not a registerable offense in the State of Mississippi and that
he should not be required to continue registration as a sex offender in this state.
¶7.
After commencing the action in Hinds County, Stallworth returned to the Maryland
trial court and appeared pro se on a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence. Stallworth
stated to the Maryland court that he was there “to try to find a solution for is [sic] how not
be on that sex offender list in Mississippi.” The motion was granted by the trial court and the
docket entry for the proceedings dated November 4, 2005, states:
The guilty finding and sentence dated 5-3-02 is hereby stricken. Further
proceedings are deferred. Entry of judgment is stayed pursuant to Criminal
Procedure Article 6-220 and placed on unsupervised probation for a period of
one year.
3
¶8.
Subsequent to Stallworth’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence being granted, on
November 17, 2005, MDPS filed its answer and propounded discovery requests to
Stallworth. Stallworth did not respond to discovery, but instead filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Stay of Discovery in Hinds County Circuit Court. No hearing was
held regarding the discovery motion.
¶9.
Stallworth’s Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that since his guilty verdict had
been stricken in Maryland, there was no conviction upon which Mississippi could base a
registration requirement. Stallworth further argued that even if the guilty verdict had not been
stricken, the offense to which Stallworth pleaded guilty is not a registerable offense in
Mississippi. Stallworth argued that a registerable offense in Mississippi required the element
of penetration, to which Stallworth argued he did not plead guilty in Maryland. However,
Stallworth’s argument is directly contrary to his own sworn testimony, which will be
discussed infra.
¶10.
In response, MDPS filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. MDPS submitted that under Mississippi Code
Annotated 45-33-23(a), a registerable offense includes a determination of guilt via a guilty
plea “regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.” MDPS further asserted Maryland’s
fourth-degree sexual offense is comparable to Mississippi’s offenses of sexual battery or
attempted sexual battery, which require registration in Mississippi.
¶11.
On May 9, 2006, MDPS filed a Submission of New Evidence in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. This
new evidence included sworn testimony from Stallworth taken from a related civil
4
proceeding.1 On May 10, 2006, Stallworth filed a Motion to Strike Defendant’s Submission
of New Evidence. On May 12, 2006, a hearing was held on both motions for summary
judgment in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County. The trial judge
took both motions under advisement and on November 17, 2006, the trial judge entered a
well-reasoned and thorough nine-page Memorandum Opinion and Order. In his order, the
trial judge held Stallworth’s guilty plea “regardless of adjudication of guilt being withheld,
remains intact, and therefore falls within the plain reading of the statutory definition of
‘conviction’ set forth in Mississippi’s Act. (Section 45-33-23).” The trial judge further found
the sex offender registration statutes are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed.
As such, the trial judge found that in Maryland, Stallworth stood convicted of
penetrating, without consent, another person’s genital, anal or other intimate
area with part of his body, other than his penis, mouth, or tongue. While a
misdemeanor in Maryland, such behavior would constitute the felony of sexual
battery in Mississippi, a registerable offense sex offense under our Megan’s
Law. This finding and the defendant department’s construction of the Act is
not repugnant to either its plain meaning or best reading. The Court, therefore,
gives great deference to the department’s construction.
¶12.
Accordingly, the trial court denied Stallworth’s motion for summary judgment and
granted MDPS’s summary judgment motion, thus requiring Stallworth to continue to register.
The trial court did not rule on the Motion to Submit New Evidence filed by MDPS and the
Motion to Strike New Evidence filed by Stallworth, but it is clear from the trial court’s
opinion that this evidence was considered.
¶13.
Stallworth now appeals to this Court and presents the following issues:
1
The related civil proceeding in this matter: Mississippi United Methodist Conference
v. Brown, 911 So. 2d 478 (Miss. 2005).
5
I.
II.
Whether the lower court erred in determining that Stallworth had a
conviction from Maryland.
Whether the lower court erred in granting MDPS’s Motion for
Summary Judgment which required Stallworth to continue to register
as a sex offender.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. “We employ the de novo standard in reviewing a trial court's grant of summary
judgment. The moving party shall be granted judgment ‘if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Dearman v. Christian, 967 So. 2d 636, 638-639 (Miss. 2007)
(citing M.R.C.P. 56(c)) (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.
Whether the lower court erred in determining that Stallworth had a conviction
from Maryland.
¶15.
