In the Interest of D.S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-01381-SCT
IN THE INTEREST OF D.S.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
06/28/2005
HON. MILLS E. BARBEE
COAHOMA COUNTY YOUTH COURT
DARNELL FELTON
C. KENT HANEY
CIVIL - JUVENILE JUSTICE
AFFIRMED - 12/07/2006
BEFORE COBB, P.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.
COBB, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This appeal comes from the dismissal of a petition charging D. S., a minor, with
delinquency. The Coahoma County Youth Court, presided over by special judge Mills E.
Barbee, appointed to hear the case due to the recusal of the regular youth court judge,
concluded the youth court was without exclusive original jurisdiction to proceed on the
charge filed against D.S. and dismissed without further elaboration. On appeal D.S. asserts
that the judgment was erroneous because the charge filed against him, pursuant to the
statutory rape statute, Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-3-65 (Rev. 2006), excludes a life sentence
for individuals under eighteen years of age, and therefore the youth court did have exclusive
original jurisdiction. This argument is contrary to established precedent, and thus we affirm
the youth court’s decision.
FACTS
¶2.
D.S., then sixteen years of age, was arrested on April 2, 2003, and charged with
fondling J.M., a three-year-old female. Clarksdale Police Investigator Robbie Linley
contacted the youth court judge who instructed him to release D. S. into the custody of his
mother and to issue an intake date. Following those instructions, an intake proceeding was
scheduled for April 7, 2003. D.S., his mother and father met with the intake counselor, Trip
Webster, on that date. However, for reasons not provided in the record, the matter then was
dormant for one and half years.
¶3.
On November 30, 2004, a Coahoma County grand jury indicted D.S. for “unlawfully,
wilfully and feloniously engag[ing] in sexual penetration with [J.M.], a female child under
the age of fourteen (14) years and [D.S.] was twenty-four (24) months older than [J.M].” The
title, at the top of the indictment, was titled “Sexual Battery MCA Section 97-3-95(1)(d).”
On December 7, 2004, D.S. filed a Motion to Dismiss and Transfer in the Coahoma County
Circuit Court, seeking to return the matter to the youth court. Other than the indictment, the
only part of the circuit court record is contained in the record before this Court is the detailed
Order of the Circuit Judge, in which he concluded that “[t]his Court will dismiss without
prejudice in the Circuit Court and transfer the entire cause to the Youth Court of Coahoma
County, Mississippi, for such appropriate proceedings as the Youth Court might determine
2
to be appropriate.” He further ordered that the documents be sent to the Youth Court, and
all records of the Circuit Court should be expunged.
¶4.
On February 1, 2005, the Youth Court prosecutor filed a two-paragraph Petition which
stated that D.S. was a delinquent child within the meaning of the Youth Court Act, in that he
“did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual battery on J.M, a child under the
age of 14 and 24 months younger than D.S., in violation of Section 97-3-65(1)(b)[sic]1 of the
Mississippi Code Annotated.” Simultaneously, a one-sentence Motion to Transfer back to
the circuit court was filed against D.S. in youth court.
¶5.
The youth court heard brief initial testimony and arguments on the petition and
motion to transfer on February 18, 2005, after the judge announced that he needed additional
time for research in light of his concerns about “these charges and about the circumstances
surrounding this Petition.” Since the parties and witnesses were present, their testimony was
heard. Officer Linley testified with regard to the arrest and his call to the youth court judge.
His copy of the juvenile arrest report, which reflected the charge of fondling and the
scheduling of the intake meeting, was admitted without objection. The youth court file also
contained the court’s copy of the report upon which handwritten notes were jotted in several
places. D.S.’s mother testified that D. S. had been released into her custody, and that she,
her husband, and D.S. met with youth court counselor Trip Webster three or four days after
1
The petition originally stated the sexual battery code section , but the numbers were
marked through (without initials) and the handwritten statutory rape numbers were inserted,
without any corresponding change in the name of the stated crime.
