INA COCHRAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2010
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2008-SC-000095-DG
03AT
INA COCHRAN
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO . 2006-CA-001561-MR
CASEY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 06-CR-00003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
This appeal considers whether a woman may be charged with wanton
endangerment of her child based on having ingested illegal drugs while
pregnant . As this Court previously recognized in Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W .2d 280 (Ky. 1993), the General Assembly has expressly precluded such a
prosecution by the Maternal Health Act of 1992 . Therefore, we hold that the
trial court properly dismissed the indictment in this case .
On December 29, 2005, Appellant, Ina Cochran, gave birth to a child
who tested positive (as did Cochran) for cocaine. As a result, Cochran was
indicted for first-degree wanton endangerment,' and for being a second-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO 11) .2 The indictment alleged that Cochran,
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life . . . wantonly engaged in
conduct which created a substantial danger of death
or serious physical injury to [C .C.] (DOB :
12/29/2005) when she ingested cocaine while [C .C .]
was in utero and thereafter gave birth to [C.C .] at such
time as both the Defendant and [C .C .] were positive for
cocaine . . . .
Cochran moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Welch, 864 S .W.2d 280 . The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the
indictment. The Commonwealth appealed . The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's order dismissing the indictment, erroneously concluding that
Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W .3d 654 (Ky. 2004), had, sub silentio,
overruled Welch. This Court granted discretionary review and we reverse the
Court of Appeals . As we previously recognized in Welch, which was not
overruled by Morris, the prosecution of Cochran on the grounds stated in the
indictment has been prohibited by the General Assembly .
The prosecution in this case is basically identical to that which we held
invalid in Welch. The appellant therein, Connie Welch, was arrested in a drug
raid when she was eight months pregnant, and was discovered by police to
have just injected herself with oxycodone . Three weeks later she gave birth.
The child did not test positive for illegal substances, but did suffer symptoms of
drug withdrawal, resulting from having become passively addicted due to
1 KRS 508 .060.
2 KRS 532 .080.
Welch's drug abuse during her pregnancy. Welch was charged with, and
convicted of, second-degree criminal abuse of the child for having used
oxycodone while pregnant. We held that two grounds required reversal of the
conviction - that application of the criminal abuse statutes to prenatal conduct
would render the statutes void for vagueness, and that the General Assembly,
in the Maternal Health Act of 1992, expressly prohibited the prosecution.
First, we recognized that the application of the criminal abuse statutes4
to a woman's conduct during pregnancy, "could have an unlimited scope and
create an indefinite number of new 'crimes' . . . a `slippery slope' whereby the
law could be construed as. covering the full range of a pregnant woman's
behavior - a plainly unconstitutional result that would, among other things,
render the statutes void for vagueness." Welch, 864 S.W .2d at 283 (citation
omitted) . We explained :
The mother was a drug addict. But, for that matter,
she could have been a pregnant alcoholic, causing
fetal alcohol syndrome ; or she could have been
addicted to self abuse by smoking, or by abusing
prescription painkillers, or over-the-counter medicine;
or for that matter she could have been addicted to
3 KRS 508.110, which provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the second degree
when he wantonly abuses another person or permits
another person of whom he has actual custody to be
abused and thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury ; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause him serious
physical injury . . . .
4 KRS 508 . 100, .110, and .120, commonly referred to as the criminal child abuse
statutes . The purpose of these statutes is to criminalize serious physical abuse of
children, twelve years old or less, by a custodial person, although their scope
includes others who are physically or mentally helpless . Welch, 864 S.W .2d at 282 .
downhill skiing or some other sport creating serious
risk of prenatal injury, risk which the mother wantonly
disregarded as a matter of self-indulgence. What if a
pregnant woman drives over the speed limit, or as a
matter of vanity doesn't wear the prescription lenses
she knows she needs to see the dangers of the road?
The defense asks where do we draw the line on selfabuse by a pregnant woman that wantonly exposes to
risk her unborn baby? The Commonwealth replies
that the General Assembly probably intended to draw
the line at conduct that qualifies as criminal, and then
leave it to the prosecutor to decide when such conduct
should be prosecuted as child abuse in addition to the
crime actually committed.