In 2002, Stallworth pleaded guilty to fourth-degree sexual offense in Maryland, and
on November 4, 2005, Stallworth again appeared in the Maryland circuit court to ask for
reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court granted Stallworth’s motion for
reconsideration, stating, “It’s a motion for reconsideration of sentence, and I’m going to grant
it, and I’m going to effect the finding of guilt and enter probation before judgment and it will
be unsupervised probation. . . .”
¶16.
“Conviction” has a specific meaning under the Mississippi Sex Offender Registration
Laws. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-23(a) (Rev. 2004) provides:
6
“Conviction” shall mean that, regarding the person’s offense, there has been
a determination or judgment of guilt as a result of a trial or the entry of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.
According to the plain meaning of our statute, although the Maryland court modified its
original ruling in contradiction to the fact that Stallworth had already completed his sentence,
does not afford Stallworth relief. It is the entry of the plea which satisfies “conviction” under
the Mississippi Act.
¶17.
This Court finds this issue to be without merit, as Stallworth stands “convicted” under
Maryland’s fourth-degree sexual offense statute.
II.
Whether the lower court erred in granting MDPS’s Motion for Summary
Judgment which required Stallworth to continue to register as a sex offender.
¶18.
In an effort to avoid the non-criminal consequences of his behavior, Stallworth filed
a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, as opposed to a Petition for Relief from Duty to
Register. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-47 establishes various requirements for
relief from the duty to register.2 See, e.g, Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-47(2)(b)(ix)(Supp. 2007)
(If the offender has been convicted of one (1) of the following offenses, the offender is
subject to lifetime registration and shall not be relieved of the duty to register: (ix) Any
conviction for violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction or designation as a sexual
predator in another jurisdiction). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-47(3) (Rev. 2007), ([t]he
offender will be required to continue registration for any sex-offense conviction unless the
conviction is set aside in any post-conviction proceeding, the offender receives a pardon, or
2
The failure of Stallworth to bring this action under the statute was not raised as an
issue by the state.
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the charge is dismissed. Upon submission of the appropriate documentation to the department
of one (1) of these occurrences, registration will continue).
¶19.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the state filed Stallworth’s deposition
testimony from a civil action based on the same underlying facts. Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 45-33-47 establishes the standard of proof and factors to be considered
by the trial court on a Petition for Relief from Duty to Register.
In determining whether to release an offender from the obligation to register,
the court shall consider the nature of the registrable offense committed and the
criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior of the petitioner both before and
after conviction. The court may relieve the offender of the duty to register only
if the petitioner shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that the registrant
properly maintained his registration as required by law and that future
registration of the petitioner will not serve the purposes of this chapter and the
court is otherwise satisfied that the petitioner is not a current or potential threat
to public safety. The district attorney in the circuit in which the petition is filed
must be given notice of the petition at least three (3) weeks before the hearing
on the matter. The district attorney may present evidence in opposition to the
requested relief or may otherwise demonstrate the reasons why the petition
should be denied. If the court denies the petition, the petitioner may not again
petition the court for relief until one (1) year has elapsed unless the court
orders otherwise in its order of denial of relief.
Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-47(3) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
¶20.
Following the statutory mandate, the lower court was presented with the facts
surrounding Stallworth’s crime. It is clear from the trial court’s opinion that the trial judge
considered Stallworth’s sworn testimony from the related civil proceeding. That testimony
provides compelling evidence which cannot be ignored.
¶21.
Pertinent portions of Stallworth’s deposition taken on February 5 and 6, 2003, reveal
the following:
ATTORNEY:
Had [the victim] asked you to come into the bed?
8
STALLWORTH: She had not. . . . I put my hands in her pajamas and I
started to - I guess massaging her clitoris. . . .
STALLWORTH: I kept. . . my finger on her clitoris for I would suspect
about more than ten minutes. . . .
ATTORNEY:
Are you having vaginal intercourse or anal intercourse?
STALLWORTH: Vaginal. . .
ATTORNEY:
You’re saying that you would have vaginal intercourse
and then oral, and go back and forth?
STALLWORTH: Right. . . .
STALLWORTH: And I just turned over and laid on the bed and she pulled
the cover and said, “What was that? What were you
doing?” And she said, “That was not consensual. . . .”
¶22.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95(1)(a) (Rev. 2006) states, “A person is
guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with (a) another person
without his or her consent.”
¶23.
Even if one were to ignore Stallworth’s sworn testimony in the civil proceeding,
Stallworth’s actions, which he admitted in the Maryland plea colloquy, clearly satisfy the
definition of attempted sexual battery, a registerable offense in this state pursuant to
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-25(1).