3
the arrest, although she could not remember the exact date. There were no questions asked
of her about the specifics of that meeting. D.S.’s father was also present to testify, but the
attorneys stipulated that his testimony would be substantially similar to hers. At that point,
the prosecutor advised the court that he would like to talk with Webster, and since he was no
longer in the area, would try to call him to find out more about the alleged meeting. The
court agreed, and asked the prosecutor to advise counsel opposite as to what he learned, and
he would then return to hear the case.
¶6.
The hearing was reconvened on June 8, 2005, at which time the court announced that
the issue of whether the youth court has jurisdiction would be addressed before briefs were
submitted. He then recited and explained the statutes he found to be applicable, and
concluded “[i]t seems to me the Circuit Court would have jurisdiction of the offense and
then be guided by the punishment only if the person who is convicted is age 13 to 15 [sic]
is not in this jurisdiction.” He then allowed the attorneys to proceed with their argument in
response to his position. D.S.’s Motion to Dismiss and Transfer and the indictment, both
from the Circuit Court hearing, were admitted into the youth court record. On June 28, 2005,
the youth court entered its order, finding that the petition “is hereby dismissed for the lack
of exclusive original jurisdiction.” It was silent as to any further proceedings.
ANALYSIS
¶7.
In reviewing questions of law, this Court proceeds de novo. Sykes v. State, 757 So.
2d 997, 999 (Miss. 2000) (citing Ellis v. Anderson Tully Co., 727 So. 2d 716, 718 (Miss.
1998); Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So. 2d 97, 100 (Miss. 1996)). The first question this
4
Court must consider is under which criminal statute, sexual battery or statutory rape, the
analysis should be performed. The petition, briefs and order of the youth court state that D.
S. committed sexual battery, although the petition cited the statutory rape statute, Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-3-65(1)(b) The earlier circuit court indictment was clearly brought under the
sexual battery statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(d).2
¶8.
The youth court addressed this issue in his order, stating:
The Youth Court Prosecutor alleged [D.S.] to be a delinquent child as defined
by the Mississippi Youth Court Act alleging that “on or about the 2nd day of
April, 2003, [D.S.] did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual
battery on J.M., a child under the age of 14 and 24 months younger than [D.S.]
in violation of Section 97-3-65(1)(b) of the Mississippi Code Annotated.”
That statute charges statutory rape. And, although the charge in the Petition
herein alleges the act of sexual battery in violation of the statutory rape penal
code section, there is no issue before the Court thereon.
Since neither party raised the discrepancy in their briefs and it does not ultimately affect the
outcome, we proceed under Miss. Code. Ann. Section 97-3-65(1)(b) (statutory rape).
¶9.
Where the youth court has exclusive original jurisdiction, juveniles may not be tried
as adults in circuit court unless the youth court, in its own discretion, decides to “transfer
jurisdiction of the alleged offense or a lesser included offense to the criminal court which
would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult.” Blue v. State, 674
2
Although it is not discussed in either the youth court order or the circuit court order,
we note that the original charge on the arrest report was fondling, which is yet another in the
confusing assortment of “sex crimes” found in the Miss. Code. Apparently the circuit court
had some testimony before it as to the details of D.S.’s actions against J.M., but all that we
know from the court’s order is that she was a three-year-old female.
5
So.2d 1184, 1230 (Miss.1996), overruled on other grounds, by King v. State, 784 So. 2d 884
(Miss. 2001). By statute the youth court has exclusive original jurisdiction as follows:
(1) The youth court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings
concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child,
an abused child or a dependent child except in the following circumstances:
(a) Any act attempted or committed by a child, which if committed by an adult
would be punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment or death,
will be in the original jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Miss. Code Ann. Section 43-21-151 (emphasis added). This Court has long recognized that
“when a juvenile is charged with an offense carrying a potential life sentence, such as rape
or murder, jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the circuit court and the Youth Court Act is
inapplicable.” Smith v. State, 534 So. 2d 194, 196 (Miss. 1988), citing Johnson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Miss. 1987). See also Winters v. State, 473 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 1985).
