COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. JACK CONWAY, ATTORNEY GENERAL V. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT, ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLI SHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINI ONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : JANUARY 21, 2010
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2009-SC-000324-MR
APPEL
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
EX REL. JACK CONWAY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2008-CA-002297-OA
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 07-CI-00751
v.
APPELLEE
HONORABLE THOMAS D . WINGATE, JUDGE,
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
AND
MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY, LLC
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
AND
MARATHON OIL CORPORATION
AND
SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, LLC
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This is a matter of right appeal' from an original action in the Court of
Appeals denying the Attorney General's (Appellant herein) petition for a writ of
prohibition. The request for a writ was made by the Appellant after the trial
1 CR 76.36(7).
court ruled that the Attorney General's office must designate "at least one
individual with knowledge of relevant facts to be available for deposition," and
further, directed the Attorney General to complete interrogatories and discovery
in a consumer, products case filed under KRS 367.374 by the Appellant. We
opine that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying said
writ and thus affirm.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, then-Kentucky Governor Ernie
Fletcher, by Executive Order 2005-927 (EO 5-927), declared a state of
emergency in the Commonwealth . The next day, August 31, 2005, Governor
Fletcher signed EO 5-943, which implemented the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act2 dealing with SALES AND RENTALS DURING STATE OF
EMERGENCY, 3 by applying the Act to the sale of gasoline. 4
On May 10, 2007, the Attorney General filed a civil action against the
real parties in interest which alleged that the real parties in interest violated
KRS 367 .374 by excessively charging their consumers for fuel during the
period that the Commonwealth was under a. declared state of emergency which reportedly reaped record incomes for the real parties in interest. The
real parties in interest answered and counterclaimed challenging the
constitutionality of KRS 367.374 and raising a number of affirmative defenses
and arguments in their counterclaims.
KRS 367.110 et seq.
3 KRS 367.372 et seq.
4 Did not include diesel fuel.
2
During discovery, a dispute arose when Marathon served former
Attorney General, now House Speaker Gregory D. Stumbo with a CR 30 .02(6)
notice to take a videotaped deposition about certain matters relating to the
passage and enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act . - The current
Attorney General resisted with a motion to quash . By order entered November
13, 2008, the circuit court ruled that Marathon could not take the former
Attorney General's deposition, but that the Attorney General's office must
designate a representative to be available for deposition, pursuant to CR
30 .02(6) .
The Attorney General filed an original action with the Court of Appeals
seeking a writ of prohibition to prohibit enforcement of that portion of the
November 13 trial court order directing it to designate an individual to be
available for deposition . The Court of Appeals denied the writ after concluding
that the Commonwealth failed to meet the high standard for issuance of a writ
because allowing the deposition to proceed would not result in irreparable
injury or a substantial miscarriage ofjustice . The Court of Appeals opined that
the Commonwealth's desire to protect privileged information could be
accomplished
by objecting during the deposition to questions that
seek such privileged information. Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 30.03(3) states that "[a]ny
objection to evidence during a deposition shall be
stated concisely and in a nonargumentative and
nonsuggestive manner." The Commonwealth can then
seek a protective order pursuant to CR 26 .03 and CR
30.04.
"The writ of mandamus, like the writ of prohibition, is extraordinary in
nature. Such a writ bypasses the regular appellate process and requires
significant interference with the lower courts' administration of justice." 5
"-[T]his Court has articulated a strict standard to- determine whether the remedy
of a writ is available. "6 In Hoskins v.__Maricle, 7 we said
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing
that (1) the lower court is,proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate
court ; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction,
and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury
will result if the petition is not granted.
Even where the request meets this strict standard, the court: in which the
petition is filed may decline to exercise this discretionary power. 8 The standard
of review we must apply when reviewing a denial of a writ of prohibition
depends upon the class or category of the writ.9 When the lower court is
alleged to be acting outside its jurisdiction, the proper standard is de nouo
review because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law. t o When an
appellant alleges the lower court is acting within its jurisdiction, but in error,
the standard is abuse of discretion . l i It was uncontroverted in this case that
5
Cox v . Braden , 266 S .W .3d 792, 795 (Ky . 2008) .
6
7
Id . at 796 .
150 S .W .3d 1, 10 (Ky . 2004) .
8 St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S .W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 1999).
9 Grande Mutual' Insurance Co . v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004).
to Id .
11 Id .
the trial court was acting within its jurisdiction . Therefore, the question before
us is not whether the circuit court has .jurisdiction, but whether the court is
about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, to justify a writ
action, thus our review is, for arrn- abuse- of discretion .
-
- -
. %
We are of the opinion that. the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion in denying the writ. The Court of Appeals determined that this was
not one of those cases where there was no adequate remedy by appeal nor was
it one of those "certain special cases" where the requirement of irreparable
harm can be substituted with a showing that a "substantial miscarriage of
justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously . . .
."12
The
Court correctly noted that the Attorney General could object to a question
under CR 30.03(3) and proceed under CR 26 .03 and CR 30.04 for a protective
order. Under these rules, the Attorney General can move for a ruling by the
trial court before the deponent answers the question (or is relieved from
answering the question on the grounds of privilege). The Civil Rules
themselves provide the Appellant with a remedy before an appeal is necessary.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny
the petition for a writ of prohibition is affirmed .
All sitting. All concur.
12
Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961) (recognizing "certain special cases" where
great and irreparable harm does not have to be shown).
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Tad Thomas
- .Lisa Kathleen Lang
Assistant Attorneys General
Capitol Building, Suite 118
700 Capital Avenue
Frankfort, KY 40601-3449
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Thomas Dawson Wingate
Franklin Circuit Court Judge
Franklin County Courthouse
P.O . Box 678
214 St . Clair Street
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST:
Tanya Yarbrough Bowman
Charles S. Cassis
Peter Matthew Cummins
Frost Brown Todd, LLC
400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor
Louisville, KY 40202-3363
Barry Douglas Hunter
Frost Brown Todd, LLC
250 West Main Street, Suite 2700
Lexington, KY 40507-1749
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