However, it is inflicting intentional or wanton injury
upon the child that makes the conduct criminal under
the child abuse statutes, not the criminality of the
conduct per se. The Commonwealth's approach would
exclude alcohol abuse, however devastating to the
baby in the womb, unless the Commonwealth could
prove an act of drunk driving; but it is the mother's
alcoholism, not the act of driving that causes the fetal
alcohol syndrome .
The "case-by-case" approach
suggested by the Commonwealth is so arbitrary that, if
the criminal child abuse statutes are construed to
support it, the statutes transgress reasonably
identifiable limits; they lack fair notice and violate
constitutional due process limits against statutory
vagueness .
While the appellant in Welch was charged with second-degree criminal
abuse, the identical analysis would apply to a construction of the wanton
endangerment statutes to cover a pregnant woman's conduct. Such a
construction would similarly render the statutes void for vagueness. 5 Id.
5 Cochran was charged with first-degree wanton endangerment, KRS 508.060, which
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the
first degree when, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a substantial
danger of death or serious physical injury to another person ." Second-degree
What Welch found most telling, however, in ascertaining that the
legislature did not intend criminal sanctions for prenatal use of drugs and
alcohol, is the language of the Maternal Health Act of 1992, 1992 Ky. Acts, ch .
442 (H .B . 192) . 864 S .W .2d at 283-84 . The Preamble states the Act's purpose
as follows :
WHEREAS, The General Assembly finds that a
woman's ability to bear healthy children is threatened
by the consequences of alcoholism and drug abuse; as
many as ten percent (10%) of all births in the
Commonwealth may be affected by alcohol or drug
abuse; drug and alcohol use during pregnancy can
result in low birthweight, physical deformities, mental
retardation, learning disabilities, and other health
problems in newborn infants; fetal alcohol syndrome is
the leading identifiable cause of mental retardation in
the nation and the only one that is totally preventable ;
drug and alcohol impaired individuals pose
extraordinary societal costs in terms of the medical,
educational, and support services needed throughout
the individual's lifetime ; education and treatment are
essential strategies in preventing prenatal exposure to
alcohol and other drugs; pregnant substance abusing
women face more barriers to substance abuse
treatment than other persons seeking treatment;
adequate prenatal care is an essential element in
delivering a healthy, well-developed newborn; punitive
actions taken against pregnant alcohol or
substance abusers would create additional
problems, including discouraging these individuals
from seeking the essential prenatal care and
substance abuse treatment necessary to deliver a
healthy newborn; and
WHEREAS, the General Assembly finds it is
necessary to treat the problem of alcohol and drug
use during pregnancy solely as a public health
problem by seeking expanded access to prenatal
care and to alcohol and substance abuse education
and treatment programs[.]
wanton endangerment, KRS 508 .070, requires that a person "wantonly engages in
conduct which creates a substantial danger of physical injury to another person ."
(Emphasis added.)
It is the duty of a reviewing court "to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly ." Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson
County, 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1994) . In Welch, we recognized that the
Maternal Health Act of 1992 made clear that
the General Assembly intends no additional criminal
punishment for the pregnant woman's abuse of alcohol
and drugs apart from the punishment imposed upon
everyone caught committing a crime involving those
substances. Welch's possession of the drugs which she
took is a punishable offense, but her punishment is
not enhanced because she is pregnant, nor is she to be
punished for injurious results to the baby. We would
have to deliberately ignore the legislative purpose and
the legislative approach specified in H.B . 192 to accept
the Commonwealth's present argument that the
General Assembly intended to use the deterrent effect
of the criminal child abuse statutes as an additional
approach to the self-abuse problem.
864 S .W.2d at 284 . Similarly, in the present case, we would have to ignore the
legislative intent clearly expressed in the Maternal Health Act of 1992 to accept
the Commonwealth's position that the penal code permits the prosecution of
Cochran for wanton endangerment of her child based on her use of cocaine
while pregnant . It is the legislature, not the judiciary, that has the power to
designate what is a crime . Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S .W.3d 84, 92 (Ky .