Therefore, the determinative question is whether an adult, could possibly be sentenced to
life in prison for committing the act allegedly committed by D.S.
¶10.
The sentences to which a person is exposed, if convicted under section (1)(b) of the
rape of a child who is under age 14, and is 24 months younger than the person, are codified
in Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-3-65(3)(c) & (d), which provides:
(c) If eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under paragraph (1)(b)
of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary or such lesser
term of imprisonment as the court may determine, but not less than twenty (20)
years.
(d) If thirteen (13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years of age
and convicted under (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, such imprisonment, fine
or other sentence as the court, in its discretion, may determine.
6
In sentencing a criminal defendant, their age at the time the crime was committed is used, not
their age at the time of trial. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1293 (Miss. 1994). Therefore,
when the trial court sentences an individual who is under the age of eighteen but older than
thirteen for violation of. Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-65(1)(b), the court would use Miss. Code
Ann. 97-3-65(3)(d). However, this is not the same provision which vests jurisdiction.
¶11.
The only determination necessary to vest original jurisdiction over a juvenile in the
circuit court is whether an adult who committed the same offense would be exposed to death
or life imprisonment. The potential life sentence is the determinative factor. The actual
sentence imposed by the trial court is irrelevant. Johnson, 512 So. 2d at 1250, citing
Williams v. State, 459 So. 2d 777 (Miss. 1984) (once jurisdiction is acquired it cannot be lost
by the punishment imposed on the juvenile). In the present case the relevant sentencing
provision is Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-65(3)(c) which clearly provides for the possibility of life
imprisonment for an adult found guilty of statutory rape. The same analysis and
determination is true for sexual battery cases brought under section 97-3-95(1)(d) and
sentenced under section 97-3-101(4). 3 Therefore, we conclude that the Coahoma County
3
This is the point at which the circuit court erred in its decision to transfer D.S.’s
sexual battery case to the youth court. In its thorough and detailed order, the circuit court
erred only in its finding that “a sentence of life imprisonment is only available if the
perpetrator was over the age of eighteen (18) at the time of the alleged act”, relying on Biggs
v. State, 741 So. 2d 318 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), which stated incorrectly, in dicta, “the youth
court had exclusive jurisdiction over the burglary and sexual battery charges”, which implies
that section (4) of the sexual battery penalty statute, on its face, is the only sentence which
can be imposed on a person who shall be convicted of sexual battery who is thirteen (13)
years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years of age.
7
youth court was correct in simply dismissing the petition before it for lack of exclusive
original jurisdiction of the charge filed against D.S.
CONCLUSION
¶12.
The youth court lacked jurisdiction over D.S. because he was charged with statutory
rape, which if committed by an adult carries the possibility of sentencing to life
imprisonment. The actual sentence D.S. might eventually receive because of his age is
irrelevant. We affirm the youth court’s decision.
¶13.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY CARLSON, AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. DICKINSON, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, P.J., AND CARLSON, J. RANDOLPH, J., JOINS
IN PART. DIAZ J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED
BY GRAVES, J.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶14.
My view is that the majority has arrived at the right result without providing a
complete analysis of the relevant statutes, leaving the incorrect impression that the circuit
judge had no authority to transfer this case to the youth court. The circuit judge, relying on
Miss. Code Ann. Section 43-21-159 (Rev. 2006), transferred this case to youth court. The
statute states:
(1) When a person appears before a court other than the youth court, and it is
determined that the person is a child under jurisdiction of the youth court, such
court shall, unless the jurisdiction of the offense has been transferred to such
court as provided in this chapter, or unless the child has previously been the
subject of a transfer from the youth court to the circuit court for trial as an
8
adult and was convicted, immediately dismiss the proceeding without
prejudice and forward all documents pertaining to the cause to the youth court.
¶15.
