State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Scott Lawrence Butterfield, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
State of Minnesota
in Court of Appeals
C9-95-2463
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Scott Lawrence Butterfield,
Appellant.
Filed October 15, 1996
Affirmed as modified
Peterson, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. KX954699
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota
Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)
Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, M. Katherine Doty, Assistant
County Attorney, Anoka County Government Center, 2100 Third Avenue, Seventh
Floor, Anoka, MN 55303 (for Respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant State
Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., # 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414
(for Appellant)
Syllabus
1. Offenses that have no unity of time, place, or criminal intent are
separate behavioral incidents
2. Severe aggravating circumstances must be present to support a sentence
that is longer than twice the presumptive term.
3. Severe aggravating circumstances must be present to support a sentence
that is a double durational departure and a departure with respect to
consecutive service.
Affirmed as modified.
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief
Judge, and Peterson, Judge.
Opinion
PETERSON, Judge (Hon. Joseph Quinn, District Court Trial Judge)
On appeal from convictions for kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, Scott Butterfield argues that the facts do not warrant a 544-month
prison term. We affirm as modified.
Facts
At 8:30 p.m. on April 19, 1995, appellant Scott Butterfield approached L.L.
at a gas station and asked her to give him a ride to a nearby bar. L.L.
agreed. As L.L. drove through a secluded park, Butterfield told her to stop
the car. When L.L. stopped the car, Butterfield turned it off, grabbed the
keys, and told L.L. that he wanted to have sex with her.
When L.L. refused, Butterfield pulled out a knife. He held it six to eight
inches from L.L. and told her to get out of the car and take off her
clothes. L.L. again refused, but Butterfield pushed her out the driver's
side door and crawled out after her. As L.L. continued to struggle,
Butterfield threw her on the ground. When L.L. screamed, Butterfield hit
her in the face twice with something hard. L.L. saw stars and may have
briefly lost consciousness. Butterfield then pinned L.L. to the ground.
Because of Butterfield's knife, strength, speed, and threatening
statements, L.L. believed that her best hope of survival was to cooperate
with him.
Consequently, when Butterfield again ordered L.L. to get undressed, she
took off her clothes. It was so cold outside that L.L. was shaking.
Butterfield forced L.L. to put his penis in her mouth, then told her to
turn over onto her hands and knees. Butterfield then had vaginal and anal
intercourse with her. When Butterfield lost his erection, he forced L.L. to
turn over and perform oral sex again. This process was repeated twelve to
fifteen times over the next two hours. Butterfield never let go of L.L.
during this time.
Butterfield also told L.L. to call him ``Daddy'' and to answer every
question with ``Yes, Daddy'' or ``No, Daddy.'' Butterfield asked L.L. if
she wanted to have sex with Uncle Steve.(1)
[Footnote] (1)Butterfield testified that he had a
brother named Steve.
When L.L. said no, Butterfield asked her if she would have sex with Uncle
Steve if Butterfield wanted her to. L.L. had to reply ``If you want me to,
Daddy, then I will have sex with him.'' Butterfield asked similar questions
about other people and L.L. had to say she would have sex with them if
``Daddy'' wanted her to. When a car drove by during the assault,
Butterfield told L.L. that if the police were in that car and she told them
that he raped her, he would shoot and kill her right in front of them. L.L.
did not doubt that Butterfield had a gun or that he would carry out this
threat. During the assault, L.L. told Butterfield that she had to go to the
bathroom. He ignored her at first, then forced her to continue performing
oral sex while she urinated.
Around 11:30 p.m., Butterfield told L.L. that he wanted to go somewhere
else. He allowed her to put on her sweater. Butterfield then forced L.L. to
perform oral sex while he drove her car. At about midnight, Butterfield
stopped at a trailer park. There, he told L.L. to put her pants back on and
then forced her to enter a trailer.
The trailer was very cold and Butterfield said it had no heat, electricity,
water, or telephone. Butterfield forced L.L. to sit on a couch while he
built a fire. Butterfield then told L.L. to take off her clothes and to go
over to a blanket on the floor. There, Butterfield forced L.L. to perform
oral sex. After a few minutes, Butterfield told L.L. to turn over onto her
hands and knees. Then, he penetrated her vaginally and anally. When
Butterfield lost his erection, he got upset and told L.L. to turn around
and perform oral sex again. This pattern continued for two to three hours.