App . 2004) (citing Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S . 419, 424 (1959)) ; see also
Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S .W.3d 570 (Ky. 2001) . The General
Assembly has determined that the conduct alleged in the indictment in this
case does not constitute a crime. Hence, the indictment was invalid on its face,
and the trial court's dismissal thereof was proper . RCr 8.18 ; Peterson v. Shake,
120 S.W.3d 707 (Ky. 2003) ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 709 S .W.2d 838 (Ky.
App . 1986) .
Accordingly, we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate
the dismissal of the indictment by the trial court.
All sitting. Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ .,
concur. Venters, J ., dissents by separate opinion, in which Minton, C .J., joins .
VENTERS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING OPINION: I respectfully dissent. For
two reasons I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
indictment was properly dismissed .
First, the majority wrongly creates an immunity from prosecution never
enacted by the General Assembly . The majority fashioned its notion that the
legislature intended to immunize Appellant from criminal responsibility for
endangering her child from the preamble of the Maternal Health Act of 1992
which states "punitive actions taken against pregnant alcohol or substance
abusers would create additional problems, including discouraging these
individuals from seeking the essential prenatal care and substance abuse
treatment necessary to deliver a healthy newborn ." That section of the
preamble does not relate to the circumstances of this case . The majority
ignores the fact that in this case, no punitive action was taken against
Appellant while she was pregnant. Long before she was indicted, Appellant
had completed all her prenatal care and delivered her baby. Because the
indictment came after her baby was born, it in no way discouraged her from
seeking prenatal care and it in no way deterred her from treatment she might
need to deliver a healthy baby. Thus, the legislative purpose to be gleaned
from the preamble of the bill is in no way furthered by dismissal of Appellant's
indictment .
Had it been the General Assembly's intent and purpose to block
prosecutions in cases such as Appellant's, it surely would have effectuated that
intent by enacting the necessary revisions of the penal code and the controlled
substance statutes, rather than simply hoping that prosecutors and judges
would decipher the supposed purpose from the vague and general language of
a bill's preamble, the part of the bill that never became part of the law. Jasper
v. Commonwealth, 375 S .W.2d 709, 710 (Ky. 1964) ("The preamble is not the
law. It is not necessary for its enactment, nor are its provisions binding.")
Secondly, Kentucky jurisprudence has long acknowledged the strong
doctrine of separation of powers provided in our state Constitution . Sibert v.
Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S .W. 455, 457 (1922) ("Perhaps no state forming a
part of the national government of the United States has a Constitution whose
language more emphatically separates and perpetuates what might be termed
the American tripod form of government than does our Constitution . . . .") We
have long recognized under that doctrine that the judicial branch of
government has no authority to dismiss a valid indictment without the consent
of the executive branch represented by the Commonwealth's Attorney or the
County Attorney.6
The indictment does not charge that Appellant wantonly endangered her
unborn child . The indictment very plainly charges her with endangering her
post-natal, born alive child, which by any definition is a "person." Despite the
fact that the Appellant consumed cocaine just hours or minutes before her
baby's birth, the alleged victim of her conduct was the child ex utero. Nothing
in our penal code bars such a prosecution. By upholding the trial court's
dismissal of an indictment before trial, the majority invades the prosecutorial
powers reserved to the executive branch, and usurps the authority of the
legislature to define what behavior constitutes criminal conduct. I therefore
dissent.
Minton, C .J ., joins.
6 Flynt v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415, 425 (Ky. 2003); Allen v. Walter; 534 S .W.2d
453, 455 (Ky . 1976) . See also Commonwealth v. Cundiff, 149 Ky. 37, 147 S .W. 767,
768 (1912) and Hayden v. Johnson, 489 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ky. 1972) ("There is no
authority for the use of summary judgment procedure in a criminal prosecution.") ;
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 153 Ky. 34, 154 S.W. 399, 400 (1913) (" [the trial court] is
without power to dismiss a sufficient indictment without a trial of the defendant, when
such dismissal is objected to by the commonwealth's attorney") .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Jamesa J . Drake
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS ; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION ; AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE; BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD
CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY INSTITUTE OF BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER ;
CAROL STANGE, MSSW ; CHILD WELFARE ORGANIZING PROJECT; FRAN
BELVIN, CPAT; KENTUCKY COALITION FOR WOMEN'S SUBSTANCE ABUSE
SERVICES ; KENTUCKY PSYCHIATRIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; LAW
STUDENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE; LYNN POSZE, MA, LPCC; NANCY
DAY, PHD ; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN WOMEN'S FORUM ;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS ; NATIONAL COALITION FOR
CHILD PROTECTION REFORM; NATIONAL PERINATAL ASSOCIATION ;
NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER ; OUR BODIES OURSELVES ;
PATHWAYS, INC . ; PEOPLE ADVOCATING RECOVERY ; SISTERSONG WOMEN
OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COLLECTIVE ; STEPHANIE S .