As the majority explains, the judge’s order stated that “[t]his Court will dismiss
without prejudice in the Circuit Court and transfer the entire cause to the Youth Court of
Coahoma County, Mississippi, for such appropriate proceedings as the Youth Court might
determine to be appropriate.” The judge further ordered all documents be sent to the youth
court and records of the circuit court be expunged.
¶16.
However, the judge ignored Section 43-21-159(3) which provides; “[n]othing in
subsection (1) or (2) shall apply to a youth who has a pending charge or a conviction for any
crime over which circuit court has original jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added). Because of this
provision, subsection (1) did not apply. The majority correctly concludes that the circuit
court has original jurisdiction over D.S. for the specific charges of sexual battery or statutory
rape in this case, and that the circuit judge improperly transferred the case based on language
found in Section 43-21-159(1) and (3).
¶17.
My concern is that the majority leaves the incorrect impression that the circuit judge
had no authority to transfer the case. The circuit judge could have transferred the case to
youth court under subsection (4) of Section 43-21-159, which requires a specific finding that
such transfer was in the best interests of D.S. and in the interest of justice. The relevant
subsection provides:
(4) In any case wherein the defendant is a child as defined in this chapter and
of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction, the circuit judge, upon a
finding that it would be in the best interest of such child and in the interest of
9
justice, may at any stage of the proceedings prior to the attachment of jeopardy
transfer such proceedings to the youth court for further proceedings unless the
child has previously been the subject of a transfer from the youth court to the
circuit court for trial as an adult and was convicted or has previously been
convicted of a crime which was in original circuit court jurisdiction, and the
youth court shall, upon acquiring jurisdiction, proceed as provided in this
chapter for the adjudication and disposition of delinquent child proceeding
proceedings.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159(4) (emphasis added). However, because no such finding was
made or even implied by the circuit judge, the transfer was improper.
¶18.
I believe the above clarification of the requirements of the individual subsections of
Miss. Code Ann. Section 43-21-159 is necessary to prevent the mistaken impression that a
circuit judge has no authority to transfer such cases to the youth court. Because the majority
overlooks this analysis, I provide this concurring opinion.
WALLER, P.J., AND CARLSON, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. RANDOLPH, J.,
JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.
DIAZ, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶19.
Because jurisdiction was properly vested in the youth court after transfer from the
circuit court and because youth courts have original jurisdiction over minors charged with
statutory rape, I must respectfully dissent.
¶20.
For clarification, the facts are as follows: D.S. was arrested and charged in youth
court with fondling on April 2, 2003. However, the youth court prosecutor never brought a
delinquency petition on this charge. Nineteen months later, the district attorney brought
another case against D.S. for the same incident in circuit court, but for sexual battery. The
10
circuit court then transferred the sexual battery case to youth court. After transfer, the youth
prosecutor filed a petition charging D.S. with a third crime, statutory rape. The youth court
subsequently dismissed the case on the grounds that it did “not have jurisdiction of the
charge.”
¶21.
Three different charges have been brought against D.S., and it has now been three and
a half years since the defendant was first arrested. Unfortunately, the record is incomplete,
making it nearly impossible to unscramble this procedural debacle. At the youth court
hearing on the statutory rape charge, D.S. presented evidence that a youth court judge had
disposed of the case. The youth court prosecutor disputed this claim but presented no
evidence in support. There is no order in the record addressing the fondling charges as
required by Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-357.4 Additionally, there is no evidence that the youth
4
(1) After receiving a report, the youth court intake unit shall promptly make a
preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interest of the child, other children in the same
environment or the public requires the youth court to take further action.. . . If it appears from
the preliminary inquiry that the child or other children in the same environment are within
the jurisdiction of the court, the youth court intake unit shall recommend to the youth court:
(a) That the youth court take no action;
(b) That an informal adjustment be made;
(c) The Department of Human Services, Division of Family and Children
Services, monitor the child, family and other children in the same environment;
(d) That the child is warned or counseled informally; or
(e) That a petition be filed.