¶24.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-1-7 (emphasis added) states,
Every person who shall design and endeavor to commit an offense, and shall
do any overt act toward the commission thereof, but shall fail therein, or shall
be prevented from committing the same, on conviction thereof, shall, where
no provision is made by law for the punishment of such offense, be punished
as follows: If the offense attempted to be committed be capital, such offense
shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years;
if the offense attempted be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or
by fine and imprisonment in the county jail, then the attempt to commit such
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offense shall be punished for a period or for an amount not greater than is
prescribed for the actual commission of the offense so attempted.
¶25.
This Court has held, “In general, Section 97-1-7 (1972) requires a showing of three
elements: (1) an attempt to commit a particular crime, (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward
its commission and (3) the failure to consummate its commission.” McGowan v. State, 541
So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted).
¶26.
Stallworth admitted in his plea that he placed his hands on the victim’s vagina without
her consent. We are constrained to understand how a person placing his hands on the genitals
of another person without her consent would not be an attempt to commit the crime of sexual
battery and a direct ineffectual act toward its commission. Therefore, even in the absence of
Stallworth’s deposition testimony, Stallworth’s conduct and plea satisfy the elements of
attempted sexual battery in Mississippi, a registerable offense in this State.
¶27.
We find no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of MDPS,
which requires Stallworth to continue to register.
CONCLUSION
¶28.
Requiring Jeffery Stallworth to register fulfills the spirit and intent of the Legislature
in creating the Mississippi Sex Offender Registration Laws. To do otherwise would be an
affront to and an intrusion upon the rights of the general public, whom the law seeks to
protect. The pertinent portion of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-21 states,
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced expectation of
privacy because of the public’s interest in safety and in the effective operation
of government. In balancing offenders’ due process and other rights, and the
interests of public security, the Legislature finds that releasing such
information about criminal sex offenders to the general public will further the
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primary governmental interest of protecting vulnerable populations and, in
some instances the public, from potential harm.
¶29.
It is not the duty or within the power of this Court to divine the State of Maryland’s
intent in allowing Stallworth to plead guilty to a non-registerable offense in Maryland after
being charged with multiple sexual offenses. It is our calling to interpret the laws of this state
passed by our Legislature to protect the citizens of this state. The Mississippi Sex Offender
Registration Laws are designed to warn the public of persons who commit sex offenses.
¶30.
The facts surrounding Stallworth’s conduct and crime prove that he has committed
a registerable offense. Stallworth has not satisfied the requirements, nor has he met the
burden of proof which would relieve him of his continuing duty to register. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm the ruling of the trial court and Stallworth shall not be relieved of his
duty to register.
¶31.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., EASLEY, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR.
CARLSON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ. GRAVES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
CARLSON, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶32.
While I agree with my learned colleagues in the majority that Stallworth stands
“convicted” in Maryland of fourth-degree sexual offense, I respectfully disagree that
Maryland’s fourth-degree sexual offense is a registrable offense in Mississippi. In my
opinion, the majority fails to recognize the critical issue presented to this Court. While the
majority briefly discusses why it believes Stallworth’s Maryland conviction is a registrable
offense in Mississippi, most of the majority opinion focuses on Stallworth’s statutory duty
11
to continue to register as a sex offender and why he should not be permitted under the statute
to be released from this duty to continue to register. Stallworth is not asserting that he
committed a registrable offense and that he should now be relieved from re-registration as
a sex offender. Instead, Stallworth is asserting that fourth-degree sexual offense in Maryland
is not a registrable offense in Mississippi and that he thus should have never been required
to register in the first place. Therefore, I will address the issue as I see it presented to this
Court.
¶33.
The misdemeanor offense to which Stallworth pleaded guilty is defined in Maryland
Criminal Code Annotated Section 3-308. Under section 3-308(b)(1), a person is guilty of
sexual offense in the fourth degree if that person engages in “sexual contact with another
without the consent of the other.” “Sexual contact” is defined in Maryland Criminal Code
Annotated Section 3-301(f):
(1) “Sexual contact”, as used in §§ 3-307 and 3-308 of this subtitle, means an
intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s genital, anal, or other intimate
area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party.
(2) “Sexual contact” includes an act:
(i) in which a part of an individual’s body, except the penis,
mouth, or tongue, penetrates, however slightly, into another
individual’s genital opening or anus; and
(ii) that can reasonably be construed to be for sexual arousal or
gratification, or for the abuse of either party.