COVINGTON, PHD, LCSW; SUSAN BARRON, PHD; SUSAN BOYD, PHD ; THE
DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE ; THE HEALING PLACE WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S
COMMUNITY :
Allison G. Harris
Shearman & Sterling LLP
599 Lexington Ave .
New York, NY 10022
Tiloma Jayasinghe
Lynn M . Paltrow
Kathrine D . Jack
National Advocates For Pregnant Women
15 W. 36th St., Ste. 901
New York, NY 10018
Michael L. Goodwin
600 W . Main St ., Ste . 100
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE LEGAL MOMENTUM AND NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER :
Sheryl G . Snyder
Amy D. Cubbage
Frost Brown & Todd LLC
400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor
Louisville, KY 40202-3363
Jill C. Morrison
National Women's Law Center
11 Dupont Circle, NW Suite 800
Washington, DC 20036
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE ANTI-SEXISM COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD; CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ;
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC ; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SEXUALITY AND GENDER LAW CLINIC ; CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
CLINIC AT RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW - NEWARK; CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CLINIC AT HOFSTRA LAW SCHOOL ; INTERNATIONAL MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW REFORM PROJECT IN THE JUSTICE ACTION CENTER AT NEW YORK
LAW SCHOOL; INTERNATIONAL REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL HEALTH LAW
PROGRAMME AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO; JAMIE O'CONNELL
(UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC) ; JUSTICE NOW; LEITNER
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 8s JUSTICE AT FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL;
MINDY JANE ROSEMAN (HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRAM) ; SOUTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER :
Caroline Bettinger-Lopez
Columbia Law School
435 W. 116th Street, Box G-3
New York, NY 10027
Michael Jay O'Hara
O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan 8v Sergent
25 Town Center Boulevard, Suite 201
P. 0. Box 17411
Covington, KY 41017
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT ; AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY :
David Alan Friedman
325 W. Main St., Ste . 150
Louisville, KY 40202
William Ellis Sharp
ACLU of Kentucky
315 Guthrie St., Ste . 300
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ADDICTION
PSYCHIATRY ; ANNA C. MASTROIANNI, JD, MPH ; BRYAN HILLIARD, PHD; C .
RONALD KOONS, MD, FACP; CAVIN P. LEEMAN, PHD; DAVID MAGNUS, PHD ;
DONALD BRUNNQUELL, PHD, LP; ELAIANE MORGAN, MD ; GLENN MCGEE,
PHD; GLOBAL LAWYERS AND PHYSICIANS ; GREGORY LOEBEN, PHD ; HILDE
LINDEMANN, PHD; HOWARD BRODY, MD, PHD ; HOWARD MINKOFF, MD ;
INMACULADA DE MELO-MARTIN, PHD, MS ; JEFFREY KAHN, PHD, MPH;
JUDITH BERNSTEIN, RNC, PHD ; KATHERINE A. TAYLOR, JD, PHD ; LAUREN
G . MCALILEY, MSN, MA, CNP; LOIS SHEPARD, JD ; MARY FAITH MARSHALL,
PHD ; PETER J. COHEN, MD, JD ; REBECCA BIGONEY, MD; REV. TIMONTHY
A. THORSTENSON ; ROBERT A. DEWEESE, MD, MA; ROSAMOND RHODES,
PHD ; STEPHEN S . HANSON, PHD ; SUSAN K. PALMER, MD ; TIMOTHY F.
MURPHY, PHD :
Forrest Roberts
1844 Griffith Ave .
Owensboro, KY 42301
Lawrence J . Nelson
Law Offices of Lawrence J. Nelson
99 Banks St.
San Francisco, CA 94110
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