(2) The youth court shall then, without a hearing:
(a) Order that no action be taken;
(b) Order that an informal adjustment be made;
(c) Order that the Department of Human Services, Division of Family and
Children Services, monitor the child, family and other children in the same
environment;
11
court held a transfer hearing on the original charges. Because the charges were originally
brought in youth court, Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 requires a bifurcated transfer hearing
before a juvenile may be tried in circuit court. See Buck v. State, 838 So. 2d 256, 259-60
(Miss. 2003) (youth court could not transfer case to circuit court without bifurcated hearing
and specific statutory findings under Section 43-21-157).5
¶22.
Also of note is the State’s reluctance to participate in appeal of the matter. Our case
law permits the State to appeal a decision to transfer a case from circuit court to youth court.
State v. U.G., 726 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 1998). No such appeal was filed after the transfer order
from the circuit court. Additionally, the record contains correspondence between the youth
prosecutor and the Attorney General’s office indicating that the youth prosecutor was
unwilling to handle the appeal. A December 6, 2005, letter from the Attorney General’s
office to the prosecutor, demanding the prosecutor craft the appeal, states, “you were of the
opinion that appellate work is neither a statutory mandate nor a part of the Youth Court
Prosecutor’s job description and that the Office of the Attorney General should handle the
youth court appellate work.” Again, on February 27, 2006, the Office of the Attorney
(d) Order that the child is warned or counseled informally; or
(e) Order that a petition be filed.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-357.
5
D.S. raised the issue of double jeopardy at the hearing and in his brief to this Court.
In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975), the Supreme Court
recognized that double jeopardy applied to youth court proceedings. Unfortunately, the
record does not reveal the outcome of the original charges.
12
General wrote, “[y]ou also stated during our October 28, 2005 phone conversation, ‘. . . that
if the Attorney General’s office doesn’t handle the appeal then it just ain’t going to get done
because I’m not doing it.’” Finally, after the Supreme Court Clerk entered a show cause
notice against the youth prosecutor for failure to file a brief, the prosecutor filed a meager
two and a half page brief, with only one page devoted to legal arguments.
I. THE CASE WAS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO YOUTH COURT.
¶23.
The majority holds that the circuit court had original jurisdiction, but original does not
mean exclusive. Even if the circuit court has original jurisdiction over juveniles charged with
statutory rape, a youth court may not refuse to hear a case transferred from the circuit court.
The statute clearly states, “the youth court shall, upon acquiring jurisdiction, proceed as
provided in this chapter for the adjudication and disposition of delinquent child proceeding
proceedings.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159. “Simply stated, ‘shall’ is mandatory.” Pitalo
v. GPCHP-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927, 929 (Miss. 2006) (citing Franklin v. Franklin, 858 So.
2d 110, 114 (Miss. 2003)).
¶24.
Once the circuit court order was entered, the youth court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case. As a court of lesser jurisdiction, a youth court does not have discretion to
dismiss a case once it has been transferred to its jurisdiction by a circuit court. See Helmert
v. Biffany, 842 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Miss. 2003) (both chancery and youth courts have
jurisdiction over the adjudication of minors, however, youth court jurisdiction is limited to
specifically delineated matters); Griffin v. Bell, 215 So. 2d 573, 575 (Miss. 1968) (“The
13
youth court is a court of statutory and limited jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, the youth court
erred in dismissing this case.
II. THE YOUTH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
¶25.
The majority incorrectly finds that circuit courts have original jurisdiction over
juveniles charged with statutory rape. This is a case of first impression as this Court has
never determined whether circuit courts have original jurisdiction over juveniles charged
with sex crimes after the 1989 amendment to the Youth Court Act. The first version of the
statute conferring original jurisdiction upon the circuit court read: “the circuit court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of such child if he be charged with any crime which, upon
conviction, is punishable by life imprisonment or death.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-31
(1972) (emphasis supplied). In 1989, the Legislature amended the jurisdictional statute to
state that the circuit court has original jurisdiction where “any act attempted or committed
by a child, which if committed by an adult would be punishable under state or federal law by
life imprisonment or death, will be in the original jurisdiction of the circuit court.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 43-21-151 (1989) (emphasis supplied).