(3) “Sexual contact” does not include:
(i) a common expression of familial or friendly affection; or
(ii) an act for an accepted medical purpose.
12
¶34.
Upon Stallworth’s return to the State of Mississippi, MDPS required Stallworth to
register as a sex offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-25(1) (Rev.
2004), which states in pertinent part:
Any person residing in this state who has been convicted of any sex offense .
. . shall register with the Mississippi Department of Public Safety.
Registration shall not be required for an offense that is not a registrable sex
offense.
(Emphasis added). According to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-23(g) (Rev.
2004), the following are registrable sex offenses for which MDPS is requiring Stallworth to
register:
(iv) Section 97-3-95 relating to sexual battery . . .
(xi) Section 97-1-7 relating to attempt to commit any of the above-referenced
offenses;
(xiii) Any other offense resulting in a conviction in another jurisdiction,
whether state, federal or military, which, if committed in this state, would be
deemed to be such a crime without regard to its designation elsewhere. . . .
¶35.
Stallworth argues that fourth-degree sex offense in Maryland is not a registrable sex
offense in Mississippi pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-25(1).
Following this assertion to a logical conclusion, Stallworth opines that since section 45-3325(1) does not require him to register has a sex offender, MDPS’s actions in requiring him
to register are illegal.
¶36.
On the other hand, MDPS contends that Stallworth’s conviction of fourth-degree sex
offense in Maryland does fall within Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-25(1). In
particular, MDPS claims that Stallworth’s conviction in Maryland equates to sexual battery
13
in Mississippi. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95 (Rev. 2006) defines sexual
battery as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with:
(a) another person without his or her consent.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-97(a) (Rev. 2006) states:
Sexual penetration includes cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or pederasty, any
penetration of the genital or anal openings of another person’s body by any
part of a person’s body, and insertion of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body.
¶37.
Stallworth argues that the difference in the elements of Maryland’s sex offense in the
fourth-degree statute and Mississippi’s sexual-battery statute preclude the MDPS from being
able to require him to register as a sex offender, since our sexual-battery statute, Mississippi
Code Annotated Section 97-3-95, requires sexual penetration as opposed to mere sexual
contact, which is all that is required under Maryland’s fourth-degree sex offense statute.
¶38.
The majority finds that Stallworth was found guilty of penetrating his victim in
Maryland based upon the Mississippi circuit court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order which
found that in Maryland, Stallworth stood convicted of
penetrating, without consent, another person’s genital, anal or other intimate
area with part of his body, other than his penis, mouth or tongue.
The Maryland court did NOT find Stallworth guilty of penetrating his victim. In fact, it
found only that Stallworth placed his hands on the victim’s vaginal area.
¶39.
Furthermore, the majority finds that Stallworth penetrated his victim based on sworn
deposition testimony from Stallworth in a subsequent civil proceeding. In my opinion, this
analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 45-33-47, the
14
statute used by the majority, establishes the standard of proof and factors to be considered
by the trial court on a Petition for Relief from Duty to Register. Clearly, a person should not
be required to petition for relief from the duty to register if that person has never committed
a registrable offense, which is precisely Stallworth’s claim. While the trial court, when
addressing a petition for relief from duty to register, “shall consider the nature of the
registrable offense committed and the criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior of the
petitioner both before and after the conviction,” such matters as a matter of law should not
be considered when determining if the petitioner has committed a registrable offense which
thus requires registration under the statute. With this having been said, I submit that
Stallworth’s civil deposition testimony should have been stricken by the trial court and that
neither the trial court, nor this Court on appeal, should consider this testimony in reaching
the issue before us today.
¶40.
Second, the majority states “[t]he trial court did not rule on the Motion to Submit New
Evidence filed by MDPS and the Motion to Strike New Evidence filed by Stallworth, but it
is clear from the trial court’s opinion that this evidence was considered.” Again, the majority
assumes that it is clear the trial court considered the deposition testimony based upon the
circuit court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order which found that in Maryland, Stallworth
stood convicted of:
penetrating, without consent, another person’s genital, anal or other intimate
area with part of his body, other than his penis, mouth or tongue.
As I pointed out earlier, that is not what the Maryland court found. In fact, the Maryland
court had no evidence before it that suggested Stallworth penetrated his victim.
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¶41.