Butterfield also performed oral sex on L.L. and forced her to fondle his
genitals. During this time, L.L. had to continue calling Butterfield
``Daddy.'' Butterfield also mentioned the name ``Stacy.''(2)
[Footnote] (2)Butterfield testified that he had a
sister named Stacy.
L.L. had to pretend that she wanted Butterfield as much as he wanted her.
Butterfield told L.L. to lie back on the couch in a seductive manner and to
put one leg up on the back of the couch. Butterfield then pretended to come
home and see L.L. in this provocative position. L.L. had to give
Butterfield the answers that he told her to give to his questions.
Butterfield became irritated when L.L. did not give the answers that he
wanted and started the game over again.
At about 3:00 a.m., Butterfield moved L.L. to a bedroom. In the bedroom,
Butterfield continued the same pattern of assaulting L.L. for another two
hours. Butterfield then said ``I better pull out or so there isn't any
evidence.'' He then ejaculated on L.L.'s back. L.L. lay on the bed
exhausted while Butterfield sat on the edge of the bed next to her. L.L.
talked to Butterfield and tried to be nice to him because she thought that
befriending him would give her a better chance of surviving and escaping.
L.L. eventually fell asleep. When she awoke, it was light outside.
Butterfield let L.L. go to the bathroom. There, she saw in the mirror that
her face was swollen and that her eye was nearly swollen shut. L.L. was
wrapped in a blanket because Butterfield would not allow her to get
dressed. At one point, Butterfield went outside to try to turn on the
water, but he was never far enough away from the trailer to allow L.L. to
escape. Later, someone knocked on the door and Butterfield told L.L. to go
into the bedroom and to be quiet. L.L. heard voices but did not reveal
herself because she was afraid the visitor was one of Butterfield's
friends, and she did not want to put herself in a situation involving two
men. L.L. also thought that Butterfield soon would release her because he
repeatedly told her that they would be leaving soon.
Late in the afternoon, Butterfield said he wanted to have sex again. L.L.
started crying but Butterfield ignored her. He ordered L.L. to get
undressed and to perform oral sex on him. He then ordered her to lie on the
couch where Butterfield had vaginal intercourse with her. This assault
continued for about one-half hour.
Butterfield and L.L. left the trailer at about 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. L.L.
assumed Butterfield had a knife in the case he was wearing on his belt.
After driving back to the park and spending about 15 to 20 minutes there
looking for a beeper that Butterfield had lost the night before, L.L.
followed his directions to a church parking lot. There, Butterfield said he
paid at least $100 for a prostitute in Reno and wanted to give L.L. the
same amount. To get rid of Butterfield, L.L. finally agreed that he could
leave this money for her at the gas station where they had met. Butterfield
then got out of the car and walked away.
When L.L. was sure that Butterfield was too far away to catch her, she
drove home and immediately reported the assault. The doctor who examined
L.L. after the assault said that she had a black eye and bruises on her
right collarbone, back, and right foot. The doctor also said an x-ray
showed L.L. might have suffered a broken nose but he could not be certain
because the film was over-penetrated by radiation.
Butterfield was charged by complaint with two counts of kidnapping and
seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The officer who
arrested Butterfield recovered a knife and a sheath from him. At trial,
Butterfield admitted that he had oral, vaginal, and anal sex with L.L. in
the park and the trailer and had oral sex with her in the car but claimed
that these acts were consensual. Butterfield explained that L.L. had fallen
and hit her head in the trailer's bathroom. Butterfield said L.L. had lied
about the assaults because he did not want to have a relationship with her
and because she had spent 24 hours with him and needed a story to tell her
fiancée.
The jury found Butterfield not guilty of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct involving the use of a dangerous weapon in the trailer but guilty
of the other eight charges. The state sought a sentencing departure with
regard to duration and consecutive service. At the sentencing hearing, L.L.
testified that her family had been traumatized by her ordeal and that her
daughters had nightmares and could not sleep. L.L. said she had
uncontrollable flashbacks of the incident, which caused her to start
shaking, turn white, and suffer panic attacks. L.L. said she could not
return to work as a day care provider because of the flashbacks and ``the
way I am'' after the assault. L.L. said she needed counseling. During
trial, L.L.'s fiancé indicated that after the assault, L.L. was more
paranoid, always locked doors, and was afraid to go out alone at night.