¶26.
This amendment came immediately after the United States Supreme Court held that
it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment to sentence juveniles under the age of sixteen to death. Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988). In light of the Thompson decision,
it made sense for the Legislature to amend the jurisdictional statute. In doing so, however,
an ambiguity arose with regard to juveniles charged with sex crimes.
14
¶27.
Sex crimes are unique in that the Legislature has specifically delineated separate
levels of punishment depending on the defendant’s age. Miss Code Ann. §§ 97-3-101 and
97-3-65. While adults may receive up to life imprisonment, the Legislature has left it up to
the court’s discretion to determine the appropriate punishment for juveniles. However, if the
circuit court has original jurisdiction over sex crimes involving juveniles, as the majority
holds, then this discretion is rendered void. The code provides that where the circuit court
has original jurisdiction, and the case is not transferred, then “the trial judge shall sentence
the youth as though such youth was an adult.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159. Therefore,
with regard to sex crimes, either the jurisdictional statute is valid, or the penal statutes are
valid.
¶28.
Because the jurisdictional statute is ambiguous with regard to sex crimes committed
by juveniles, it is necessary to determine legislative intent.
“Whether the statute is
ambiguous, or not, the ultimate goal of this Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and
give effect to the legislative intent.” City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So. 2d 1087, 1089
(Miss. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
¶29.
First, the majority opinion overrules a Court of Appeals case on this very issue, yet
it does so in a footnote claiming that the finding is “dicta.” The finding of the Court of
Appeals was not dicta and was critical to the outcome: “[T]he circuit court had original
jurisdiction over the kidnapping and capital murder charges, while the youth court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the burglary and sexual battery charges.” Biggs v. State, 741 So.
15
2d 318, 331-32 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis supplied). Though not binding on this
Court, the Biggs decision certainly constitutes persuasive precedent.
¶30.
Second, “[a]ll doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of a statute.” Univ. of
Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 876 So. 2d 337, 339-40 (Miss. 2004) (citing Loden v. Miss.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 So. 2d 636, 640 (Miss. 1973)). “It is our duty to support a
construction which would purge the legislative purpose of any invalidity, absurdity or unjust
inequality.” City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 688 So. 2d 742, 747
(Miss. 1996) (citing Robertson v. Tex. Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356, 362, 106 So. 449 (1925)).
Read in pari materia with the penal statute, the jurisdictional statute should not apply to
juveniles charged with sex crimes. Such an interpretation preserves the validity of both
statutes as required by our rules of statutory interpretation.
¶31.
Finally, this interpretation is consistent with this Court’s longstanding practice of
interpreting criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Murray v. State, 266 So. 2d 139, 141
(Miss. 1972) (citing Johns v. State, 255 So.2d 322 (Miss. 1971); Berry v. State, 212 Miss.
164, 54 So.2d 222 (1951)). This is particularly important when the interests of juveniles are
involved. Quite simply,
[T]he youth court is better situated to make decisions regarding the interest of
the juvenile, as is reflected by the Legislature's reference to the youth court
within Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(5); the circuit court does not have the
facilities to evaluate juvenile interests. If the circuit court always makes the
decision on whether a case should be transferred to the youth court, the role of
the youth court is then severely diminished. In effect, the district attorney will
be deciding whether a youthful offender will be prosecuted as an adult or a
juvenile.
16
State v. U.G., 726 So. 2d at 160 (McRae, J. dissenting, joined by Sullivan, P.J., & Banks, J.).
¶32.
In light of the above, the interests of the child require that we err on the side of caution
and interpret the statutes as giving original jurisdiction to youth courts. The legislature
intended the court to use its discretion when determining punishment, and the youth court is
best suited for this endeavor. The youth court may then make the appropriate determination
under Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 whether to transfer the case or retain jurisdiction.
¶33.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings in the
youth court.
GRAVES, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
17
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