I recognize the “essential elements” test is not a hard-and-fast rule. In fact, I look not
only to the exact elements of the statutes for both Maryland’s fourth-degree sex offense
statute and Mississippi’s sexual-battery statute, but I find it permissible to review the factual
basis for Stallworth’s guilty plea. At the guilty plea hearing in Maryland, Judge Shepherd
asked for the factual basis for Stallworth’s plea of guilty. The transcript of those proceedings
reflects the following:
THE COURT:
MS. MASON:
Thank you, Your Honor. Had the State gone to trial, the
State would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
on or about August 15th, 2001, that the defendant,
Jeffery A. Stallworth, seated before Your Honor today,
had sexual contact with the victim,[3 ] . . . . who is present
in the courtroom; that the sexual contact was made
without the consent and against the will of [the victim];
and those events occurred in Prince George’s County,
Maryland.
THE COURT:
Specifically what sexual contact?
MS. MASON:
¶42.
Before I can accept your plea of guilty to the third count,
fourth degree sexual offense, I need to hear the factual
basis of it. I will ask the State to recite the evidence.
He did place his hands on her vaginal area.
Taken together, I cannot conclude that Stallworth would have been found guilty of
sexual battery if charged in Mississippi.
This state’s sexual-battery statute requires
penetration, however slight, as an essential element; however, Stallworth was not found
guilty in Maryland of sexually penetrating the victim. In order to be found guilty of fourthdegree sexual offense in Maryland, sexual contact must occur without consent. While sexual
3
The adult victim in today’s case is the same victim identified in Mississippi United
Methodist Conference v. Brown, 911 So. 2d 478, 480 (Miss. 2005).
16
contact may include “an act: (i) in which a part of an individual’s body, except the penis,
mouth, or tongue, penetrates, however slightly, into another individual’s genital opening or
anus,” sexual contact does not necessarily have to include penetration; whereas, Mississippi’s
sexual-battery statute, without exception, requires some form of penetration of the victim.
As such, Mississippi’s sexual-battery statute is more synonymous with the definition of a
“sexual act” in Maryland as opposed to “sexual contact.” A “sexual act” is defined in
Maryland Criminal Code Annotated Section 3-301(e) as:
(1) “Sexual act” means any of the following acts, regardless of whether semen
is emitted:
(i) analingus;
(ii) cunnilingus;
(iii) fellatio;
(iv) anal intercourse, including penetration, however slightly, of
the anus; or
(v) an act:
1. in which an object penetrates, however slightly,
into another individual’s genital opening or anus;
and
2. that can reasonably be construed to be for
sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of
either party.
(2) “Sexual act” does not include:
(i) vaginal intercourse; or
(ii) an act in which an object penetrates an individual’s genital
opening or anus for an accepted medical purpose.
17
¶43.
“Sexual penetration” is defined in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-97(a)
(Rev. 2006) as including “cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or pederasty, any penetration of the
genital or anal openings of another person’s body by any part of a person’s body, and
insertion of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body.”
Therefore, only if Stallworth was convicted of a sexual offense in Maryland which required
a “sexual act” on his part would he be required to register as a sex offender in Mississippi for
committing an “offense resulting in a conviction in another jurisdiction . . . [which] if
committed in this state, would be deemed to be such a crime without regard to its designation
elsewhere;” i.e., sexual battery. Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-23 (xiii) (Rev. 2004).
¶44.
Thus, looking at the specific facts revealed at Stallworth’s plea hearing, I find of
significant import the comments of the Maryland prosecutor when she stated that “[h]ad the
State gone to trial, the State would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that . . .
[Stallworth] . . . had sexual contact with the victim . . . that the sexual contact was made
without the consent and against the will of [the victim]” and that the specific sexual contact
was that “[Stallworth] did place his hands on her vaginal area.” The Maryland prosecutor
never stated Stallworth penetrated the victim. Again, the applicable Maryland statute states
in pertinent part that “sexual contact . . . means an intentional touching of the victim’s or
actor’s genital, anal, or other intimate area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the
abuse of either party. Md. Crim. Code Ann. § 3-301(f)(1) (emphasis added). While section
3-301(f)(2) states that “‘[s]exual contact” does include acts . . . (i) in which a part of an
individual’s body, except the penis, mouth, or tongue, penetrates, however slightly, into
another individual’s genital opening or anus; and (ii) that can reasonably be construed to be
18
for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party,’” section 3-301(f)(2)(I)-(ii)
is not all-inclusive as to specifying what acts may constitute sexual contact. This fact is
obvious when one reads section 3-301(f)(3), which states “‘[s]exual contact” does not include
(i) a common expression of familial or friendly affection; or (ii) an act for an accepted
medical purpose. Obviously, if all sexual contact under the Maryland statutes required some
type of penetration of the victim, there would have been no need for the Maryland legislature
to expressly except from the definition of sexual contact “a common expression of familial
or friendly affection.”