The district court determined that the assaults in the park, the car, and
the trailer were three separate behavioral incidents. The court sentenced
Butterfield to a 330-month term for his conviction for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct involving fear of great bodily harm in the park. To
support this triple durational departure, the court cited the three types
of penetration, the use of a dangerous weapon, the threats to the victim,
the injury to the victim, and particular cruelty consisting of forcing L.L.
to remove her clothing in 45-degree weather, to lie in the grass and dirt,
and to perform oral sex while she urinated.
The court then sentenced Butterfield to a 42-month consecutive term for his
conviction for kidnapping. See Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2)
(1994) (confining another without her consent to facilitate commission of
felony). The court said this double durational departure and departure with
respect to consecutive service was justified by the fact that the offense
occurred in four different locations, the psychological trauma to the
victim, the use of a knife, and the verbal threats. The court sentenced
Butterfield to the presumptive 134-month concurrent term for his conviction
for first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving fear of great bodily
harm in the car.
Finally, the court sentenced Butterfield to a consecutive 172-month
sentence for his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct
involving fear of great bodily harm in the trailer. The court said this was
a double durational departure and a departure as to consecutive service
that was justified by the length of the assault, the multiple types of
penetration repeated numerous times, and extreme mental cruelty consisting
of forcing L.L. to play sexual games and to assume sexual poses. The
aggregate sentence imposed was 544 months.
Issues
1. Did the district court err in determining the assaults in the park, the
car, and the trailer were separate behavioral incidents?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in sentencing Butterfield?
Analysis
1. Whether offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a fact
determination that will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
Effinger v. State, 380 N.W.2d 483, 489 (Minn. 1986).
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (1994), provides:
Except as provided in * * * section[] 609.251
[double jeopardy exception for kidnapping] ***, if a
person's conduct constitutes more than one offense
under the laws of this state, the person may be
punished for only one of the offenses * * *.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, ``ensures that punishment is
commensurate with the crime committed.'' State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995). ``If section 609.035 applies, multiple
sentencing is prohibited, including the imposition of concurrent
sentences.'' State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Minn. App.
1991), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1991).
``Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior incident depends
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.'' Bookwalter,
541 N.W.2d at 294. To determine whether two intentional offenses arose
out of the same behavioral incident, we ``consider the factors of time and
place and whether a defendant is motivated by a single criminal
objective.'' Id.
``[T]he essential ingredient of any test is
whether the segment of conduct involved was
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal
objective.''
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 404, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (1966) ).
Butterfield argues the district court erred in imposing multiple sentences
for the assaults in the park, the car, and the trailer because those
offenses were part of the same behavioral incident. Butterfield apparently
concedes that the three assaults occurred at different times and in
different places, but argues they all were motivated by the same criminal
objective to satisfy his sexual needs. Butterfield relies on State v.
Herberg, 324 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1982), to support his argument that
moving L.L. to three different locations did not destroy his unity of
purpose in committing the crimes.
But this court has held that a defendant's desire to satisfy his perverse
sexual desires is too broad a motiviation to justify application of the
single behavioral incident rule. State v. Secrest, 437 N.W.2d 683,
685 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. May 24, 1989). Further,
in Herberg, the supreme court explained:
Defendant moved the victim to a different place
before committing the second act of penetration only
because he feared that the first location was too
open and that they might be noticed. His underlying
motivation remained the same: to satisfy his
perverse sexual needs by assaulting, penetrating,
and degrading the victim in various ways.
Id. at 349.
Here, Butterfield did not move L.L. to a different place because he feared
detection. Nor did any other external force prompt Butterfield to stop each
assault and move L.L. to another location and assault her again.
Butterfield stopped his assaults and moved L.L. to a new location to serve
his own whims. Given these facts, the district court did not clearly err in
determining Butterfield had a separate and distinct criminal objective for
each assault. Because the assaults in the park, the car, and the trailer
had no unity of time, location, or purpose, they were separate behavioral
incidents, and the district court did not err in imposing a sentence for
each assault.
2. The decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the
district court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn.
1996). The district court may depart from the guidelines only if
substantial and compelling aggravating circumstances are present.
Id.; Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.D.01.
A. Triple durational departure for assault in the park
Generally, when aggravating circumstances are
present, the upper limit on a durational departure
is double the Sentencing Guidelines maximum
presumptive sentence duration. But when the
aggravating circumstances are severe, the doubling
limit *** does not apply.
State v. Glaraton, 425 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Minn. 1988) (citation
omitted). When severe aggravating circumstances are present, the only limit
on the duration of the sentence is the statutory maximum sentence for the
offense. Id.
[T]here is no clear line that marks the boundary
between ``aggravating circumstances'' justifying a
double departure and ``severe aggravating
circumstances'' justifying a greater than double
departure. In the final analysis, our decision
whether there were ``severe aggravating
circumstances'' must be based on our collective,
collegial experience in reviewing a large number of
criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.
State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Minn. 1982).
Butterfield concedes that the facts here support a double durational
departure but argues the aggravating circumstances were not severe and
therefore are insufficient to support a triple durational departure. We
disagree. Multiple penetrations alone can support a double durational
departure. State v. Allen, 482 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. App. 1992),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1992). Here, Butterfield not only
subjected L.L. to multiple types of penetration, but also repeated all
three types of penetration 12 to 15 times during the two-hour assault in
the park. SeeGlaraton, 425 N.W.2d at 832- 35 (penetration of victim
in three different ways was aggravating factor supporting greater than
quadruple departure); State v. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633, 634-35
(Minn. 1982) (three types of penetration was aggravating factor supporting
more than triple durational departure).
Moreover, Butterfield acted with particular cruelty. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines II.D.2.b(2) (treating victim with particular cruelty is
aggravating factor). He forced L.L. to remain unclothed in the dirt in 45-
degree weather for over two hours. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 348 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Minn. App. 1984) (leaving victim naked in garage in 18-
degree temperatures was gratuitous cruelty), review denied (Minn.
July 26, 1984). Butterfield hit L.L. so hard that he blackened her eye,
bruised her face, and possibly broke her nose. See State v. Strommen,
411 N.W.2d 540, 544-45 (Minn. App. 1987) (repeated punches to victim's
face to make her submit to rapists' demands was aggravating factor
supporting greater than quadruple durational departure), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1987).
Butterfield also threatened to kill L.L. and threatened her with a knife.
See State v. Mortland, 399 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987) (threats to
kill victim provided support for greater than double durational departure).
Finally, Butterfield forced L.L. to call him ``Daddy,'' to say she would
have sex with different people if ``Daddy'' wanted her to, and to perform
oral sex while she urinated. SeeState v. Mesich, 396 N.W.2d 46, 53
(Minn. App. 1986) (taunts, threats, and degradation of victim constituted
emotional abuse that made offense more serious than typical sexual
assault), review denied (Minn. Jan. 2, 1987). Given these facts, we
conclude that this was one of the rare cases where severe aggravating
circumstances justify a triple durational departure. See Glaraton,
425 N.W.2d at 833-35 (quadruple departure upheld when defendant put gun
in victim's orifices, penetrated victim three ways, inflicted gratuitous
physical injury leaving permanent scar, urinated on victim, forced victim
to lie face down in urine, and ridiculed victim's religious beliefs);
Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 633-35 (greater than triple departure
upheld when defendant inflicted permanent injury on 66-year-old victim,
forced her to submit to three different types of penetration, invaded her
zone of privacy, and dragged her outside her home, thereby increasing her
fear).
B. Kidnapping sentence
Minn. Stat. § 609.251 (1994), provides that
a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of
kidnapping is not a bar to conviction of or
punishment for any other crime committed during the
time of the kidnapping.
When a defendant is sentenced for both kidnapping and a crime that was
committed during the kidnapping, the sentences are presumed to be
concurrent. State v. Halverson, 506 N.W.2d 331, 340 (Minn. App.
1993). The district court may order that the sentences imposed for
kidnapping and an offense committed during the kidnapping run
consecutively, but such a sentence is a departure from the guidelines that
must be support by aggravating circumstances. Id. Further, a
district court may not depart durationally and with respect to consecutive
service on these sentences unless severe aggravating circumstances are
present that would justify imposition of a sentence longer than double the
presumptive term. Id.
Butterfield argues the district court erred in sentencing him to a
consecutive term for his kidnapping conviction because the confinement of
L.L. was connected solely to the commission of the sexual assaults.
See State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1987) (multiple
sentences can unfairly exaggerate criminality of defendant's conduct when
confinement is connected solely to crimes committed during course of
kidnapping). But here, Butterfield confined L.L. in his trailer for nearly
19 hours. Because Butterfield did not spend this entire time assaulting
L.L., the kidnapping was not solely incidental to the commission of the
sexual assault.