¶45.
Furthermore, the majority argues that even without evidence of penetration, Stallworth
would still be required to register as a sex offender in Mississippi based on his purported
attempt to commit sexual battery. However, on this point I note that:
[t]he attempt statute requires that, before one may be convicted of attempt, he
“shall fail therein, or shall be prevented from committing the same.” The
gravamen of this offense of attempt is that the accused have done an overt act
toward sexual penetration “and be prevented from its commission.” State v.
Lindsey, 202 Miss. 896, 899, 32 So. 2d 876, 877 (1947).
West v. State, 437 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Miss. 1983). In addition, “[u]nder our attempt statute
prevention or frustration must have resulted from extraneous causes.” Id. (citing Bucklew
v. State, 206 So. 2d 200, 202 (Miss. 1968); c.f. Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 149, 152 (Miss.
1981)). Thus, I disagree with the majority’s argument that “[e]ven if one were to ignore
Stallworth’s sworn testimony in the civil proceeding, Stallworth’s actions, which he
admitted in the Maryland plea colloquy, clearly satisfy the definition of attempted sexual
battery, a registrable offense in this state pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 4533-25(1) (Rev. 2004).” Stallworth’s conduct and the facts presented at the plea hearing
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clearly do not satisfy the elements of attempted sexual battery. The prosecution failed to
provide specific evidence that Stallworth attempted to penetrate the victim, and failed only
because of extraneous causes.
¶46.
I find error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of MDPS inasmuch
as MDPS’ requirement that Stallworth register is not supported by substantial evidence.
Dep't of Marine Res. v. Brown, 903 So. 2d 675, 677 (Miss. 2005). There is no evidence
whatsoever which legally can be considered by this Court to support the determination that
Stallworth penetrated the victim while committing the act of fourth-degree sex offense for
which he was convicted in the state of Maryland. As explained supra, Stallworth’s sworn
deposition testimony in a civil case regarding his conduct with the victim in this case was not
considered by the Maryland court; therefore, this deposition testimony likewise should not
be considered by this Court in today’s appeal.
¶47.
I find that this issue raised by Stallworth has merit in that Stallworth’s conviction
under Maryland’s fourth-degree sex offense statute, Maryland Criminal Code Annotated
Section 3-308, defined as “sexual contact with another without the consent of the other,”
when read in conjunction with Maryland Criminal Code Annotated Section 3-301(f)(1)(2)(3),
is not a registrable sex offense under Mississippi’s Sex Offenders Registration Law.
¶48.
While I recognize that the Mississippi Sex Offenders Registration Law is a remedial
statute with an intended deterrent effect, thus requiring this Court liberally to construe the
statutory provisions in favor of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, I am constrained
as a matter of law to find that the difference in the elements of the Maryland offense for
which Stallworth was convicted and Mississippi’s sexual-battery statute, coupled with the
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record in this case, brings me to the inescapable conclusion that the act of which Stallworth
was convicted under Maryland’s fourth-degree sex offense statute is not a registrable sex
offense under the Mississippi Sex Offenders Registration Law. (See Mississippi Code
Annotated Sections 45-33-21, et seq. (Rev. 2004)).
¶49.
I have no sympathy for Jeffery A. Stallworth, who “may well be deserving of
society’s condemnation.” See May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984). While I in no
way condone Stallworth’s conduct toward the victim, the issue before us is not whether what
Stallworth did was offensive, or immoral, or even criminal, but instead, the issue before us
is one of application of a clear legislative enactment. We are constitutionally mandated to
apply the language of the statute as written, and not legislate from the bench. “[I]f we
interpret a statute contrary to the intent or will of the Legislature, that body has the absolute
authority to change the statute to suit its will.” Bd. of Supervisors v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 448 So. 2d 917, 924 (Miss. 1984) (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). For the reasons stated, I would reverse the summary judgment entered
in favor of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety by the Circuit Court for the First
Judicial District of Hinds County, and render judgment here in favor of Jeffery A. Stallworth.
¶50.
Because the majority holds otherwise, and for the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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