Butterfield next argues the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to durational and consecutive service departures because
severe aggravating circumstances were not present in the commission of the
kidnapping. We agree.
In sentencing the defendant for kidnapping, the court can consider what
happened during the kidnapping. State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647
(Minn. 1981), overruled in part by State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774,
777 n.4 (Minn. 1996) (holding that defendant may waive right to be
sentenced under guidelines). But the court cannot rely on the elements of
an assault committed during the kidnapping to depart on the kidnapping
sentence when the defendant also was sentenced for the assault. See
State v. Coley, 468 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. App. 1991) (district court
properly relied on elements of assault to depart on kidnapping sentence
when defendant was not sentenced for assault); See also State v. Spaeth,
552 N.W.2d 187, 196 (Minn. 1996) (district court improperly used
conduct that resulted in murder conviction and sentence to justify
aggravated term for burglary during which murder was committed).
To justify the departure here, the district court cited the length of the
kidnapping, the fact that Butterfield moved L.L. to four different
locations, the psychological damage inflicted on L.L., the use of the
knife, and the repeated verbal threats. These aggravating factors do not
constitute the severe aggravating circumstances necessary to support
departures with respect to duration and consecutive service. Accordingly,
we reverse the sentence imposed for the kidnapping. It is clear that the
district court intended to impose on Butterfield the maximum permissible
sentence under the guidelines. A remand, therefore, is unnecessary.
State v. Pince, 358 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App. 1984), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 6, 1985). A departure with respect to consecutive
service would result in the maximum sentence for Butterfield. See
Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV-V (sentencing guidelines grid and offense
severity table). We, therefore, affirm the departure with respect to
consecutive service but reduce the length of the sentence for kidnapping to
21 months.
C. Sentence for assault in trailer
The imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses involving
the same victim is a departure from the guidelines. State v. Jones, 451 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21,
1990). Severe aggravating circumstances must be present to support a
durational departure and a departure with respect to consecutive service.
State v. Branson, 529 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. App. 1995), review
denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1995).
Butterfield argues that although the facts here support a double durational
departure, they do not constitute the severe aggravating circumstances
necessary to justify a departure with respect to consecutive service as
well. We disagree. As previously discussed, multiple penetrations alone are
sufficient to support the double durational departure. Allen, 482 N.W.2d at 232. In this case, Butterfield not only subjected L.L. to five
different types of penetration during the assault in the trailer, he also
repeated those acts several times over a five-hour period on the morning of
April 20, 1995 and then again for one-half hour later that day. See
Glaraton, 425 N.W.2d at 832-35 (three different types of penetration
was aggravating factor supporting more than quadruple departure).
Moreover, Butterfield acted with particular cruelty toward L.L. in
committing the assault in the trailer. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
II.D.2.b.(2) (treating victim with particular cruelty is aggravating
factor). During the five-hour assault in the trailer, Butterfield forced
L.L. to call him ``Daddy,'' to assume provocative poses, and to participate
in other sexual games. Cf. Mesich, 396 N.W.2d at 53 (taunts,
threats, and degradation of victim constituted emotional abuse that
distinguished offense from typical assault). Finally, due to the assault,
L.L. suffered psychological damage that prevented her from returning to
work and forced her to seek counseling. See Branson, 529 N.W.2d at 5
(psychological effect on victim may support departure). Given these facts,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
assault in the trailer involved severe aggravating circumstances sufficient
to justify the imposition of both a durational departure and a departure
with respect to consecutive service.
Decision
The district court did not err in imposing multiple sentences for the
assaults in the park, the car, and the trailer because these crimes were
three separate behavioral incidents. The triple durational departure
imposed for the sexual assault in the park was not an abuse of discretion
because it was supported by severe aggravating circumstances. The
durational departure and the departure with respect to consecutive service
imposed for the kidnapping offense was an abuse of discretion because it
was not supported by severe aggravating circumstances. We affirm the
departure with respect to consecutive service but reduce the length of the
sentence for kidnapping to 21 months. Finally, the durational departure and
the departure with respect to consecutive service imposed for the assault
in the trailer was not an abuse of discretion because it was supported by
severe aggravating circumstances. The total length of Butterfield's
sentence is reduced to 523 months.
Affirmed as modified.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.